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ABSTRACT 
THE UNION OF DEMETER WITH ZEUS: 
AGRICULTURE AND POLITICS IN MODERN SYRIA 
by 
JAMES LONG WHITAKER 
`The Union of Demeter with Zeus: Agriculture and Politics in 
Modern Syria' is a study of the interplay between agriculture and 
politics in the French Mandated territories of the Levant between 1920 
and 1940. This era saw the first attempts at a planned and systematic 
modernisation of rural production. The Mandatary was the driving 
force behind the changes, but its goal was as much to enhance its own 
dominance as to improve the lives of those in its charge. 
In exploring the links between agriculture and politics in Syria 
during the Mandate, two relationships are of primary importance. The 
first was that between France and Syria, one in which France sought to 
promote rural regeneration through expansion of the production of 
certain important primary products and extension of the cultivated area 
by means of irrigation. Whilst impressive achievements, such 
programmes were limited by the inability of French officials to 
understand the other primary relationship between the individual 
peasant, his community, and society at large. This was embodied in 
musha ,a form of landholding and a system of cultivation. Enamoured 
by the ideal of the smallholder capitalist, the French sought to 
undermine the village community whilst failing to curb the excesses of 
the great landowners. Their activities stymied rural progress, but the 
Mandatary needed their support to maintain its hold over the 
countryside. 
In its conclusion, this work draws together strands linking 
capitalism and agriculture; community and society; systems of 
knowledge, systems of power, and webs of expectation. These 
themes, taken as a whole, had enormous influence on rural 
development under the Mandate. 
PREFACE 
The writing of this study of the interplay of politics and 
agriculture in modern Syria has taken a long time, and has been fraught 
with difficulty. In composing it, I have been aware of my own 
limitations, but throughout have sought to follow the precepts of the 
great savant Jean Itard, guardian of Victor, the `Wild Boy of I'Aveyron', 
and pioneer in the study of deafness and the education of deaf mutes. 
Like Itard, I have become convinced whilst pursuing my research, 
`qu'on n'est savant que par /'experience, lucide que par le doute, 
intelligent que par /'acceptation des limites du savoir acquis'. 
To Syrian and French readers, I wish to affirm that I have sought 
not to criticise, but to understand the complex, often tortuous, 
relationship between two countries, both of which I hold in affection. 
Finally, let me say that whilst composing this work, I have kept in 
mind the injunction which my first supervisor, Professor Manfred 
Halpern at Princeton, long ago, instilled in all of his students, to wit: 
that each should strive to make every piece of research a model of 
clarity and thought. 
I can only hope that you, the reader, will find that I have achieved 
this goal. 
J. L. Whitaker 
Durham, 
August, 1996 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, in his introduction to Syria and Lebanon: A 
Political Essay (Oxford University Press, 1946), Albert Hourani noted 
that one of the problems facing the Arab World at that time was that of 
how the Arab countries would react to the fundamental changes 
caused by the spread of Western influence since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Would they do so in a negative way, borrowing 
Western technology in order to resist the encroachments of the 
Western states and the Western spirit or would they seek to 
reconstruct their society by assimilating, but not necessarily imitating, 
the best elements in Western life? 
He noted further that Syria and Lebanon could serve as 
mediators of Western civilisation to the Arab East because of their 
geographical situation, their traditions and certain characteristics of 
their inhabitants. Therefore he felt it particularly important to examine 
the problem of Westernisation in Syria and Lebanon in order to clarify 
the conditions necessary for a unity and balance between traditional 
and new elements in the lives of their people and between them and the 
Western peoples with whom they are in such close contact. ' 
<----Fig. 1. Syria and Lebanon, 1945. Source. Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria 
and Lebanon under French Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 
1958. ). 
1 Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: 
University Press, 1946), 1-2. 
A Political Essay (London: Oxford 
The questions he posed were and are interesting and valid ones. 
The work presented here attempts to examine them through the lens of 
the relationship between agriculture and politics in the French 
Mandated territories of the Levant between 1920 and 1940. Its focus is 
on agriculture because during this period, agriculture was one of the 
mainsprings of economy and society in the region. The era of the 
French Mandate saw the first attempt at a planned and systematic 
modernization of the processes of rural production. The Mandatary 
was the driving force behind the changes, but its goal was as much to 
enhance its own dominance as to improve the lives of those in its 
charge. 
In examining the evolution of Syrian agriculture during the 
Mandate, the introduction and Chapter I lay the foundation for this 
study. The INTRODUCTION will first define the meaning of the word Syria 
as used here and then will look at some of the geographical and 
oecological parameters of agriculture in that country. Next will come a 
discussion of the background to Mandate in the late Ottoman period 
focusing on agricultural expansion, agrarian relations, and the results 
of the insertion of Syria into the world economy from the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Then the concepts of Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft developed by Ferdinand Tönnies will be introduced in 
order to facilitate understanding of the development of Syrian society. 
Finally there will be a discussion of the great famine which devastated 
Syria during the First World War. 
n 
CHAPTER I will explore the character of French involvement in Syria 
and the Ottoman Empire as a whole before the First World War, and 
show how the strategies and methods used to pursue these interests 
mirrored those used to exploit the French Empire. This analysis will 
then examine the relationship between France and Syria in the years 
immediately after the Great War, a time in which France saw Syria as a 
potential source of primary agricultural products which were needed to 
supply the requirements of French industry. The ideas of one man, 
Edouard Achard, are of particular importance because his proposals 
for rural regeneration continued to shape agricultural policy in one way 
or another throughout the Mandate period. 
The next three chapters examine in turn the three components of 
Achard's approach: CHAPTER II will analyse the all-important subject of 
agrarian relations during the Mandate. This will centre around the 
fundamental role played by nusha`tenure, a form of landholding and a 
system of cultivation, which underpinned the rural village community. 
CHAPTER III will look at the expansion of production by examining policies 
towards wheat, silk, and cotton. CHAPTER IV will investigate the use of 
irrigation to extend the cultivated area, focusing on the various French 
projects to develop the Orontes, the river which the experts of that era 
believed to be the most useful for cultivation. 
Finally, the CONCLUSION will discuss briefly three aspects of the 
development of agriculture under the Mandate. The first is the impact 
of French capitalism on rural Syria, and the manner in which it paved 
0 
the way for the emergence of a vigorous local capitalism. The second 
is the relationship between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, between 
the organic community and the administratively created one. The third 
is the interplay of systems of knowledge, systems of power, and webs 
of expectation: For the way in which the French perceived Syria had a 
great effect on their methods of administration whilst the manner in 
which Syrians perceived France had an equally great effect on the way 
in which they reacted to this tutelage. 
*** 
Introd. 1>A definition of Syria and a geographical description 
The name `Syria' can have several meanings2 : 
1>Geographical Syria in the larger sense, that region 
known as `Bilad al-Sham' to the Arabs; `La Syrie 
integrale' or the `Levant' to French imperialists; and 
`Suriya al-kubra' or Greater Syria to Pan-Syrian 
nationalists. It comprises all that land from the 
Taurus to the Sinai, west of the Euphrates, and 
includes from north to south: the Turkish province of 
Hatay (known during the Mandate as the 
autonomous sanjaq of Alexandretta), those portions 
of the Syrian Arab Republic west of the Euphrates, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine/Israel. 
2>MandatorY Syria, that region awarded to France as a 
Mandate under the League of Nations by Allied 
Powers meeting at the Conference of San Remo in 
April, 1920, and confirmed by the League in July, 
1922. These were officially known as the French 
Mandated States in the Levant (Les Etats du Levant 
sous Mandat fiangais) and often called simply the 
`Levant' or `Syria'. These territories included the 
northern part of geographical Syria--Alexandretta, 
Syria, and Lebanon as well as part of the area east of 
the Euphrates called the Jazira. 
2 For a definition of the term `Syria', see Ibid., 4-5. 
A 
3>the state of Syria, one of the four states into which 
the French divided the Mandate. Between 1925 and 1936, these were the State of Syria, the Lebanese 
Republic, the States of Jabal Druz and of the 
Alaouites (after 1930, renamed, the Governments of 
Jabal Druz and of Latakia). After 1936, and the 
signing of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, the two 
Governments were merged into what was now 
known as the Syrian Republic. 
4>Independent Syria which is the Syrian Republic of 
1936 minus the sanjaq of Alexandretta which 
became formally part of Turkey in June, 1939. 
In discussing agriculture in the Mandated territories, `Syria' will 
be used in the second sense. Nevertheless because the focus will be 
on the dry-farmed agriculture of the plains, there will be little reference 
to the different regime of cultivation practised in the mountains of 
Lebanon and the Jabal Ansayria, with the exception of silk production. 
Moreover, the Biqa' valley will be treated as part of agricultural Syria 
because its inhabitants follow the same system of land tenure and 
cultivation even though this region has been united politically to 
Lebanon since 1920. Similarly some reference will be made to the 
`Amuq plain as part of the valley of the Orontes. 
Before exploring the links between society, polity and agriculture 
in Syria, one must examine the constraints imposed by geography and 
climate because if they do not determine the nature of cultivation and 
policies affecting it, they do have a great influence upon them. 3 
Geographical Syria contained within it a large slice of the justly 
3 For the geography of Syria, see 1>Jacques Weulersse, Paysans de Syrie et du 
Poche-Orient (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1946), 17-53; 2>W. C. Brice, A 
Systematic Regional Geography, VIII. - South-west Asia (London: University of 
London Press Ltd., 1966), 200-16; 229-36. 
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celebrated `Fertile Crescent' which according to the American 
Orientalist James Henry Breasted was that part of the world where 
civilisation first began. Nevertheless this crescent, like that of the 
moon, has waxed and waned over time, influenced not by shifts in the 
tides, but by those in climate and the affairs of men. 
The section of the Fertile Crescent belonging to independent 
Syria is divided into two quite unequal slices: On the one hand, there is 
a narrow, continuously verdant zone comprising some 1.9 million 
hectares which is slightly more than 10% of Syrian territory; on the 
other, a `transitional' belt of some 5.8 million hectares, a bit more than 
30% of Syria, which links the cultivable area with the true desert. The 
arid regions make up the remainder, approximately 60% of the land 
area or 10.8 million hectares. 4 
The only truly fertile part of the `Fertile Crescent' is that region 
which receives more than 500 mm of rainfall annually because of its 
position west of the chain of mountains stretching from Mt Hermon in 
the south to the Taurus in the north. Here relief forms a series of more 
or less parallel features: First a narrow strip along the Mediterranean 
coast followed by the mountain chains of the Lebanon and the Jabal 
Between pages 6 and 7: Fig. 2. (lef) Syria and Lebanon: Rainfall: yearly 
average over a period of several normal years. 
Fig. 3. (right) Syria and Lebanon: Mean rainfall of the three dry years, 1958, 
1959, and 1960. 
Source: Eugen Wirth, Syrien: Eine geographische Landeskunde (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), Maps 3 and 4, between 92-93. 
4 Nazim Moussly, Le Probleme de /'eau en Syrie (Lyon: Imprimerie BOSC Freres, 
1951), 15-17. The figures for area are taken from the table on 17. Note that to 
this, one must add the some 1,000,000 hectares comprising Lebanon, of which 
slightly more than half are exploitable. 
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Ansayria to its north; then the two rift valleys, the Biqa' and the Ghab; 
and finally the mountains of the Anti-Lebanon and the hills of the Jabal 
Zawiya beyond them to the north. These conditions of rainfall are 
replicated in the small sliver of territory belonging to the Syrian state in 
the far northeast along the Tigris. This so-called `Bec de Canard' or 
`Duck's Bill' lies in the shadow of the mountains of Kurdistan. 
The mountainous part of this region--Lebanon and the Jabal 
Ansayria--which contains some 350,000 hectares or 2% of the whole 
receives more than 1000 mm of rain per annum. Although steep ridges 
and rocky soils prevent this water from being used to best advantage, 
the run-off serves to enrich the plains and valleys below. Moreover, the 
fact that some of these mountains have snow above 1200 metres for 
many months of the year enables them to act as a sort of reservoir for 
other regions not so blessed. 
This area particularly favours the growth of orchards producing 
olives, apricots, and pistachios as well as tobacco. The tobacco grown 
is either a pungent variety which is exported for the flavouring of 
cigarettes or another type called tombac used in the water pipe. At one 
time, though more in the Lebanon than in the regions to the north, large 
stands of mulberry trees were planted for the breeding of silkworms. 
Nevertheless the dominant feature of the Fertile Crescent is not 
this relatively small, well-watered region where cultivation is no 
problem, but its neighbour to the east and south, the large transitional 
7 
zone which serves as a passage to the steppe and desert beyond. 5 
This region of great interior plains is the most important area of Syrian 
agriculture because here are harvested the wheat and barley which are 
the staple food crops of the Levant. It is this great tract of land that 
gave Syria its reputation for agricultural fecundity in the eyes of French 
authors who described it as the `granary of Rome'. Yet this was in 
many ways a false estimate, not so much because of the amount 
produced, but because of a certain inconsistency in its production. 
These cereal-growing districts lie on the other side of the 
mountains which in large part block the rain-bearing winds. Therefore 
they are watered by only 200-400 mm of rainfall per annum. 
Nevertheless they are far more blessed with rain than the desert on 
their southern rim because the Jabal Ansayria and the Jabal Zawiya are 
lower in height than are the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon chains. 
Moreover, these mountains are more broken in their structures with 
several avenues into the interior: the `Noms gap'(the plains of `Akkar 
and Buqaya); the corridor of the Nahr al-Kabir al-Shimali at Latakia; and 
the trench formed by the valley of the lower Orontes. Although the rain- 
bearing winds can follow these pathways, they deposit water to an 
ever-diminishing degree the further east they move. 
Until comparatively recently the peasants dwelling on the plains 
grew their grain under a system of `dry farming', i. e. without the benefit 
5 For the concept of the transitional zone and its role in Syrian history, see 
1>Norman N. Lewis, `The frontier of settlement in Syria, 1800-1950, ' International 
Affairs (London), XXXI, 1, January, 1955,48-60; 2>/dem, Nomads and Settlers in 
Syria and Jordan, 1800-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
passim. 
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of irrigation. Of course over the millennia, the cultivator developed 
certain means of bringing groundwater and river water to his fields: 
The digging of shallow wells and the tunnelling of kilometres-long 
qanats or foggaras into aquifers were supplemented by such primitive 
lifting devices as the saqia ('Archimedes screw') and the na `ura (noria, 
a giant wooden water wheel), both propelled by animal power. These 
were limited in what they could achieve, but since more elaborate 
methods of irrigation were beyond their means, the peasants perforce 
had to place their chief reliance on rainfall. 
This region was also the place where two worlds met, two worlds 
which existed in uneasy balance with one another because they often 
competed for the same stock of scarce resources: that of the village- 
dwelling peasant and the wandering herdsman. Nevertheless the 
conflict over scarce resources of land and water was only one aspect of 
their relationship. More often, there was the mutual dependence of two 
complementary ways of life linked by trade and intermarriage. In 
periods of agricultural prosperity, settled life became more attractive, 
and nomads began to abandon their encampments for the plough. This 
was a long, drawn-out process with differing degrees of 
sedentarisation, and should the time of plenty end, the trend reversed 
itself. 
The transitional zone merges in the south with the steppe and the 
desert where lies the home of the true nomad. This vast region receives 
less than 250 mm of rainfall each year because the mountains on its 
western flank, the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges are of a height 
9 
sufficient to prevent rain-bearing winds reaching this area from the 
Mediterranean. 
The distribution of precipitation is reinforced by the peculiar 
nature of the climatic regime with its alternation of extremes of wet and 
6 dry. Syria, which in latitude(32/33°-37/38°) lies between the temperate 
and tropic zones, has what geographers call a `Mediterranean' climate. 
This gives it, in effect, only two seasons per year: a wet winter from 
November through April and a brutally hot and dry summer from May 
through October. It is this intense rainy period which compensates for 
the six arid months which follow it. 
The problem is that the circulation of high and low pressure 
systems which cause this pattern is not as immutable as in northwest 
Europe. In Syria, one can be generally sure of rain only during the 
months of November, December, and January, but sometimes even this 
fails to come. If the low pressure systems pass to the north of the 
Mediterranean, the Levant is left with dry, sunny winters followed by 
drought, crop failure, and destitution. 
Introd. 2>Background to Mandate--expansion of cultivation in the late ottoman 
period 
When the French came to Syria in 1920, agriculture was still 
under the overwhelming influence of these vagaries of climate which 
fluctuated over space and time. Nevertheless, after long years of 
6 For climate, see 1>Weulersse, 21-34; 2>Moussly, 17-28; 3>Louis Dubertret and 
Jacques Weulersse, Manuel de Geographie: Syrie, Liban et Proche Orient, 
premiere partie: La Peninsule Arabique (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1940), 
32-40. 
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stagnation, certain trends had been gathering momentum for nearly a 
century. These trends would eventually lead, not of course to the 
alteration of immutable patterns of rainfall, but to the transformation of 
particular conditions of society and polity which would enable the 
Syrian peasant better to work round them. The most significant 
occurrence was the extension of the cultivated zone eastward into 
areas which had not been worked for many centuries. Several 
interrelated factors stimulated this expansion: the improvement of 
security conditions in the countryside; an increase in population; the 
revival of Syria as a supplier of raw materials for the world market; and 
the beginnings of a change in the inextricably linked systems of land 
tenure and taxation. 
A sine qua non for agricultural expansion was desert security. 
With the coming of the Tanzimat, the Ottoman reform movement which 
started in the 1840's, more efficient administrations sent increasing 
numbers of better-armed troops into the countryside. These 
expeditions were able to make real headway against nomad 
depredations which had slowly driven the line of cultivation west of the 
road linking Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. One of the principal 
results of this pacification was the founding (and often re-founding) of 
villages ever deeper within the transitional zone between the rainfed 
areas and the true desert. 
Increased security after the tumultuous Egyptian interlude of the 
1830's brought a growth in population from perhaps 1.5 million or more 
in 1840 to 2.5 million in 1878; to 3.1 million in 1895/96; and to 4.5 million 
11 
in 1914.7 This addition to the number of mouths to be fed must have 
augmented the need for basic foodstuffs, thus giving further impetus 
for an increase in the area of dry farmed cereals. 
Another stimulus to agricultural expansion was the intermittent, 
but generally continuing insertion of Syria into the world economy in the 
course of the nineteenth century. During certain periods, agricultural 
products were grown, not just for local use, but for shipment abroad, 
either to other parts of the Ottoman Empire or to Europe and even to 
the United States. One can divide these exports into two categories: 
food crops and industrial crops. 
Grain, the primary food crop, was sent in large quantities to 
Europe during the boom in the cereals market in the middle years of the 
century. With the coming of large quantities of American and Russian 
grain to Europe in the late 1870's, Syrian grain was gradually squeezed 
out. What is particularly interesting is the fact that even with the 
growth of population, and the problematic nature of the Syrian harvest, 
the Syrian peasant had sufficient grain to export. It is obvious that a 
surplus was being produced, and the incentive for surplus was the 
chance for profit under current market conditions.. The profit motive 
was certainly what impelled the middlemen who were well aware of the 
possibilities abroad, but the fact that a desire for gain penetrated the 
7 This is the population of geographical Syria which includes Lebanon, Palestine, 
and the districts east of the river Jordan. For these extremely gross estimates 
and the comments and warnings which they produce, see 1>Justin McCarthy, 
`The population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq, 1878-1914, ' Asian and African 
Studies, XV, 1, March, 1981,3-44; and the comments made on them by 2>Charles 
Issawi (ed. ), The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914: A Documentary Economic History 
[FCDEHJ(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 15-16. 
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interior, even to the most isolated village, says something for the links 
being forged with the outside world. 8 
The industrial crops were another matter entirely. These, 
principally silk, and to a lesser degree, tobacco, licorice root, and 
cotton had long been grown in geographical Syria. They did not 
compete with the food crops because they were planted in the well- 
watered regions of western Syria, the coastal, mountain or upland 
regions where it was difficult to grow grain. These were specialty 
crops, and those who raised them did not participate in the expansion 
of the cornlands. Nevertheless, they are interesting if only because they 
demonstrate the possibilities of diversification and the risks of 
specialisation. 
Silk and cotton were the most important of the industrial crops 
because during both the Ottoman and Mandate periods, they clearly 
illustrated the impact of foreign capital on agricultural patterns in Syria 
for both good and ill. Silk presents the classic case of a single crop tied 
to a single market. Although silk had been cultivated as an export crop 
in parts of the Lebanon for centuries, it was only in the 1840's that 
Lyonnais capitalists began to take a financial interest in the rearing of 
silkworms in Mount Lebanon for the mills of their native city. This 
demand stimulated the production of silk with a quality of international 
8 For the grain trade during this period, and comments about the sensitivity of 
the peasant to the currents of the world market, see Linda Schatkowski 
Schilcher, `The grain economy of late Ottoman Syria and the issue of large-scale 
commercialisation, ' in caglar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds. ), Landholding and 
Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East(Albany, N. Y.: State University of New 
York Press, 1991), 173-195. 
13 
standard. Because the silk industry was in a sense `enclosed' in that 
the product was grown in the mutasarriflyya of Jabal Lubnan which was 
administratively separate from the neighbouring Ottoman vilayets after 
1861; and because its exports and outlook were tied to that single 
external market, its undoubted success had little effect on the economy 
of Syria as a whole. Nevertheless, the fact that it was dominated by 
entrepreneurs representing a single market ensured that it was 
protected from the competition of silk emanating from the Far East 
which outstripped it in quantity if not in quality. Moreover silk 
production served as a salutary example of both the rewards and the 
risks of monoculture. 9 
In contrast, cotton during the late Ottoman period was a crop 
whose potential was still to be realised. It had been grown in Syria and 
neighbouring areas of the Levant since the Middle Ages where it was 
used for local textile handicrafts. In addition, Syria was one of the main 
sources of supply for the cotton mills of Italy, France, and England, 
industries which had originally developed in order to process Levant 
cotton. Nevertheless, by the middle eighteenth century, European mills 
were gradually turning away from Levantine cotton towards cheaper 
and better sources of supply in the West Indies and later in the United 
States. 1° 
9 For the rise and decline of silk production and the French interest in it, see 
Chap. III infra. 
10 Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in 
the Eighteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1967), 27,28-29,173. 
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Although there was an increase in production under the rule of 
the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha in the 1830's and during the American Civil 
War when all sources of supply were needed, short staple Syrian cotton 
could in no way compete in the international arena with American, 
Indian, or Egyptian varieties. Its only market was a local one, and 
cotton production lost its raison d'etre when the Syrian handicraft 
industry collapsed in the 1840's before the onslaught of cheaper and 
better cotton goods from Lancashire. When this industry revived in the 
1870's, craftsmen were so seduced by the quality of Indian, Egyptian, 
and American cotton that they never returned to the local product. " 
Even within the Ottoman Empire, the cotton of Cilicia was 
considered far superior to that of Syria. When the Germans made an 
effort at the beginning of the twentieth century to invest in cotton 
cultivation, efforts which were ultimately unsuccessful, their activities 
focused on the plains of Cilicia rather than those of Syria. 12 
In examining the courses followed by silk and cotton over more 
than a century, one observes how the decline of the former mirrors the 
rise of the latter. The fact that silk was a specialty crop grown for a 
11 For cotton in the Syria during the nineteenth century, see 1>Roger Owen, The 
Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
1981), 172-73; 2>lssawi (ed. ), FCDEH, 276-77; and 307-08: `Cotton in Aleppo 
region, 1864': Excerpt from `Report on Aleppo Cotton', 9 June 1864, France, 
Correspondance commerciale [CC] (Alep), vol. 33,1863-66. This report 
illustrates the problems inherent in the marketing of Syrian cotton abroad, 
problems which were to recur often during the next eighty years: `Badly cleaned. 
.. a large amount of 
fragments of pods .... a result of poor methods and bad tools 
employed. Attempts have been made to introduce. . . machines used in Europe; 
but whether because people here did not know how to work them or whether. . 
. they are not suited 
to local cotton varieties, they were unsuccessful. ' 
12 For a discussion of German investments in cotton production in Cilicia, see 
Chap. I infra. 
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particular market enabled it to flourish. Nevertheless when fashion 
changed and an economic crisis ruined the financial structure which 
had nurtured silk production, this production rapidly collapsed. 
By contrast, there was little international demand for Syrian 
cotton during the late Ottoman period because the quality of the fibre 
produced was neither high nor consistent. During the Mandate period, 
foreign capital made great efforts to introduce varieties with more 
desirable attributes. As did silk, cotton suffered a body blow when the 
French firms which promoted it foundered during the economic crisis of 
the nineteen thirties. Nonetheless their collapse did not stymie the 
growth of cotton production, for its potential was so great that local 
entrepreneurs were willing and able to fill the gap. 
Intro d. 3>Background to Mandate--agrarian relations in the late ottoman period 
If agricultural expansion was encouraged by improved security, 
population growth, and the opportunity to supply primary products for 
the world market, it was also facilitated by a change in the inextricably 
linked systems of land tenure and taxation. Tenurial relations between 
the one who possesses the land and the one who works it affect not 
only how much the cultivator produces, but also how this `revenue' is 
apportioned between producer, landlord, and government. 
In Syria there were different categories of land determined by the 
nature of ownership (raqaba), consonant with the system prevalent in 
the lands of Islam and which were set out in the Ottoman Land Code of 
16 
7 Ramadan 1274/21 April 1858.13 
divided into five categories: 
According to the Code, land was 
1 >/IIU/kor private freehold property 
2>a/SW 8fifte or Ill!! for short, public land whose 
raqaba belonged to the state, acting as trustee for 
the community of Believers. Those who controlled or 
worked this land, whether absentee landlords or their peasants merely had the right of usufruct 
(tasarrui over it. 
3>wVa41, mortmain dedicated to the maintenance of a 
charitable or religious institution. 
4>malr! /ka, land reserved for public use, and 
consisting of roads, threshing floors and the like. 
5>fawaI land unowned and unclaimed by any 
person. 
Of these land categories, the two most important were mu/k and 
mini. Mu/k was taxable and confined largely to urban and village 
property (houses and other buildings); the orchards and gardens 
surrounding villages; and land held in certain specific geographical 
regions such as Lebanon with extensive planted areas and a large 
Christ ian population. 14 In the 1940's, Paul Klat who did research on 
13 The Ottoman Land law of 1858 is set out in 1>Aristarchi Bey (Gregoire) (tr. ), 
Legislation ottomane ou Recuei/ des lois, reg/ements, traites, capitulations et 
autres documents de L'Empire ottomane, I (Constantinople [Istanbul]: Imprimerie 
Freres Nicolaides, 1872), 57-170; 2>George Young, Corps de Droit ottoman: 
Recueil des Codes. Lois, Reglements, Ordonnances et Actes les plus importants 
du Droit Interieur, et d'Etudes sur la Droit Coutumier de /'Empire Ottoman 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), VI, 45-83; 3>For a commentary, see W. Padel 
and L. Steeg, De la legislation fonciere ottomane (Paris: A. Pedone, Editeur, 
1904), passim. 
14 As non-Muslims, Christians had the freehold of lands granted them by the 
Islamic state on conditon that they paid tribute (kharaj) on it. Although there was 
a formal distinction made in the Land Code (Arts. 2.3 and 2.4) between mulk 
kharajiya and mulk 'ushriya (land which the Islamic state gave to the victorious 
Muslims on condition that they paid the tithe [ `ushr] which was assessed at a 
much lower rate than the kharaa), in fact this distinction no longer had much 
significance in late Ottoman times. 
17 
land tenure during the Second World War for the Middle East Supply 
Centre, noted that in the Syrian Republic, mu/k covered only 1,250 sq. 
km. out of a total area of 185,680 sq. km. (. 7%) and a total occupied 
area of nearly 80,000 sq. km. (1.6%), most of which was concentrated in 
and around cities. 15 
Mini comprised the overwhelming proportion of lands within the 
Ottoman Empire. It consisted of agricultural land outside villages and 
urban areas, which in Syria was for the most part cereal-producing. 
Klat found mini to occupy some 40,000 sq. km., 21 % of the total, 50% of 
occupied land, and 73% of agricultural land (which he defined as 
occupied land less matruka land). 16 
A special category of `state' land not listed in the Land Code was 
what in Syria was called Sultaniya land. These lands were the private 
property of the Sultan, and were amassed for the most part by the 
rapacious `Abd al-Hamid II in the late nineteenth century. In Syria, they 
were to be found largely in Salamiya qada' east of Hama and in the 
eastern and southeastern portions of Aleppo vilayet along the 
Euphrates. After the deposition of the Sultan in 1908, the Ottoman 
government confiscated these lands from him. Henceforth they were 
treated as State Domain, and continued to be so treated during the 
Mandate period. 
Waqf was mulk which had been `given to God', for some 
charitable purpose, usually to support mosques or other religious 
15 Figures extrapolated from Paul J. Klat, `The origins of landownership in Syria, ' 
Middle East Economic Papers [MEEP], 1958,64 and Table. 
16 Loc. cit 
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buildings. It was not taxable and was administered by trustees. In 
Syria, a fairly large, but indeterminate amount of agricultural land was 
wag. 17 
What was important for the Ottomans as for their predecessors 
was the revenue produced by the lands within the empire, whether this 
took the form of men or money. In Syria this in effect meant revenue 
derived from miri land which composed the bulk of the agricultural 
wheat-producing lands of the interior. The type of `income' squeezed 
from these lands gradually changed over time. In the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries when the Ottoman state was young, it had a need 
for a continuous supply of cavalry levies rather than for cold cash. 
Therefore the state made land grants to its cavalrymen (sipahis) with 
the proviso that they would use the proceeds derived from the 
exploitation of their holdings to equip units for military service. These 
grants were called timars, and the state did not lose control of them 
since they could be revoked at any time. Moreover, the grantee was 
responsible for the burdensome task of management. 
With passage of time, the Ottomans found themselves faced with 
a static empire, a professional army equipped with firearms, and an 
increasing administrative burden. As a result, they had less need for 
untrained cavalrymen and more for taxes, a state of affairs aggravated 
by the inflation of the late sixteenth century. To compound the problem, 
17 For waqf in Ottoman Syria, see `Abd al-Karim Rafeq, `Land tenure problems 
and their social impact in Syria around the middle of the nineteenth century, ' in 
Tarif Khalidi (ed. ), Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East 
(Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), 378-81. 
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the central government in Istanbul became powerless to collect the 
money itself in its more distant provinces. Therefore a number of 
money-raising expedients were tried in order to refashion the timar 
system into one which would suit the changing needs of the Ottoman 
state. This involved making use of a new kind of middlemen whose only 
interest in his land was to collect the taxes due, remitting part of them 
to the Ottoman authorities whilst keeping the rest for himself. By the 
nineteenth century, two principal vehicles had evolved as a means of 
garnering revenue for the government. 
First were those large estates outside village boundaries which 
were leased to an individual, usually an urban or rural notable or a 
government official, who collected the taxes due. The lessees of these 
sift/iks or mazra`as paid annual rent to the state for the use of this 
property, and it could be passed down the generations so long as the 
annual fee was paid. They held the tasarruf over the land, but did not 
cultivate it themselves. Rather they sublet it to the peasants of the 
neighbouring villages who did so. 
Second were those larger pieces of land which were auctioned to 
individuals for several years as `tax farms' (i/tizam or in Syria, 
mugata`a) with the proviso that they maintain it in cultivation. In this 
case, a local man received the right to collect income from it during the 
period of his allocation, part of which he turned over to the government 
whilst retaining the rest as his fee. As one can imagine, the result was 
that the tax farmer or mu/tazim sought to squeeze as much as possible 
as quickly as possible from the peasants under his control before his 
20 
lease was up. Sometimes one piece of land might be divided into tax 
farms by different individuals who in turn might sublet part of their 
holdings as tax farms to others. The ultimate refinement was the 
allotment of tax farms for life (ma/ikane) which the holder could pass on 
to his descendants. 
It should not surprise us that the system of tax farming in its 
various forms developed widely in Syria from the end of the sixteenth 
century, for Syria was one of the places where the central Ottoman 
government had the least control. Nevertheless one cannot posit from 
this the creation of vast latifundia ruled by avaricious and brutal 
landlords, for reality was considerably more nuanced. For one thing, 
the balance of power between mu/tazim and peasant did not 
necessarily shift in favour of the former. Indeed there is some evidence 
that village solidarity expressed in communal landholding systems 
(musha' was proof against exactions of the tax collector who often had 
trouble raising the sums due him. Moreover there was no unilinear 
progression from timar to iltizam to malikane because these 
arrangements tended to co-exist in different configurations depending 
on local conditions. The only thing one can say with assurance is that 
by the middle of the nineteenth century, the timars had practically 
disappeared in Syria. 18 
18 For these different categories of tax farm in Syria, see Rafeq in Khalidi, 374- 
78. For another discussion of the relationship between timar, iltizam, and 
ma/ikane, See Haim Gerber, The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East 
(London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987), 51-56. Note that Gerber must be 
used with the knowledge that his theories tend to be generalisations based on 
examples taken principally from Anatolia and Palestine. 
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In any case, the line drawn between timars and iltizams held as 
malikane on one hand, and mulk property on the other was by this time 
a very fine one. Legally, of course, the distinction was still in force. Yet 
in reality, so long as the leaseholder paid his dues to the government 
and saw to the continuous tilling of his estates, he could do with them 
practically anything he chose. 
In Syria, this uneasy equilibrium between the Ottoman authorities 
who needed revenue, the tax farmers who collected it, and the peasant 
communities who supplied it crumbled during the nineteenth century. 
The increase in the effectiveness of the central government led to the 
enactment of a series of measures so designed as to make taxgathering 
both more efficient and more remunerative. These produced a change 
in the way men of influence now controlled the countryside. The 
position of the notable, whether urban speculator or tribal shaykh, was 
enhanced and he was now better able to increase his holdings. To a 
certain degree, his desire to do so was a sign that the Syrian notable 
saw agriculture as an area of profitable expansion. Such an attitude 
was primed by increased security in rural districts and the growth of a 
grain export market in the 1860's and 1870's. After the collapse of this 
market in the late eighteen seventies, the slack was taken up by the 
growth of urban agglomerations such as Damascus and Beirut with 
their appetite for fruit and other specialty crops. The coming of 
railroads to Syria in the eighteen nineties, facilitated the shipment of 
perishable agricultural products to heretofore `distant' urban markets. 
Nevertheless the undoubted attraction of profit must not blind us to the 
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fact that for the notable, a far greater incentive was the fact that the 
more villages he was able to bring under his control, the more he was 
able to dominate the countryside. To do so strengthened his influence 
in relations with his peers whilst increasing his revenues through 
manipulation and control of peasant debt. 
The principal act which enhanced the ability of the notable to 
increase his holdings was the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. This code 
was an attempt to bring some order into the confusing and overlapping 
tax jurisdictions coterminous with the land tenure system whilst 
asserting the raqaba of the state. Nevertheless it was more a 
recognition that certain processes were taking place rather than the 
creation of new circumstances. The ultimate aim of course was to 
increase tax receipts. Therefore the code dealt mostly with niri land 
(Arts. 8-90), although it did confirm owners in their possession of those 
allodial estates which had been separated from the state domain over 
the preceding centuries (Art. 2). 19 
The goal of this land code was to ensure that each person who 
had rights over state land should have in his possession a certificate of 
title (sened tapu) which he would receive directly from the state his 
landlord. The abolition of the taxing powers of those who mediated 
between the state and the peasant, and the assertion of the rights of the 
19 For the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, see 1>Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk- 
Sluglett, `The application of the 1858 Land Code in Greater Syria: Some 
preliminary observations, ' in Khalidi (ed. ), 409-21; 2>Klat, `The origins ., ' 59- 
61; 3>G. Baer, 'The evolution of private landownership in Egypt and the Fertile 
Crescent, ' in Charles Issawi (ed. ), The Economic History of the Middle East and 
North Africa, 1800-1914: A Book of Readings [EHME] (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), 83-85. 
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former was an attempt to ensure that the Porte ultimately would receive 
more money. 
Like many reforms of the Tanzimat, the 1858 Land Code was only 
partially successful in its application. The land registration which 
underpinned its reforms proved difficult to carry out in practice. Even 
after the creation of a Defterkhane or Land Registry Office, it proved 
impossible to institute a proper cadastral survey since there were few 
Ottoman officials with the training to do so. As a result, land 
registration proved very inaccurate: Inefficiency and bureaucratic 
confusion ensured that the boundaries of lands enrolled were not 
clearly delineated which meant that sharp operators often could sell the 
rights to the same piece of land many times over. 
As for the notable, he could now obtain definite confirmation of 
his rights to property which heretofore had been clouded by the welter 
of tenurial types and jurisdictions. Among the tribes where there was a 
long tradition of communal grazing rights, lands came to be registered 
in the name of the tribal shaykh who thus suddenly became a great 
landowner. Many of the poor peasants and beduin saw the new code as 
a pretext by means of which an impersonal and distant government 
could register them for military service whilst extracting more revenue. 
Therefore they were more than happy to have their lands placed under 
the name of a familiar local notable or shaykh who would `protect' them 
from such exactions. 
Since tax collection was now considerably more regularised, the 
process leading to rural debt accelerated as peasants borrowed from 
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the local notable in order to meet the annual demands of the publican. 
This inevitably brought the alienation of peasant rights in favour of the 
rich as the great landlord foreclosed on those who were unable to meet 
their debts to him. 
The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 and laws elaborating it which 
were passed until 1914 brought increased revenue to the central 
government whilst impoverishing the peasant and degrading his social 
status. Moreover it confirmed the landholding rights of wealthy urban 
notables and tribal shaykhs. This completed their transformation from 
seigneurs into proprietors, i. e. from men who held land in their function 
as agents of government to those who did so as a private possession 
complete with title, even though this property remained miri land and so 
was still technically owned by the state. Their relationship with the 
peasants on the land changed also. Previously their rights over the 
peasants were those of taxation, public rights which higher authority 
had granted them. With the creation of the system of sened tapu, 
certificates of title to land, the notable changed from a government 
agent into a mere landlord. Although he was still liable for tax, his 
relations with those who worked his land were now the private ones of 
owner and tenant. 20 
20 For these definitions, see Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural 
Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), 81-83,86-87. 
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Introd. 4>Background to Mandate-agrarian revolt in the late ottoman period 
The strains resulting from the insertion of Syria in the world 
economy during the second half of the nineteenth century led to 
outbreaks of peasant revolt centred in southern Syria, the region which 
had been most closely tied to Europe through its participation in the 
grain trade. These revolts were different from much of the rural 
violence in the Levant in the nineteenth century in that they did not arise 
from tensions between different religious communities (mi/lets), but 
rather from frustrations of peasants oppressed by their lords and 
impoverished by the fluctuations of an international economy over 
which they had no control. 
Previous upheavals had tended to take the form of inter- 
communal strife. For example, sporadic revolts had occurred early in 
the nineteenth century, particularly among and between the `Alawis 
and Isma`ilis of the Jabal Ansayria and the Ottoman government. 
21 
Then there was the turmoil occasioned by strife in Mount Lebanon in 
the late 1850's which had its origins in the changing balance of power 
between Druze and Maronites co-existing uneasily in the mountains. 
This civil war reached its climax by the massacre of Christians in 
Damascus during the month of July, 1860, a bloodbath which brought 
the intervention of a French expeditionary force with the sanction of the 
Great Powers. In this case, perceived hardships occasioned by the 
reforms of the Tanzimat and the insertion of Syria into the European 
21 For comments about this, see, Lewis, Nomads and Settlers..., 58-61. 
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economy had aggravated a series of conflicts which had been 
polarising Muslims, Druzes, and Christians, over some forty years. The 
fact that the supposedly `inferior' Christian communities had become 
more prosperous due to their better ability to participate in markets 
dominated by Europeans generated resentment among other 
communities who were not so blessed. The conflict between them was 
then primarily a clash of rich and poor, exacerbated by the fact that the 
`rich' happened to be Christian. 22 
The sustained series of peasant rebellions which occurred in the 
Hawran and Jabal Druz (a region also known as the Jabal Hawran) from 
the beginning of the 1860's to the end of the 1890's were different in 
that they produced an alliance across lines of religious community with 
Christians, Druze, and Muslims; peasants, hillmen, and beduin opposed 
to Damascene notables and the Ottoman authorities and their troops. 23 
The cultivators of the Hawran reacted vigorously against what 
they perceived to be their exploitation by a heterogeneous and ever- 
shifting alliance of central government officials, European commercial 
interests, and urban notables, aided and abetted by certain local 
leaders. These groups had introduced the Hawran to the world grain 
22 For the civil war of 1860, its causes and consequences, see Leila Tarazi 
Fawaz, An Occasion for War., Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 
(London: I. B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1996), passim. 
23 For the commercialisation of agriculture in the Hawran and the events whch 
sprang from it, see the series of articles by Linda Schatkowski Schilcher: 1>`The 
grain economy ..., ' 173-95; 
2>'The Hawran conflicts of the 1860's: A chapter in 
the rural history of modern Syria, ' International Journal of Middle East Studies 
[/JMES], XIII, 1981,159-79; 3>'Violence in rural Syria in the 1880s and 1890s: 
State centralizaton, rural integration, and the world market' in Farhad Kazemi 
and John Waterbury (eds. ), Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East 
(Miami, Fla: Florida International University Press, 1991), 50-84. 
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market during the 1860's whilst seeking its re-integration with the 
Ottoman Empire which they hoped would bring an increase in the tax 
revenue supplied. As a result, the inhabitants of this particular region 
experienced extraordinary prosperity followed by extraordinary 
suffering when that economy collapsed starting in the late 1870's. 
Reductions in profit and revenue led the largely urban-based combine 
to pressure its rural suppliers for more product. Moreover the Ottoman 
government began to make concerted efforts to assert its authority in 
the Hawran by sending punitive expeditions and stationing troops in the 
region. These troops had to be supplied and paid, and the onset of the 
depression impelled the authorities to seek new sources of revenue to 
fill their depleted coffers by attempting to farm the taxes more 
efficiently. As the economic crisis bit deep, notables refused to bid for 
the right to collect taxes because there was no profit in it for 
themselves. The government, desperate for funds, either tried the 
expedient of direct taxation or pressured local leaders to farm their 
own villages. In addition, it employed gendarmes to extract further 
contributions from unwilling peasants. 
The different elements within the Hawran--Druze from the Jabal 
Druz; beduin tribes; Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic Christian 
villagers; and Sunni Muslim villagers formed an ever shifting 
kaleidoscope of alliance and opposition, depending on the 
circumstances. These people lived a marginal existence even during 
the best of times, and as the crisis worsened could sacrifice no more. 
Their only possible answer was violent opposition to further exactions. 
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In 1890, this produced an episode of `radical populism' in which 
peasants from all communities united in revolt against their leaders, 
seeking a more equable apportionment of the tax assessed and 
demanding that they not be taxed directly by the government. These 
protests culminated in April, 1890 with the proclamation of a commune 
(`ammiya) by Druze and some Christian peasants. Their programme 
included the election of their own shaykhs and a division of the harvest 
which would allot the peasants three quarters of it. This was not a 
revolt against the Ottoman government per se because the peasants 
were careful to proclaim their loyalty, offering to pay their taxes, and 
even proposing that an ethnic Turk be made governor of the Hawran 
instead of a prominent notable or local shaykh. 
Rather than taking advantage of this opportunity to split the 
peasants from their leaders, the Ottomans chose to send troops into 
the Jabal Druz to crush the rebellion. Moreover they sought to register 
the lands in the Hawran starting in 1892 in order to privatise cultivation 
and establish direct control over it. Finally, the railway, often 
threatened, was pushed through the Hawran between 1892 and 1894. 
The opening of the railway led to the disintegration of the urban 
combine as Hawrani grain flooded the market and sent prices plunging. 
This situation was exacerbated by the crash in the financial markets of 
both London and Paris in 1895 which gave Syrian investors a twenty 
million franc loss. In the Hawran, the final collapse of the grain market 
led to a catastrophic reduction in tax revenue and forced peasants to 
abandon cultivation altogether. 
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The Ottomans now tried to impose direct taxation on the 
peasants, and sent armies sweeping through the Hawran. The 
peasants, particularly the Druze, resisted heroically, and finally in 1897, 
there was a general uprising of peasants from all communities against 
the exactions of the government. 
Finally the government relented and abandoned direct taxation, 
and in 1900, the Sultan proclaimed a general amnesty. Although the 
Ottoman apparatus was ultimately able to triumph because of superior 
resources, good will was never re-established between the rural 
inhabitants of the region and the officials and notables from Damascus. 
The events in the Hawran in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century highlight two salient characteristics of agriculture during the 
Ottoman period. The first was the appearance of Syria as a supplier of 
grain to the world market in the eighteen sixties. A world grain 
shortage and high prices brought prosperity not only to grain 
merchants and notables based in Damascus, but penetrated deep into 
the countryside to the peasant producer of the Hawran, the principal 
source of cereals. Unfortunately the insertion of Syria into the world 
economy meant that she became exposed to its fluctuations. The 
collapse of the grain market in the late eighteen seventies ushered in a 
period of economic crisis and social dislocation for the peasant 
communities of southern Syria. 
It was the existence of strong peasant communities particularly 
in southern Syria that was the second characteristic of agriculture in 
the Ottoman period. Like so much of rural Syria, the Hawran was in a 
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frontier zone where cultivation was difficult because of the erratic 
rainfall, and where a melange of peasants and beduin lived side by side 
in an uneasy relationship of conflict and co-operation. As a result of 
these circumstances, a system of cultivation grew up in which the 
members of the village community as co-holders of village lands 
allotted shares in their patrimony on the basis of what each production 
unit could contribute in terms of manpower and/or capital-- in this case 
plough teams. Moreover to ensure absolute equality, each member had 
rights to a certain portion of village land rather than control over any 
specific piece of property within it. To reinforce this principle, the lots 
were changed periodically, and each rightholder was given parcels of 
the different types of agricultural land worked by his community. 
Nevertheless if cultivation was strictly by individual production units, 
nonetheless these units were subject to communal disciplines of 
ploughing and harvesting, and confined their crops to cereals. 24 
This `musha° tenure, so typical of the Hawran, created strong 
communal bonds among the peasants, and in the economic crisis of the 
eighteen eighties and nineties, the peasants, driven to desperation, 
united in revolt against those who exploited them. This did not occur 
just at the level of the individual village community or even at that of 
neighbouring communities working together, but at the level of the 
entire `community' of countryfolk oppressed by notables, merchants, 
and the Ottoman government. The interests of this wider union 
24 For an extensive discussion of this form of tenure, see Chapter II infra. 
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transcended the separate interests of its members who as Druzes, 
Beduin, Christians, or Muslims usually went their separate ways or 
could even be in conflict. 
The issues raised by the insertion of Syria into the world market 
and the effects this had on the peasant communities of the Syrian 
interior did not end in the late Ottoman period, but arose again during 
the French Mandate, but in somewhat altered form. In order to 
understand this more clearly, it might prove useful to examine certain 
concepts developed by Ferdinand Tönnies to explain social change. 
Introd. 5>Theoretical interlude--Gemeinscban and Gesellschaft in a Syrian 
context 
Tbnnies distinguishes between two `normal' or ideal types of 
social organisation, the Gemeinschaft (community) and the 
25 Gesellschaft (association). He points out that the rural village 
community is an `outstanding example' of a Gemeinschafflike structure. 
It is so because it is bound together by kinship, either real or fictitious; 
neighbourhood--the fact of living together; common agricultural 
disciplines; the holding of common property; willing obedience to the 
25 1>Ferdinand T6nnies, `The nature of sociology, ' [`Das Wesen der Soziologie'], 
paper read before the Gehe Foundation, Dresden, 1907 in Werner J. Cahnman 
and Rudolf J. Heberle (eds. and trs. ), Ferdinand Toennies on Sociology, Pure, 
Applied, and Empirical (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1971), 99-106; 2>/dem, `Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft' in Alfred Vierkandt 
(ed. ), Handwörterbuch der Soziologie (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1931), 
Part Five of Ferdinand T6nnies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft), Charles P. Loomis, ed. and tr., (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 
250-59. 
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decisions of a common leader--all permeated by the two principles of 
fellowship and authority. 
Gemeinschafflike organisations evolve as the original bases of 
their union change. Tönnies believes that this progression is natural, 
one which occurs during the process of evolution towards modern life. 
The change is marked by the rise of individualism. Whereas previously, 
persons might have worked co-operatively together, now they do so on 
the basis of exchange founded on impersonal contracts. Such 
collectives are economic, indeed capitalistic, in character. Unlike a 
Gemeinschafflike structure which carries its purpose within itself, this 
new type of association is animated by an external purpose which is 
rational, the means to achieve an end. 
Tönnies believes that the state usually exemplifies this 
Gese//schafflike structure. Although ideally its own citizens might see it 
as the family writ large, a natural whole composed of its members and 
dependants, in reality its Gemeinschafflike qualities tend to be 
subordinated to the `decisive criterion' of the economic relationship 
between the whole and its parts, i. e. ownership rights. Usually, the 
state is created by capitalistic and middle class, largely urban groups 
in order to protect persons and property and nourish the status and 
honour of its supporters, The state claims to represent all the people, 
rich and poor, but in so doing, it merely emphasises the gap 
between 
those who control it and the mass of the people below. 
Tönnies thinks that political and intellectual organisations 
eventually develop within cities with the aim of closing what 
has 
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become a yawning chasm between rich and poor. Through the 
activities of these groups, the `consciousness' of the Gesellschaft 
becomes the consciousness of the mass of the people rather than of 
just a few. The result is that the people increasingly identify with the 
state, and see it as the weapon which they can use to better their 
condition, crushing the monopoly of wealth which is held by the few, 
and winning a share of the output for themselves. Now each person 
receives what is necessary for a comfortable life, and property for 
communal use is held in common by the Gesellschaft, i. e. by the people 
or their association, the state. 
Tönnies remarks on the effect which application of such policies 
would have on the nature of the state. In his opinion, a state which 
follows this course, a course which he calls `socialism', can no longer 
be considered a Gese//chaft, but will become a community, a true 
Gemeinschaft. The problem is whether it is possible for the modern 
state to transform itself into such a community or whether it will remain 
an association based on individualism and the cash nexus. 
Although the progression from Gemeinschafflike structures to 
Gese//schaMike structures, appears to be a linear one, Tönnies 
emphasises that it may be possible for the former to remain even whilst 
the latter develops. He believes this would occur if the whole or the 
commonwealth, although no longer similar to a natural union in form, 
still wishes to maintain a common spirit. He asserts that it is religion 
which nourishes this communal spirit, and which hallows the 
commonwealth. Yet perhaps something else can also nurture this 
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spirit: the bonds of the past, of family and neighbourhood along with 
those stemming from a common life and common burdens. 
One might say that the peasant communities of the plains of inner 
Syria were typical Gemeinschafflike social formations. The 
characteristics of such entities were reinforced in the Syrian case by 
the existence of musha`tenure and the common agricultural disciplines 
associated with it. 
According to Tönnies, the replacement of organisations founded 
on communal co-operation by those based on impersonal exchange and 
individual action leads to the attenuation of the spirit of Gemeinschaft 
and its transformation into one of Gesellschaft. During late Ottoman 
times, the insertion of Syria into the world market did not destroy the 
spirit of Gemeinschaft among the villages of the Hawran. On the 
contrary, the introduction to the market strengthened this spirit by 
uniting those who might otherwise have been in conflict. 
The reason for this was that introduction to the market created 
an impersonal exchange relationship between two parties which 
heretofore had either been in relations of dependency or had little to do 
with one another. The cultivators of the Hawran were merely reacting 
vigorously against what they perceived to be exploitation by a 
heterogeneous and ever-shifting alliance of Ottoman officials, 
European commercial interests, and urban merchant-notables, aided 
and abetted by certain local leaders. For example, in calling for the 
restoration of sharecropping agreements with their shaykhs to replace 
direct government taxation, the peasants were rejecting the principle of 
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impersonal exchange so typical of Gesellschaft, and calling for a 
restoration of the Gemeinschafflike structures which had served them 
so well in the past. 
Tönnies believes that the state is the exemplar of a 
Gese//schafflike structure although ideally its own citizens should find it 
imbued with the spirit of Gemeinschaft. The events in the Hawran 
during the last decade of the nineteenth century certainly damaged the 
legitimacy of the Ottoman state in the eyes of the cultivators. This claim 
was further tested and found wanting by the great famine which 
disrupted rural structures during the First World War. An Ottoman 
government which was unable to prevent greedy cartels of speculators 
from enriching themselves at the expense of hundreds of thousands of 
their compatriots could hardly retain Syrian loyalties which now 
switched definitively to the more promising horse of Arabism. 
Introd. 6>The Great War and the last years of ottoman rule 
Between 1915 and the end of 1918, some 500,000 out of a 
population of some 4.5 million souls living in geographical Syria died 
from starvation or those diseases which sprang from it. 26 A famine was 
not expected at the beginning of the World War in 1914 because there 
were adequate grain supplies from the recent harvest and Syrians 
presumed that it would still be possible to import foodstuffs from the 
26 For this famine, see Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, `The famine of 1915-1918 in 
greater Syria' in John P. Spagnolo (ed. ), Problems of the Modern Middle East in 
Historical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani (Reading: Ithaca 
Press, 1992), 229-258. The casualty figure is given on 229. 
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area east of Suez. Nevertheless high prices and shortages began to 
affect the civilian population from the second half of 1915, and the crisis 
only worsened as hostilities progressed. That mass starvation did 
occur was due to a number of factors combined: 
1>The stifling of all imports by the Allied blockade of the Levantine coast. 
2>Meagre harvests due to inadequate rainfall. 
3>Ottoman inefficiency and inadequate planning. 
4>The heartlessness of German military officials 
stationed in Syria. 
5>The Arab Revolt which led the authorities to divert 
grain supplies from Syria in order buy the loyalty of 
southern beduin tribes. 
6>Prohibitive grain prices due to speculators who 
cornered the market in order to make fortunes at the 
expense of their compatriots. 
7>Methodical hoarding on the part of the general 
population. 
The blockade of the Entente Powers along the Syrian coasts 
throughout the period of hostilities prevented imports of grain from 
overseas to supplement local resources when these ran short. A 
normal harvest gave Syria self-sufficiency, but during the War, it was 
necessary to provide nourishment to other groups deemed more 
important for raisons d'etat before feeding civilians. The sectors of the 
population given priority were the huge Ottoman army mobilised in 
Syria during the conflict; the inhabitants of the two Holy Cities of Mecca 
and Medina; southern beduin to keep them from joining the Arab Revolt; 
German units which came to be stationed in Syria after 1917; Ottoman 
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officials and supporters and their families. The grain required to supply 
these extra mouths in the absence of imports had to come from what 
was in essence a supply that could not be readily increased, and which 
in all likelihood would produce a deficit. These deficits did appear, not 
only because of the usual weather problems, but also due to the 
requisitioning of labour and draft animals normally used in agriculture 
to aid in the war effort. 
Therefore the Ottomans resorted to extraordinary measures in 
order to extract Syrian grain from its producers. First, they ordered 
that the `ushr, the annual tithe of 10%, be paid in kind rather than in 
specie, but when the gendarmerie came to collect it, they found little to 
be had at the meagre prices they were offering. Pressure on the 
peasants to sell, only led them to conceal their harvests, and gave them 
little incentive to plant for the following season. 
Moreover the grain that did reach the markets in Aleppo, 
Damascus, and Beirut was largely cornered by speculators, eager to 
make a killing, and indifferent to the suffering their tactics might cause. 
The government sought to counter these tactics by forming syndicates 
of its own to buy grain and re-sell it to the populace at reasonable 
prices, but most of these combines failed. They offered too low a price 
to draw custom, and if they paid a higher rate, they could not sell to 
bakers at a more moderate one and still meet their expenses. 
The coastal areas, Mount Lebanon, and northern Palestine, 
districts which had always been forced to import grain from the interior 
or buy it abroad, suffered particularly during the crisis. Since such 
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transactions were now impossible, the luckless inhabitants found 
themselves at the mercy of smugglers and black marketeers who 
supplied little grain at exorbitant prices. The result was starvation: 
Probably more than 200,000 died in northern Lebanon alone. 27 
As the war progressed, government efforts at organising supply 
continued to prove ineffectual. Although the Ottomans made the entire 
Syrian region a single supply zone, grain purchases and distribution 
were left to private entrepreneurs who followed official guidelines as to 
quantities to be bought and profits to be earned. The results were 
predictable: Government sponsored syndicates could hardly compete 
on the open market with private entrepreneurs who offered, not 
increasingly worthless Ottoman paper currency, but sound gold coins. 
Even the threat of confiscation made to anyone who refused to accept 
the scrip could not dampen the desire for gold. 
As a result of this failure of supply, the Ottoman authorities made 
food the currency of political loyalty. They gave priority to selected 
civilian groups in allotting scarce victuals: public institutions, Ottoman 
officials and their kin, and the families of serving military personnel-- 
with the rest of the civilian population left to scrounge or starve. 
This attempt to squeeze grain from ever more reluctant 
producers to feed a restricted bunch of Ottoman loyalists caused the 
prices of the grain available to make a stratospheric leap. It also 
27 Loc. cit. 
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increased the price of gold which was now the only acceptable medium 
of exchange. 
By 1917, the results were catastrophic, and even the creation of 
a Public Food Service (L `asha `ummumiya) in Damascus whose task 
was to give food relief to the poorest inhabitants of the city was quite 
inadequate. Poor weather and unrest in the countryside, not unrelated 
to the progress of the Arab Revolt, reduced the harvest of 1917. This 
brought even harsher methods to obtain grain using the army as 
bludgeon. 
The stationing of large numbers of German troops in Syria 
starting in 1917 proved an added calamity as food had to be found for 
them. The Germans refused to interfere in what they saw as a 
catastrophic, but hopeless supply situation, although they did appeal 
for a supply of hard currency to purchase food for military needs. 
As Ottoman authority slowly collapsed, Druze shaykhs who now 
controlled the grain of the Hawran found it politically expedient to sell 
their supplies to the Arab rebels and their British allies. The Ottomans 
sought to make deals with speculators whereby they would be given 
free rein if they would supply grain to the Ottoman army, but the 
speculators simply refused to keep their word, secure in the knowledge 
that the Ottomans were now incapable of making reprisals. 
Moreover local authorities began to do a curious thing: The rains 
in the winter of 1917-18 were heavy which meant that there would be a 
plentiful yield come the spring, barring unseen calamity. Nevertheless 
these officials deliberately underestimated the size of the crop to be 
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reaped in their districts whilst finding many more civilian mouths to 
feed. With civilian quotas set so high, it was quite easy for them to 
retain the grain from their own districts at harvest time rather than 
delivering it to military depots. Perhaps local administrations took such 
actions in order to profiteer. Yet one could give equal weight to the 
possibility that this was done in answer to pressure from their 
constituents, anxious about their own welfare and no longer having 
confidence in or fear of the representatives of Istanbul. 
There was one final paroxysm of hoarding during the summer of 
1918 as speculators strove to make a final killing before the collapse of 
the Ottomans brought an end to the war and the restoration of normal 
conditions of trade. The creation of an Imperial Food Council and the 
first Ministry of Food in the summer of 1918 came too late to act 
effectively. 
The Entente blockade was not lifted until October when British 
and French troops landed along the coast, and for the first time in four 
long years, food supplies could be landed from abroad. The French 
bought grain in Damascus to help feed the coastal areas, and accepted 
the offer of a Japanese company based in Egypt to supply grain for 
Syria from the Far East. This proposal was deemed particularly 
advantageous because Mediterranean sources could then be used to 
supply France itself. 1919 saw a poor harvest and the French 
purchased grain from other parts of the Mediterranean to feed their 
military forces in the Levant rather than seeking to burden Syrian 
producers. The free market in grain was not restored in Lebanon until 
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the end of 1921 with the closure of the Bureau de Ravitaillement, and 
the French refused to intervene in the beginning of 1922 when Beirut 
millers pleaded for a policy of protection to block foreign imports. To 
this appeal, the French retorted, perhaps quite rightly, that the Beirut 
grain merchants were far more interested in turning a quick profit for 
themselves than they were in the welfare of Syria's slowly recovering 
agriculture. 
When one looks at this unhappy culmination to four centuries of 
Ottoman rule in Syria, certain continuities with the events of the Hawran 
not so many years before become apparent. In each case, outside 
forces played a prominent part in shaping local economic trends. 
Moreover, the Ottoman authorities were unable and perhaps unwilling, 
even in time of war, to control combines of urban notables whose 
manipulation of the market proved so detrimental to other sectors of 
the population. 
Local and regional networks of patrons and clients 
functioned to provide food for the starving, however little this turned 
out to be. Perhaps there were links between speculators, landowners 
(or speculator/landowners), and the peasant and between urban 
notables and their local clients which alleviated some of the misery. 
Smugglers could only operate with the connivance of local civilians, 
military authorities, and officials more sensitive to the needs of their 
friends and relatives than to those of the state they ostensibly served. 
The events of the last year of the war when local leaders upheld the 
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requirements of their clients over the demands of the Ottoman war 
machine seem to argue for the reassertion of parochial allegiances. 
Nevertheless Syrian networks could only provide relief to a 
limited degree because much of the responsibility for the situation in 
which they found themselves lay in the hands of those outside the 
Syrian arena. One of the prime causes of the famine was the blockade 
of the Levant coastline by the navies of the Allied Powers right up until 
the end of the war. This prevented any food entering from abroad to 
compensate for local shortages, and ensured that the coastal regions 
suffered much hardship. Moreover it was the Arab Revolt which forced 
the Ottomans to divert wheat from Syria to feed southern beduin tribes 
and the population of the two Holy Cities. Yet in the end, it was the 
success of this same `national' rebellion which provided a new pole of 
legitimacy to attract the allegiance of Syrian Arabs now finally 
disillusioned with Ottoman and Turkish rule. 
The horrors of the famine struck at the very legitimacy of the 
Ottoman government and its officials. The failure of the government to 
curb speculation and inflation was bad enough, but when it made food 
the currency to reward political loyalty, the allegiance of the victims 
shifted elsewhere. 
This shift was made possible because the opening of the Arab 
Revolt in the spring of 1916 presented another option, at first quite 
insubstantial, but one which became ever more viable as time went on. 
The presence of strong contingents of Ottoman and German forces in 
Syria itself prevented the outbreak of any insurrection there. 
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Nonetheless tidings of the rebellion gave concrete focus to the idea of 
Arabism which had been evolving slowly in the non-Turkish provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire since the late 19th century. 
Faisal's Arab Kingdom, created from a portion of the ruins of 
Ottoman Syria, was a product of this new legitimacy, although it must 
be said that if all Syrians wanted self-rule, not all of them wanted 
Hashimite rule. Because the new regime inherited a legacy of famine, 
destitution, and internal unrest, it proved too weak to outface the 
French, eager to claim Syria for themselves as spoils of war. Therefore 
it was France under the leadership of High Commissioner [HC] General 
Henri Gouraud, not the Syrian nationalists, who replaced the Ottomans 
in the Grand Serail in Beirut--and France had its own priorities for the 
agriculture of Syria. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE MANDATE--I: 
FRENCH THEORY AND SYRIAN REALITY 
It was during the French administration of Syria between 1920 
and 1945 that agriculture first became subject to a programme of 
systematic amelioration. This is not to say that there had been no 
improvements previously. It is simply that during this period, specific 
policies were adumbrated and carried out with the object of 
regenerating agriculture from the nadir to which it had descended at 
the end of the Great War. 
This period was also the first in which a European power had 
become politically responsible for shaping Syrian destinies. Moreover 
this power accepted the charge, at least in theory, as a representative 
of the international community embodied in the League of Nations 
rather than as a colonial ruler. In other words, theory had it that Syria 
was not to be exploited for the benefit of the foreigner, but to be guided 
by the foreigner towards independence and self-sufficiency. 
The European power which put itself forward as best suited to act as 
tutor for Syria was France. Her motives were hardly disinterested 
since she had long been involved in the affairs of what she termed the 
`Levant', as protector of (Christian) minorities; as purveyor and pioneer 
of education; and in the quarter century preceding the Great War, as 
economic entrepreneur. The horrors and the destruction occasioned 
by that war impelled her towards a policy of autarky in preparation for 
any future conflict. As a result she cast around for sources of raw 
materials within her colonial empire and elsewhere. 
France saw Syria as one such source, and this made her even 
more eager to obtain a mandate. Nevertheless these same horrors and 
the colossal task of domestic reconstruction they had engendered 
made her wary of incurring new and potentially expensive foreign 
obligations. A powerful segment of French opinion was decidedly not 
`partant pour /a Syrie', particularly when it seemed that the very 
occupation of this country in face of a surging Syrian nationalism might 
be fraught with difficulties. As a result, France entered upon her Syrian 
venture with a degree of ambivalence which could not be masked by 
the euphoria of extreme members of the colonial party and other 
members of the Syrian lobby. French ambivalence toward intervention 
into Syrian affairs was reinforced by a deep scepticism as to the value 
of the resources to be found in that country, and whether these could 
ever be exploited to their full potential. These doubts dogged those 
who were responsible for administering this charge, and had a 
profound effect on their abilities to devise and pursue coherent policies 
towards agriculture in all its various aspects. 
Therefore with the coming of the French to Syria, another and 
quite different era began. The familiar, laisser faire Ottoman 
administration and its inexperienced Sharifian successors were slowly 
replaced by a cumbrous, layered bureaucratic apparatus whose 
primary mission seemed to be control rather than execution. Moreover 
France had its own agenda based on its past relationship with the 
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Levant which conflicted in many ways with Syrian aspirations as these 
emerged from the crucible of the Great War. Nevertheless this agenda 
could not be fully realised because Wilsonian ideals, much at variance 
with the cynical practices of the old diplomacy, forced the victors to 
cloak their ambitions under the guise of a tutelage supervised by the 
newly created League of Nations. 
*** 
1.1>France and the ottoman Empire--culture and Catholicism 
In the period immediately before the First World War, when 
European Powers decided it was time to stake their claims to the lands 
of what appeared to be a moribund Ottoman Empire, France sought 
Syria as her special sphere of influence and control. She did so 
because of the long historical association which she had enjoyed with 
those lands on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. This 
connexion had led to the elaboration of certain interests set atop the 
twin pillars of religion and economy. 
The association founded upon religion and the culture which 
flowed from it was the stream which had the longest course. 
Enthusiastic French publicists liked to trace French influence back to 
<----Fig. 4. The French Mandated states in the Levant, showing boundaries as 
of 1930-36, roads, railways, and agencies of the Banque de Syrie et du 
[Grand] Liban. Source: Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Archives 
Diplomatiques-Nantes. 
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the Crusades, St Louis, or even to Charlemagne. More modest, but still 
impressive assertions dated her link to the Levant to a series of 
capitulatory agreements made with the Ottoman Empire starting in the 
sixteenth century. These granted her a protectorate over all European 
Catholic Christians which over time was extended to local Uniates as 
well. 
French cultural and religious influence increased by leaps and 
bounds after her intervention in Lebanon during the massacres of 1860. 
Schools run by French religious orders, many banned from teaching in 
the metropole itself, were viewed as effective purveyors of French 
culture and French political influence, even by radical, laicist politicians 
of the Third Republic, who were happy to accord these agents certain 
fiscal subventions. 1 Yet the clientele created by these schools came 
largely from a narrow segment of the population: Of those educated 
within them, only 6.5% were Muslims whilst 44.4% were either Latin 
Catholics or Uniates; 22% Greek Orthodox or Gregorian Armenians; 
and 26.8% Jewish. 2 Thus those most touched by French influence were 
not members of the leading status groups in Syrian society, but those 
who by virtue of their religion held an inferior position in a Muslim- 
I cf. the `profound' statement of Leon Gambetta, 'A cardinal and some 
missionaries render greater service than an army corps. ' He had said this in 
relation to the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, but one could apply 
such sentiments to the Levant with equal relevance. For this, see Chambre 
de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon [C. C. I. L. ], Fonds Musees-- Tissus CCIL 
93c 1*1, Dossier «7», [Syrie]Documents divers, 1918 ä 1924: Conseil 
superieur de la guerre, section frangaise, 1 ere section: Levant, `La politique 
francaise dans le Levant, ' Versailles, 27 November 1918,5. 
2 For these percentages, see Jacques Thobie, Ali et les 40 vo/eurs: 
imperialismes et moyen-orient de 1914,1 nos fours (Paris: Editions Messidor, 
1985), Table on 27. 
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dominated polity. These were also those to whom France turned when 
she sought Syrian interlocutors, and they distorted her image of Syria. 
Yet the traditional prestige which France enjoyed among her 
Christian clientele was besmirched by the outbreak of laicist zeal 
during the ministry of Emile Combes (1901-05) which culminated in the 
rupture of diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1904 and the 
complete separation of Church and State in France. In the eyes of her 
European rivals, principally Germany and Italy, this break with the 
Roman Catholic Church made a mockery of French claims to `protect' 
all Latin and Uniate Christians within the Ottoman Empire. Therefore 
these states were emboldened to assert vigorously the right to protect 
their own missionaries and their own religious orders living in Ottoman 
territory in order to whittle down the French protectorate and the 
claims deriving therefrom. 3 
I. 2>France and the Ottoman Empire--tentacles of financial control 
Whilst the impact of French cultural and religious influence was 
important in creating a clientele devoted to France and willing to serve 
French interests, such prestige merely served to supplement the more 
solid potential of railroads and other investments when it came time for 
France to gobble up her portion of the Ottoman patrimony. For many 
years, France had exploited economic interests in the Ottoman Empire 
3 For a discussion of the French religious protectorate and the complications 
arising from the outbreak of laicist zeal in France at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, see William I Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle 
East. " The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon, 1900-1914 (Madison, Wis.: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 33-48. 
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with a particular emphasis on Syria. These had increased dramatically 
in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first fourteen years of the 
twentieth century as France manoeuvred to obtain her 'fair' share of the 
`Sick Man of Europe' whose demise appeared so imminent. 
An examination of the manner in which foreign investment was 
apportioned within the Ottoman Empire (excluding Egypt) at the 
outbreak of war in 1914, reveals that nearly 75% of it was placed in 
loans made to the Ottoman government whilst the other 25% was sunk 
into the private sector. 4 Of these government obligations, French 
investors, seduced as always by the apparent security of government 
debt, held 60%; with Germany holding some 16%; Great Britain 14%; 
and other European capital, 10%. 5 The chief agency for the 
supervision of this debt was the Ottoman Public Debt Administration set 
up in 1881 by the Decree of Muharram to administer the repayment of 
Ottoman loans after the great bankruptcy of 1874-75. The Council of 
the Debt was run totally by foreigners, with the leading part being taken 
by representatives of England and France. In order to ensure the 
regular payment of the interest and service charges on the Ottoman 
Debt, the Public Debt Administration obtained control of some 25-30% 
of the financial resources of the Empire. It managed and collected 
revenues from such important enterprises as the tobacco and salt 
monopolies; stamp, alcohol, and fishing taxes; and the tithe on silk. The 
4 These percentages are derived from figures given in Thobie, A#. .., Table 
on 17. 
5 See /dem, /nterets et imperialisme frangais dans /'empire ottoman (1895- 
1914), Universite de Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne--Serie Sorbonne 4 (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne/Imprimerie nationale, 1977), Table on 307. 
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monies generated here went directly to service the Debt rather than 
being put to more productive use. 
French investors had even more financial power in the Ottoman 
Empire due to their control of the Banque imperiale ottomane. This 
bank, founded in 1853, was both a private bank and the Ottoman state 
bank with the right to issue Ottoman paper money. It was administered 
by boards of directors in London and Paris, and served as an important 
link between foreign capital and the Ottoman state. For example, it had 
a seat on the Council of the Debt, and had a favoured position in 
obtaining foreign capital whilst its financial preponderance served to 
reassure foreign creditors as to the security of their loans. Moreover 
its sixty-two branches throughout the empire placed it in an excellent 
position to take part in local investment opportunities. It goes without 
saying that the bank ensured that the privileged situation which it had 
created for itself was not profitless.? 
The foreign creditors of the Ottoman Empire were quite happy to 
encourage it to indebt itself further after the constitution of the Public 
Debt Administration because these loans were sure to prove profitable 
6 For a brief discussion of the Ottoman Public Debt up to the First World War, 
see Thobie, A/i ..., 17-18. 
Thobie enters into far greater detail in /nterets. . 
., 94-125 and 219-315. 
See also, G. Poulcy, Les Emprunts de /'Etat Ottoman 
(Paris: Jouve & Cie, Editeurs, 1915). Good summary treatments of this 
subject are 1>Owen, 191-200; and 2>lssawi (ed. ), EHME, 94-106 which has 
interesting tables of the loans contracted. These tables are on 100-01,103- 
06. The only discussion in English which follows the Debt until the settlement 
of 1928 is D. C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire: 
A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Ottoman 
Public Debt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929; AMS Press, Inc., 
1966). 
7 For the Banque imperiale ottomane, see Thobie, A#. .., 16; /dem, /nterets. . 
., passim, particularly 
81-88,113-119,449-59, 
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for foreign investors and were `guaranteed' by the existence of an 
organism whose control of revenues would service them. Moreover 
such loans ensured that the Ottomans would remain dependent on 
European capital and firmly within the European sphere of control. 
Nevertheless one must emphasise that the Ottomans found themselves 
in a certain sense placed on a treadmill, for these loans were not used 
for productive investment within the empire. Instead they were used to 
service or pay off previous debt, or were sunk in military expenditure. 
Since it was impossible for the Ottomans to generate enough 
capital internally for the economic development of their empire, they 
had perforce to turn to foreign capital. Thus whilst the other 25% of the 
foreign investments in the Ottoman domains were indeed placed in 
productive enterprises, these investments were perhaps more 
productive for the accounts of the foreign entrepreneurs than for those 
of the Ottomans themselves. Of these investments, France had some 
45%; Germany, 25%: Great Britain, 16%; and other European powers, 
14%. 8 
I. 3>France and the ottoman Empire--railways and other enterprises 
As foreign capitalists, French and other European entrepreneurs 
were interested in the Ottoman Empire only insofar as they could make 
quick and steady profits from their investments. Therefore they tended 
to place their money either in those activities which by their very nature 
8 These percentages are derived from table in Thobie, A/i ..., 19. 
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seemed to offer an assured success or in enterprises where profits 
were `guaranteed' by a subvention from the Ottoman state. The `sure' 
money earners included banking, public works, municipal services, 
mining, and oil exploration. 
Railways were the principal investments of the second type. 
They appeared quite attractive to European investors because 
entrepreneurs could usually cushion potential losses by obtaining 
various privileges from the Ottoman government in order to sweeten 
the concession. For example, the concessionnaire might gain the right 
to exploit mineral wealth for a certain distance on either side of the 
track; the right to develop quarries and gravel pits or cut timber if 
needed for construction; and even the right to explore for antiquities. 9 
Perhaps the most important means of encouraging the 
construction of railways were certain forms of financial support which 
the Ottoman government promised the concessionaires. The principal 
method employed was the so-called `kilometric guarantee', i. e. a sum of 
money usually drawn from the tithes of the lands through which the 
lines passed and collected by the Public Debt Administration. The way 
this worked was that the Ottoman government would guarantee that the 
proposed line receive a certain gross revenue per kilometre, and if it 
did not, undertook to pay the difference between the two sums. 
9 For the various methods used to promote railway construction within the 
Ottoman Empire, see 1>Edward Meade Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers and 
the Bagdad Railway. - A Study in Imperialism (New York: Russell & Russell, 
1966), 77-80 and 85, fn 7; 2>Orhan Conker, Les Chemins de fei en Turquie et 
la po/itique ferroviaire turque (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1935), 79-82 
where he gives examples of the financial outcomes of various kilometric 
guarantees; 3>Blaisdell, 127-29. 
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The Ottoman authorities were willing to offer such privileges and 
guarantees in order to facilitate the development of a communications 
network of strategic interest to the state but which, given the parlous 
state of its own finances, the government could not construct for itself. 
These considerations meant that in practice, kilometric guarantees 
were given only to important standard gauge lines (1 m. 435 wide), and 
not to narrow gauge ones (1 m. 05), or tramways of purely local 
interest. 
Such incentives were fairly typical of an era which saw a 
dramatic increase of railway mileage throughout the world. For 
example Congress offered certain types of concession to encourage 
companies to build railroads in the western half of the United States. In 
one instance, the Union Pacific system was granted the right of way 
through public domain, and given twenty sections (1 section=1 square 
mile) on either side of its route with full rights to explore for minerals 
and other assets. Moreover Congress gave the company a fifty million 
dollar loan in the form of government bonds. 10 
Nonetheless in the Ottoman case there was a definite negative 
side to the subsidies. The kilometric guarantees did not encourage the 
railway companies to improve their lines or increase traffic beyond a 
certain level because whilst better materiel and more traffic meant 
more receipts, they usually brought greater expenses which were not 
offset by the guarantee. Indeed the increase in receipts might lead to 
10 Earle, 79. 
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the suppression of the guarantee, and by themselves might not ensure 
the railways a profit. As a result, the investors adopted the more 
prudent course of an assured but small return to one involving greater 
rewards, but also greater risks. Thus in the long term such a 
commercial strategy worked against the interests of the Ottoman state 
whose ultimate aim was not to coddle foreign entrepreneurs, but to 
establish a strong and rationally organised network of railroads 
throughout its 11 
A large proportion of the French share in this capital investment 
was concentrated in Syria. For example, a major French enterprise 
was the construction and management of the port of Beirut, the first 
modern facility of this type to be built in the Levant. Construction was 
undertaken between 1890 and 1895 by a French company (Compagnie 
imperiale ottomane du port, des quais et des entrepöts de Beyrouth) 
which was responsible for administering it and maintaining it. Various 
improvements were made over the years, and by 1914, Beirut 
possessed the best port on the Syrian coast, attracting to it much of the 
trade of southern Syria. Its charges were high compared to 
Alexandretta, the chief port of northern Syria, but it continued to bring a 
steady and ever increasing profit to the company and its investors. 12 
Considerably less successful were companies providing public 
services to Beirut. The Beirut Gas Company (Societe anonyme 
ottomane du gaz de Beyrouth) was established in 1887 and controlled 
11 See the comment in Thobie, Interets..., 324, fn 49. 
12 For the port of Beirut, see Ibid., 172-77,377-84. Table of profits gained on 
379. 
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largely by the Banque imperiale ottomane. The Lebanese Tramways 
(Tramways libanais Nord et Sud de Beyrouth) were set up in 1894, and 
the Beirut Waterworks Company (Compagnie des eaux de Beyrouth) 
was founded in 1909. Each of thee enterprises started with 
overweening ambitions which were never realised due to a failure to 
appreciate the realities of the situation with which it was forced to deal. 
They continued to exist, but were never able to furnish all the services 
projected, and provided no pots of gold to their investors. 13 
The centrepiece of French economic influence in the Levant was 
the railway finally known as the DHP (Societe ottomane du chemin de 
fer de Damas-Hama et prolongements) which was controlled 70% by 
French investors. At the beginning of the 1890's, when consideration 
was first given to the building of a railway from Beirut to Riyaq, 
Damascus, and Muzayrib, it was viewed as a sure money-maker 
because of the profits to be made from the shipment of Hawrani grain to 
Beirut, and from the growth of rail traffic which would be generated by 
the two dynamic cities of Damascus and Beirut. A certain fillip to the 
affair was given by the parallel construction of the port of Beirut under 
the leadership of some of the same financiers. It was hoped that these 
elements would feed on one another, making the whole a dynamic 
economic combination. 
By 1914, the expectations of the investors had been amply 
fulfilled with prospects of still more to come. The DHP network 
13 For the Gaz de Beyrouth, see Ibid., 189-92,439; for the Tramways libanais, 
see Ibid., 329-330; for the Eaux de Beyrouth, see Ibid., 445. 
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stretched for 682 kilometres, and comprised 249 kilometres of narrow 
gauge railway as well as 433 kilometres of standard gauge. 331 
kilometres of the standard gauge trackage enjoyed a kilometric 
guarantee. The narrow gauge segment (which included sections of 
rack-railway over some of the more forbidding mountain terrain) went 
from the port of Beirut over the Lebanon mountains to Riyaq then south 
to Damascus and from there to Muzayrib in the Hawran. This was the 
first, and most difficult part to be constructed and was completed in 
1894-95, but without kilometric guarantee. The next part, standard 
gauge and with kilometric guarantee, was built between 1900 and 1906 
and ran for a total of 331 kms. from Riyaq through Horns and Hama to 
Aleppo where it joined the German-built Baghdadbahn. The final 
section of 102 kms. from Homs to the port of Tripoli, standard gauge 
but without kilometric guarantee, was constructed between 1909 and 
1911. 
In the general settlement of accounts between French and 
German railroad interests concluded in February 1914, the French 
gained the right to push their Tripoli-Horns line east to Palmyra and 
Dayr al-Zur whilst the Germans were allowed to build lines from Aleppo 
to Alexandretta and from Aleppo to Maskana on the Euphrates with a 
zone of protection of 60 kilometres between the two rival networks. 
Finally in April, 1914, the DHP obtained the privilege of pushing its lines 
south to Lydda in Palestine--a station on the Jaffa-Jerusalem line- 
without a kilometric guarantee but with a subvention based on a more 
flexible formula whose elements included the length of the line, the 
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gross receipts received, and the number of kilometres actually covered 
by the trains. With these agreements, the shareholders seemed to have 
obtained an assured investment, at least until the far distant date of 5 
May 1943 after which the Ottoman government was to have the right to 
repurchase the entire system. 14 
The DHP did prove to be a profitable enterprise, but this was 
largely due to the financial participation of the Ottoman government 
through its subsidy. Between 1902 and 1914 it paid the DHP some 22 
million francs, a sum equal to the gross receipts of the guaranteed 
section (Riyaq-Aleppo) and 30% of the receipts of the whole (some 73 
million francs). As Thobie points out, `This indemnity is thus the very 
motor of the system insofar as it assures the profits. '15 
Yet despite its profits and its ever-expanding network, the DHP 
was not a particularly rational system, compared with those of its 
competitors, the German-built Baghdadbahn and the Ottoman-built 
Hijaz Railway. The DHP was essentially a system of only local 
importance tying as it did coastal ports to cities of the interior beyond 
14 The clearest and most accurate presentation of the lengths, the gauges, 
and the finances of the different parts of the DHP is to be found in Syria and 
Palestine, Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section 
of the Foreign Office--No. 60 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920), 68-76. 
For a more complete elucidation of the railway question in Syria and the 
Ottoman Empire before the Great War, see 1>Thobie, lnterets ..., 164-72, 
318-29; 2>William I. Shorrock, `The origin of the French Mandate in Syria and 
Lebanon: the railroad question, 1901-1914, ' /JMES, I, 1970,133-53; 3>/dem, 
French Imperialism ..., 
138-64; 4>Rashid Khalidi, British Policy towards 
Syria and Palestine, 1906-1914: A Study of the Antecedents of the Hussein- 
McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour 
Declaration (London: Ithaca Press, 1980), 113-99; 5>Earle, passier, 
6>Conker, 15-82; 7>lssawi (ed. ) EHME, 248-257; 8>/dem, FCDEH, 220-224; 
9>Dr. George-Samne, La Syrie (Paris: Editions Bossard, 1920), 154-61. 
15 Thobie, /nterets ..., 324. 
58 
which there was only desert. The fact that its lines were of two different 
gauges meant that its most important section, the one linking Aleppo 
with Beirut was never able to realise its full potential because of 
transhipment costs. Moreover its southern branch effectively led 
nowhere, and could not compete with the Syrian section of the Hijaz 
Railway, built and constructed at hardly any charge to the Ottoman 
state. This became even more obvious when the Ottomans built a line 
linking Dara'a on the Hijaz Railway with the port of Haifa which was a 
natural and now easily reached outlet for shipments from Damascus. 
The DHP was faced by a two pronged system which was of 
strategic rather than merely commercial importance because its 
components linked Istanbul with two distant, but important regions of 
its Empire--Iraq and the Hijaz. 16 The first prong was the German-built 
line known as the `Baghdad Railway'. The Germans had conceived 
their enterprise in the grand manner with the aim of linking Berlin to the 
Persian Gulf via Istanbul. Konya, Adana, Aleppo, Nusaybin, Mosul, 
Baghdad, and Basra. This standard gauge line was built in two 
tranches: First, track was laid down from Ismit to Ankara and from 
Eskishehir to Konya by the Anatolian Railways (La Societe ottomane 
des chemins de fer d'Anatolie) between 1888 and 1896. " Second, 
lines were constructed from Konya by the the Baghdad Railway 
Company (Compagnie du chemin de fer de Baghdad known as the 
16 For an interesting argument along these lines see the opinions of Charles 
Rabot in George-Samne, 157-58 fn 1. 
17 The short line--91 kms. --from Haydarpasha to Ismit had been built by the 
Ottoman government between 1871-73. The Anatolian Railway Company had 
taken it over from its British lessors as part of its own concession. 
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Baghdadbahn) which received its concession in 1903. By the end of the 
Great War, the Baghdad Railway stretched unbroken to Aleppo with the 
first trains entering that city in October, 1918.18 
The other prong was the narrow gauge Hijaz Railway which 
linked Damascus to the two Holy Places. This was funded by a 
subscription collected from Muslims worldwide, and laid down between 
1901 and 1908 largely under the direction of German engineers. 19 
One might describe those Frenchmen who promoted railways, 
ports, and utilities in Syria as mere businessmen because they sought 
immediate profit and regional economic preponderance. Nevertheless 
if they were not strategists who sought to dominate an entire empire 
through control of its communications, their activities did consolidate 
the ascendancy of their own country in a region which she considered 
to be her historic domain of action. Unfortunately the interests of 
France in Syria, confined largely to public utilities, communications, 
and the education of minorities, were in sectors far removed from the 
concerns of the majority of the Syrian Muslim population. Such 
activities gave her citizens little insight into the nature of Syrian 
society; into the all-important relations between town and countryside; 
or into the problems peculiar to rural life. This ignorance was 
18 For the Baghdad Railway, see Earle, passim. 
19 For the Hijaz Railway, see 1>William Ochsenwald, The Hi/az Railroad 
(Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1980); 2>Walter Pinhas 
Pick, `Meissner Pasha and the construction of railways in Palestine and 
neighboring countries, ' in Gad G. Gilbar (ed. ), Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: 
Studies in Economic and Social History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 179-218. 
This is a study of the life and career of the German engineer who was 
technical director and chief de facto of the Hijaz Railway project. 
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exacerbated by the refusal of French capitalists to put money into 
agricultural projects where profits could be neither immediate nor 
guaranteed, but through which her nationals might have gained 
experience of the real Syria. 
1.4>France and the ottoman Empire--agriculture 
The one exception to this general tendency to avoid agricultural 
investments was French financial support of Lebanese silk production. 
Here there was a tight link between the producers and the market, and 
the silk manufacturers of Lyon were willing to make investments in 
order to maintain their dominance. Nonetheless silk was a speciality 
fibre and its production and trade were conducted under peculiar 
conditions. French involvement here tended to reinforce their 
predilection for Christian Lebanon in all its aspects whilst giving them 
little insight into the very different problems of the inner Syrian grain 
lands. 20 
Thus French capitalisation of the Lebanese silk industry occupied 
an anomalous position in relation to the general thrust of French 
investment in the Ottoman Empire. This becomes clear when looking at 
the record of those few other agricultural projects which attracted 
French interest before the First World War. Francois Brun and certain 
Jesuit fathers established two small vineyards in the Biqa' valley in 
1876 and 1880 respectively. The increasing number of wine-drinking 
20 For silk production see Chapter III infra. 
61 
Europeans and imitative locals soon guaranteed success. Although 
Egyptians began to demand these Lebanese wines from the 1890's, 
such small enterprises found themselves in stiff competition with 
Jewish and German vintners in Palestine. By 1914, the two estates 
comprised a maximum of 300 hectares, valued at 3000 F per hectare 
including their wine-making installations. This was tiny when compared 
with the productive potential of the German and Jewish colonies to the 
south. Nonetheless, in 1913 the French vineyards did ship 800 
hectolitres of their product to Egypt, Europe, and even as far away as 
America--a triumph, but a small one. 21 
In contrast to these small-scale exploitations were several 
projects for large scale agricultural development proposed in the years 
just before the Great War. In 1910 a French financier sought a 
concession of 3,491,000 hectares of former imperial domain land 
located in Cilicia, Syria and Mesopotamia. The entrepreneur made his 
proposal after the definite termination of the Ottoman loan project of 
1910 in the hopes that the revenues of the lands to be conceded could 
be used as collateral for a new loan to Istanbul. Neither the French nor 
the Ottoman governments seemed interested in this somewhat ill- 
conceived idea and nothing more was heard about it for the moment, 
particularly when the Ottomans raised a new loan, this time from 
Germany. 
21 For the vineyards in Lebanon, see Thobie, /nterets..., 421-22,426. 
62 
A new round started in 1913 when another French financier, an 
associate of the first, heard of an official notice to sell 2,572,000 
hectares of former imperial domain land in the vilayets of Syria and 
Mesopotamia. This gentleman, backed by the resources of the Credit 
foncier d'Algerie et de Tunisie, 22 formed the Societe des domaines 
imperiaux with the idea of obtaining all this land against a loan of 100 
million F to the Ottoman government. Although this time the Quai 
d'Orsay supported the affair, the Paris financial markets were not keen 
on giving such a huge sum because of the continued swelling of the 
Ottoman floating debt coupled with the refusal of the Ottoman Bank to 
promote a new bond issue before the consolidation of those which had 
already been placed on the market. Moreover the Ottoman government 
itself decided on a new game, by turning this project into a settlement 
plan for thousands of refugees from the Balkan Wars. 
This scheme also attracted the interest of French financiers, with 
the most serious offer being made by a Franco-Austrian group. It too 
had a short life because the plan to install refugees included what was 
in effect a building society to make loans to the new colonists. Such an 
institution proved unacceptable because, if set up, it would have been 
in direct competition with the state building society, the Credit foncier 
ottoman. This institution happened to be run by another French 
financial combine which put pressure upon the Quai d'Orsay to block 
the settlement project. As a result, the Public Debt Administration was 
22 Whose chairman, the former Minister of the Colonies Andre Lebon, would 
become president ten years later of the Union Economique de Syrie, the most 
important French business lobby during the Mandate. 
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persuaded to issue an unfavourable opinion which led the Ottomans to 
cancel their settlement plan in January, 1914. 
The final, and most important development scheme to be 
proposed before the War was that of the Societe des fermes imperiales 
de Tchoucour-Ova (cukurova) which was a concession given life by a 
contract signed in April, 1912. A group of French entrepreneurs in 
association with the Ottoman government proposed to exploit the 
80,000 hectares contained within the imperial domain of cukurova, 
situated north-east of the Adana plain, primarily to grow wheat and 
cotton, but also linen, hemp, poppies, legumes, and even sugar cane. 
The capitalists planned to recruit local workers to take in the cotton 
harvest, and the nature of the terrain supported the employment of 
agricultural machinery. They believed that the market of Adana would 
prove an excellent local outlet for the products of this scheme which 
could also be shipped abroad via the railroad connecting it to the port 
of Mersin. All of this would be produced, processed, and transported 
using economies of scale similar to those applied in cultivating the vast 
plains of the United States and Canada. It was hoped that profits would 
also be similar--a minimum of 17% of the capital engaged. 
Such a rational and potentially successful enterprise aroused 
much opposition from those who had vested interests of their own in 
the region: First, from local landed magnates who feared for their 
estates. Second, from German entrepreneurs, chief among them the 
Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft (DLBG) which was 
seeking to develop cotton cultivation in the Adana region as a result of 
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the 1903 Baghdad railway convention. 23 The Germans were not 
particularly happy to see a successful French enterprise planted in the 
midst of what was supposedly their own sphere of influence. Third, 
from Ottoman nationalists who felt that foreigners had been given too 
many advantages in a project which was in any case illegal because it 
had never been debated by the Ottoman parliament. Even more 
important was the certainty that this concession would give France a 
sure grip over an entire province which could only be the prelude to 
military occupation and imperialist control. 
As a result of this opposition, the concession was declared illegal 
in December, 1912, but was once more recognised as valid in February, 
1913. Its area of operation which had already been restricted to an 
initial slice of 45,000 hectares was further reduced by local 
manipulations to a mere 10,000 hectares. Yet egged on by the Quai 
d'Orsay, the French group persisted in its efforts, and finally had its 
original slice of 45,000 hectares restored--on 30 October 1914. Alas, 
too little, too late! 24 
23 For the DLRG, see 1>Edouard-C. Achard, `Etudes sur la Cilicie et la Syrie: 
le Coton en Cilicie et en Syrie, ' Documents economiques, politiques et 
scientifiques, 3. Supplement to L'Asie Frangaise: Bulletin mensuel du 
Comite de L'Asie Frangaise [AF], XXII, 203, June, 1922,23,31-34; 2>Charles 
Issawi (ed. ), The Economic History of Turkey [EHT], 1800-1914 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980), `Cotton production in the Adana and 
Izmir region, 1910' [Selection from W. F. Bruck, `Türkische 
Baumwollwirtschaft, ' Probleme der Weltwirtschaft, No. 29, Jena, 1919,58- 
79], 242-45; 3>Donald Quataert, `Ottoman reform and agriculture in 
Anatolia, ' unpubl. Ph. D. thesis, U. C. L. A., 1973,283. 
24 For these large scale pre-war French agricultural projects in the Ottoman 
Empire, see Thobie, Interets..., 423-26. 
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In seeking reasons for the dearth of French agricultural 
investment within the pre-war Ottoman Empire, one can contrast the 
relative success of such small-scale ventures as the vineyards of the 
Biqa' with the failure of the more ambitious schemes. The vineyards 
were too small to threaten the integrity of the empire. Indeed their 
influence was beneficent rather than maleficent because they acted as 
a sort of `tacke d'hui/e', setting an example for their Lebanese 
neighbours who were not slow to copy their methods and emulate their 
success. 
25 
The much weightier projects which revolved around the imperial 
domains were another matter entirely. These did not involve the 
building of railways which merely passed over the land from one point 
to another, but the exploitation and even the purchase by European 
Christians of vast estates in the very heartland of the Ottoman Empire. 
These were the patrimony of the Ottoman state held `in trust' so to 
speak for the entire community of Believers whose representatives 
were not happy to see them exploited by the infidels. 26 Unlike the 
system of the DHP which slowly came to fruition over a period of 
25 For an example of this, see Issawi (ed. ), FCDEH, 312 where a British official 
gives an account of Lebanese winemaking in 1898: `Journey from Bitlis to 
Beirut, ' FO 195/2024. 
26 Granted that foreigners had been permitted to purchase lands within the 
Ottoman Empire on an equal footing with Ottoman subjects since the law of 
13 Safar 1284/16 June 1867. This was confirmed by the protocol of 7 Safar 
1285/9 June 1868 between the Porte and France to which other Powers 
adhered in the course of the next fifteen years. Nonetheless this fact does 
not invalidate the real concerns of Ottoman nationalists when faced by what 
they feared might be the prelude to foreign occupation. For the law, the 
protocol, and commentaries upon them, see I> Aristarchi Bey, 19-26; 
2>Young, I, 334-45; 2>Padel and Steeg, 16-23. 
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twenty-five years, these agricultural projects were conceived in haste 
during the years just before the First World War in order to exploit the 
misfortunes of a government so strapped for cash that it was willing to 
alienate part of its lands. Two of the schemes came to naught, in 
essence because the parlous state of the Ottoman fisc made European 
financial markets extremely wary of underwriting vast projects which 
might never bring a return to their investors. The third had more 
potential, but was never given a chance to realise this, stymied as it 
was by powerful opposition from various quarters. Perhaps it would 
have overcome its adversaries had the War not intervened, but it is 
more likely to have died on the vine. For such a `plantation', no matter 
how beneficial in economic terms, posed an unacceptable political 
threat to the integrity of the state which acted as its host. It was only 
when France had achieved secure political control over Syria and the 
Lebanon by other means that the time appeared propitious for French 
investment in the agricultural sector. 
i. 5>The empire, cornucopia for the metropole 
It is perhaps not surprising that French capitalists should have 
neglected somewhat risky long term investments in agricultural 
projects within the Ottoman Empire in favour of assured profits to be 
found within the sectors of banking and communications. Nonetheless, 
despite appearances to the contrary, this attitude did not reflect a 
general indifference to the productive potential of other regions outside 
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Europe on the part of French merchants and investors. Of prime 
importance in this respect, were the French colonies. 
France was a principal participant in the European scramble for 
colonies which took place between 1880 and 1914, and during a period 
of less than thirty years acquired an empire of nearly twelve million 
square kilometres with a population of some fifty million. Yet 
apparently France did little to exploit this vast domain. For example, 
she placed only 9% of her total foreign investment in her own empire 
whilst sinking 25% into Russia. Moreover only 10% of French foreign 
trade was with its colonial empire, the second largest in the world after 
that of Great Britain whose Indian possessions were its largest export 
market in 1914. 
Such percentages are in fact misleading. In looking at French 
overseas investment, one finds that the French colonial empire with a 
total investment in 1914 of between 4.1 and 7.5 milliard francs27 ranked 
third behind Russia with 12.3 milliard and Latin America with 8.3, and 
ahead of Austria-Hungary (3.2), Spain (3.1), and the Ottoman Empire 
(2.8). Another measure of the importance of the French colonial empire 
27 Depending upon what was included in the calculation. The lower figure 
included private capital of companies listed in the Annuaire de /a Cote 
Desfosses (a publication listing those companies quoted on the Paris Bourse) 
and debt incurred by the colonies themselves for public works; the higher 
one comprised metropolitan funds applied to the development of the empire; 
funds of private companies not found in the Annuaire Desfosses, and 
investments placed by family or individually-owned firms. The totals 
excluded investments of French colons in North Africa. For the figures and a 
discussion, see 1>Jacques Marseille, Empire colonial etcapita/isme frangais: 
Histoire d'un divorce (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), 95-101 and 384-85, fn 19; 
2>Jacques Thobie, Gilbert Meynier, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Charles- 
Robert Ageron, Histoire de la France coloniale, /l, 1914-1990 (Paris: Armand 
Colin, 1990), 57-65. 
68 
to metropolitan capitalists is total private direct investment. 28 Here, 
one finds the empire with 2 milliard F to be equal with Spain and hard on 
the heels of Russia (2.2 milliard F) for second place. 29 
A third measure of the interests of French capitalists in their 
empire is the number of companies holding imperial investments. Of 
the 469 companies with such investments listed in the Annuaire 
Desfosses nearly half (200) were founded before 1914, whilst one third 
(156) were set up between the end of most colonial conquests in 1898 
and 1914. In 1913, for example, more companies were formed for 
colonial investment (51) than for investment outside the French Empire 
(24). In the final analysis what counted for most was the rate of profit 
achieved. For companies with capital placements in the colonies 
during the years immediately preceding the Great War, this rate was 
often considerably higher than it was for companies engaged in home 
and foreign activities. As Marseille points out, economic activities in 
the French Empire were indeed `good business'. 30 
Nonetheless one must emphasise that certain parts of the French 
Empire drew more investment than did others. More than half of the 45 
milliard francs invested outside the metropole was placed in Algeria 
which was the private preserve of French financiers. By contrast, a 
region such as French Equatorial Africa, thinly populated and with 
28 Marseille defines direct investment as `the flow of capital which is oriented 
towards the purchase of shares issued by companies operating in the 
colonies. ' Marseille, 386, fn 40. 
29 For private direct investments by French capitalists in the French Empire 
and elsewhere, see Ibid., 106-07; Thobie et at, 58. 
30 For the figures and an analysis, see Marseille, 106-113 and 387, fn 48. 
Quote on 109; Thobie et al., 58-59. 
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apparently little prospects, was not particularly attractive to 
metropolitan capital, and was left in a state of underdevelopment, the 
"Cinderella" of the empire. 31 
The figures for investment and commerce between France and 
her empire give the lie to those who claim that there was a `general 
indifference. . . to colonial expansion' on the part of French banks and 
French industry. Rather they support the assertion that `the empire 
was indeed considered by metropolitan investors as not just a reserve 
for the future, but as a card of first choice'. 32 
One can make a similar case for trade between the empire and 
the metropole, particularly with regard to the raw products of colonial 
agriculture. The empire in 1913 supplied 9.4% of French imports and 
contributed 13% of French exports. These gross figures are hardly 
earthshaking, but they conceal a reality which shows that the empire 
was can essential commercial partner' for France. 
For example, if one examines total exchanges (imports and 
exports combined), one finds that with 1,729 million F in the period 
1911-13, the French empire ranked as the third most important 
commercial partner of the metropole behind Britain (2,396.3) and 
Germany (1,843.6). Moreover it served as the most important outlet for 
certain sectors of French industry--textiles, iron and steel, candles, 
locomotives, ball-bearings and pipes--whilst providing the mother- 
31 Thobie et at, 59-62. 
32 For the negative assessment, see C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, 
`French business and the French colonialists, ' The Historical Journal, XIX, 4, 
1976,982-84 (quotation on 982). For the positive one, see Marseille, 113; 
Thobie et al., 59. 
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country with more than a quarter of its primary agricultural products. 
Among these, it supplied more than half the wine imported, 85% of the 
rice and 100% of the sugar in 1913.33 
The substantial place held by the French Empire in the provision 
of certain primary agricultural products was complemented by the fact 
that nearly a quarter of the 469 companies involved in the Empire--111 
or 23.6%--were engaged in running plantations. Moreover another 161 
(34.3%) were involved in the ancillary services of finance, commerce, 
and transport . 
34 
Unfortunately investment in agriculture and its supporting 
activities was unable to make good certain deficiencies. For example in 
the textile sector only 3.2% of the wool, 0.2% of the silk and 0.1% of the 
cotton used by French industry came from the French Empire. With 
regard to the latter, the largest percentage was imported from the 
United States. The efforts made by the French colonial cotton 
development group, the Association Cotonniere Coloniale (ACC) to 
promote cotton cultivation in French West Africa met with a uniform 
lack of success due to little scientific research; rudimentary methods of 
cultivation; insufficiently trained technical personnel; and prices so low 
that the peasant was hardly tempted to switch from millet to cotton. 35 
33 For the statistics and discussion of the commerce between France and her 
empire, see Marseille, 40-57; Thobie et al., 52-56. 
34Marseille, 108; Thobie et at, 58. 
35 For the textile statistics, see Marseille, table on 55. For the ACC and its 
pre-war attempts to develop cotton cultivation in French West Africa, see 
Emil Schreyger, L'Ofce du Niger au Ma/i, 1932J 1982. " /a prob/ematique 
d'une grande entreprise agricole dans /a zone du Sahel (Wiesbaden: Franz 
Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1984), 9-13. 
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The coming of the First World War with its appalling sufferings 
and massive waste of resources led those in charge of the destinies of 
France to cast around for succour. To them, the empire appeared to 
be a vast reserve which might supply the transfusion of men and 
materiel to stanch the terrible haemorrhage which was sapping the 
energies of the mother country. Despite much rhetoric, little could be 
done during the war itself to set a programme in train to realise such a 
hope. Moreover, even if the colonies had miraculously produced vast 
quantities of primary products, it would have been extremely difficult 
for France to bring them to her shores at the height of unrestricted 
submarine warfare. 
Therefore it was only after the war, under the leadership of Albert 
Sarraut, twice governor general of Indochina and Minister for the 
Colonies between 1920 and 1924, that a plan for the systematic 
exploitation of the French colonial empire was put before the Chamber 
of Deputies. He expounded his ideas in a book, La raise en valeur des 
colonies francaises (Paris: Payot, 1923), which became the bible of 
French colonial development policy. In it, Sarraut called for a vast 
infusion of capital to improve the infrastructure of ports, railways, and 
roads. At the same time he promoted the production of primary 
products in order to give autarky to the mother-country should she be 
caught in another world conflict. The fact that Sarraut was unable to 
propose any sound method of financing this vast scheme does not 
obviate the fact that by the end of the Great War, France was eagerly 
casting about for each and every source of raw materials in regions 
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subject (or potentially subject) to French influence. Syria and Cilicia 
were two of these. 36 
1.6>The Levant as a cornucopia? 
Hence when France came to stake her claims in the `scramble' to 
partition the Ottoman Empire after the Allied victory, she did so with the 
requirements of la raise en valeur very much in mind. In the Levant, /a 
raise en va/eur did not mean expansion of the concessions in 
communications and utilities because these were highly developed 
sectors where most of the profits had already been made. Moreover 
concessions were by their very nature parasitic enterprises whose aim 
was more to bring profits to their shareholders than to improve the 
welfare of the countries in which they operated. Indeed the local 
inhabitants complained vociferously about the high charges which they 
believed were designed to bring profits to the concessionnaires, and 
which were well above the true cost of the services provided. 37 
36 For the theory and practice of 'la mise en valeur' during the First World 
War and afterwards, see 1>Robert Cornevin, `La France d'outremer, ' in 
Alfred Sauvy et a/., Histoire economique de /a France entre /es deux guerres, 
3--Divers sujets (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1972), 274-93; 2>Thobie et 
al., 71-100,136-54,227-34; 3>C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France 
Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion 
(London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1981), 132-34,141-43,211-13,226-28. 
37 For a comment by a senior official of the Mandate on the unfortunate 
consequences of a "politique des Societas concessionnaires" for the 
economic development of the Levant states, see the report of Jean de 
Hautecloque, Delegate of the High Commissioner at Damascus to High 
Commissioner Gabriel Puaux, on `L'Avenir economique de la Syrie', ' 13 
January 1940,3-4. Ministare des Affaires Etrangeres--Archives 
Diplomatiques--Nantes [MAE--Nantes], Fonds Beyrouth [FB], Syrie, 1918- 
1940, Carton 364--Services Techniques. 
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Thus for France, /a raise en valeur meant exploitation of the 
resources of the newly won territories in the Levant. Development of 
their natural resources might prove profitable and was not 
incompatible with the mission entrusted to her by the League of 
Nations. Since mining possibilities appeared to be limited, 38 the new 
mandatary decided to focus on agriculture. Indeed the agricultural 
potential of the Levant territories was the strongest card held by 
advocates of a French occupation in the face of public indifference and 
even downright hostility. 
Despite the trumpet calls of the French colonial party for the 
occupation of `/a Syrie integrale' which stretched from the Sinai to 
Cilicia and from the Levantine coast far beyond the Euphrates, many 
people were not quite sure what these exhortations entailed; what they 
might cost the French tax-payer; and what would be gained in the end. 
For example, the President of the Comite Iyonnais des interets francais 
en Syrie, one of the principal French pressure groups in favour of the 
Syrian enterprise, supported intervention in Syria only insofar as it was 
consonant with both the military and financial abilities of the French 
state. This in face of calls for a hegemony which should stretch to 
Kurdistan, Lake Van, and even across the Persian frontier! 39 
38 With regard to the possibilities of mines in Syria, Professor Paul Huvelin of 
the University of Lyon who headed the French Mission to Syria in 1920, 
remarked that `the Syrian mining concessionnaires used their genius to sell a 
bearskin that did not exist'. For this comment and a discussion of the limited 
mining possibilities in Syria, see Paul Huvelin, `Que vaut la Syrie, ' Documents 
economiques, politiques et scientifiques, 1. Supplement to AF, XXI, 197, 
December, 1921,18-19. Quotation on 18. 
39 For this, see `Reunion du Comite lyonnais des interets frangais en Syrie, ' 5 
May 1920 and report of meeting attached, CCIL, Fonds Musees--Tissus CCIL 
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These men realised as did High Commissioner General Henri 
Gouraud that the resources of France were limited in terms of both men 
and money; that she was already deeply committed in Morocco; and 
that the defence of the Rhine came above all else. Moreover there was 
an enormous war weariness, and a people and an army which had 
already sacrificed so much were not particularly happy to involve 
themselves in matters generally considered `exotic enterprises'. 40 
Given this background of hostility to any French intervention in 
the Levant, those who supported this venture were forced to present 
the sceptics with a balance sheet which carefully weighed the gains 
and losses to be accrued. General Gouraud gave one such crucial 
exposition to hard-bitten members of the Finance Committee of the 
French Chamber of Deputies at a session held on Saturday, 20 
November 1920.41 The previous day, an important member of this 
committee42 had told Paul Huvelin, secretary-general of the Comite 
Lyonnais des Interets Francais en Syrie, that he was determined to find 
ammunition to use against Gen. Gouraud and Alexandre Millerand. a3 
Because a budget of fifty milliard francs was in deficit by two milliards, 
93c 1*1, Dossier «3»: Congres frangais de la Syrie--1919/Comite Iyonnais 
Syrie--1 920. 
40 Loc. cit. Also `Notes de I'entretien avec le General Gouraud, ' 20 November 
1920 and `Comite lyonnais des interets frangais en Syrie: Reunion du 23 
novembre 1920' which are contained in the same file. 
41 For this, see MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 2377: `Note sur les questions posees 
au General Gouraud Haut Commissaire en Syrie et Cilicie par la Commission 
des Finances le 20 Novembre 1920. ' 
42 Charles Dumont, a former Minister of Finance who was Rapporteur of the 
budget to the Chamber. 
43 Prime Minister from January-September, 1920 and then elected President 
of the Republic where he took a special interest in foreign affairs. 
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economies were necessary, and these had to be found somewhere. 
Credits could hardly be reduced for operations along the Rhine and in 
Morocco, so it was the Syrian budget which would get the chop. 44 
Thus when General Gouraud stood before the Finance 
Committee, he faced a hostile audience who expected to him to justify 
French Syrian policy. The questions posed by the Finance Committee 
were quite blunt: 
1>What are the agreements by virtue of which France is in 
Syria? 
2>What advantages do these agreements give to France? 
3>What are the obligations which represent the quid pro 
quo? 
In response, the High Commissioner pointed out that the Sykes- 
Picot Agreement with the British in 1916 had reserved Syria as a 
sphere of French action. This was affirmed by the directives of Field 
Marshal Allenby giving France control of the coastal regions after the 
Armistice, and finally confirmed by the Allied Powers who awarded the 
Mandate of Syria to France on 23 April 1920 during the Conference of 
San Remo. 
The principal advantage which France derived from her control 
of Syria was the consolidation of her influence in the Levant. The 
Mandatory Power would as a matter of course have economic 
paramountcy which would open the region to the activities of French 
capital and prove extremely profitable. 
44CCIL, `Comite lyonnais ..., Reunion 
du 23 novembre 1920, ' 3. 
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General Gouraud presented Syria as a natural partner for the 
French economy: 
FIrSL he claimed that the majority of Syrians felt friendship 
for France; that a `notable proportion' spoke French; and 
a5 that their currency was at parity with the French franc. 
Second, Syria imported all types of manufactured goods, for 
example, luxury articles and construction materials which France and other European countries were in a position to 
provide. 
Third, Syria produced and would continue to produce 
enormous quantities of cereals and cotton necessary for 
French industry, goods in which France had been in deficit 
up till now. To this, Gouraud added silk, wool, fruit, oil and 
pastoral products. 
Fourth, her occupation of Syria gave France control of the 
coastal ports, Alexandretta in particular, which served as 
economic outlets for a great hinterland extending as far as 
Mesopotamia and the oil of Mosul. 
Fifth, what was perhaps a more political gain, but with 
potential economic consequences: France, that great 
Muslim Power, derived benefit by holding Damascus and 
Aleppo, important centres of Islam. 
Gouraud averred that the expenses France would incur in 
undertaking this task were primarily those of administration and 
45 When the Allies occupied Syria in 1918, General Allenby decreed that the 
Ottoman paper pound be replaced by the Egyptian paper pound. Therefore 
the French had to pay the expenses of their troops in Syria in Egyptian 
pounds which they bought with a greatly weakened franc. This meant in 
effect the doubling of their expenses. Therefore from May, 1920, a specially 
created French financial institution, the Banque de Syrie, was given the right 
to issue a Syrian currency which would be tied to the franc. Gouraud was 
somewhat disingenuous in his response, because in this transition to the new 
order, the expenses of the French occupation were still being calculated in 
Egyptian pounds whilst being paid with a steadily falling franc. See: 
`Memorandum de I'expose verbal fait le 13 Novembre 1920 ä M. le President 
du Conseil par le General Gouraud Haut Commissaire en Syrie et Cilicie': 
>'Budget, ' 4. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 2377. More generally, Ahmad 
Samman, Le regime monetaire de la Syrie (Paris: Librairie L. Rodstein, 
1935), 23-29. 
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control. These could be reduced to a minimum by limiting personnel on 
the civil side whilst relying on lower-paid native military units, members 
of the so-called Syrian Legion, as well as native irregular troops drawn 
from bedouin and Circassians. To him, this was a small price to pay for 
the opportunity to participate in such a profitable adventure. 
As can be seen from the above expose, when the chief French 
official in Syria was pressed by the parsimonious members of the 
parliamentary finance committee to set out good reasons as to why 
France should undertake the burdensome and extremely expensive 
occupation of Syria, he made the barest nod to sentiment, and placed 
primary emphasis on how the Syrian enterprise could be made 
profitable for France. First there was the Syrian purchase of French 
manufactures, but here France would be in competition with the rest of 
Europe. Second were the undoubted profits to be made from the 
transit of products shipped from the Syrian hinterland--particularly 
petroleum. Finally and most important, Gouraud saw Syria as the 
source of those raw materials so necessary for powerful sectors of 
French industry, and the well-being of the French citizen--silk, wool, 
vegetable oil, but above all, cotton and cereals . 
46 
46 One can contrast this optimistic evaluation of the economic worth of Syria 
offered by the chief political representative of France in the Levant at the 
beginning of his mission with the more realistic attitude of one of his leading 
technical experts. Edouard Achard pointed out that Syria had `a clearly 
agricultural character' precisely because the extent of her metal-bearing 
ores was unknown whilst deficiencies in her system of communications, her 
means of transport, and her labour force prevented any mines from being 
exploited. Edouard-C. Achard, `Actualites syriennes: ('irrigation, ' AF, XXIV, 
222, May 1924,200. 
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In this euphoric assessment, General Gouraud merely echoed 
the opinion of a study mission sent to Syria in the spring and summer of 
1919 under the auspices of the University of Lyon, the Chambers of 
Commerce of Lyon and Marseille, and the Paris-based Comite 
d'Orient. 47 This mission sprang from the desire of the economic 
section of the Congres frangais de la Syrie held in Marseille at the 
beginning of January, 1919 to obtain an inventory of Syria and its 
assets. Upon its return, its director Paul Huvelin, produced a report 
with the frank title of `Que vaut /a Syrie? ' ('What is Syria worth? '). 
Published in L'Asie Francaise, the principal organ promoting French 
colonialism in Asia, this account of the bounties which Syria offered to 
France was designed to counter those doubters who thought that Syria 
was not worth very much. 
As we have seen, propagandists for a French political presence 
in the Levant emphasised the strong historical links between the past, 
the present and the future in order to affirm the inalienable right of 
France to be there. So too did those who sought economic justification 
for the Mandate. They sought to portray French policies as ones 
designed to revivify a land, once so fecund in Roman times, which had 
languished for hundreds of years under the Ottoman yoke. In short, the 
`granary of Rome' was soon to become the granary of France. 
47 For an account of this mission, see 1>'Une mission 
frangaise en Syrie, ' AF, 
XX, 185, September-October, 1920,309-12; 2>Dominique Chevalier, `Lyon et 
la Syrie en 1919: les bases d'une intervention' Revue 
Historique, CCXXIV, 
1960,309-310; 3>Michel Seurat, `Le Röle de Lyon dans ('installation du 
mandat francais en Syrie: Interets economiques et culturels, 
luttes d'opinion 
(1915-1925), ' Institut francais de Damas: Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales [BEO], 
XXXI, 1979,141-43. 
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The propaganda extolling the future of Syria and her agriculture 
under French rule was buttressed by `statistics' purporting to show the 
penury of the present contrasted with the promise of the future. Those 
showing past production were supposedly the most accurate that could 
be obtained, usually either German compilations from Ottoman sources 
or French abridgements of these same sources. 48 This information was 
supplemented by estimates of current production gathered from 
`knowledgeable' local observers. As for the future, the 
prognostications varied from attempted estimates based on projections 
from current to future agricultural capacity to wild guesses founded 
more on hope than reality. 
Following Ruppin, Huvelin gave estimates of current Syrian 
wheat production in a `normal' year (i. e. one with sufficient rainfall and 
no locust depredations) at 1,000,000 tonnes. Using the same source, 
he gave normal barley production as 500,000 tonnes. 
49 He himself 
calculated that it might be possible to boost Syrian wheat output to 
some 3,000,000 tonnes and that of barley to some 2,000,000 tonnes. 
50 
As for cotton whose pre-war production was infinitesimal (an average 
48 The principal German source used was the report prepared by Dr. Arthur 
Ruppin, an agent of the Jewish Colonisation Association in his `Syrien als 
Wirtschaftsgebiet'. Supplement to Tropenpflanzer, 35,1916 (Berlin: 
Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee Verlag, 1917). This work was prepared at 
the invitation of the Ottoman governor of Syria, Jemal Pasha, and Ruppin had 
access to Ottoman sources. An English translation, considerably abridged, 
was published under the title Syria: An 
Economic Survey, translated and 
abridged by Nellie Straus (New York: The 
Provisional Zionist Committee, 
1918), 96 pp. 
The principal Ottoman source was Resume de /a statistique agricole 
de /a Turquie d'Asie et d'Afrique, annee 1325/1910 (Constantinople, 1912). 
49 Ruppin, Syrien ..., 
35,38', Idem, Syria.. ., 17; Huvelin, 
9-10. 
50 Huvelin, 9-10. 
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of some 1,500 tonnes produced mostly in the Idlib-Dana region), French 
experts predicted a future harvest of from 80-100,000 tonnes. 51 
The cereal production figures which Ruppin gave as indicative of 
a `normal' year appear to be quite an exaggeration. Ottoman statistics 
for 1325 M/1909-10 for the vilayets of Aleppo, Beirut, Syria, and the 
`independent' sanjaq of Zor gave a total production of 546,714 tonnes 
of wheat and 259,910 tonnes of barley. This area was somewhat larger 
than either Mandate or independent Syria since it included portions of 
what became later southern Turkey, northern Palestine, and northern 
Transjordan. Counterbalancing this increase in size was the fact that 
1325/1909-10 was a year `when the harvest was unusually poor, not 
more than 2/3 of what it usually is. '52 So perhaps these figures rather 
than those given by Ruppin are a more accurate measure of the cereal 
production of Syria in the years before the Great War. 
The predictions made by Huvelin had no basis in reality, either for 
the time they were made or for the foreseeable future. The year 1939 
51 For the pre-war figure, see Achard: `Etudes ..., ' 55; Huvelin, 11; Lower figure for future production extrapolated from information given in Achard, 
`Etudes ..., ' 20,47,48; higher 
figure from Huvelin, 11. 
52 Figures converted from those given in Justin McCarthy, compiler, The 
Arab World, Turkey, and the Balkans (1878-1914): A Handbook of Historical 
Statistics (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1982), Tables XIV. 4 and XIV. 6,266 and 
268. Figures given in kiles and kiyyes., viz. 
Wheat Weight per kile Barley Weight per kile 
(kites) (kiyyes) (kites) (kiyyes) 
Aleppo 1,698,747 23 771,516 17 
Beirut 1,576,037 25 460,622 17 
Syria 2,055,872 23 987,470 19 
Zor 145,000 22 190,500 15 
1 kile=36.37 litres 1 kiyye=1.28 kg 
McCarthy took this information from a book of Ottoman agricultural statistics: 
Ormen ve Maden ve Ziraat Nezareti, Kalem-i Mahsus Muduriyeti lstatistik 
Subesi, 1325 SenesiAsya ve Afrika-yi OsmaniZiraat /statistigi (Istanbul, 1327 
M. ). Quote from Ruppin, Syria ..., 15. 
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which saw the best cereal crop of the peacetime Mandate presented 
production figures of 685,000 tonnes for wheat and 480,000 tonnes for 
barley. These figures were only made possible by the burgeoning 
cultivation of the vast and rich lands beyond the Euphrates (the so- 
called 'Jazira'). That million tonne mark for wheat which Huvelin 
considered `normal' was only passed in 1956, and his half million tonne 
mark for barley in 1954. The target which Huvelin sought for wheat was 
only reached in 1992 (3,045,000 tonnes), some seventy years after 
Huvelin made his projection. A barley harvest of 2,836,000 tonnes only 
came in the fantastic crop year 1988. This was a `one-off' and was 45% 
greater than the next highest production figure, attained in 1980.53 
In a similar vein, the projections for cotton output which Huvelin 
and Achard drew up were not achieved under French rule. 
Nonetheless foundations were laid during that period which enabled 
Syria to reach the goal by 1950, and to far exceed it in the years that 
followed. 
However inaccurate their statistics, the experts were agreed that 
Syria was worth quite a lot, and that her agriculture had golden 
potential. Nonetheless they were equally certain that much needed to 
be done in order to reach this objective. Huvelin, for example, was well 
aware that variations in the weather pattern caused great fluctuations 
in production, and that the annual harvest was often barely able to 
53 1939 production figures: `Le developpement agricole en Syrie et au 
Liban, ' 1-2. MAE--Nantes, F. B., Carton 370. The production figures for 
independent Syria can be found in Syrian Arab Republic, Statistical Abstract 
of Syria, various years. 
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satisfy the needs of the local population in normal years, much less able 
to provide quantities to export abroad. He believed that the only way 
for Syria to triple her wheat harvest, quadruple her barley harvest, and 
transform herself into a net exporter of cereals was through expansion 
of the cultivated area onto hitherto virgin soil rather than by an increase 
in yields which might be quite problematic and take considerable 
time. " 
Even after such a brief visit, Huvelin realised that such an 
enhancement could occur only after the improvement of `physical, 
legal, and fiscal security' through the imposition of an `ordered 
political, administrative, and judicial regime'. 55 Nevertheless it was not 
Huvelin who set out what such a regime would entail in order to achieve 
agricultural development, but one of his colleagues on the study 
mission of 1919, Edouard Achard. 
1.7>Edouard Achard and his ideas 
Edouard Achard was delegated by the Marseille Chamber of 
Commerce to participate in the study mission because of his skills as an 
engineer-agronomist with great experience in the production of colonial 
crops, especially cotton. General Gouraud retained him for his 
expertise, and he later became Counsellor for Agriculture to the High 
Commission with particular responsibility for agricultural policy in the 
State of Syria, the most important of the statelets into which the 
54 Huvelin, 9. 
55 Loc. cit. 
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mandated territory came to be divided. 56 He stayed in Syria until the 
early 1930's and was universally acclaimed as a man with sound and 
sensible ideas on the subject of Syrian agriculture. During his period of 
service, he was perhaps the person who had the most influence on 
agricultural policy, not only for the State of Syria, but for all French- 
controlled territory in the Levant. He earned this respect because he 
saw himself as an agronomist, an objective expert, and within the 
constraint of political realities propounded those policies which in his 
opinion were best suited to further agricultural development in Syria. 
He first set forth his ideas in reports he prepared in October, 
1919 after his return from Syria. 57 Whilst voluminous, these were but a 
preliminary survey, and his astute observations were tempered by his 
ignorance of the Levant. Six years later, he returned to the subject, 
having refined his ideas after extensive field experience in the 
Mandated territories. In several reports written to expound his ideas, 
he set out a carefully-conceived programme for the regeneration of 
Syrian agriculture. 
56 Hourani, Syria ..., 172-73 outlines the various changes in the political and 
territorial structure of the Mandated states between 1920 and 1942. 
57 There were three of them, but they did not see the light of day until the 
summer of 1922, and included slight revisions to take account of changing 
political circumstances, viz. 1>'Notes sur la Cilicie'; and 2>'Notes sur la 
Syrie, ' Documents economiques, politiques et scientifiques, 4. Supplement 
to AF, XXII, 204, July-August, 1922,67-93 and 94-113; 3>`Etudes ..., ' 19-62. 
In the first two studies, Achard dealt more generally with agriculture in Cilicia 
and Syria whereas in the third he focused his attention on the cotton 
problem. He made two agricultural inventories of Syria in 1920 and early 
1922, viz. 1>`Notes sur les valeurs agricoles de la Syrie et la zone d'influence 
economique francaise en Turquie, ' Beirut, 1920 (probably sometime in the 
autumn), CCIL, Fonds Musees--Tissus 93c 1*1, Dossier Syrie--Divers, 1920; 
2>'Notes agricoles sur la Syrie, ' 20 January 1922 (rough draft of a lecture he 
gave on that date). MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 2377. 
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From the very beginning, Achard heaped scorn upon those who 
held a rosy vision of past Syrian agricultural history and its potential for 
the future. He pointed out that if indeed the great Arab general Amr b. 
al-As, the conqueror of Egypt for Islam, had said that `When God gave 
out benefits to the world, he gave nine-tenths to Syria, leaving the last 
tenth to be shared among all other regions', this was spoken like a true 
son of the desert for whom Syria, or at least parts of it, seemed to be 
Paradise on Earth. Those modern authors who adopted this dictum as 
their own were merely perpetuating an error, albeit a flattering one. 
For Syria was an agricultural country more by necessity than by right 
because she had few goods other than her crops to export as a means 
of paying the expenses of her imports. In examining closely what was 
produced, one saw that in the case of crops whose growth required 
human intervention (as opposed to those `spontaneous' crops like 
licorice root which merely required harvesting by man), the quantities 
produced were representative neither of the extent of the country nor 
of the fertility of its soil, nor even of an intense productive effort. In this 
regard, one could hardly place Syria in the same league with the United 
States, New Zealand, Canada, the Argentine, or Indochina where a 
population relatively small compared to the amount of territory 
inhabited produced and exported enormous quantities of food crops 
each year. 
If Syria did possess in reality nine-tenths of the bounties of the 
earth--a claim which the discovery of the New World, a pole of 
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attraction for many Syrian immigrants, had invalidated for centuries- 
her inhabitants should exploit far more of them than they did at present. 
For example, Syria was pre-eminently a producer of cereals. If 
so, why then did she have to import them from abroad in the period 
before the War in order to feed her population? Achard felt that she 
should he able to produce enough grain, not only to supply her own 
population, but to supply Europe as well in competition with the great 
grain-exporting countries of the New World. Yet in order to reach this 
goal, how many reforms must be introduced!! 58 
In outlining his own reform programme, Achard focused on four 
areas where he believed change was necessary for Syrian agriculture 
to move into the modern world. These were agrarian relations between 
landlord and cultivator; the labour force which he deemed insufficient 
for Syrian needs; the expansion of production to include valuable 
export crops; and a programme of irrigation to facilitate this expansion. 
1.8>Ideas of Achard--agrarian relations59 
In looking at the Syrian countryside for the first time, Achard was 
struck by the existence of great latifundia. Like Akram Hawrani, some 
thirty years later, Achard believed the most important obstacle 
hindering the development of Syrian agriculture was a system of land 
58 Achard, `Notes sur la Syrie, ' 94-95. 
59 Achard formulated his ideas on the subject of land tenure and agrarian 
relations in Syria in three reports, viz. 1>`Notes sur la Syrie, ' 100-103; 
2a>`Propriete rural et condition du cultivateur en Syrie, ' dated 6 March 1925, 
but probably written earlier. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 389; 2b>an expanded 
version of this report: `Les Problemes de ('agriculture syrienne: le probleme 
agraire, ' 19 December 1925, MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1571. 
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tenure which had led to the creation of such great estates. 6° In his 
opinion, the dissolution of these vast properties was the sine qua non 
for any agricultural progress in Syria. For their owners were mere 
parasites, eager to exploit their tenants through usury, binding them 
with the iron fetters of debt. For these great proprietors, what was 
important was not the precise amount of land they owned--indeed most 
had only the vaguest idea of the full extent of their domains--but the 
number of villages they controlled. A large number of tenants meant 
more opportunities for the extension of credit which enabled the 
landlord to increase his power--and their misery. 
Achard observed that most of the great proprietors did nothing to 
increase the value of their lands through improvements in technique. 
Indeed they did not even allow those members of their families who had 
studied modern agronomy in Europe to apply these skills on their own 
holdings. 
Achard also pointed out that the credit system which the Ottoman 
government had put in place to foster progress in the agriculture of the 
empire had proved beneficial to the pockets of the landlords whilst 
falling well short of helping the peasant. The Ottomans had set up an 
agricultural bank in 1887 in order to give low interest loans to 
cultivators and encourage them to improve their properties. 
Unfortunately, it was underfunded and its loan procedures so 
complicated that the peasant preferred to turn to his landlord or to 
60 Although Achard must have been aware that many of these estates had 
been created as recently as the chaotic period following the Great War, 
nowhere does he allude to this. 
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local merchants for funds. Moreover the various branches of the 
agricultural bank proved susceptible to local pressures, and local 
landlords borrowed from it only to re-lend the money to their tenants at 
a much higher rate. 61 
Faced with a situation in which he was ever the loser, the peasant 
had little incentive to improve production since its fruits would go 
largely to swell the coffers of avaricious landlords or usurious 
merchants. For their part, the great families had little incentive to 
change their methods of operation, weighed down as they were by the 
dead hand of tradition--whilst making a comfortable living off of it. 
Although Achard believed in the importance of changing the 
agrarian system, he realised that this would occur only over a long 
period of time. This was due to the inescapable fact that the Mandatory 
authorities would be unable to confiscate lands directly from the great 
proprietors because this would result in `regrettable political 
repercussions', i. e. a full-scale rebellion on the part of landlords robbed 
of their heritage. This could in no way be counterbalanced by the 
support of the peasant masses because the French had no means of by- 
passing the master to get to the serf who, in any case, still considered 
him as his lord. Therefore the only way in which the French could 
61 For the Ottoman Agricultural Bank and its deficiencies, see 1>Achard, 
`Propriete rurale..., ' 5-6; 2>/dem, `Les Problemes ... le probleme agraire, ' 5; 
3>Nadra Moutran, La Syrie de demain (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1916), 295-97; 
4>Charles Pavie, Etat d'A/ep: renseignements agrico/es (n. p., n. d. [Aleppo, 
1924? ]), 100-02; 4>Mohammed Thome, `Le Role du credit dans le 
developpement economique de la Syrie depuis la premiere guerre mondiale 
jusqu'ä nos jours, ' Thesis, University of Geneva (Madrid: Ediciones Castilla, 
S. A., 1953), 68-70. 
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achieve the break-up of the large estates was for the state to purchase 
those parts held legally, and distribute the lands so acquired to the 
cultivators. Outright seizure would prove legitimate only in the case of 
properties which landlords had obtained through unlawful 
machinations. 
Achard was well aware that this method of altering agrarian 
structures could be carried out only in direct proportion to the amount 
of money allocated to mount these operations. This expense would rise 
even higher because the government would have to give the peasants 
the initial capital to operate their new holdings. For a certain period 
these lands would have to remain inalienable to protect the new owners 
from the grip of the moneylender, and therefore could not be used as 
collateral to obtain bank loans. 
Moreover if the authorities decided to broach the idea of 
dismembering the great estates, they would soon come up against the 
obstacle that the exact extent of these properties was hardly known, 
based as they were, not on a precise survey of their boundaries, but 
often only with vague reference to certain natural features. Therefore 
precise and non-acrimonious division of these lands could only be 
undertaken after the institution of an accurate cadastral survey using 
the most modern techniques. 
For Achard, the problems were how to accomplish this 
`revolution' in tenurial relations. Since the French could not impose it 
by fiat, they had to use indirect methods whose application merely 
required time and a great deal of money. 
Since the latter was in short 
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supply, Achard proposed that the changes be implemented in stages 
with the least expensive (and least controversial) to be completed first. 
In his eyes, there was a certain logical order to the choices to be made: 
First would come the division of what he called `collective' property, i. e. 
lands where each member of the village community had a share of the 
whole rather than a specific plot (so-called `musha° tenure); next, the 
partition of lands held in common by a single family; then the 
dismemberment of State Domain. Finally, after all these measures had 
taken place would come the dissolution of the great latifundia. This 
whole process would be underpinned by the cadastral survey which 
would provide those titles so necessary for the creation of a class of 
peasant smallholders which Achard saw as the ultimate goal. 
The measures which Achard advocated were designed to make 
Syrian agriculture more productive by changing the social structure in 
the countryside. Moreover the permanent alteration of these 
arrangements to the benefit of the peasant smallholder would 
encourage an increase in the rural population. Achard believed that 
such an expansion in the number of cultivators was a sine qua non for 
agricultural regeneration under Syrian conditions. 
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1.9>Ideas of Achard--rural population62 
Achard observed that in a country like Syria, climate was such 
that in only one year out of three was it possible to export cereals; in the 
other two production was either barely sufficient for local needs or 
cereal imports were required. In such a situation profits were 
insufficient to generate the capital needed to fund the introduction and 
maintenance of machinery necessary to bring into production the vast 
uncultivated regions which undoubtedly existed. Therefore in order to 
avoid the vast debts which mechanisation would incur, the Syrian 
landowner perforce had to rely on manpower instead of horsepower. 
Achard felt that the system of sharecropping or metayage which 
was practised in Syria had developed in response to the necessity of 
making such a labour-intensive system work to the advantage of the 
proprietor. Whilst his profits might be less than if he had worked the 
land with wage labour, his charges would also be less, and he could 
continue his exploitation of the soil during both good years and bad. 
Moreover his tenant would become bound to him through an 
indissoluble economic link. 
62 Achard expressed his ideas on the relationship between agricultural 
productivity and the size of the rural population 
in four essays: 1>`Notes sur 
la Syrie, ' 98,101; 2>'Les Problemes de ('agriculture syrienne: ('exploitation 
du sol et la main d'oeuvre, ' Bulletin 
economique mensuel des Pays sous 
Mandat frangais [Bull. EHC], December, 1925,101-07; also found, dated 27 
January 1926 in MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1571; 3>'Culture du coton et main 
d'oeuvre agricole en Syrie, ' Bulletin de /'Union 
des Agriculteurs d'Egypte, 
XXIII, 159, March 1925,73-81; 4>'Le Main d'oeuvre agricole dans ('Etat des 
Alaouites, ' Bulletin de /'Union Economique de Syrie [Bull. UESJ, II, 1,31 
March 1923,23-25. 
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Achard asserted that a great increase in the agricultural 
population would be necessary for this system of cultivation to be 
effective in promoting the prosperity of the country. Therefore he 
called for the Mandatory authorities to encourage at all costs `the 
prolific tendencies of the Syrian race'. 
In his opinion, the constitution of smallholdings would help to 
achieve this object. The chance to become a smallholder would stem 
the current of urban and overseas migration from rural areas which 
could not support their inhabitants adequately. Moreover, the 
exploitation of new lands would provide an area of settlement for some 
of the minority refugee populations who had fled to Syria and engulfed 
the cities in the chaos at the end of the Great War. Finally, the 
formation of such small family-owned units in the countryside would 
furnish the Syrian peasant with sufficient economic security to enable 
him to rear a large family. 
Achard proposed that financial resources of the states, 
commercial credit, and loans from the agricultural bank be used to 
furnish the necessary funds to provide for the family unit. He believed 
that legal measures should be enacted to give guarantees of immunity 
from expropriation for debt; and to bar the subdivision of the new 
holdings in case of inheritance or sale. He also felt that Improvements 
in rural health care which would encourage family growth by lowering 
the rate of infant mortality were a necessary complement to these 
financial and legal measures. 
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Finally, Achard emphasised that the smallholdings should be 
large enough to support a single family, but small enough so that the 
children would be forced to migrate to new centres of production in the 
countryside. As a result, the expansion of the rural population would 
proceed hand-in-hand with the extension of the cultivated area. 
Achard believed that programmes designed to bring physical 
improvements to Syrian agriculture could succeed only after the 
number of cultivators had increased significantly, and the state had 
taken steps to alter agrarian relations to their benefit. Nevertheless 
this sequence was an ideal which would take many years to come to 
fruition, and action was needed to design and implement such schemes 
in the here and now. 
1. lo>Ideas of Achard--expansion of production through irrigation63 
It was because of his great experience in the raising of those 
`colonial' crops so desired by the French market that the Marseille 
Chamber of Commerce had first sent Achard to Syria. One of the 
reports which he produced after his return from the study mission of 
1919, `Etudes sur la Cilicie et la Syrie: le coton en Cilicie et en Syrie' 
set the seal on his reputation for expertise in the matter of cotton 
production. General Gouraud retained his services precisely because 
63 Achard developed his ideas on the expansion of production through 
irrigation in two articles: 1>`Actualites syriennes ..., ' 200-06; 2>'Les 
Irrigations dans I'Etat de Syrie, ' Bulletin economique mensuel des Pays sous 
Mandat frangais, July-August, 1926,819-832 and September-October, 1926, 
1076-1090. This essay is also to be found in MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1571 
under a slightly different title: 'Les Irrigations dans 
I'Etat de Syrie: leur etat 
actuel et leur avenir, ' 10 August 1926. 
93 
he felt that Achard would be able to devise a programme which would 
have a direct effect on the production of cotton and other vital 
commodities. 
Therefore, in addition to his ruminations on the problems of land 
tenure and population, Achard turned his mind, to ways and means for 
the direct improvement of agriculture under Syrian climatic conditions. 
Like other observers64 , he found the remedy in irrigation. 
Achard pointed out that a major obstacle to Syrian agricultural 
production was the variation in natural water reserves over time and 
that as a result, the existence of regularly available supplies was an 
absolute prerequisite for the flourishing of crops. Because rainfall was 
so inconsistent, the inhabitants of Syria had used various methods 
throughout history to tap the water available from rivers, springs, and 
permeable rock formations. It was these networks so laboriously 
created which had made parts of Syria so fecund in the past. Even 
after what Achard judged to be four centuries of Ottoman neglect, the 
ingenuity which maintained the fertility of the Ghuta of Damascus and 
the gardens surrounding Homs and Hama still retained a capacity to 
astound. Therefore the regeneration and the extension of irrigation 
was the key to the expansion of production. 
64 For example, HC General Gouraud who invited Georges Carle, an 
agricultural engineer and cotton expert, to come to Syria in the spring of 
1922 in order to examine the irrigation possibilities. He published his 
findings the following year, and his report strongly promoted the use of 
waterworks to expand production. See Georges Carle, `L'Hydraulique 
agricole et industrielle en Syrie, ' La Geographie, XXXIX, 5, May, 1923,564- 
602. His report was also published separately by the Societe d'editions 
geographiques, maritimes et coloniales (Paris, 1923). 
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The question was how to launch a programme which was cost- 
effective. Achard believed that it could be divided into two parts: First 
was the ongoing one of continuous improvement and extension of the 
many private irrigation networks currently in use; second, a planned 
and rational development of the water resources contained in the rivers 
which passed through Syrian territory. These had not been properly 
exploited for many generations, if ever. 
The first part of this irrigation programme was to be 
accomplished by implementing certain simple and inexpensive 
measures: training the peasant how to make more efficient use of the 
water currently available to him whilst making better use of 
groundwater by drilling more wells and restoring the extensive qanat 
systems to be found on the desert fringes of Syria, many of which had 
long fallen into desuetude. Although measures of this type were 
certainly important, it was difficult to gauge their effect on increasing 
production. Therefore Achard believed that the taming of rivers which 
now flowed unchecked to the sea was of far greater importance. 
In choosing from the inventory of resources available, he focused 
on the rivers of western Syria as proving more immediately useful. He 
placed a particular emphasis on the development of the Orontes, both 
in its upper course through the restoration of the storage capacities of 
Lake Horns and in its middle course through the drainage of the Ghab 
Valley between Qala`t Shayzar and Qarqur. He felt that utilisation of the 
waters of the Orontes offered several obvious advantages: First, these 
districts were located well within the zone of settled agriculture and 
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experienced cultivators. Moreover, there was a very large labour force 
available in the Jabal Ansariya to the west of the Orontes basin. This 
was of the greatest importance since Achard had already established65 
that any exploitation of the soil would be labour intensive rather than 
capital intensive under the system of metayage then prevalent in Syria. 
Finally it was obvious that any irrigation scheme could only pay for itself 
if it produced high-value commodities, principally cotton, for shipment 
abroad. The location of the Orontes region near the ports of Tripoli and 
Beirut and contiguous to the principal sections of the DHP gave it an 
advantage over less favoured districts. 
A case in point was to be found in those lands adjoining the river 
Euphrates. Here the potential was enormous, but most of the region lay 
deep within the desert zone where the existence of a nomadic 
population with large herds would make it difficult for large agricultural 
schemes to function. The corollary to this was the presence of a small 
sedentary population whose density was unlikely to increase in the near 
future. Moreover these territories were located far from the ports of 
western Syria, and facilities for the transport of any commodities grown 
were practically non-existent. 
In sum, Achard saw irrigation as a sort of lever with which he, like 
Archimedes, could move the world, the world of agriculture, out of a 
past within which it lay embedded like a fossil, into a vibrant and 
productive future. The establishment of such schemes posed 
65 In his essay `Les Problemes de I'agriculture syrienne: ('exploitation du sol 
et la main d'oeuvre. ' 
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problems, but these problems, which were largely technical, seemed 
far easier to solve than those presented by landlord-tenant relations 
and population scarcity. In fact, he believed the potentials for profit 
was such that landlords would be more than happy to support irrigation 
projects on their lands, even to the extent of being prepared to bear 
some of the costs. 
Overall Achard believed that changes in land tenure, an increase 
in the rural population, and the physical extension and qualitative 
improvement of production through irrigation were three aspects of the 
same question: At that time, agriculture was the only wealth Syria 
possessed. She had no known mineral resources, and her traditional 
status as an entrepöt was much diminished by the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire which had led its successor states to erect customs 
barriers in order to protect their own interests. Therefore for him the 
problem faced was how best to nourish Syrian agricultural potential in 
order to support her commerce and stabilise her budget whilst 
augmenting those revenues and resources needed for unfettered 
development. 66 
1.11>The Influence of Achard on agricultural policy 
The ideas which Achard presented so cogently were important 
because in one form or another, official attitudes and policies towards 
the development of agriculture during the time of the Mandate reflected 
66 Achard, `Actualites syriennes ..., ' 201. 
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them. For example, in 1940 which was the very end of peacetime 
administration, HC Gabriel Puaux sent a number of reports to the Quai 
d'Orsay on `French achievements in the Levant'. 67 In essence, these 
were a summary of those projects which the Mandatary considered its 
most important accomplishments in Syria and the Lebanon after some 
twenty years of stewardship. The programmes in the area of rural 
regeneration were rather different in their emphases and in their 
proportions than those which Achard had advocated some fifteen years 
previously, but the influence of his ideas could still be discerned. The 
differences were the result of certain adaptations which reality had 
forced upon his successors. The reasons for these adjustments 
illustrate the various problems which hampered French administration 
in Syria. 
An important example of this was the relationship between the 
cadastral survey and the physical improvements made to Syrian 
agriculture over the twenty years of the Mandate. Although the 
authorities listed the cadastral survey first in their list of 
accomplishments, in fact they placed far more emphasis on projects for 
the physical amelioration of the Syrian countryside. The compilers of 
67 MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 370, covering letter dated 14 Dec. 1940, his final 
day in office, and thus truly the last day of the `normal' Mandate 
administration. Among other items are nine notes on various aspects of 
agricultural development of which four are extant, viz. 1>'L'Oeuvre du 
mandat dans le domaine agricole' (n. d. ); 2>'Le Developpement agricole en 
Syrie et au Liban' (n. d. ); 3>'Les Irrigations dans la region de Homs' (19 April 
1939); 4>`Amenagements hydrauliques au Djebel Druze, ' (n. d. ). In the carton 
there is also an undated report entitled `Realisations francaises au Levant' 
which was probably written in the spring of 1940 for publication 
in a 
brochure (references to photographs to be inserted). The section on 
`agricultural renovation' is to be found on pages 7-10. 
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these reports described the work of the cadastral survey as a `gigantic 
task' demanding `years of effort' from both the technical and legal 
points of view. They asserted this because cadastration was not only a 
matter of survey, mapping, delimitation, and demarcation, but also one 
of adjudicating extremely complicated property disputes caused by the 
imprecision of previous Ottoman legislation and the overlapping of a 
variety of communal property rights. 
Over nearly twenty years, some 3,250,000 hectares comprising 
the richest agricultural regions were cadastred. This was slightly over 
half of a cultivable/cultivated area of 6,114,000 and 16% of a total area 
of 20,250,000 hectares. Whilst this figure might appear somewhat 
derisory, given the difficulties encountered and the money available, all 
in all the technical results were quite respectable. 68 
Unfortunately the social ones were less so. Achard had seen 
cadastration as a tool which could be used to reform the system of land 
tenure, and spread the benefits of the physical improvements to the 
poorest cultivator. Yet in the reports of 1940 there was nary a mention 
of this larger goal. For the Mandatory administration, cadastration had 
68 For the figures of cultivable/cultivated area and total area, see Regie des 
travaux du cadastre et d'amelioration fonciere des Etats de Syrie et du Liban, 
`Statistiques relatives: 1>ä la superficie des Etats de Syrie et du Liban apres 
la derniere rectification de la frontiere syro-irakienne; 2>au denombrement 
de la population, ' December, 1934, MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 388,2. These 
statistics are for the entire territory of the Mandate: the Republic of Syria 
including the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, the Republic of Lebanon, the 
Government of Latakia, and the Governmemt of the Jabal Druz. Note that the 
area of cultivated/cultivable land was approximate, and excluded desert, 
forest, and mountain land as well as those areas which it was not possible to 
bring under production or which required important engineering works as a 
prerequisite for doing so. 
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become a task which was complete in and of itself with no further 
consequences for agrarian relations. 
The writers of these reports extolled what they believed to be the 
other major accomplishment of agricultural regeneration carried out by 
their compatriots. This was the construction of irrigation systems in 
order to expand cultivation onto virgin territory. The goal was to 
improve the standard of living and enrich the country by using these 
lands to grow crops of high value: fruit and olive trees, market garden 
crops, and industrial crops such as cotton. 
The principal irrigation project centred around the repair and 
elevation of the ancient dam at the northern end of Lake Homs/Qattina; 
and the construction of a main irrigation canal, 56 kilometres of 
secondary canals, and 250 kilometres of tertiary canals. These feats of 
engineering were designed to extend cultivation over some 15,000 
hectares of the fertile plateaux which extended along the course of the 
Orontes between Homs and Rastan, with further work opening up 
another 7,000 hectares between Rastan and Hama to agriculture. Thus 
considerable progress was made towards the goal which Achard had 
propounded: to bring under the plough these lands in the heart of 
Syria, and to transform it into the granary it once had been in the days 
of the Romans. 
The writers pointed out that efforts made to extend the dry- 
farmed lands deeper into the transitional zone complemented the 
programme of irrigation. These too were another facet of the 
regenerative measures which Achard had advocated. Here the 
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authorities followed tried and true techniques of the past-renewing 
wells and cisterns and digging new ones. The reports said that it was 
an effort such as this which had opened up the great area of the Jazira 
to productive agriculture, a task facilitated by a more effective policing 
of the desert in order to control nomad depredations. 
These economic improvements were complemented by what was 
described as a `humanitarian undertaking', but which in its economic 
consequences carried out certain ideas adumbrated by Achard. This 
action was the settlement of Christian minority refugee groups on lands 
which were underpopulated but fertile. The authors asserted that it 
was only through the exercise of this right of asylum that the High 
Jazira had been brought into production. 69 
The authorities of 1940 painted their work of agricultural 
regeneration as the least spectacular, but the most solid 
accomplishment of the Mandate. There were certain other 
improvements carried out during the Mandate which rounded out the 
more direct measures which Achard believed necessary to improve 
production, whilst reflecting certain long-standing preoccupations of 
French entrepreneurs. These were the enhancement of the 
communications network within the Mandated territories--the roads, 
69 In fact a bit of an exaggeration. In 1939, the population of the fertile High 
Jazira was some 166,000 souls, of whom some 81,000 were Muslim Kurds, 
42,000 Arab Muslims, 40,000 Christians (of whom 8000 were Assyrians 
settled along the western Khabur), the balance being Yezidis, Jews, and 
Chechens, See MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1367. Dossier `Repartition de la 
population de la Haute Djezireh--avril 1939'. Another copy of this list, 
undated, is in Carton 504. 
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railroads, and ports so necessary to ship agricultural products to 
markets both within Syria and abroad. 70 
The amount of asphalt all-weather road increased from none in 
1920 to 3,000 kilometres in 1940 with an additional 7,000 kilometres of 
improved tracks. The principal rail effort was applied to the former 
Baghdadbahn, first driving it eastward to Tal Ziwan, 10 kilometres 
beyond Nusaybin, and then south-east for 72 kilometres to the Iraqi 
frontier whence it was linked to Mosul. The French authorities 
compared this to the `rail miracle of the American Far West' in that it 
facilitated the opening of the Jazira to cultivation by providing a more 
efficient means of sending its harvest to market. The final link in this 
transportation chain was the development and improvement of three 
ports whence Syrian produce could be exported abroad: Latakia, 
Tripoli, and Beirut. 
The improvements to the ports of Latakia and Tripoli were quite 
modest. The new harbour of Latakia was an expansion of the little 
fishing port which lay on the site of the ancient Laodicea ad Mare. This 
was built to serve the Alaouite State and by extension Aleppo and north 
Syria. There were docks for sailing boats and small cargo ships, and a 
roadstead for the discharge of larger ones. The port of Tripoli was 
enlarged, and a special facility built for the shipment of oil coming 
through the pipeline from Iraq which had its terminus there. 
70 For the improvements made in the communications network within Syria 
during the Mandate, see 1>`Realisations ..., ' 1-7; 2>'Les Voies de 
communications et les moyens de transport au Levant'; and for more 
detailed analyses 3> `Les Installations portuaires'; 4>Les Voies ferrees. ' All 
in MAE--Nantes, F6, Carton 370. 
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The major effort of port renovation was directed toward the port 
of Beirut, the principal outlet for the Levant states, and the chief rival of 
Haifa in the eastern Mediterranean. The original port built between 
1890-95 had long outgrown its facilities. It was necessary to deepen 
and extend the harbour, lengthen the quays, and build new ones so that 
ships were no longer forced to undergo the long and costly process of 
discharging their cargoes onto lighters to be transhipped ashore. 
Thus one could say that by 1940, the Mandatory authorities had 
implemented part of the programme of infrastructural improvements 
which Achard had sketched so many years before, and in certain areas 
had moved well beyond him. Nevertheless there were certain gaps in 
this achievement, particularly with regard to the reform of agrarian 
relations in the countryside, but also in the field of irrigation, where 
despite much-vaunted French expertise, certain projects were never 
realised. One can impute these lacunae to a concatenation of factors 
which would have limited the attainments of any programme for /a raise 
en valeur. 
1.12>Factors limiting the French achievement 
These factors can be grouped into two categories. To begin 
with, there were those related to certain shortcomings peculiar to the 
French Mandatory system and its servants, viz. 
I>The ideological biases held by Achard and his 
colleagues, biases which were compounded by 
deficiencies in their understanding of Syrian reality. 
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II>The methods proposed and used to implement the 
reforms. 
III>The financial constraints which hampered the 
implementation of all projects. 
IV>The close links between economics and politics where 
problems in one sphere often served as an excuse and an 
explanation for problems within the other. 
V>The nature of the French administration responsible for 
the programmes--a bureaucratic machine with all its 
inherent strengths and weaknesses--and one which had 
created a labyrinth of jurisdictions in which to operate. 
VI>The problem of time and timing: France was in Syria for 
only twenty years, and during part of this period, the world 
was sunk in one of the greatest economic crises ever 
known. 
Beyond these particular constraints lay those which were rather 
more nebulous, and thus more difficult to comprehend, viz. 
A>The very nature of the mandate system, which 
encouraged attitudes of ambivalence among those who 
might otherwise have promoted agricultural schemes. 
B>The character of French imperialism which often 
brought little economic and social improvement to 
indigenous populations, even in those colonial territories 
which were under the French flag for thrice as long as 
Syria. 
C>the question whether one could really have expected 
greater economic accomplishments from any colonial or 
mandatory enterprise. 
The particular constraints. Among the particular 
constraints, one must list first what one might describe as the 
`ideological' biases of Achard and his colleagues, attitudes which 
conditioned their response to the situation as they found it in Syria. 
Their behaviour was affected equally by a failure to understand the 
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peculiarities of Syria as opposed to North Africa or French West Africa 
where many of them had seen previous service. Whilst one can laud 
Achard as an extremely astute observer and an undoubted expert on 
colonial agriculture, one must realise that he was in no way an expert 
on Syria. Moreover he carried with him the baggage of certain 
prejudices which were not applicable to Syrian conditions. 
One of the most important of these was his preoccupation with 
and predilection for the destruction of large landed property in favour 
of private peasant smallholdings. This idea was buttressed by his belief 
that whilst, in principle, the knowledge and financial resources 
possessed by large landowners were certainly conducive to the 
employment of the most modern agricultural techniques, the capacity 
for production of individual farm units was less for large holdings than it 
was for small ones. This obsession with the creation of individual 
peasant plots blinded him to the essentially communal nature of 
agriculture in a land where the interests of the individual cultivator 
were carefully balanced against those of the social group within which 
he functioned. It also led him to ignore the essentially patrimonial 
relationship between landlord and tenant, although it must be said that 
during the period of the Mandate, the element of exploitation in this 
bond was coming more to the fore in certain regions. 
This misperception was symbolic of a deeper failing: his inability 
to fully understand the complex patterns woven into Syrian agricultural 
life. For example, he did understand that the relationship between the 
two partners in a sharecropping contract was a symbiotic one, but 
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believed, rightly, that the dominance of the landlord when combined 
with his desire to recover his capital outlay meant that in practice the 
cultivator got the worst of the bargain. Yet he did not seem to be aware 
that there were various forms of metayage prevalent in Syria whose 
distinctions derived from the fertility of the district involved and the 
type of agriculture practised. 
A second constraint was that Achard and his colleagues 
determined to use only indirect and legalistic methods to accomplish 
the reforms he had suggested. A prime example of this was the role he 
proposed for the cadastral survey. Achard believed that because many 
of the newly cadastred properties were grossly undervalued, they 
should be appraised and their taxes increased.. The funds thus 
obtained would be used to guarantee a loan which would then be 
employed to establish smallholdings and to acquire property from large 
landlords. Such methods of acquisition were designed to accomplish 
their object with a minimum of social disruption. This delicate 
approach to what was indeed a bouleversement in social relations was 
conditioned by the political weakness of the French in a land where 
they were hardly loved and where their only clients were among 
minorities who were largely concentrated in Lebanon, a region where 
latifundia were the exception rather than the rule. In Syria, the French 
could not afford to antagonise the notables, many of whom were large 
landholders, through acts deemed to be ones of spoliation. Such a 
policy was deemed necessary because of political expediency, but one 
also suspects that there was a natural bourgeois antipathy for 
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procedures deemed to smack of depredation, a repugnance reinforced 
by the recent horrors of the Bolshevik Revolution where such policies 
were widely applied. 
It goes without saying that indirect methods were insufficient to 
enforce change in agrarian relations. Economic realities and social 
traditions proved too strong for such elegant manoeuvres. 
The application of policies of gradualism in order to effect 
change was also conditioned by a third constraint, one which was 
continuously present during the Mandate, that of finance. France was 
unwilling and unable to pay for the various improvements she proposed 
to carry out in her mandated territories due to her own rather parlous 
financial situation in the interwar period. Even if she had possessed 
vast reserves of cash, she was unwilling to dispense them to equip a 
territory for which she did not have the ultimate responsibility, and for 
which the plan was eventual accession to independence. 
Indeed those who devised the mandate concept did not expect 
the responsible Power to use its own resources to develop those of its 
ward without being reimbursed for its outlay by the beneficiary. Thus 
Article 15 of the Mandate Charter for Syria and Lebanon provided that 
upon independence, the three parties would come to an agreement 
under which the tutees would reimburse the tutor the money she had 
spent on their behalf. This expenditure was defined to include the costs 
of administration, of the development of natural resources, and of such 
permanent structures as roads and ports. The French soon realised 
that any such an agreement had no chance of being honoured due to 
107 
the poverty of the territories under Mandate, and to the fact that no 
Syrian leader would ever agree to remunerate the Mandatary for any 
substantial sum. Thus France had one more reason to spend as little as 
possible. 71 
The impact of this capital insufficiency on development projects 
in the French Mandated territories was highlighted by what occurred in 
the British Mandate of Palestine. Britain found herself in a similar 
situation after the Great War, unable to supply cash from her own 
coffers to bring improvements to her new charge. Yet this was never 
required because the financial penury of the Mandatary was 
compensated by the ability of Zionist organisations to pour money into 
Palestine in order to create a modern infrastructure and develop the 
territory. 
The price paid for this Zionist investment was European Jewish 
immigration: In effect, what the British did in Palestine was to permit 
the creation of a colony of foreign settlers who brought their skills and 
their capital to bear in their new home. For their part, the French did 
not allow the immigration of colonists with capital because to do so 
71 For the discussion of this question which took place at the time of the 
Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, see Republique Frangaise, Ministere des 
Finances [MF], 1>Letter from HC de Martel to MAE, 12 May 1936 to which is 
attached 2>PrOCes-Verbal: `Reunion aux Affaires Etrangeres au sujet de la 
creance de la France sur la Syrie, ' 7 May 1936. Dossier: Syrie: Finances des 
Etats--Creance de la France sur les Etats Syriens sous Mandat francais 
(1926-36). Carton B 32.937--F30 2044. Even this minimum was subject to 
lively criticism, e. g. from the Socialist Deputy Sixte-Quentin. See his article 
`Le Gouffre Syrien, ' La Populaire, 15 March 1931 to be found in the same 
dossier. By contrast, HC de Martel pointed out in his own note that since the 
expenses of France in the Levant were aimed at maintaining her prestige 
among the local population, to demand their remuneration to the last franc 
would destroy the image of generosity which she sought to present. 
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would be counter to the spirit of the Mandate. As a result many worthy 
projects could not be carried out for want of funds. The British did 
permit such immigration, and great changes did occur, but at what 
cost! 
72 
This brings up a fourth constraint which blocked much of the 
process of /a raise en va/eur. the close intertwining of politics and 
economics during the Mandate. On the one hand, the French sought to 
focus on economic development in a vain attempt to divert Syrian 
preoccupations with the slow pace of political evolution, and to prove to 
their wards that this tutelage which they hated actually brought them 
some benefit. Yet on the other, these same administrators found it 
extremely difficult to propose a coherent programme of infrastructural 
amelioration. The reasons for this contradiction lay in the fact that 
whereas the French were continually engrossed by politics, that is to 
say by the management of the various local governments they had 
spawned as well as by an endless duel with their opponents among the 
Syrian elite, they seemed to have focused only intermittently on 
economic questions. 
The French view certainly was that political stability was 
necessary for economic improvement. Until the signing of the Franco- 
Syrian Treaty of 1936, `political stability' was understood to mean 
political quiescence with puppet regimes of technicians and political 
yes-men who would interest themselves solely in economic problems, 
72 See the comments in Weulersse, Paysans..., 208. 
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leaving political questions to be solved by their French advisors. The 
Alaouite State was a typical example of such a regime, and during the 
1920's, it was one of the regions with the most success in attracting 
foreign capital, principally for investment in cotton. 
After the treaty of 1936, a unitary Syrian state comprising the 
political entities previously known as the State of Syria, the 
Government of Latakia, and the Government of the Jabal Druz was set 
up. 73 The new `republic' was now controlled by Syrian nationalist 
politicians guided by French officials, and was apparently set on the 
road to independence. For French officials writing then, the economic 
viability of the new state was dependent on the ability of its 
administration to contract loans which in turn was still intimately linked 
to the maintenance of a `stable and definitive regime'. 74 
To reverse this argument, one could say that if the French had 
been able to carry out a massive programme of equipment of the 
country for success in the modern world, this would have led to a more 
harmonious relationship with Syrian nationalists, i. e. 
economic development-->political stability 
Nevertheless this proposition too was flawed by the indubitable fact 
that the conflict between the French and their opponents had very little 
to do with economics, and everything to do with politics. 
73 The difference between the `state' of Syria and the two `governments' of 
Latakia and Jabal Druz lay in their administrative organisation. Syria had 
Syrian ministers and a largely Syrian administration who ruled with the 
advice of French counsellors. Both Latakia and the Jabal Druz had French 
governors, and administrations mostly run by Frenchmen because the 
French considered these two regions to be less politically evolved. 
74 See the comment in de Hautecloque, `L'Avenir economique ..., ' 22. 
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When one probes deeper into the question as to why there were 
so few concerted programmes for agricultural expansion, one comes 
upon a fifth constraint: the cumbersome administration which France 
imposed on Syria. This was a regime whose various elements were 
often more interested in enlarging their own arenas of action vis-ä-vis 
bureaucratic rivals than in uniting in support of policies whose results 
would be beneficial to the country whose interests they were 
supposedly there to further. Moreover when the various arms of this 
bureaucratic hydra were able to agree upon a project, they were often 
afraid to commit themselves to its implementation before it was proven 
to be absolutely viable. This meant years of studies, and 
postponements, and more studies, and in the end, nothing done at all. 
The failure to exploit the Ghab-Asharna region is a classic case in 
point. 75 
It was only in a crisis situation, when a single powerful person 
pressed for a particular programme that moves were made towards its 
implementation. In Syria, this figure was inevitably the High 
Commissioner who was sometimes seconded by a powerful 
subordinate, anxious to see his own plan brought to fruition. Two 
examples of such a situation were the first project to drain the Ghab for 
75 A long-serving (and anonymous) French official levelled bitter criticisms at 
the administrative organisation of the Mandate which, in his opinion, led to 
ignorance and sloth. He felt that the recent creation of a Counsellor for 
Economic Affairs merely added another toothless official and bureaucratic 
layer, and called for an economic czar with the power and tools (such as a 
statistical bureau) to deal coherently with current affairs whilst planning for 
the future. Needless to say, his advice went unheeded. `Note', February, 
1930. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 808. 
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cotton cultivation in 1923-25 where failure was due to lack of finance, 
and the decision in 1934 to build the Horns Dam, and extend the 
irrigated area in the Homs-Hama region. 
Such intervention would occur only for very important projects, 
ones which would benefit the entire Mandated territory. The smaller 
ones were the responsibility of the different statelets into which the 
Mandate was divided. This points to the other aspect of the 
administrative problem: The fact that each of these political entities 
was theoretically independent of its fellows with its own separate 
administration seconded by French advisors in each department. As a 
result of what was a bureaucratic dream, but an administrative 
nightmare, it was impossible to have a co-ordinated agricultural policy 
for all the territories under Mandate. It was impossible because having 
created this maze of jurisdictions, the French were forced to respect 
them--although those officials involved in shaping various aspects of 
economic policy often complained sotto voce about the shackles thus 
imposed. 76 
Moreover having fostered `independent' governments with 
separate budgets, each responsible for projects within its own purview, 
the advisors could hardly force action, however recalcitrant their 
76 For example, Charles Pavie, Director of the Agricultural and Economic 
Services in the Alaouite State noted how the political organisation of the 
Mandated territories prevented the implementation of a co-ordinated cotton 
policy. Charles Pavie, Le Coton dans /e Gouvernement de Lattaquie (Aleppo: 
Imprimerie Maronite, n. d. [1931? ]), 17. In 1928, a hard-headed official of the 
Ministry of Finance noted the pernicious effects of these political divisions for 
administrative and financial efficiency in general: `Les finances des Etats de 
Levant places sous mandat francais, ' 9 November 1928. MF, Carton B 
32.936--F302043. 
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puppets. Often as not, these tools proved less than pliable, whether 
because of indolence and/or incompetence, or as a subtle way of 
demonstrating independence from the foreign counsellors with their 
hectoring admonitions. 
Finally one comes to a Sixth constraint, one which seems so 
trivial, but assumed an enormous importance. This is the problem of 
time and timing. France was in the Levant for only some twenty years 
whereas in her other colonies or protectorates, she ruled for double or 
triple the length. As a result of this, there was much less time to 
accomplish the development of infrastructure and the exploitation of 
resources. Moreover the period of French rule in the Levant was cut in 
two by the world economic crisis of the nineteen thirties. In 1929-1930, 
it appeared that the Mandated territories were finally poised for 
`takeoff' after having gone through some ten years of disorganisation 
and bureaucratic indecision. Cotton cultivation and irrigation were two 
carefully nurtured plants which seemed about to bear fruit. The coming 
of the Great Depression put paid to all these plans, and when Syria 
emerged from it some five years later, it did so into a different world. 
Thus both time and timing when taken with the other constraints had a 
significant effect on the evolution of economic policy. 
The general constraints. The trammels of ideology, 
method, finance, politics, bureaucracy, and time certainly limited those 
policies of the French administration whose object was to improve rural 
life and production in Syria. These particular constraints were in many 
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ways peculiar to the Syrian situation, and not replicated exactly 
elsewhere. Others were much more nebulous because they stemmed 
from more general considerations: the type of system under which 
conquered territories were awarded after the Great War; the very 
character of the French imperial enterprise; and, more generally, the 
capacity of any kind of colonial or mandatory system to carry out 
coherent schemes for economic betterment. 
In order to understand the first general constraint, one must look 
at the mandate system itself, and more particularly at the relation of this 
system to Syria and the historical role which France had conceived for 
herself there. The victorious Allied Powers decided to create 
`mandates' after the Great War in deference to the principles of 
national self-determination espoused by Woodrow Wilson, and in 
embarrassment at their own cynicism after the Bolsheviks exposed the 
secret treaties dividing up the spoils of the Ottoman Empire. Observers 
drew an unflattering parallel between the altruistic proposals of the 
American president and the greed displayed by Britain and France in 
their carve-up of the Ottoman lands in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 
1916. Therefore after the war, the Great Powers agreed to curb their 
appetites by ruling their new acquisitions not as master, but as tutor 
under supervision of the newly created League of Nations. Not only 
were the ruling Powers to be accountable to an international body for 
their behaviour, but their role was conceived as one of bringing their 
wards to economic and political maturity which would eventually lead to 
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independence and a seat in the League as an adult member of the 
family of nations. " 
Problems did not arise with the mandates which had been 
German colonial possessions in Africa and the Pacific. These `B' and 
`C' mandates were so undeveloped politically and economically as to 
differ little from neighbouring colonial territories. They could be 
administered along the same lines with little protest from their 
inhabitants and the international community. 
Unfortunately Syria and the other territories of the former 
Ottoman Empire were not in this category. They were `A' Mandates 
because the framers of the mandate system considered their 
inhabitants to be much more highly evolved in both political and 
economic terms. As a result, their tutors could not treat each of them 
as a mere colony to be milked in the interests of the occupying power, 
but were compelled to seek a balance between their own needs, the 
needs of the tutee, and the needs of the `senior tutor', the international 
community. 78 
77 For a discussion of the several sources of the mandate idea, see 1 >Peter 
Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 18-19; 54, 
fn 35; and in particular, 2>Helmut Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil. - Iraq, 1910- 
28 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 49-69. 
78 As enshrined in the famous Article 11 of the Mandate Charter which 
provided for the principle of `economic equality' in the Mandated territory for 
all members of the League of Nations. This meant that there could be no 
tariff discrimination, no fiscal or commercial favouritism, no bias in 
employment, and perfect equality of treatment for ships and airlines. This 
`Open Door' principle was a difficult charge to carry out in itself, particularly 
because it had to be balanced against the interests of the tutee, and those of 
the Mandatary. For some of the problems encountered, see Letter: HC de 
Martel to MAE, 17 November 1933: `Les Etats sous Mandat et le principe de 
I'egalite economique. ' MAE--Nantes, F6, Carton 863. 
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In the case of Syria, France had traditional interests and clients 
which the other Great Powers had recognised before the coming of the 
War. 79 In defence of these interests, she had brutally rejected and 
ejected the Sharifian regime which claimed to be the voice of the Syrian 
people. As a result, her tutelage was not welcomed by a large 
proportion of that people. The soundings taken by the King-Crane 
Commission indicated that most preferred no mandate. If that was not 
feasible, they would accept an American Mandate; if that too proved 
impossible, a British; but in no case did they desire a French one. 80 
Thus when France entered Syria, she did so by force of arms and 
was faced by reactions which ranged in general from sullen 
acquiescence to outright revolt. She really only had support from 
certain traditionally Francophile elements: Maronite and other Uniate 
Christians; minorities such as the Armenians and the Circassians; and 
certain members of the commercial and landed elite who saw it to be in 
their own interest to co-operate with the new masters. 
When one combined such a delicate political situation with the 
restrictions imposed by the mandate concept, it was no wonder that the 
French authorities were forced to tread lightly in propounding certain 
policies. The proposals espoused by Albert Sarraut in La raise en 
va/eur des colonies francaises could never have been applied in their 
79 For the relationship between French and British interests in the Levant, 
see 1>Khalidi, passim; 2>Shorrock, French imperialism ..., 114-37. 
80 For the soundings of Syrian public opinion regarding a possible Mandatary 
which were made by the King-Crane Commission, see Harry N. Howard, An 
American Inquiry in the Middle East. " The King-Crane Commission (Beirut: 
Khayats, 1963), 200-203. 
116 
full vigour to Syria because Syria was not a colony created for the 
benefit of France. Since it was not so, and since eventually, in what was 
hopefully a far-distant future, Syria would be emancipated from French 
tutelage and become an independent nation, there was a great deal of 
hesitation on the part of the Mandatory Power as well as on the part of 
private citizens and organisations of that Power as to how much capital 
should and could be invested. On the one hand, many in the colonial 
party easily blurred the distinction between the familiar concept of 
`colony' and the new and strange one of `mandate'. Yet at the same 
time, they were reluctant to place money in Syrian projects because 
they knew that any investment would only be realised over the long 
term. They feared that they might draw no profits before France 
departed, and that these might prove precarious in an independent 
Syria. 
Moreover hardened imperialists were not particularly enamoured 
of that new and ridiculous principle of `equality of economic opportunity 
among all member states of the League of Nations'. They did not want a 
`level playing field', but one which was steeply tilted in their favour, and 
whether in colony or mandate they expected to get it. 
Such qualms ensured that many good projects never got off the 
ground, and that both France and Syria suffered because no one was 
willing to take risks. Nevertheless the consequences of this caution 
were less than they might have been because the settlement of the 
Ottoman Public Debt in 1933 released funds which were used to finance 
the Homs-Hama irrigation project, the expansion of the port of Beirut 
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and other large capital-intensive projects. The happy result was that at 
independence, Syria found herself endowed with a good infrastructure, 
and without external debt to hamper her freedom of action. 
Beyond the mandate system and the relationship it engendered 
between France and Syria lay the second general constraint which 
hobbled the abilities of France to carry out successful development 
policies in her Syrian Mandate. This revolved around certain peculiar 
characteristics of French imperialism. France was not particularly 
successful in promoting /a mise en valeur of her colonial possessions 
except in areas such as Morocco and Indochina where French colons 
found it quite profitable to invest in productive export-oriented 
enterprises. 81 One reason for this might stem from the French 
approach to imperial administration, an approach rooted in certain 
inherent predispositions. 
One can make a start at understanding this by focusing on 
certain ideas put forth by a noted French colonial thinker in comparing 
French and British policies towards their African possessions. 82 In 
tropical Africa, where climate made it difficult for the white colonist to 
81 The forms and results of French imperial investment is a vast and 
complicated subject. Generally, see 1>Marseille, passier, 2>Cornevin, 
passim. For Morocco, see 1>Will D. Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages: 
Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987), passier, 2>Paul Pascon, Le Haouz de Marrakesh, II (Tangier: Editions 
Marocaines et Internationales, 1977), passim [English edition of II only: 
Capitalism and Agriculture in the Haouz of Marrakesh (London: KPI, 1986)]. 
For Indochina, see Charles Robequain, L'Evo/ution economique de 
/'/ndochine frangaise, (Paris: Paul Hartmann, Editeur, 1939), passim. 
82 Henri Labouret, Paysans d'Afrique occidentale, 3rd ed., (Paris: Librairie 
Gallimard, 1941), 7-9. In presenting this theory, he cites some of the ideas of 
one of his colleagues, Georges Hardy, former director of the Ecole Coloniale, 
and expert on African education. 
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settle permanently, agriculture was left to an indigenous population 
who over many centuries had become expert at wringing the best out of 
the soil through a social and agricultural system peculiarly suited to 
local conditions. Under European influence, the African cultivators had 
turned to the production of certain high-value export crops such as 
cocoa and ground-nuts (peanuts). The prosperity thus engendered had 
completely transformed the local economies and by extension the 
societies which depended on them. 
What was the reaction of the two imperial powers, France and 
Britain when faced by the transformation which they had provoked in 
these societies by their demand for certain crops? Due to their 
Common Law tradition, the British were tolerant of customary law 
despite its many contradictions. Therefore they adopted a policy of 
`Indirect Rule' which meant that local peoples were to be allowed to 
attain modernity within the framework of their own culture and their 
own institutions. One result of this policy was that the British undertook 
the study of the languages and cultures of various African peoples in 
order to refine this system. They focused particularly on the problems 
of interaction between European and African civilisations in an effort to 
facilitate the task of modernisation. 
France, on the other hand, engaged in a quite different approach. 
The French were raised in the classical tradition, which expressed itself 
through Roman law embodied in prescriptive codes. As a result, the 
French administrator tended to legislate in the abstract and to let 
systems of expectations overrule facts. He was interested in 
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formulating an arrangement that would be pre-established rather than 
relying on an organisation which would evolve spontaneously 
according to the situation, i. e. basing colonial law upon principles of 
absolute value. These tendencies led inexorably to centralisation, 
uniformity, and finally to assimilation. Therefore if local peoples would 
eventually become Frenchmen, it was hardly useful to learn about 
cultures which in any case were destined to be submerged beneath the 
tide of Gallic civilisation. 
Yet if administrators, enticed by the `policy of quantity' to 
demand still greater production from the cultivator, scoffed at those 
who sought to learn more about him, they were deluding themselves. It 
was certainly no mistake to explore the culture of the being who was 
the basic unit of production, especially since administrators, chained to 
their desks, were dependent on chiefs, interpreters, and political 
informants as their links with the native population. Yet one could 
hardly describe such intermediaries as disinterested since often they 
were responsible for the very problems they were set to solve, and 
sought to dissimulate their roles whilst they increased their influence. 
As a result, French ethnographers, scorned by those in power and left 
to their own devices, did not study those matters--legal concepts, land 
tenure, economic organisation and production--which administrators 
might have found useful, but rather focused their attention on subjects- 
religion, kinship, games--which most interested them personally. 
One could perhaps describe the desire for assimilation of 
colonial peoples through imposition of a bureaucratic uniformity as an 
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attempt to apply the Jacobin ideal of the brotherhood of man. 
Unfortunately most of the inhabitants of the French Empire were 
possessed of no fraternal feelings towards France or towards each 
other. Those Frenchmen who recognised this, adumbrated an 
opposing model, one which called for colonial autonomy with each 
territory being allowed to develop along its own particular lines whilst 
its inhabitants were encouraged to maintain their own culture and 
institutions. According to this idea, the French were to `associate' 
indigenous peoples in the task of exploiting their resources to the 
fullest possible extent. Yet this partnership was never considered to be 
one between equals, but rather one between tutor and tutee. 83 
One can employ these two strands of thought in order to gain 
some understanding of some of the difficulties which the French 
created for themselves in the Levant. To begin with, when the French 
first entered Syria, they did so with certain preconceptions as to what 
Syria was and what she could become. These ideas were not based on 
any reality, but on faulty information which was either imparted by 
clients and other mediators or derived from a hasty and often 
inadequate inspection of the prize. All of this merely served to feed the 
many hopes and delusions engendered by years of scheming for 
possession. 
These basic misunderstandings were reinforced by the 
experience of those who had previously served in French North Africa 
83 For an analysis of the theory of `association', see Raymond F. Betts, 
Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 106-53 and 165-76. 
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and had been transferred hastily to Syria. These men had a legalistic 
view of agrarian structure, a view which was not modified by much 
study of facts on the ground. 84 Along with these Arab experts came 
those such as Edouard Achard with no expertise in Syria, but with 
definite solutions to the agrarian problem which were based on 
ideology as well as on experience elsewhere. 
Thus a programme of agrarian reform was laid out based on "a 
pre-established order" rather than being tailored around a 
"spontaneous organisation" which sprang from the needs of the 
countryside. The professed ideal was an agrarian society of peasant 
smallholders more suited to France than to Syria, and the methods 
used to achieve this, such as the cadastral survey, employed concepts 
of bounded private property which were entirely alien to the Syrian 
peasant and the Syrian land system although well-suited to the French 
one. 85 
The administration which was responsible for bringing about 
these changes was formed from bureaucratic cadres who sought to 
impose their will through legal decrees which tended to address the 
form rather than the substance of the problems. As a result, there were 
84 For an example of this genre of analysis, see Haut Commissariat de la 
Republique francaise en Syrie et au Liban, Rapport genera/ sui des etudes 
foncieres effectuees en Syrie et au Liban (Beirut: Les Services fonciers, 
1921). 
85 See the comments by Jacques Weulersse on the `artificial operation' of the 
cadastral survey `superimposed on soil which knows it not'. Jacques 
Weulersse, Le Pays des Alaouites (Tours: Arrault & Cie, Maitres Imprimeurs, 
1940), 217-18. 
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constant complaints when the decrees failed to achieve their desired 
object. 86 
The multiplication of states brought a surge in the number of 
French administrators assigned to guide them. Heroically, these men 
tried to make government in the Mandated territories function 
according to some bureaucratic ideal which constantly ran up against 
what they considered to be the slothful Syrian reality. 
It was unfortunate that, during the 1930's, when men like Richard 
Thoumin, Jean Gaulmier, Jacques Weulersse, and in particular, Andre 
Latron were producing excellent ethnographic/geographical studies of 
the land and its inhabitants, their insights were totally ignored by the 
bureaucrats in Syria just as the insights of their colleagues in French 
West Africa were ignored by the bureaucrats there. It is a sad 
commentary on the relationship between bureaucrats and intellectuals 
in the Mandated territories to note that nowhere in the archives is there 
reference to the work they produced. 87 
86 An example of this line of action is contained in a letter from the HC per 
interim (p. i. ) to his special representative in Damascus dated 14 March 1927 
complaining about the failure to apply certain decrees concerning the 
division of musha'and State Domain lands which had been issued exactly 
one year previously. The decrees embodied ideas of Achard which he had 
expressed in his report on `Les problemes de ('Agriculture syrienne: le 
probleme agraire' of 19 December 1925. The writer emphasised process 
and the process was taking too long, but the solution he proposed was 
merely an administrative reorganisation which would place the local 
Department of Land Tenure of the State of Syria under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, thus concentrating all land questions under one roof. 
Unfortunately, adding another layer of bureaucracy was hardly likely to bring 
about `the greatest possible activity in carrying out agrarian reform', but 
rather the reverse. Letter: HC p. i. (P. de Reffye) to Envoy Extraordinary, 
Damascus, 14 March 1927. MAE--Nantes, F6, Carton 1571. 
87 Although to be fair one must say that there is much evidence of the respect 
in which administrators held C. Duraffourd, guiding hand behind the 
cadastral survey, and the greatest expert on land tenure in the Levant. 
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Therefore despite much optimistic talk in the beginning from the 
French side about a happy alliance between the `evolved' Syrians and 
their French tutors; despite the creation of elaborate systems of 
indirect rule with Syrian politicians under the `guide' of French 
advisors, the reality proved quite different. It was not fraternal 
association, but bureaucratic domination which became the norm, and 
the French did not hesitate to express disdain for their Syrian 
`partners', even the most exalted among them. 88 
Examination of these characteristics of French imperialism, and 
their generally quite negative effect on French development policies in 
the Mandated territories in the Levant leads naturally to consideration 
of the influence of any system of colonial rule or mandatory tutelage on 
such policies. This is indeed a third general constraint, but one which 
moves to a level of analysis well beyond an examination of the 
significance of particular imperial systems. 
In considering this factor, it is necessary to determine whether a 
distinction should be made between a colony and a mandate. In the 
first, the ruling power was there under its own auspices and 
88 An example of such contempt occurred during a meeting of HC Ponsot and 
his most important collaborators to finalise the contract between the Regie 
des Etudes Hydrauliques and the Levant states which hopefully would result 
in a plan for the development of their water resources. When the Secretary 
General read the preamble of the draft agreement which specifically named 
the President of Lebanon as one of the parties to the contract, the Delegate 
for Lebanon made the remark that the President was `irresponsible' and 
therefore should not figure in it by name. To this, his colleague from 
Damascus added, `This observation applies equally to Shaykh Taj al-Din [al- 
Hasani, puppet Prime Minister of Syria]. ' `Deuxieme reunion des Delegues, ' 
1 ere seance, 1 May 1929,13-14. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 373--Services 
Techniques. 
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theoretically could remain forever. In the second, an international body 
entrusted the mandatary with the tutelage of a certain territory with the 
object of guiding it towards independence in the foreseeable future 
under the watchful eye of an international `board of control'. 
In essence the difference between the two was one of obligation: 
In the colony, the ruling power had an obligation to itself, and the 
possession existed only to increase the well-being of its master in 
whatever form this might take. In the mandate, the obligation of the 
tutor was towards its tutee and, to a lesser degree, towards the 
international community. 89 
When it came to `development' or `exploitation' which might be 
considered opposite sides of the same coin, one would expect to see a 
contrast in the treatment of a colony and a mandated territory. In the 
former, it would be in the self-interest of the owner to increase the 
productive capacity of its possession whilst in the latter, the tutor would 
be much less interested in capitalising programmes of economic 
improvement because this investment might well be lost. 
There was certainly a dearth of investment in the French 
Mandated territories in the Levant for the various reasons cited above. 
As for the French Empire, it appears that the exploitation of the 
resources of its different components depended on the opportunities 
available. For example, when the French entered Indochina, they found 
a clearly wealthy region which offered numerous opportunities for 
89 For example, with regard to matters subsumed under Article 11 which 
revolved around the `principle of economic equality', i. e. an `Open Door' 
policy. See fn 78 supra. 
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productive investment. As a result, this particular colony attracted 
substantial private capital, and funds were placed in banking, mining 
and rubber plantations to name but three sectors. 
If Indochina (and North Africa) attracted considerable capital 
placed in mining, banks, plantations, and transport, the French African 
colonies were another case entirely. In this regard, one can cite the 
experience of Professor Auguste Chevalier, founder and editor of the 
well-known journal Revue de Botanique app/iquee et d'agricu/tune 
colonia/e, and an imperialist of the old school. He made a tour of the 
countryside in Senegal during 1947 after having first visited it at the 
end of the nineteenth century. In the intervening fifty years (! ) nothing 
had changed: The huts were as miserable as they had ever been and 
the peasants still in rags. He asked himself, "Whatever became of the 
fifty million gold francs gained from the sale of peanuts? "90 
Obviously those fifty million gold francs had been spent 
somewhere, but not in Senegal. And why not? Precisely because 
Senegal and other black African colonies were not very good 
investments viewed from a strictly economic standpoint. In tropical 
Africa, it did not require much capital to introduce a crop like 
groundnuts which adapted easily to the milieu and was not difficult for 
local peasants to learn how to cultivate profitably. Nevertheless the 
profits went not to the cultivators, but to the foreign exporters who re- 
invested them elsewhere. The usual method was for a trading company 
90 For this vignette and other similar ones, see Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique 
noire: /'ere co%oniale, 1900-1945(Paris: Edition Sociales, 1962), 200. 
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to set up posts in the bush supplied with cheap goods--Manchester 
cottons, German lamps, Venetian glass beads--desired by the peasant. 
The cultivator would bring his crop there, and exchange it for cash 
which he would promptly spend on these trifles. The company, which 
was closely associated with shipping firms and banks, would dispose of 
the crop at an enormous profit to itself and a relatively small one to the 
producer. Thus when Henri Labouret spoke of the `extraordinary 
fortune' which groundnuts brought to the Senegalese peasant, he 
meant a fortune which was extraordinary only when compared with 
what he had received in the past. 91 
Moreover much of the private investment in the Empire was built 
upon a base of public investment in infrastructure. Initially as in the 
Ottoman Empire, railroads were built by private capital enjoying a state 
guarantee. The economic crisis of the nineteen thirties saw a massive 
increase in infrastructural improvements with the inauguration of a 
series of loans which were contracted by the colonies and guaranteed 
by the French State Expansion of ports, roads, and railroads were 
designed to make the export-oriented economies of the colonies more 
profitable by facilitating the shipment of their primary products 
overseas. Yet in doing so, this policy burdened them with heavy debt 
charges. In French West Africa, which had the highest debt, 25% of 
ordinary revenue was given over to debt service; in Indochina, with the 
second-highest debt, the service amounted to 20% of such income. 
91 Labouret, 8; also Cornevin, 293-94.. 
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Thus investments were made in the colonies, but public debt was also 
created so perhaps one can say that the blessings achieved were 
mixed. 
92 
Yet profit was often not the main reason for acquiring lands 
overseas in the first instance. The desire for imperial prestige; the 
competitive drive to emulate a hated rival, all acted as spurs to colonial 
conquest. This was so, even if such coveted areas as the vast desert 
regions of French West Africa were economically useless. 93 
This was certainly true in the case of the French occupation of 
Syria. Despite rapturous assessments of its productive potential and 
the existence of powerful economic interests stemming from activities 
of the various concessions, one could well say that, on balance, factors 
of cultural ascendancy and imperial rivalry were far more potent 
motivations. 
Speaking generally, the economic development of a mandated 
territory tended to be more problematic than that of a colony. If the 
colony offered opportunities for profit, metropolitan capitalists were 
more than happy to place their money there. Moreover in a colony, 
public investment acted as a `crutch' for private investment and 
eventually took upon itself the responsibility for improvements of 
infrastructure through the medium of the state-supported loan. 
92 For a discussion of French colonial investment strategies, see Marseille, 
113-119; Thobie et al., 141-54; 232-34. 
93 For a discussion of the causes of European imperialism before the 
Great 
War, see D. K. Fieldhouse, "`Imperialism": an historiographical revision, 
' The 
Economic History Review, Second Series, XIV, 2,1961,187-209. 
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The economic improvement of mandated territories was more of 
a puzzle. In such territories, the mandatary also tended to rely on the 
private sector as the engine of progress, at least initially. 
Unfortunately, despite much rhetoric about such concepts as /a raise 
en va/eur, hard-nosed capitalists assessed a temporary mandate as too 
great a risk for the investment of large sums unless, as in Palestine, 
those capitalists had an ideological incentive to place their funds there. 
Therefore how did a mandate get developed, or did it? In Syria, 
at least, economic development through private initiative was in 
essence, a failure. Capitalists and the administrators who supported 
them used economic criteria to gauge the viability of proposed 
projects. As a result, they tended to consider only those schemes with 
the clearest potential for successful investment, and even these were 
deemed too risky because the temporary nature of the Mandate hardly 
guaranteed a sure return. 
The abdication of private capital placed the onus for 
development squarely upon the shoulders of the mandatory power. As 
tutor, it was already faced with a number of unavoidable expenses-- 
administration, personnel, troop maintenance--which despite Article 15 
of the Mandate Charter proved impossible to recover. Therefore the 
mandatary did not particularly wish to use its own funds to equip a 
territory from which it would eventually depart. 
The world economic crisis of the nineteen thirties should have 
put paid to all efforts of development in a mandated territory such as 
Syria. For the tutee was economically prostrate, and the tutor was 
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unwilling to guarantee a loan which its ward might never repay. Yet 
despite such an unfavourable prognosis, the decision was made to 
embark on a programme to furnish the mandated territories with 
important additions to their infrastructure--among which was a major 
irrigation project. This decision came from administrators, not 
capitalists, because the judgements made were as much political as 
economic. These officials believed that whilst the schemes proposed 
were beneficial in and of themselves, they were also part of what the 
High Commissioner at that time chose to call the `politics of prestige'. 
By visibly promoting such improvements, France felt she could justify 
her tutelage in the eyes of her clients and, what was more essential, in 
the eyes of those who chafed under her supervision. Fortuitously, 
money became available after the extinction of the Ottoman Debt to 
fund this double commitment. and enabled France to depart from Syria 
with a respectable record of achievement in the economic realm, if not 
the political one. 
*** 
The next three chapters will examine certain aspects of the 
oeuvre of France in her Mandated territories. An analysis of the 
structure of agrarian relations, the expansion of production, and the 
development of irrigation will elucidate the nature of the marriage 
between agriculture and politics in modern Syria. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MANDATE--II: 
THE STRUCTURE OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS 
During the period of the French Mandate, the ties which bound 
the triad of the peasant who cultivated the land, the notable who 
controlled the bulk of it, and the central authorities who ruled over all 
underwent certain changes which were generally mere modifications of 
an existing order rather than that wholesale transformation which 
Achard believed to be an absolute prerequisite for agricultural 
regeneration in Syria. The failure to implement a more major agrarian 
metamorphosis was in part ideological because most of those who 
propounded and implemented agrarian policy under the Mandate were 
mesmerised by the idea of the independent peasant smallholder. It was 
also due to the fact that the pernicious influence of the great Syrian 
latifundia on the life of the peasant and agricultural progress in general 
appeared obvious to French observers. Nonetheless the French soon 
came to realise that any attempt on their part to dissolve these great 
estates by force, would undermine their own position since the notable 
landlords helped them control the countryside. As a result of these 
preoccupations, Achard and his colleagues failed to look farther for 
other rural structures, and did not grasp the primordial importance of 
the village community and the collective agricultural disciplines of 
which it was a reflexion. 
*** 
II. 1 >Musna'cultivation--a definition 
Achard and other French observers believed that great estates 
controlled by mostly absentee notable proprietors were the salient 
features of the Syrian landscape. In their eyes, the dissolution of these 
holdings was the culmination of a process which would bring a web of 
peasant-owned properties to the countryside. 1 Whilst they recognised 
the existence of what they called `collective property' (propriete 
collective), their infatuation with the contradictions between the reality 
of latifundia and the ideal of individual smallholdings tended to blind 
them to the importance played by the rural community and the form of 
exploitation which sprang from it. 
This was particularly characteristic of the web of villages which 
flourished in the grain-producing plains between the mountains and the 
desert. Unlike those legal categories of land tenure which received 
their final definition in the Ottoman Land Code of 1274/1858, the musha' 
system for village cohesion was not imposed from outside, but had 
grown up in response to a precarious agricultural situation. In regions 
where farming was risky due to the wild fluctuation in the amount of 
rainfall received and the physical insecurity of life on the edge of the 
cultivated zone, it only made sense for individuals to band together in 
tight knit groups for mutual support in the face of hazards known and 
1 For this process, see Chapter I supra and this chapter infra. 
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unknown. A form of landholding which encouraged and reinforced 
communal disciplines could only strengthen this solidarity. 
Such landholding arrangements were enshrined in no legal 
code2 , and were subsumed under the term musha `3 ,a word whose 
2 Although if one considers it a form of `co-ownership, ' sharikat mu/k is 
related to an important Islamic legal concept. See A. I. Udovitch, Partnership 
and Profit in Medieval /s/am (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) 
and comments in Yaakov Firestone, `The land-equalizing mushä' village: a 
reassessment' in Gilbar (ed. ), Ottoman Palestine ..., 103-05. For the use of sharika contracts in the Levant during Ottoman and Mandatory times, see 
/dem, `Production and trade in an Islamic context: Sharika contracts in the 
transitional economy of northern Samaria, 1853-1943, ' Part I, /JMES, VI, 
April, 1975,185-209; Part II, IJMES, VI, July, 1975,308-25. 
3 The first serious field research on traditional forms of landholding in Syria 
was started in the early 1930's when the pattern had already undergone 
many modifications. For musha'tenure as for other aspects of rural life in 
Syria, see first and foremost, 1>Andre Latron, La Vie rurale en Syrie et au 
Liban: etude d'economie sociale, Memoires de L'Institut frangais de Damas 
(Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936), esp. Chaps. VI and VII, 182-240, and 
map between 176 and 177, and his remarks in 2>'En Syrie et au Liban: 
village communautaire et structure sociale', Anna/es d'histoire economique 
et sociale, VI, 27, May, 1934,225-234; 3>Weulersse, Paysans..., esp. 96-109 
and map on 98; and his comments in 4>Le Pays ..., 357-62. Of these two 
authors, Latron is to be preferred because he focuses on rural life in Syria 
whilst Weulersse looks at Syria and the Middle East which leads him to make 
some misleading generalisations from that Syrian case of which he was most 
familiar. See also 5>Anon. [C. Duraffourd], `Notice sur le demembrement et 
I'amenagement des terres "mouchaa" possedees dans l'indivision collective' 
(extract of a larger study on Syrian communal villages), 1935. MAE--Nantes, 
FB, Carton 864. This brochure prepared for the 1936 Damascus Fair 
discusses mushy `tenure and the goals of the Cadastral Survey. For a study 
of landholding in a specific region where musha' tenure is present, see 
6>Anon. [Jean Gaulmier], `Notes sur la propriete fonciere dans la Syrie 
centrale', AF, XXXIII, 309, April. 1933,130-37. 
The most recent and thorough studies of this phenomenon are to be 
found in the articles of Yaakov Firestone: 7>'Land equalization and factor 
scarcities: Holding size and the burden of impositions in Imperial central 
Russia and the late Ottoman Levant, ' The Journal of Economic History, XLI, 4, 
December 1981,813-33; 8>'The land-equalizing. .., '91-129. 
For other discussions of musha ` tenure in Syria, see 9>Owen, The 
Middle East ..., 
35 and 256-259; 10>Paul J. Klat, `Musha holdings and land 
fragmentation in Syria', MEEP, 1957,12-23; 11>Lewis, Nomads ..., 63 and 
fn 
12,221-22. For a comparative view, see 12>A. Granott, The Land System in 
Palestine: History and Structure (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952), Ch. 
IX, 213-248; 13>F. Arin, `Essai sur les demembrements de la propriete 
fonciere en droit musulman, ' Revue du Monde Musulman, XXVI, 1914,277- 
317. 
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principal definition is `common, public, joint' from a root meaning 
among other things `to spread, diffuse'. 4 The idea behind this method 
of agricultural exploitation was to promote solidarity by ensuring that 
each member of the village community had absolutely equal rights in 
the various types of land cultivated by that entity. The absentee 
landlord had legal control over the land either as mu/tazim or as holder 
of a sened tapu whilst the peasants merely had rights of usufruct 
(tasarrutj over it. Yet the cultivated area was not held by the 
community per se because Islamic law `does not recognise juristic 
persons'. 5 Rather its members owned the land in undivided shares as 
co-proprietors. 6 In order to ensure absolute equality, the co-owners 
invested a council of elders with the task of re-allotting the cultivated 
land among the members of the community every so often, distributing 
parcels to each person with share-rights. The land to be distributed 
was divided into a certain number of large sections (mawgi , pl. 
4 For the definitions, see Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic 
(J. Milton Cowan, ed. ), 4th ed. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979), 581- 
82. 
5 Indeed, `not even the public treasury (bayt a/-mai is construed as an 
institution, [sic] its owner is the Muslim community, i. e. the sum total of 
individual Muslims. ' Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1964), 125. 
6 Latron states this clearly: La Vie ..., 188 and 
189. For a discussion of the 
distinction between co-ownership and collective possession, see Firestone, 
`The land-equalizing ..., ' 99-102. 
The analogy in English common law is 
between a `joint tenancy' and a `tenancy in common'. In the former, each 
owner has an interest in the whole, without having any specific share in the 
property (in Bracton's felicitous formulation: totum tenet et nihi/ tenet, i. e. 
each joint tenant `holds everything and yet holds nothing'. ). Since the 
owners do not have a specific part in the property, when each dies, his rights 
in the whole pass to his co-proprietors (the `right of survivorship'--ius 
accrescendi) with the last being able to pass it on. In the latter, co-owners 
hold in undivided shares which they can do with what they will, i. e. there is no 
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mawaqi), as agronomically homogeneous as possible. These sections 
were then subdivided into subsections (sahm, pl. asham), each having a 
particular soil quality and being rigorously equal in value. Finally these 
were distributed in lots to the right holders. In doing so, the elders saw 
to it that each parcel should contain an equal portion of the various 
types of land held by the co-proprietors, e. g. well-watered, hilly, stony, 
etc. ' 
Under this form of tenure, there were two methods of allocating 
the land to be distributed. The first which Weulersse calls `musha` 
ownership' (propriete mouchaa) and Firestone, the `open-ended 
system', provided for the allotment to be based on the number of males 
in a village or the number of teams they possessed, i. e. by what each 
production unit could contribute in way of labour or capital to the 
community. 8 The system was open-ended in the sense that newcomers 
could join the community with their assets and become a recognised 
right of survivorship. K. J. Gray and P. D. Symes, Real Property and Real 
People: Principles of Land Law (London: Butterworths, 1981), 233-238. 
Weulersse, Paysans ... 99; For another, slightly different description of a 
village in the Hawran, see Achard, `Propriete rurale ..., ' 9-12; `Les Problemes ... le probleme agraire, 
' 7-9. 
8 In Palestine, at least, the first allocation unit was called dhukur (from 
dhakar, pl. dhukur meaning a male person) whilst the second was named 
faddan (from faddan, pl. fadadin, `yoke of oxen'). By extension the word 
faddan came to mean 1>the amount of land which a team could plough in 
one day; 2>the amount of land worked by one team in one year. In a further 
extension of this meaning, the term came to indicate that `agrarian cell', the 
units of land of varying types, which together comprised the fundamental 
elements of each agricultural community. In this way, the capital unit came 
to define the production unit; For the dhukursystem, see 1>Firestone, `Land 
equalization ..., 
' 819; 2>/dem, `The land-equalizing ..., ' 9-10; 3>Weulersse, 
Paysans ..., 
99 (although he does not use any term for it). For the faddan 
system, see 1>Latron, La Vie ..., 11-12,14-18; 2>Firestone, 
`Land 
equalization ..., 
' 814-19. 
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part of it. Indeed new settlers might be given land in a community only 
if they were able to bring with them a plough team to put it into 
production. 9 Moreover for this system to function properly, there had 
to be plenty of land available for occupation, i. e. in frontier districts of 
new settlement. 1° 
Weulersse names the second allocation method `musha`tenure' 
(tenure mouchaa) and Firestone, the `quantified share system'. In the 
villages which employed it there were a fixed number of shares, and 
each right-holder could transmit his interest to another person through 
succession, gift, or sale. 11 Over time, the Islamic laws of inheritance 
led to an infinite division of the original right so that in many cases the 
<----Fig. 5. Part of the cadastral survey map (scale 1: 30,000) of the village 
of Maallaqa (Biqa'), showing the characteristic division of the lands in a 
musha` village: Fields in parallel strips, many of more than 1 km. in length. 
Source: Jacques Weulersse, Paysans de Syrie et du Poche Orient (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1946), Fig. 20,105. 
9 As an illustration of the value of a team, see the story related by Philip G, 
Baldensperger about a stranger who was given land in a village because he 
brought with him a yoke of oxen whilst a villager was thrown out of his own 
house to make way for the newcomer because he was not a cultivator and 
had no team. He was only welcomed back into the community when he went 
to Ramla, bought a pair of beasts and promised to become a regular 
cultivator. For this vignette, see Philip G. Baldensperger, `The immovable 
East, ' Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, XXXVIII, July, 1906, 
193-94 and Firestone, `Land equalization..., ' 815. 
10 For the `open-ended' system of allocation and its implications, see 
1 >Latron, La Vie ..., 14-15,183-89; 
2>Weulersse, Paysans ..., 99-100; 
3>Firestone, `Land equalization ..., ' 815; 
4>/dem, `The land equalizing..., ' 
93-94; 4>Owen, 256. 
11 Arts. 54-55 of the 1858 Land Code made mini lands legally transmissible to 
children of both sexes or if there were no children, to the parents of the 
former occupier. Aristarchi Bey, 100-10; Young, VI, 60-61. The right of 
transmission was modified in the years following the promulgation of this 
code to include all other possible relatives. See Klat, `The origins ..., 
' 60. 
`Land tenure in Syria and the Lebanon and its economic and social effects 
with some suggestions for reform, ' B. Litt. thesis, Oxford 
University, 1948,32 
and 34, fn 27. 
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portion belonging to any one person could only be expressed 
fractionally. Physically, the lots came to be divided over time into long, 
slivers of land, the width of a furrow and several kilometres in length 
with one end terminating at the village. The shape was dictated by the 
fact that each cultivator had to be given equal access to his lands from 
the village, whilst the movement of the plough imposed a rectilinear 
shape. Moreover such an arrangement facilitated the merger of 
several parcels into more manageable plots since in practice, the land 
was worked by family groups. The parts belonging to each individual 
were consolidated and given en bloc to the production unit with the 
amount handed out being determined by the number of right-holders. 12 
Although each plot was worked by the family to whom it was 
assigned, the cultivators did not enjoy full freedom of action because 
they had to submit to a discipline imposed by the community through 
the mechanism of its council of elders. Thus each farmer in common 
with his fellows had to follow the same rotation with planting, weeding 
and harvesting taking place at appointed times. 13 
To further ensure equality of treatment, these lots were changed 
periodically. Andre Latron believed that the timing of these re- 
allotments was a function of the crop rotation cycle with three years as 
a norm. 14 Thus the cycle length of musha'tenure generally coincided 
12 For the `quantified share' system and its implications, see 1>Weulersse, 
Paysans..., 101-04; 2>Firestone, `The land equalizing. - ., '94; 3>Owen, 256- 
57. 
13 For the disciplines of cultivation , see 1>Latron, 
La Vie ..., 232-234; 
2>Weulersse, Paysans..., 100. 
14 Latron, La Vie ..., 188. 
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with that of cereals farmed in those less well-watered districts which 
comprised the great plains of inner Syria. Nevertheless there were 
variations: Achard observed that in the Hawran, for example, musha` 
lands were re-divided every four or five years. During the 1930's, his 
colleagues pointed out that in the area around Homs, the land was 
reallocated every year whilst in the Aleppo region where the climate 
was better (probably the area around Jabal Samaan NW of Aleppo was 
meant), the redistributions were carried out every three years. 15 
It is interesting to note that the lands held under musha'did not 
include dwellings or those plots surrounding the village planted with 
gardens or fruit trees, but solely comprised more outlying areas sown 
in cereals. There was a reason for this: Cereals were the staple food 
crop of these regions, and therefore each family/cultivating unit had to 
obtain an equal harvest for the preservation of social harmony within 
the village. Since cereals were an annual crop, easy to cultivate, and 
one which did not require an overwhelming amount of investment in 
time and technique, redistribution of cereal lands was not 
counterproductive. 
In these regions, gardens and fruit trees generally took up a 
much smaller proportion of village lands. Those parcels which 
immediately surrounded the village agglomeration were mu/k, the 
freehold property of individuals and their families, and required a much 
15 Achard, `Propriete rurale..., 12; `Les Problemes ... le probleme agraire, 
' 
9. Republique Frangaise, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (MAE), Rapport ä 
/a Societe des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1934 (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1935), 103. 
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greater investment both in time and in care in order to yield a bountiful 
harvest. Therefore a periodic re-allotment of orchards and gardens 
would have hardly been fair to those who had laboured so long to bring 
them into production. 16 
In contrast, the tracts held under musha`tenure and cultivated in 
cereals were miri land. These expanses belonged to the entire 
community of Muslims and were held in their name by the State acting 
as their representative. Since the cultivator who worked this land did 
not have ownership, but merely the right of usufruct (tasarrutj, he had 
less incentive to improve it. Thus miri was suited for cereals, not only 
agronomically, but because cereals were a crop where it was difficult 
for any sort of possible peasant initiative to have much effect. The most 
needed improvements--better strains, fertiliser, mechanisation--were 
beyond the means of the humble cultivator, and could only be 
introduced as a result of either government policy or through the 
enterprise of interested capitalists. Although musha`cultivation did of 
course produce food for the peasants and their families, its function 
was pre-eminently social--to strengthen the village community. 
Therefore, those inefficiencies perceived by Western observers" were 
not really important. 18 
16 Perhaps the legal category had originally been based on an established 
fact. 
17 For example, 1>G. F. Walpole, `Land settlement in Trans-Jordan, ' Paper 
delivered at the Conference on Middle East Agricultural Development, 10 
February 1944, in Middle East Supply Centre, The Proceedings of the 
Conference on Middle East Agricultural Development, Cairo, February 7th- 
10th, 1944 (Agricultural Report No. 6), 158; 2>Doreen Warriner `Land tenure 
in the Fertile Crescent (Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and the Lebanon, 
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Nevertheless proof that villagers were not adverse to rewarding 
enterprise carried out on musha`Iands was to be found in their attitude 
toward those small, odd-shaped, often rocky parcels which occurred 
here and there among the musha` properties. Because these were 
deemed uncultivable, he who undertook to put effort into their 
improvement was given full rights over them as a sort of `payment' for 
his labours, and the properties were exempt from any future re- 
allotment. 19 
II. 2>Musha`cultiuation--origins and function 
The origins of this system of landholding are obscure, and much 
debated. There are roughly two schools of thought concerning this 
problem: The first derives musha'cultivation from the peculiar nature 
of beduin society whilst the second sees it as the product of a purely 
peasant consciousness. Upon close analysis these tend to be 
variations on a single theme. This theme is that musha` cultivation 
formed the basis of landholding on the plains of inner Syria due to the 
need for communal solidarity in face of those rigours of climate, 
physical, and fiscal insecurity to be found on a hostile frontier. 
Iraq), '8. Report prepared for the Middle East Supply Centre, 1944, FO 922, 
Middle East Supply Centre (1941-45), 258\AP/858\43-44; also found in Issawi 
(ed. ), EHME, 76; 3>/dem, Land and Poverty in the Middle East (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 19-20; 4>Klat, `Musha holdings ..., ' 
19. 
18 Owen draws attention to this point. Owen, 258. 
19 Latron, La Vie ..., 100 and Plate 
V, fig. 1. 
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The first school of thought believes musha'to be a development 
from the egalitarianism of the beduin tribe, in which every member had 
equal right to the use of the lands upon which his community pastured 
their animals. Its argument holds that when tribesmen settled, this 
principle was carried over into the agricultural lands they occupied. 
The fact that this was usually a gradual process with nomads often 
cultivating and pasturing at the same time gave logic to this argument. 
So too did the fact that many cultivators could trace their near ancestry 
to some tribe and still had bonds of `brotherhood' (khuwa) with a tribal 
protector who expected `gifts' in return. The fact that musha'existed in 
villages composed of recently settled beduin or in those with close 
blood ties to the pastoralists seemed to confirm the links between the 
communal organisation and that of the nomads. As an example, Jean 
Gaulmier cites the village of Helfaya, 22 km NW of Hama, of one 
thousand divided into twelve `tribes' (fakhd--in fact tribal subdivision) 
which practised an annual division of land. To him, the existence of 
such a village practising musha'makes `it seem incontestable that one 
finds oneself here in the presence of vestiges of beduin organisations 
and customs. '20 
Latron21 tends to lean towards this view and feels that musha' 
was a mode of social organisation which could only have been imposed 
20 Two of the principal proponents of the argument linking musha'to beduin 
social organisation are Doreen Warriner and Jean Gaulmier: 1>Warriner, 
`Land tenure ..., ' 6-8; 
Issawi (ed. ), EHME, 75-76; 2> /dem, Land and Poverty . 
.., 18-20; 
3>Anon [Gaulmier], 131-32. 
21 Latron, La Vie ..., 184,242-43. 
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over lands which were virgin whether because they were empty to 
begin with or because the original inhabitants had been chased away. 
He draws an analogy with similar systems to be found scattered over 
Europe, notably in the great northern plains and in the Slav regions. 
Here there were identical land maps showing a division into parcels 
accompanied by the same customs, and characterised by the same 
evolution. 22 He believes that the village community to be found on the 
vast stretches of the Syrian interior owed its origins to the 
`sedentarisation of social groups in open plain' just as villages of 
analogous organisation had their origins in ancient communities settled 
on the steppe-like plains of northern and eastern Europe. 23 
Weulersse too admits that there was a certain correspondence in 
structure and discipline between the plains of eastern Europe and the 
Middle East, but points out that the mechanism of `social parts'24 so 
22 Ibid., 184, fn 1. In the Russian case, Latron is probably thinking of the mir 
or peasant commune. The existence of communes was very ancient going 
back perhaps to the Kievan period (9th through 11th centuries) and beyond. 
These communes were responsible for the management of common lands 
and land not in use. In addition, they allocated the tax burden among their 
members and collected the money due. Nevertheless each member held his 
lands separately; a certain amount of periodic land redistribution took place 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it was not until the eighteenth 
century that this practice became widespread. With the introduction of new 
taxes in the eighteenth century, the equalisation of properties was a sure 
method of evenly distributing the payments among members of the 
commune. For a very clear explanation of the Russian case, see Jerome 
Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), ch. 24,504-35 passim. For 
analogies between the Russian and Levantine cases, see Firestone, `Land 
equalization ..., 
'passim- 
23 Latron, La Vie ..., 241-42. 
24 i. e. quantified shares. For these, see Latron, La Vie ..., 184 and in 
particular Weulersse, Paysans..., 101. 
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intrinsic a part of the latter system did not appear to exist in Europe. 25 
Nevertheless he thinks that one can attribute the resemblance between 
the two agrarian systems to the existence of similar agrarian 
economies based on wheat production and communal cropping. 
The second school holds that musha, rather than stemming from 
beduin social organisation, derived from the `operational necessities' of 
agricultural life on a precarious frontier. Here unsettled conditions and 
the simultaneous pursuit of farming and sheep herding promoted 
communal solidarity as well as a two (or three) field system to 
accommodate both grazing and cultivation. In the well-known 
formulation of Jacques Weulersse `the mechanism of musha'is indeed 
too complex and reveals too profound a peasant touch to attribute it to 
the invention of semi-nomads. '26 
Whether musha'tenure had its origins in beduin social structure; 
stemmed from the demands of agriculture on a precarious frontier; or 
derived in some mix of the two is a matter which ultimately can never 
be determined. Indeed an exact knowledge of its origins is not 
important. What is important is that whatever the composition of the 
group, peasants cultivating the transitional zone or beduin wandering 
in the desert, each was confronted with the necessity for social 
cohesion in a world buffeted by the rigours of climate and physical 
insecurity. Among beduin this resulted in the common sharing of 
25 In fact, not true. See Blum, 515-17. 
26 Two proponents of close ties between musha'and peasant agriculture are 
Jacques Weulersse and Norman Lewis. 1>Weulersse, Paysans ..., 107-08; 
2>/dem, Le Pays ..., 358-59; 
3>Lewis, Nomads-, 63 and 221-22, fn 12. 
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pastureland and of herds between members of the group; among 
peasants, each villager had rights to a portion of shared cropland, and 
the parcels of land were redistributed every so often in order to ensure 
a measure of equality and maintain social harmony in the face of 
danger. Thus among both beduin and peasants, similar operational 
problems gave birth to similar solutions. 
Arrangements designed to reinforce communal solidarity were 
particularly important in the plains of inner Syria where pre-modern 
communities were often dependent on their own resources for survival. 
In such a subsistence economy, particularly one which functioned 
within an area of marginal agricultural production, it was vital to spread 
both contributions and burdens equally among all production units. 
Moreover, in a precarious economic situation, an adequate food supply 
was perhaps the highest priority, and maldistribution led to cleavages 
and conflicts within the community. 
Agriculture within this transitional zone, where rainfall was both 
inadequate (200-400 mm) and erratic, very rarely achieved a surplus. 
Most of what was produced was either used for sustenance; went as 
seed to be sowed for the next crop; or was allocated for payments to 
those outside the village--landlords, the government, or beduin 
`protectors'. If there was a surplus, it might be traded with the beduin 
for pastoral products or sold on the market. Nonetheless in market 
transactions, the peasant had the worst of it since he was forced to sell 
right after harvest when prices were low in order to pay pressing debts 
whilst the middleman or speculator (often the same thing) could afford 
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to wait until prices rose later in the year. The peasant who was kept in 
misery by the rapacity of landlords, the exactions of the government 
and the exigencies of the market had good reason to maintain 
communal solidarity with his fellows. 27 
When circumstances did enable the cultivators to become more 
efficient producers with an assured oversupply of food, despite the 
gouging of the middleman, this did not necessarily mean that the 
peasant used the excess to participate in a market in order to obtain 
desired goods for himself. He might so participate as occurred in the 
Hawran during the 1860's and 1870's, but on the other hand, he might 
choose more leisure over the chance to increase production which 
could be exchanged for benefits. For example, the inauguration of the 
Horns Dam project in the early 1940's gave the peasants an assured 
supply of water which enabled them to expand the range of crops and 
expand their total yields by dividing and echeloning the amount of water 
allocated to them throughout the agricultural year. Yet they did not 
choose to intensify cultivation, but instead preferred to have the same 
output as before with considerably more free time for themselves. 28 
27 For a discussion of disposal of the wheat surplus under the difficult 
conditions of the early nineteen thirties, see L., `Le commerce du ble au 
Liban et en Syrie, ' AF, XXXIII, 312, July-August, 1933,227-33, and infra 
Chapter III. 
28 For this, see Chap. IV infra and Andre Gibert, `Notes sur la geographie du 
Proche Orient: 1>L'Irrigation de la plaine de Homs et ses problemes, ' Revue 
de Geographie de Lyon [RGL], XXIV, 1949,154,156. In reporting this fact, 
Gibert commented that this `reserve' was due both to factual reasons (lack of 
finance, fertiliser, etc. ), and to those of a psychological order (the ignorance 
and lassitude of the cultivators). This particular defect he felt could be 
remedied by `education'. In doing so, he follows Adam Smith, An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1937), 163-64 in believing that the possibility of producing a surplus 
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If musha` tenure developed out of the necessity for communal 
solidarity amidst a hostile physical environment where surpluses were 
few and far between, it was also predicated on the need for security on 
a frontier where there was a constant threat of Beduin raids. For 
example, when Salamiya was settled in the 1840's, it was held as 
musha` land and divided into two large blocs, one of which was left 
fallow whilst the other was apportioned into strips and worked. One of 
the reasons for grouping all the cultivated parcels in a single bloc was 
to ensure that the villagers would sow and reap well within shouting 
distance, and could render mutual aid should need arise. 29 
Another aspect of communal solidarity was the maintenance of 
cohesion in face of demands from the taxmen. In the years before the 
enactment of the 1858 Land Code with its provision for registration of 
title, taxes were collected from village communities en bloc with village 
leaders being responsible for the deliverance of the assessed sum to 
the government agent. It was important that the amounts collected 
from individual village production units be done on an equable basis in 
order to ensure that communal solidarity be preserved. Musha' 
cultivation was a mechanism for equalising such contributions. 30 
necessarily leads one to do so. In criticising this argument, Martin Orans 
asks, `Why should the food producers who have increased their efficiency 
produce more rather than work less? ' Martin Orans, `Surplus, ' Human 
Organization, XXV, 1 Spring, 1966,24-32. Quotation on 27. 
29 Lewis, Nomads-, 62-63. 
30 For an extensive analysis of the `fiscal hypothesis', see Firestone, `Land 
equalization ..., ' 824-29. 
Also Martha Mundy, `Shareholders and the state: 
representing the village in the late 19th century land registers of the 
southern Hawran, ' in Thomas Philipp (ed. ), The Syrian Land in the 18th and 
19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1992), 217-38. 
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That musha`cultivation was the result of the need for communal 
solidarity within the transitional zone, and that this pattern has 
continued to persist is illustrated by the findings of Helga Seeden and 
Muhamed Kaddour in their study of the village of Shams al-Din Tannira 
on the left bank of the Euphrates 60 kms northwest of Tabqa (al- 
Thawra). Here, even after the coming of the land reform which in itself 
was designed to bring equality of tenure to the countryside, villagers 
employed this traditional means of ensuring and preserving communal 
cohesion. Such a system has proved particularly effective because of 
its resilience. As the authors point out, it 
is able to survive periods of drought, pestilence and 
overtaxation or exploitation [and] can even reassert itself 
after such disasters, particularly if the period is 
accompanied by relative economic improvements due to 
land reforms in favour of the peasants. 31 
Speaking generally about the dilemmas of peasant life, 
Barrington Moore reinforces this view. He emphasises that the natural 
hazards facing peasants, coupled in some cases with a need to 
respond to certain methods of tax collection on the part of the overlord, 
has led in many parts of the world to the development of systems of 
land tenure which tend toward an equal distribution of resources. 
Despite considerable variation, the main idea connected 
with these arrangements stands out very clearly: every 
member of the community should have access to enough 
31 Helga Seeden and Muhamed Kaddour, `Space, structures and land in 
Shams ed-Din Tannira on the Euphrates: An ethnoarchaeological 
perspective, ' in Khalidi (ed. ), 504-05. 
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resources to be able to perform obligations to the 
community carrying on a collective struggle for survival. 32 
II. 3>Musba`cuItiuation--locus and extent 
It is important but difficult to determine the regions in Syria 
where musha'holdings were located. Both Latron and Weulersse after 
him presented a map purporting to show the location of these two 
zones. 33 The fact that, according to their maps, musha` tenure 
appeared to stretch from the Hawran right around to the Jazira did not 
mean that it actually did so, either in the nineteen thirties when they 
were writing or even in the past, however distant. Instead the maps 
illustrated the possible extension of this form of tenure according to the 
criteria which their compilers laid down for it: wheat-growing plains 
along a moving frontier of settlement. 
Under the Mandate when the most important analyses of musha` 
were made, the actual extension of this form of landholding was quite 
iable: It is possible to give a somewhat schematic account of the 
various locales which held it at one time or another, moving from 
southwest Syria around the Fertile Crescent towards the northeast: 
<----Fig. 6. Extension of musha' in the Levant according to Jacques 
Weulersse. Eastern limits are approximate. Source: Jacques Weulersse, 
Paysans de Syrie et du Poche Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1946), Fig. 16,98. 
There is a similar, but somewhat cruder map in Andre Latron, La Fie rurale 
en Syrie et au Liban: etude d economie sociale, Memoires de L'Institut francais 
de Damas (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936), Map 11 facing 176. 
32 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. - Lord 
and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 
1991), 497. 
33 Latron, La Vie. .., Map 
II facing 176; Weulersse, Paysans..., Fig. 16,98. 
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A>Hawran. Observers agreed that the Hawran was the locus 
classicus of this form of cultivation. Achard writing in 1925 said that 
musha"included the greater part of the cultivable lands'. Moreover the 
land was still redistributed at that time. 34 Eliahu Epstein writing in 
1936 says that it was to be found in many districts' especially on what 
he termed `leased' (afferme) land. 35 
From the description of its operation given by Achard, it appears 
that musha` here was of the quantified-share type. The Hawran 
epitomised the conditions necessary for this form of tenure: It had 
been the premier grain-producing area of Syria since the middle of the 
nineteenth century, and was a frontier zone where communal solidarity 
was all-important in the face of the rigours of life on the edge of the 
desert. Such cohesion was all the more necessary to sustain the 
cultivators in face of that economic depression and political turbulence 
which characterised this region during the late Ottoman period. 
<----Fig. 7. Syria and Lebanon: Extension of musha` cultivation. Source of 
base map: Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958). Source of information on musha' 
author. 
34 Achard, `Propriete rurale ..., ' 9,12. ; `Les Problemes .. . le probleme 
agraire, ' 7,9. 
35 Eliahu Epstein, `Le Hauran et ses habitants, ' AF, XXXVI, 343, September- 
October, 1936,247; /dem, `Notes from a paper on the present conditions in 
the Hauran, ' Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XXIII, Part IV, 
October, 1936,600. In fact, his `lease' was probably a share tenancy 
(muzara'a) since leasing for a money rent was comparatively rare in Syria 
except for land bearing gardens or orchards. For the muzara `a, see infra. 
For leases, see Latron, La Vie ..., 73-77. Muhammad 
Kurd `Ali says that the 
`most prevalent method [of tenure] in Hauran is the leasing of land for a 
specified quantity of grain'. Muhammad Kurd `Ali, Khitat a/-Sham, III 
(Damascus, 1925), 214-216 in Issawi (ed. ), FCDEH, 331. 
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s>labal Druz. The Jabal Druz also had a form of what might be 
termed musha' tenure. The land here was held in common and 
redistributed among the peasants every three years. Nevertheless in a 
society where leading families exercised preponderant power over 
their dependents, the lords claimed a right to the best third of the land 
and had it cultivated for them by the peasants. 
Whether one could consider the system of land tenure practised 
in the Jabal Druz as true musha' is questionable. Whilst communal 
solidarity among the peasants was determined by their ties to the land 
and the rights each held in it, at the level of the Druze community, 
solidarity was expressed by the ties of obligation and dependence 
between the Druze peasants and their lords. 
In the revolt of 1889-90, it was peasant solidarity which proved 
the operative factor. Their resentment at what was to them an unjust 
land distribution arrangement led to the creation of a `commune' 
(`ammiya), and to demands for an allocation which the cultivators 
themselves would control. 
The rebellion of 1925 was another matter. It was animated by the 
grievances of the entire Druze community in the face of what they saw 
as unwarranted interference by an alien power. The revolt occurred 
even though this power appeared to take the side of the cultivator 
against his lords, abolishing the system of triennial reallotments in 
favour of a policy in which he who planted a plot with vines was given 
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title to it. In this case, communal solidarity overrode the interest of a 
particular status group. 36 
Moreover with the end of the revolt in 1926, the Mandatory 
authorities began to take measures to bring an end to musha'tenure. 
Over the next ten years progress was made in the individuation of 
properties with the consolidation of strips and the definitive abolition of 
periodic re-allocation. Impetus towards individuation was given by the 
introduction of fruit tree cultivation, and the Druze lords, the large 
landowners who had previously favoured redistribution, now became 
keen to hold onto the land which they had planted with orchards. 
Moreover since much of this land was mortgaged to the Agricultural 
Bank, redistribution became much more difficult than in the past. 37 
C>Blga'. A third region where musha` tenure was prevalent was 
the Biqa'. It was here that the initial attempts were made by the 
Cadastral Survey to consolidate the tiny slivers of land into more 
workable blocs. In the Biqa', musha` had become `stabilised', i. e. the 
36 For the events of 1890, see Introduction supra. For the changes in tenure 
as one factor contributing to the revolt of 1925-27, see for example, 1>MAE, 
Rapport provisoire ... 
1925,13; 2>Elizabeth P. MacCallum, The Nationalist 
Crusade in Syria (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1928), 111-112; 
3>Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab 
Nationalism, 1920-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 156- 
57. 
37 MAE, Rapport ... 
1929,89; 1930,117; 1931,116; 1932,120; 1933,114; 
1934,126; 1935,126; 1937,114; 1938,118-19. Since the Jabal Druz had 
been the centre of the most serious challenge to French rule in 
Syria, the 
Mandatory authorities certainly encouraged the transformation of 
Druze 
lords, leaders of their community, into large landlords who were preoccupied 
with the aggrandizement of their estates and more 
likely to be supporters of 
the French who allowed them to do this. 
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lots were no longer re-apportioned. 38 Communal disciplines of 
cultivation were maintained, but the plots were well on their way to 
becoming properties held in individual possession worked by family 
production units. 39 
D>Damascus. No observer mentions the Damascus region as 
being one which hosted musha`. Perhaps this was because the Ghuta 
had been densely settled for a long time and most of the land with its 
orchards and gardens would have been mu/k. 
E>HOmS. It was quite different with the liwalmuhafaza (after 
1936)of Horns. This was an area of well-established musha` tenure. 
Indeed Weulersse attributes the ability of the villagers to resist the 
encroachments of city notables to the fact that this system had 
extended such deep roots into the fabric of the countryside. 4° In the 
Horns gada , the stabilised form of musha` existed in the valley of the 
Orontes where irrigated land had much greater economic potential. 
Land continued to be re-distributed by the quantified shares method on 
the State Domains to the east (Qariatayn gada') which formed 69% of 
the /iwa and on the latifundia of the city notables. The `open ended' 
38 For a discussion of the process and result of `stabilisation', see 1 >Latron, 
La Vie ..., 190-94; 
2>Weulersse, Paysans..., 104-06; 3>Firestone, `The land- 
equalizing ..., ' 94. 
39 Latron, La Vie ..., 183-98, passim; 
Weulersse, Paysans..., 104,108,189- 
91. 
4° Jacques Weulersse, L'Oronte: etude de fleuve (Tours: Arrault et Cie, 
Maitres Imprimeurs, 1940), 71. 
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VILLAGES DU CAZA DE HAMA 
CU LTIVLS 
SOUS LA FORME MOUCHAA 
MUNICIPE 
DE NAM 
nstantinop e` 
AS/E M/NEURE 
Villages cultives sous la Forme D/T[RRAN E Mouc-haa (en tout ou en pantie) ý"ý"' , 
"AS/E FRA/V A/SE" tGY P°T Ef 
method had practically disappeared except perhaps on the confines of 
the desert where there was extensive unoccupied land. 41 
F>Hama. In the liwa/muhafaza (after 1936) of Hama to the north, 
musha`tenure existed, but to a lesser extent. A study by Jean Gaulmier 
of the land tenure system of Hama qada' which was done in 1933 
clearly demonstrated the grip of the notables on the villages of the 
gada' and the inability of the musha' system to resist them. The 
notables owned 109 out of the 114 villages and parts of two others. 
The inhabitants of 33 out of the 114 villages in the qada' practised 
musha` cultivation. Notables had complete ownership of 29 of these 
villages, and part ownership of two others. Of these 33 musha'villages, 
only two, the large and long-established Greek Orthodox village of Kafr 
Buhum and the Sunni Arab village of Surana were wholly-owned by 
their inhabitants. 42 
Weulersse, citing a census made by the Cadastral Survey in 
1935, says that half the cultivated land was held in musha `. 43 Is it that 
the 33 (out of 114) villages cited by Gaulmier as being musha`(i. e. 29%) 
worked fifty percent of the land? It seems improbable on theface of it, 
------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ 
<----Fig. 8 Villages in the gada' of Hama cultivated under musha` in 1933. 
Source: Anon. [Jean Gaulmier], `Notes sur la propriete fonciere dans la 
Syrie centrale, ' L'Asie Francaise, XXXIII, 309 April, 1933,134. 
41 Anwar Naaman, `Precisions sur la structure agraire dans la region de 
Homs-Hama (Syrie), ' Bulletin de /'Association de Geographes Fiangais, 
March-April, 1950,53-59. 
42 Anon. [Gaulmier], 131-32,134. 
43 Weulersse, Le Pays ..., 358, 
fn 1. 
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but a look at the map of the musha` villages included in Gaulmier's 
account reveals that a large proportion of these villages were in fact 
quite large . 
Thus in the Hama region, where the power of the notables had 
attained its greatest extent, the communal form of tenure was much 
reduced both in scope and in power. Moreover the peasants were 
utterly miserable and continued to be so for many years after the end of 
the Mandate. Bernard Orgels, a Belgian researcher who studied Syrian 
agriculture in the late nineteen fifties concluded his study of a village in 
the Hama region by stating that `Poverty reigned everywhere. No 
radios, no newspapers, no gathering places as in other muhafazas, no 
bus line passing through the village where everything is misery and 
filth. 44 
F1>SalaM! Ya. In Salamiya district, the eastern qada' 
of this /iwa, there existed a stabilised form of musha`tenure. Here the 
village land was divided into two or more blocs with at least half in 
fallow whilst the other was split into cultivated strips. Each landholder 
had one or more strips in each bloc, and the cropped land which was 
located in one sector or in two contiguous ones was worked under a 
communal discipline. The practice of reallocating the strips was 
followed less here than elsewhere, and in any case the last partition 
took place before the First World War. 45 
44 Bernard Orgels, `Contribution ä ('etude des problemes agricoles de la 
Syrie, ' Correspondance d'Orient(Brussels), 4,1960,73. 
45 Lewis, Nomads-, 63. 
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G>Ghab and 'Amuq. Both Latron and Weulersse stated that there 
was musha' tenure on the plains of the Ghab and the `Amuq, 
continuations of the Biqa' where it was possible (in theory at least) to 
replicate the conditions of the interior plains. 46 Weulersse notes that a 
typical village in the Ghab might be situated on the slope of the Jabal 
Ansayria, and work two kinds of properties, each under the appropriate 
form of tenure. The peasants would cultivate lands situated on the 
incline as individual holdings whilst holding those on the Orontes plain 
as musha`under its communal disciplines. 
H>'Akkar. Perhaps the peasants of the `Akkar plain, north and 
east of Tripoli, once held their properties in musha . There is a tradition 
among them that the beys, the lords of the region `deprived' them of 
these rights long ago. 47 
I>Aleppo. In the vilayeflmuhafaza (after 1936) of Aleppo where 
there was a range of climate, musha'tenure tended to vary according 
to region. One can divide the areas of the vi/ayet into three climatic 
zones: The region northwest of the city of Aleppo (qada' of Jabal 
Samaan) is a quite well-watered area with rainfall of some 400 mm per 
annum. The band of territory stretching southwest-northeast of Aleppo 
46 Latron, La Vie ..., 183; 
Weulersse., Le Pays ..., 372 and 373, Fig. 150; 
Paysans..., 108. 
47 Michael Gilsenan, Lords of the Lebanese Marches: Violence and Narrative 
in an Arab Society (London: I. 6. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1996), 13. 
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(qada's of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, Idlib, Aleppo City, Bab, Manbij, and 
Jarablus) receives 300-400 mm. Finally in the area east-southeast of 
the vilayet (the gada' of Maskana) one finds the driest area with some 
200-300 mm. of rain. 
In the qada's located in the better watered areas in the western 
part of the vilayet--the so-called Ma `mura or `settled' zone), various 
observers noted the existence of rnusha `tenure: 
I. 1>Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. In Ma'arrat al-Nu`man qada' 
located in the southwest corner of the vilayet, Achard stated that the 
cadastre which was completed in 1924 found that 60 out of its 139 
villages were held under musha`tenure. 48 
I. 2>Idllb. Musha` tenure continued north and east 
into Idlib qada-. Louise Sweet, who studied the village of Tal Tugan in 
1954,49 noted that like all others `in the part east of the Aleppo- 
Damascus highway', this community followed the two-field system (as 
in Salamiya), with the south and east sides left fallow whilst the north 
and west sides were cultivated. As in Salamiya, the lands were held in 
stabilised musha` tenure with the peasants having strips in each of 
thirty-two subdivisions, each differing in soil type and quality. The 
shares were limited to thirty-six, and were measured in faddans. When 
48 Achard `Propriete rurale. . ., '9; `Les Problemes ... 
le probleme agraire, ' 7. 
49 This village lay sixty-five kilometres south of Aleppo on the southern edge 
of the al-Matakh swamp into which flowed the river Quwayk. 
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she wrote there was no redistribution, although there had apparently 
been one sometime in the past. 50 
I. 3>Jabal Samaan. In the area of Jabal Samaan qada' 
French officials in the 1930's, as mentioned above, commented that 
here musha`tenure had re-distributions every three years in contrast to 
the annual allocations to be found in the muhafazaof Homs. 51 
I. 4>larablus, Bab, Manblj, and Maskana. In the areas east 
of Aleppo stretching to the Euphrates, and contained within the qada's 
of Jarablus, Bab, Manbij, and Maskana the evidence for musha'tenure 
is scanty, although Latron notes that the village of Safira, 25 km. 
southeast of Aleppo on the Aleppo-Maskana road, was the largest 
musha'village in Syria with an area of 18,000 hectares. 52 Its vast size 
was perhaps due to the fact that it was located on the edge of the 
desert zone. 
There appear to be no other reports of the existence of musha` 
villages in this zone which was re-settled starting in the late 1870's. 
This does not mean that they did not exist for in this pre-eminent 
frontier zone, so similar in this way to the Hawran, communal cohesion 
50 Louise E. Sweet, Tell Toqaan: A Syrian Village, Anthropological Papers, 
Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 14 (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan, 1960), 50,64. Note that she does not employ musha'to 
describe 
the general organisation of landholding in `her' village. She only mentions 
it 
in connexion with certain odd-shaped plots located on shallow stony soil 
which could not be worked communally, and had individual owners. 
She 
states (64) that these plots were `named aid musha"formerly'. 
This leads 
one to believe that these were examples of those parcels which 
Latron says 
were taken out of musha `allocation and given to those 
individuals who made 
an effort to cultivate them as their own property. 
See Latron, La Vie..., 190. 
51 Supra, 140 and fn 15. 
52 Latron, La Vie ..., 184 and 
fn 2 and Plate II, 192-93. 
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was absolutely necessary when faced with the rigours of pioneering in 
a hostile environment. Here the problem was not the threat of beduin 
raids for the beduin tribes in the area were small and weak. Moreover 
much of the land in the gada's of Manbij, Bab, and Maskana had been 
acquired by Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid who provided units of gendarmerie to 
protect the settlers on his land. 53 It was simply that in a region where 
agriculture was problematic, the peasant community was forced to 
stick together in order to make a success of their new venture. There 
was no better way to maintain this cohesion than to organise the 
villages around the principle of musha. 
J>Euphrates valley. In their study of the village of Shams al-Din 
Tannira, Helga Seeden and Muhamed Kaddour have demonstrated that 
musha` tenure was and is prevalent in the valley of the Euphrates, in 
villages along both its banks. 54 Here they find evidence of musha` in 
village lands whose owners continued to follow this pattern even after 
the imposition of the land reform in 1964. The authors give a 
description of the mechanism used to carry out this process which is 
similar to those furnished by Achard and other observers writing during 
the Mandate. That such a pattern should persist even after the 
53 270,000 hectares and 333 villages in the area between the Euphrates and 
Bab; 175,000 hectares and 234 villages in the region south of Aleppo. For 
these figures and a discussion of the Su/taniya lands in the area east of 
Aleppo, see Lewis, Nomads-, 53-54 and Map 3,16. 
54 The Euphrates valley was the most densely populated part of eastern 
Syria. Moussly says that during the 1940's there were 104 villages with 
57,000 inhabitants on its left bank and 115 villages with a population of 
139,700 on its right one. Moussly, 219. 
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institution of a measure hailed as the panacea for most of the ills which 
beset the countryside certainly demonstrates its efficacy in the eyes of 
the cultivators. 55 
K>JaZlra. It is unlikely that musha`tenure was to be found east of 
the Euphrates in the vast lands of the Jazira with the exception perhaps 
of the valleys of the Balikh and the western Khabur. In this region there 
were few peasants and fewer villages, and these were concentrated in 
the river valleys. 56 Many of its inhabitants were refugees with no 
agricultural tradition. Others were beduin with little incentive to settle 
on the land. Moreover when it was developed for agriculture in the 
nineteen thirties, but particularly after the Second World War, the 
dearth of cultivators led to the introduction of machine-driven 
cultivation of vast areas where Aleppine entrepreneurs could achieve 
economies of scale on the Australian or American model. Therefore 
this was capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive cultivation. 
K. 1>BeC de Canard. In the Jazira, there was one 
exception to the general absence of musha `cultivation. This was the 
so-called `Bec de Canard', that part of the High Jazira in the far 
northeast (administratively the muhafaza of Jazira) where officials of 
the Cadastral Survey recorded the existence of what was obviously 
55 Seeden and Kaddour, 501-03. 
56 For example, in the valley of the Khabur during the 1940's, the population 
was evaluated at some 41,500 souls inhabiting 102 villages. Moussly, 227. 
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musha `. 57 This was a zone of new tillage on a frontier between desert 
and sown and between Arab and Kurd. The law of the strongest ruled 
as tribal shaykhs and city notables put forth dubious land claims based 
on ancient sened tapus and presumed rights of pasturage. Therefore 
there was a real need for peasant solidarity, and the cultivators worked 
their lands under communal discipline using a biennial rotation. This 
was an open-ended musha'system based on the faddan. When the 
maximum surface which it seemed possible to cultivate was attained, 
the holdings were stabilised. First the land was divided into sections, 
one planted and one fallow. Then the owner of each team was given the 
same number of parcels in each section so that each had equal number 
of homologous plots. 
The writer of the Cadastral report stated that the system which 
he found used to divide the lands of the High Jazira `seemed similar to 
what had already been observed in other regions of Syria, for example, 
the Aleppo region'. It certainly seems to be the same as the system 
which Lewis noted in Salamiya, and Sweet noted in Tal Tuqan and 
neighbouring districts of the Ma`mura. 
Even such a schematic survey as this shows that during the 
Mandate period, the areas where one would expect musha'tenure held 
it to a greater or lesser extent: i. e. the interior plains on the edge of the 
57 Regie des travaux de cadastre et d'amelioration fonciere des Etats de 
Syrie et du Liban. Republique Syrienne, Mohafazat de Djezireh: `Rapport 
general de reconnaissance fonciere de la Djezireh, ' 7 April 1941,30-31. 
MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 413. 
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cultivated zone whose basic crop was dry-farmed cereals. 
Nonetheless, having said this, one must make an important caveat: 
Latron points out that whilst in general there were two zones, one of 
individually-owned properties and one of communal properties, within 
each zone were examples of the other form of property. Weulersse 
seconds this by noting the following: 
L>MBSyaf gada' In this district of the Jabal Ansayria, there 
existed certain villages which were held under open-ended musha' 
tenure with annual redistributions. 58 
Whether musha' cultivation sprang from beduin society or the 
exigencies of peasant life, its disciplines embodied the cohesion 
necessary for the success of a village community settled in the 
transitional zone. Yet this particular method of organising the agrarian 
process did not remain in stasis, but was subjected to a natural 
mutation over time by two processes which held an equal place in the 
evolution of the countryside. The first was the creation of latifundia 
controlled by absentee landlords whilst the second was the gradual 
stabilisation and ultimate individuation of the musha' properties 
themselves. 
58 Weulersse, Le Pays ..., 358, 
fn 4. 
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II. 4>Peasantand landlord: the web of obligation 
The classifications of land defined by certain legal categories 
(mulk, mini, etc. ) whose roots stretched back to the first centuries of the 
Islamic era were important in theory, but in reality did not affect the 
relationship between the village community and its land because they 
were not germane to the daily round of the peasant and his family. Far 
more important from the cultivator's point of view was the pattern of 
domination existing in the countryside, because it was this which 
determined who controlled the farmlands and their revenue at any 
given moment. Latifundia had to some degree long been part of the 
Syrian agricultural scene. Some notables had obtained control over 
large estates before the promulgation of the Ottoman Land Code of 
1858, whilst others did so in the period between 1858 and 1914. Such 
acquisitions reached a crescendo during the Great War and the first 
years of peace when a certain degree of administrative anarchy 
enabled speculators, enriched by the profits of war to acquire vast 
landed properties. This was particularly the case in the Biqa', in 
`Akkar, and particularly in the districts of Homs and Hama `where a few 
families acquired almost all the cultivable area in the surrounding 
plains'. 59 
The opportunity to gain control over vast properties had been 
facilitated by the Land Code. First, it had enabled tribal shaykhs to be 
transformed into large landlords by the stroke of a pen with the 
59 Latron, La Vie ..., 
212-13; Klat, `Land tenure ..., ' 55-56. 
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registration of communal grazing lands of the tribe in their own names 
as leaders and representatives of their communities. For example, in 
1875, the grazing lands of the Fadl tribe in the Jawlan were registered 
in the name of several tribal leaders. 
Another way in which shaykhs were turned into landlords 
stemmed from the deliberate Ottoman policy of awarding them income 
from a certain number of villages as an inducement to settle with their 
tribes. The village lands were then registered in their names, but the 
intended result usually did not occur. Few tribesmen deigned to settle 
on the land, and therefore the new `landlords' were forced to employ 
villagers to work their lands as share tenants. In this manner did the 
Ottoman award of twenty villages around Aleppo to Jad'an b. Muhayd 
of the Fid'an tribe in 1865 convert this shaykh into a proprietor. 60 
A second method of acquiring estates was for a city notable from 
one of the great families to obtain land within a village community. His 
title was rendered more secure after the promulgation of the Land 
Code because the holding of a title in the form of a sened tape 
rendered possession legitimate in the eyes of the law. Moreover the 
period from the end of the 1870's to the beginning of the century saw a 
60 For a discussion of this process, see Dawn Chatty, `From camel to truck: A 
study of the pastoral economy of the AI-Fadl and the Al-Hassana in the 
Beqaa valley of Lebanon, ' Ph. D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 
1974,68-69. This process of sedentarisation continued under the Mandate. 
For a contemporary account, see A. de Boucheman, `La sedentarisation des 
nomades du desert de Syrie, ' AF, XXXIV, 320, May, 1934,140-43. 
Also Philip 
H. Khoury, `The tribal shaykh, French tribal policy, and the nationalist 
movement in Syria between two world wars, ' Middle 
Eastern Studies, XVIII, 2, 
April, 1982,180-93. 
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fall in agricultural prices which brought economic depression to the 
countryside. Since the peasant was devoid of financial resources to 
tide him over the bad years, this long crisis pushed him ever more 
firmly into the arms of the notable/moneylenders' 
This relationship between notable and cultivator was heavily 
weighted in favour of the former who was endowed with clear political 
and social primacy. Weulersse speaks of the `brutal divide' between 
town and country, between proprietor and peasant, each living in a 
world alien to the other. For him, the city and its representatives are 
"encysted" in a countryside which they dominate and exploit. 62 In this 
relationship, the lord was paramount because it was he who controlled 
the land, and he who initiated the various types of production contract 
and set the terms. The economic supremacy of the lord was reinforced 
by an entrenched political and social authority which stemmed from the 
support of whatever administration held sway in Damascus or Aleppo. 
As an agha63 or wealthy urban merchant his status was so far superior 
61 For a general discussion of this process, see Weulersse, Paysans..., 114- 
116; with reference to the Hama region, Anon. [Gaulmier], 133-134. 
62 Weulersse elaborated this idea in 1 >'La primaute des cites dans 
I'economie syrienne, ' Union Geographique Internationale, Comptes-rendus 
du Congr6s International de Geographie (Amsterdam, 1938), II, (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1938), 233-39; 2>Paysans..., 85-89 and 113-21. 
63 In Ottoman Syria, the aghawat(pl. of agha) were originally commanders of 
central government troops sent to garrison Damascus and other cities. Since 
over the years, they came to control bodies of what were in essence para- 
military troops, they were able to establish their own political and economic 
predominance both within the cities and over various districts of the 
countryside. So much so that the peasants came to use the appellation 
`agha' for the notables who came to control rural properties. The great 
notable and landowning `Azm family of Damascus and Hama is a case in 
point. For the aghawat and their role in Ottoman Damascus, see Linda 
Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and 
Estates in the 18th and 19th Centuries (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 
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to that of the humble cultivator that the latter was hesitant to dispute his 
will, particularly when that will was expressed through the intermediary 
of an overseer (waki/), one who held the authority of the master and 
could make the life of the peasant a misery should he not comply. 64 
If such predominance was characteristic of the city notable in his 
relations with the countryside, it became equally true for the tribal 
shaykh. For the acquisition of what had been property common to the 
tribe now set him apart from his fellows as it transformed into a great 
landlord one who hitherto had been merely a primus inter pares. 
In order to gain an understanding of this pattern of domination 
and the changes which flowed from it, one must begin by looking at the 
primary economic relationship and the ties of dependence which it 
created: After the enactment of the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, many 
of the mu/tazims who had held the cultivated lands as a tax farm from 
the Ottoman government gradually became transmuted into landlords 
who held a sened tapu which gave them title to those same lands. 
Whether tax farmer or title-holding proprietor, the notable was 
interested first and foremost in income to support the extravagance 
necessary to assert his own status. He did not care by what method it 
was produced, and so was unlikely to disturb those communal systems 
Wiesbaden GMBH, 1985), 108,110-114. For a history of the `Azm family, see 
Ibid., 136-44. For the use of the appellation `agha' by the peasants, see 
Weulersse, 1>'La primaute..., ' 237; 2>Paysans..., 113 
rA For the wakil, and his role, see 1>Klat, `Land tenure ..., ' 108-112; 
2>Latron, La Vie..., 83-84 for his economic function; 3>'Abdallah Hanna, al- 
Qadiya a/-zira `iya wa'/-hafikat al-fa/lahiya fi suriya wa lubnan, 1920-1945 
(Beirut; Dar al-Farabi, 1978), 386; and 4>Weulersse, Le Pays..., fn 2 on 364, 
366 for their social röle. 
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of tenure which had proved themselves over time. Therefore the links 
which the lord made with his peasants were superimposed upon those 
which they had forged among themselves. The bases of these ties were 
different forms of oral production contracts. Such contracts varied a 
great deal since they were determined by the quality of the land and the 
type of crop. At this most basic level, there was a delicate balance 
between the needs of proprietor and cultivator, a balance which had 
evolved from hard experience over the centuries into mechanisms 
which extracted the maximum amount for the lord consonant with the 
well-being of the peasant-producer. 65 
The most basic relationship between landlord and tenant was the 
muzar`a contract. This was an agreement of metayage or 
sharecropping which in its Middle Eastern guise was broadly defined as 
an association in which one of the partners furnished the land whilst the 
other supplied the labour with the results of this labour being divided 
between them . 
66 In fact the production contracts between landlord 
and metayer (muzari, were quite various, each one reflecting the 
revenue-bearing capacities of the plot concerned. Since the domains 
taken over were in areas of ancient exploitation, labour-intensive, and 
following accustomed routines, the landlord was forced to make 
contracts with numerous small existing production units and was 
unable to impose uniform economies of scale, even if he might have so 
65 Achard draws attention to this valuable point in his report on Syria written 
after his first visit in 1919. Achard, `Notes sur la Syrie, ' 101. 
66 For this contract, see Latron, La Vie ..., 48-58; Mat, `Land tenure ..., ' 119- 
25. 
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wished. The main principle behind these contracts was to keep a 
careful balance between the needs of the tenant and those of his lord. 
This was particularly important because so many of the territories 
concerned were in regions of marginal production, and a particularly 
greedy landlord could drive away his tenants and by doing so kill the 
goose who laid the golden egg. Thus in drier areas, the tenant farmed a 
much bigger area and was allowed to keep a larger proportion of the 
crop, up to 70-80%, whilst in more fertile areas, the peasant and 
landlord took a more equal share of the production and its expenses. 67 
Subsumed under the muzar`a were a number of subtypes: First 
came the sharika muraba' (quarter partnership) where the landlord 
supplied everything and paid all the taxes and expenses, and in return 
took 75% of the crop. Then came two more egalitarian contracts, the 
sharika ha/abiya (Aleppo partnership) and sharika hamawiya (Hama 
partnership) where the capital supplied by each partner, the expenses, 
and the proceeds were more or less split fifty/fifty. Finally came the 
sharika khums (fifth partnership) where the landlord supplied only the 
land and the house, whilst paying the land tax for his tenant. He allowed 
the tenant to take 80% in return for his capital input of beasts and seed. 
Within these broad subtypes, there appeared variations even 
within a single region, depending on the amount and regularity of 
rainfall; the fertility of the soil; whether there was sufficient water for 
67 Latron, La Vie ..., 50. 
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irrigation; the availability of manpower to work the land; and finally the 
power of the landlords over the peasants. These factors taken together 
determined what each partner brought to the association and what 
each got out of it. 
Latron states that in northern Syria, the hamawiya contract was 
so-called because it was used for the richer lands around Hama and 
Salamiya, but was not to be found around Aleppo. By contrast, the 
ha/abiya contract was employed in the less fertile regions around 
Aleppo [S and SE. of Aleppo must be meant]. In Hama and Salamiya, 
this contract was adopted only for tenancy agreements with very poor 
peasants. 68 
Gaulmier, for his part, notes something entirely different for the 
Hama district. He remarks that there the khums contract was that 
most frequently to be found, and included some seventy percent of the 
agreements made. 69 It is possible to attribute the difference in the 
comments of Latron and Gaulmier to the fact that perhaps the 
hamawiya contract was used for that part of the Hama district situated 
in the valley of the Orontes whilst the halabiya or khums contracts were 
employed in those areas which were either in the marshy Asharna 
valley or in the drier portions to the east of the river. 
For his part, Klat offers a comparison of production contracts 
from three areas70 : 
68 Latron, La Vie-, 51. 
69 Anon. [Gaulmier], 135. 
70 Mat, `Land tenure ..., ' 120-121. 
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In the Jazira, landlords received 10% of the crop when they 
supplied the land only; 25% when they supplied land and 
seed; and 2/3 when they supplied land, seed and plough 
animals. 71 
In Aleppo, by contrast, the landlord received 20% if he 
furnished the land alone; and 50%, if he furnished land and 
seed (a type of halabiya contract). 
In Damascus, the lord received 25% if he provided the 
land; and 50% if he provided land and half the seed. 
This schema illustrates clearly, the changing balance of power 
between proprietor and tenant. In the Jazira, the landlord was forced 
to give more to attract tenants, who in their turn, needed more with 
which to support their families. Yet if the landlord supplied everything, 
in return he took the lion's share. The extreme nature of these terms of 
contract reflected the difficulties facing both the cultivator and the 
landlord. Here there were few peasants, few towns, and rainfall was 
erratic. Because conditions were difficult, the peasants had to work 
more land and receive more capital support in order to cultivate 
successfully. For his part, the landlord needed cultivators, but he also 
had to put out more capital expense which was demonstrated by the 
great value put on the supply of a plough team which was probably 
brought from some distance away. Nonetheless the relationship 
71 Note that Mat's presentation is a schematic one. In fact, in the Bec de 
Canard at least there were numerous variations ranging from 15-50% to the 
landlord although the average worked out at between 15 and 22% with the 
muzari `supplying work, seed, and beasts whilst the landlord paid the taxes. 
This was a form of khums contract. See Regie des travaux du cadastre ..., 
`Rapport general de reconnaissance fonciere ..., ' 28-29. 
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between the two partners was inherently unequal, and he who 
controlled the capital could demand more of the proceeds in return. 72 
In Aleppo, where the climate was somewhat better, 73 and the 
peasants more plentiful, the landlord could afford to offer less. Finally 
in Damascus whose Ghuta' was famed for its fertility, the landlord took 
the most from his tenants, secure in the knowledge that he could easily 
attract others. He knew that he could get more revenue because the 
rich soil would yield more for him whilst supplying the peasants with 
enough for their own needs. 
Moreover Klat notes that irrigated lands were always worth more 
to the lord--in general double. For example, in Mishirfa in the plain of 
Horns, the share of the lord who supplied land alone went from 20% for 
unirrigated properties (the same as around Aleppo) whilst it rose to 
42.5% on irrigated ones. In the Homs region as a whole, sometimes the 
landlord's share rose to 60%. Out of his portion, he was expected to 
pay for any water charges and to maintain the irrigation system. 
72 Given the importance of machinery in the development of the Jazira after 
the Second World War, it is interesting to note Mat's comments on the effect 
the introduction of such machines had on contracts in western Syria and the 
Lebanon. He says that the usual procedure was for the tenants to hire the 
machines from their landlords in return for a specified portion of the 
produce. In Mishirfa, in the Homs region, the landlord received an extra 10% 
on top of his usual share for the machines he loaned to his cultivators. On 
the other hand, some owners who were eager to encourage the peasants to 
mechanise their procedures charged a cash rent so small that it hardly 
covered either the operating expenses or the depreciation cost of the 
machines. Klat, `Land tenure.. . ', 121. 
73 Mat did not specify any particular part of the vilayet, but one can assume 
that he was not speaking of the drier eastern qada's. For example, during 
the nineteen thirties, peasants were bussed into the qada's of Bab and 
Manbij for the harvest. 
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In Damascus, it was a different story. Here where there was 
abundant water in contrast to the more arid region around Homs, there 
was no distinction between irrigated and unirrigated land in terms of 
the portions kept by the two associates. 74 
The most extreme form of contract was the muraba' where the 
landlord furnished everything to his tenant, house, beasts and seed, 
and in return took seventy-five percent of the production. The fact that 
the common word for the tenant cultivator in Syria was murabi` bears 
mute witness to the misery of a large part of the peasantry in the face of 
the exactions of their masters. 75 
In complete contrast, was a specialised contract known as the 
mugharasa which was most likely to be applied to mu/k property. An 
agreement of this type was made in cases where the proprietor wished 
to create an orchard, a task which would take a number of years and 
would involve close supervision by his tenant. In order to persuade him 
to do this, the landlord was forced to offer incentives. For example, in 
one form of contract, the owner retained control of the land, but the two 
partners divided the trees among themselves in various proportions 
after they reached full maturity. The length of this type of contract 
depended upon the type of tree involved: four to six years for vines; 
three to five for mulberry trees; seven to eight for fig trees, and ten to 
twelve for olive trees. There were various stipulations attached to the 
mugharasa, some quite draconian: During the life of the contract, the 
74 Ibid., 121-122. 
75 Weulersse, Le Pays..., 225. 
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peasant was neither allowed to pick half of the fruits nor to cede his 
rights to any third party. In essence he was considered merely a simple 
muzar`i with the rights of one. He received ownership of his portion of 
the trees, only when the partnership contract terminated. His 
possession only lasted so long as the trees remained alive, for if they 
died, the former mugharasi was not allowed to plant new ones. Finally, 
if the plantation failed, it was possible for the peasant to receive 
nothing, not even an indemnity for his time and expenses. 
On the other hand, the contract might be extended beyond the 
original date set for its termination. This could occur if the trees did not 
reach sufficient maturity in the time allotted or if the two partners 
agreed that a prolongation was in their best interests even after they 
had divided the produce of their original association. All in all, it was 
possible for the mugharasa to be quite complex; although the 
proprietor retained the upper hand, the odds were more in favour of the 
tenant because his co-operation was vital in bringing the enterprise to a 
fruitful conclusion. 76 
Nevertheless even a production contract such as the mugharasa 
which was most favourable to the cultivator left the landlord with an 
overwhelming preponderance of power. The supremacy of the notable 
in all its different aspects gradually gnawed at the independence of 
what may well once have been a self-sufficient peasant community. 
76 For an extended discussion of the mugharasa contract, see 1>Latron, La 
Vie ..., 
65-72; 2>Klat, `Land tenure ..., ' 128-33. 
This is also set out in the 
Ottoman Land Code, Arts. 25-29 although no mention is made of the 
mugharasa per se. Aristarchi Bey, I, 74-77; Young, 
VI, 52-53. 
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During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of 
the twentieth, the lord, whatever his origins, found it ever easier to 
spread his tentacles in the countryside, acquire property, and disrupt 
the solidarity of the village community should he so desire. 
For If a communal form of tenure was the most efficient way to 
conduct an agricultural enterprise under the conditions prevalent in 
Syria, it would seem on the face of it that it would be foolish for the 
notable to tamper with this system. This was certainly true for the tax 
farmer who wished to extract the maximum amount of return in the 
quickest possible time. Whilst perhaps less so for the holder of the 
ma/ikane, it was not really worth his while in the parlous conditions of 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to meddle with a system 
which had proved its worth over the years. 
During this period powerful notables could not expand their 
properties legally because there was no Land Code with provisions for 
property registration and reception of title. Nonetheless this is not to 
say that lords did not see themselves as `possessing' villages whose 
inhabitants they dominated and whose lands they controlled. In the 
'Akkar, for example, the great landowners or `beys' had been lords of 
the land since the eighteenth century when as outsiders--Kurds--from a 
distant region, they came to this unruly march at the behest of the 
Ottomans who appointed them mu/tazims. They imposed themselves 
upon the villages by a combination of `external force and imperial fiat', 
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and over time `their' villages became bound to them through `shared 
narratives of the past, residence, and property'. " 
In the Levant, peasant villages had probably always been 
protected/dominated (which are, after all, two sides of the same coin) 
by the powerful, whether these were pashas, beys, or tribal shaykhs. 78 
It was simply that from the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
situation in the countryside began to change. Rural districts gradually 
became more secure and the line of cultivation began to spread into 
areas untouched since the sixteenth century. An agricultural 
commodity, Syrian grain, became an export of value to the European 
market. Finally, the enactment of the 1858 Land Law, however 
imprecise its terms or inefficient its enforcement, gave the landholder a 
written and registered title which for the first time granted him secure 
`ownership' of his properties. All of these factors presented the 
proprietor with an incentive and an opportunity both to increase his 
holdings and intrude into the communal arrangements practised by the 
villages. 
<----Fig. 9. Part of the cadastral survey map of the village of Tal Aran (qada' 
of Jabal Samaan). This is a stabilised village which shows the first signs of 
individuation carried out in order to plant orchards. In section A, 
surrounding a noria, neighbouring parcels are simply rented. In sections B 
and C, individuation has become fully effective illustrated by the appearance 
of rectangular plots which break the normal musha` pattern of fields in 
parallel strips. Source: Jacques Weulersse, Paysans de Syrie et du Poche 
Orient (Paris: Gallimard, 1946), Fig. 21,106. 
77 Gilsenan, Lords ..., 12-13. 
See his comments on the meaning of 
ownership in /dem, `A modern feudality? Land and labour in North Lebanon, 
1858-1950, ' in Khalidi (ed. ), 455. 
78 Firestone elaborates on this point. `The land-equalizing ..., ' 111-15. 
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One must not think that the incentive for change flowed only one 
way. The villagers too were open to new ideas: This generally took the 
form of moving away from a rotation cycle dominated by cereals into a 
more variegated pattern of cultivation by introducing vines and fruit 
trees into the village economy. 79 This process involved an attenuation 
of the communal spirit: Groups and individuals began to sense that 
their proper interests were more important than those of the village of 
which they were a part, and so chafed at the agricultural routines which 
bound them to their fellows. They sought to grasp new opportunities, 
not least a chance at profit, by enlarging the scope of their enterprises. 
Since these fruit trees took a long time to grow and bear a crop and 
required much care while doing so, he who planted them was unwilling 
to see the plot into which he had invested so much of his future 
allocated to anyone else as would happen under the musha` system. 
His right as a member of the community to a certain proportion of the 
common land now became less important than ownership of a 
particular piece of property within it. This meant a creeping death to 
the principle of periodic reallocation, the bedrock upon which rested 
musha` cultivation. Thus the agricultural lands surrounding such a 
`stabilised' village would begin to take a somewhat motheaten look: 
Instead of the long uniform croplines divided into quarters and sections 
so characteristic of musha` tenure, part of the agricultural land was 
790f course orchards had long been grown on mu/k property within villages. 
Nonetheless, the collapse of the grain market in the fourth quarter of the 
nineteenth century led to an expansion of these alternative crops on what 
previously had been grain-bearing musha'lands. See infra. 
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now partitioned into private plots, each separated from its neighbour, 
and treated as individual property. These parcels were still miri, but 
the Land Code and subsequent decrees slowly removed the 
distinctions between property over which the landlord or peasant had a 
mere tasarruf and an allodial estate. 
Thus emerged a spirit of incipient capitalism where each sought 
his own profit at the expense of the community, a spirit whose effects 
slowly began to eat its way into the fabric of Syrian rural life. In this 
process, the notable landowner, possessed of far greater resources 
than any villager or group of villagers, participated with a vengeance. 
He too was quite happy to break a centuries old cropping pattern, if by 
doing so he could bring himself more profit. Nevertheless for him, this 
was a minor gambit. He was far more interested in increasing the size 
of his estates, and with it his influence and prestige, by obtaining 
control of the villages, their inhabitants, and the lands surrounding 
them. In accomplishing this goal, his most important weapon was the 
mechanism of debt bondage. 
Since he was the principal source of capital in the countryside, 
the large proprietor used the peasant's need for a steady source of 
finance as a means of enlarging his own property. He would extend 
credit at an exorbitant rate of interest to peasants who were operating 
on very thin margins. The only collateral the peasant could offer was 
the land he worked; therefore as he fell deeper in the hole, which was 
not difficult to do, the lord would accept this land in payment for a loan 
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which was then rolled over into a new cycle with the peasant now a 
mere tenant forever tied to his master by the chains of fiscal obligation. 
Another way for the notable to penetrate into the villages was as 
an arbiter of one the numerous disputes which arose between members 
of a village community in return for a gift of land. In this way, little by 
little, he could come to own the entire village. 
Perhaps he would not wait for an invitation, but would claim a 
piece of land on some rather flimsy pretext. When this was brought 
before the court, the power of the great proprietor gained a decision in 
his favour. 80 
Thus in various ways the notable-proprietor gradually extended 
his grip over village after village, enlarging his estates as he did so. 
One finds an example of this process in the district of Hama. This region 
was the locus classicus of the latifundia where only 33 out of 114 
villages (29%) were held under musha'tenure in 1933. In a study done 
in the early 1930's, Jean Gaulmier documented how over the past fifty 
years, the great families of Hama had gradually divided the district into 
large landed properties. 81 At that time, peasant-cultivators owned in 
toto four out of 114 villages (of which two were musha'), and in two 
others, part of the village (both being musha'. According to Gaulmier, 
the notables had garnered their estates in one of three ways. First, the 
<----Fig. 10 Latifundia in the qada' of Hama in 1933. 
Source. Anon. [Jean Gaulmier], `Notes sur la propriete fonciere dans la 
Syrie centrale, ' L'Asie Francaise, XXXIII, 309 April, 1933,132. 
80 Anon. [Gaulmier}, 134-35 describes these stratagems, giving examples. 
81 /bid., 132-34. 
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village might have been a gift from the Ottoman Sultan as recompense 
for some service performed. This was somewhat rare in the Hama 
district, and only two of the villages had been acquired by notables in 
that way. A second method of acquisition was to buy villages which had 
come into the possession of different beduin tribes who made use of the 
pastures, and derived a certain revenue from the crops. These nomads 
were willing to sell their villages for a slightly larger, but still derisory 
sum. The nomads had alienated 21 villages in this manner since 
approximately 1890. As one might expect, almost all of these villages 
(19/21) were situated on the eastern edge of the district bordering on 
the qada' of Salamiya. Finally, there were the villages which were 
"`ceded" (one dare not say "sold")' in whole or in part by the peasants 
themselves, a total of 17 since 1880.82 Therefore in the fifty year period 
1880-1930, notables acquired at least 40 villages in the Hama district. 
Gaulmier indicated that this process had been taking place for a 
considerable period before that. He said that it was `fairly easy' to 
determine the origin of land belonging to notable families of relatively 
recent settlement in the district. He implies that this was more difficult 
in the case of two families, the Kilanis and the 'Azms, who had lived in 
Hama since the end of the fifteenth and the middle of the seventeenth 
82 Or 19 if one follows the map on 133. Unfortunately the list of peasant 
villages sold since 1880 does not match the villages on the map above 
it. 
Three of the villages listed are not on the map, and five of the villages on the 
map are not on the list. Perhaps the discrepancy can 
be explained by the 
fact that some of the villages were obtained before 1880. 
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century respectively, since many of their `acquisitions' had been made 
in the distant past. 83 
It is difficult to tell whether any particular type of village was 
more resistant to the avarice and influence of the great families, 
particularly in a district where almost all were owned by a notable 
proprietor. Nonetheless Gaulmier believed that the most vulnerable 
ones were those inhabited by Alawis who tended to be far poorer and 
also of lower social status than their Sunni Muslim and Greek Orthodox 
neighbours. Unfortunately the evidence he cited for this was somewhat 
confused. It was certainly true that the four large (and rich) villages 
wholly owned by the cultivators were inhabited by members of the 
Greek Orthodox and Sunni Muslim communities, but perhaps this was 
only an indication that a prosperous group could resist encroachments 
better than a poor one. 84 
Latron remarked that `Syria and Coelesyria (i. e. the Biqa') are 
characterised at the present time by the "stabilised village", the second 
phase of communal landholding. '85 Yet no author indicated when this 
shift began. It was not the increased involvement of peasants in the 
market which in itself triggered this process. For after all, they had 
supplied grain to European buyers in the 1860's and 1870's. But grain 
production, whether for home consumption or for trade outside the 
83 `Apart from the Kilani and the `Azm, the other notable families. .. have 
settled relatively recently in the area. It is thus rather easy to uncover the 
origins of their estates. ' Anon. [Gaulmier], 133. 
84 For Gaulmier's attempts to relate sect and socioeconomic status to a 
capacity for resistance, Ibid., 133-34. 
85 Latron, La Vie ..., 191. 
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village, was not incompatible with musha . One can surmise that it was 
the collapse of the world grain market at the end of the 1870's which 
predisposed (perhaps `forced' is a better word) peasants and landlords 
to turn to more remunerative crops. In Lebanon certainly there was a 
change from silkworm raising to fruit trees after the turn of the century 
due in part to demand from Beirut's growing urban agglomeration. 86 
So perhaps one can say that the move towards fruit trees which took 
place in the musha`villages of inner Syria came in the thirty year period 
1880-1910 as grain became less profitable and the coming of the 
railroads (from the middle of the 1890's) made it easier to ship such 
perishable goods to urban centres. 
Another factor influencing stabilisation was the greater security 
of the countryside which made the cohesion of the village community in 
some respects less vital. In Salamiya, Tal Tuqan, and other villages in 
the Ma `mura, the musha "lands were no longer subject to periodic re- 
allocation. In Salamiya, at least, this practice had ceased before the 
Great War. 
Thus when the French came to Syria, the two processes of 
stabilisation of musha` villages and creation and aggrandisement of 
large landed properties were firmly embedded in the countryside. For 
their part, Achard and his colleagues had their own ideas as to the 
course which agrarian relations should follow in the Mandated 
territories, ideas which added yet another skein to the twisted threads 
86 For the decline in the silk industry, see Chapter III, infra. 
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which bound together the different elements shaping the social 
structure in the rural hinterland. 
II. 5>The Mandate and the concept of the smallholder 
When Edouard Achard delivered his assessments of the ills 
besetting Syrian agriculture, he placed the inequities of the land tenure 
system at the top of his list. His solution to this problem developed from 
an ideological orientation towards private property and the virtues of 
the individual smallholder capitalist, and ignored the role which the 
village community played in the life of the countryside. His ideas ran 
counter to the basic orientation of the land system existing in Syria at 
his time of writing. This order was founded on peasant communities 
based on musha'cultivation, although it had been somewhat modified 
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century by processes of 
stabilisation and individuation. Nonetheless these changes had 
occurred within the framework of the village community which still 
remained an essential component of Syrian peasant life. 
From the very beginning of his Syrian career, Achard held firmly 
to the belief that the misery of the peasants was directly attributable to 
the tyranny of an indolent class of absentee landlords. He stated that to 
these notables, it was dominion over peasant villages which was of 
greater importance than dominion over the land itself. For the shackles 
of debt which this mastery entailed were a sure method both of gaining 
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income and of ensuring that servitude which enhanced the status of the 
notable, who was seen to be lord over myriads of souls. 87 
Achard believed that the only way to end this tyranny was to 
break up the great estates and create smallholdings from them 
because he felt that only a peasant with clear title to his land would 
have the incentive and the means to improve its productivity. In his 
opinion, possession of a legally-recognised title deed would guarantee 
security of tenure to the cultivator whilst enabling him to obtain bank 
loans at a reasonable rate of interest, using his land as collateral. Thus 
the peasant would be able to by-pass the wealthy notable who in the 
past had himself used credit as a means towards enlarging his estates, 
a process which had turned him who enjoyed the usufruct of the land he 
tilled into a tenant forever tied to his master by bonds of fiscal 
obligation. Achard was convinced that the replacement of these great 
estates by independent smallholdings would deliver the peasant at one 
stroke from the tyranny of the landlord whilst ensuring an improvement 
of production whose profits would bring prosperity to him who made 
actual use of the land rather than to him who merely lived off its 
proceeds. 
How did Achard propose to implement this revolution in tenurial 
relations? Certainly not by outright confiscation of the great estates, 
because such acts of `spoliation' would in all likelihood lead to the 
87 Achard, `Notes sur la Syrie, ' 100-101. For the mastery of the great landed 
proprietor over his dependents and and the importance acccorded exhibition 
of mastery, see Gilsenan, Lords.. ., Chap. 1,3-22. 
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revolt of those so dispossessed. Moreover he was well aware, or 
certainly became well aware, that these powerful proprietors were one 
of the principal props of the Mandatory regime . 
88 Although for the 
moment, these men were necessary evils because they linked an alien 
administration to the great mass of the agricultural population, Achard 
felt that eventually the French would be able to win the rural masses 
over to their side and dispense with landlord support as the results of 
the reform percolated downwards. 
Since direct government seizure was eliminated as a solution to 
the agrarian question, Achard turned to indirect methods to move 
towards the goals desired. The principal tool was to be a cadastral 
survey of all the Syrian lands which would provide those secure titles 
from which he hoped all other good things would flow. He also called 
for a reform of the tax system so that the tithe (` ushr), would be a fixed 
amount determined by the average of the tithe for the four previous 
years instead of being a fixed percentage of the annual crop. The idea 
behind this was that if the peasant knew he would only have to pay a 
certain sum every year, he would then seek to augment his production 
in order to retain more for himself. 
Writing in 1925-26, Achard had high hopes for the capacity of 
such proposals to overturn existing agrarian relations. Nevertheless by 
1939 these programmes had brought little change. It was not just that 
88 Achard, `Propriete rurale ..., ' 16,18; `Les Problemes .. . le probleme 
agraire, ' 11,12. For the symbiotic relationship between administrator and 
notable in one region--the `Akkar--see Gilsenan, Lords.. ., 84-85. 
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the cadastral survey had only examined half the cultivable/cultivated 
area and fifteen percent of the total: after all the areas completed were 
those lands most useful for agriculture. Nor was it that the plummeting 
agricultural prices of the early nineteen thirties made it impossible for 
the peasants to pay any tithe, much less an average of the previous four 
89 years. It was simply that the process to be triggered by the institution 
of such a survey never occurred. Although much can be laid at the 
door of bureaucratic inefficiency, impenetrable legal tangles, and 
above all, inadequate finance, these obstacles merely affected the 
implementation of the various measures designated as the agents 
which would create an army of smallholders in the countryside. 
II. 6>Two contrasting cases 
In order to gain an insight into the obstacles of creating an estate 
of smallholders in the countryside during the period of the Mandate, it is 
useful to look at two regions with systems of landholding in different 
states of evolution. There was a striking contrast between social 
relationships in southern Syria--the Hawran and the Jabal Druz--and 
those in the districts around Hama to the north. Moreover during the 
Mandate period these evolved quite differently. 
The Hawran and Jabal Druz. In both the Hawran and the 
Jabal Druz, there was a strongly developed sense of community in the 
89 For a comment on this problem, see Affaires Financieres, `Note au sujet de 
la situation financiere au 31 Mai 1932, ' 18 June 1932,2. MAE--Nantes, FB, 
Carton 311--Conseiller Financier. 
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countryside. In the Hawran, there were few landlords: An estimate of 
the middle 1920's gives the peasants ninety-five per cent of the total, 
whilst one made approximately ten years later assigned them some 
eighty-eighty-five per cent. 90 Moreover the villages maintained their 
cohesion through the egalitarian disciplines of musha` tenure, well 
suited to life on the edge of the cultivated zone. In the Jabal Druz, a 
hilly region of black rocks and poor soils, there were no latifundia. 
Starting in the seventeenth century, the Druze, a heterodox community 
anathema to the Ottoman state, had established themselves in this 
place of refuge. The Druze community was under the sway of great 
families who were tied to the peasants by bonds of religion, custom, 
and history. 
Insurrections did occur, but these were directed against outside 
forces both human and economic which disrupted the harmonious 
relationships within and between communities. In the late nineteenth 
century, vicissitudes of the international grain market brought penury 
to the cultivators. This was accompanied by attempts on the part of the 
Ottoman authorities to impose their will over these regions. The result 
was a series of sustained and bitter revolts directed against the central 
authorities in Damascus, but also to some degree against landlords 
whose perceptions bore too heavily upon the cultivators. In these 
conflicts, the Ottomans were victorious because of superior firepower 
90 For the first estimate see, Muhammad Kurd `Ali, Khitat..., in Issawi (ed. ), 
FCDEH, 330. For the second, see Epstein, `Le Hauran ..., ' 247; Idem, `Notes 
..., ' 600. 
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and a scorched earth policy, but whilst these policies brought an 
uneasy peace, they alienated the inhabitants from the state and its 
representatives. 91 
With the coming of the Mandate, the French sought to master this 
`land of dissidence', in particular the Jabal Druz. Here they first agreed 
to a form of indirect rule with a local governor and administration under 
the guidance of French counsellors. This system soon broke down and 
was replaced by the direct rule of an enlightened French governor who 
sought to send the winds of modernity whistling through the hills of the 
Jabal. 
This period of direct rule illustrated in microcosm the critiques 
made by Georges Hardy of the methods chosen by his compatriots to 
administer their overseas possessions: He believed that French 
colonial officials 
1> Legislated in the abstract, 
2>Collected facts within systems of expectation, 
3>Conceived a pre-established order rather than counting 
on a spontaneous organisation, 
in a word 
4>Founded colonial law on principles of absolute value. 92 
In the Jabal Druz, these principles were embodied in Captain 
Gabriel Carbillet who was Governor between September, 1923 and 
May, 1925. A man of the Left, a radical and Freemason who had 
received his training in North Africa, he was a moderniser who brooked 
91 For these events, see Introduction supra. Also Commandant Hassler, 'Les 
Insurrections druses avant la guerre de 1914-1918, ' AF, XXVI, 239, March, 
1926,102-08; and XXVI, 240, April, 1926,143-47. 
92 Labouret, 8 and Chapter I supra. 
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no interference as he rode roughshod over the customs and 
sensibilities of his charges in order to bring them some of the benefits 
of European civilisation. He constructed those public works so beloved 
of French colonial administrators: paved roads and new tracks; urban 
water supplies and irrigation ditches. He inaugurated a system of 
modern education by opening some thirty schools within which three 
thousand Druze children were given their first taste of the sweet 
delights of French culture. He introduced agricultural improvements by 
planting some one million vines in fields that had been cleared of stones 
and walled. 
Nevertheless the most fundamental and most controversial 
change wrought by Carbillet was in the area of agrarian reform. 
Landholding in the Jabal was a form of musha' tenure with the fields 
being reallocated triennially. Nevertheless here, where an oligarchy of 
great families overlaid the basic communal structure, the Druze 
peasants had various ties of kinship and obligation to these chiefly 
groups. Therefore when land was redistributed, the lords had the right 
to choose the best third for themselves, and the peasants were 
required to till these lands in addition to their own. In line with 
conventional wisdom, Carbillet sought to create a class of smallholders 
in the countryside, offering them the lands he wished planted in vines. 
If they accepted his offer and followed his programme, they were 
considered to have a valid title to this property, thus putting an end 
to 
communal rotation. This course did not prove particularly popular with 
the great families because they lost their property and saw 
their hold 
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over their clients weakened. Yet neither were his moves particularly 
favoured by the peasantry he was supposedly helping. These 
cultivators were deeply conservative by nature, and were bound to 
their lords by ties which transcended the land. 
Moreover both lords and peasants resented the high-handed 
methods used by Carbillet and his collaborators to drag the Jabal into 
the twentieth century. The peasants detested the corvee required of 
them to construct the public works brought to their villages. The 
oligarchy were bitter at Carbillet's refusal to concede them superior 
status: He cancelled the monthly stipends allotted them by his Druze 
predecessor; abolished their leaseholds; eliminated the system of 
collective tax payments which was subject to abuse by the powerful; 
treated them when before the courts as if they were no better than the 
humblest peasant--in short sought to impose republican egalitarianism 
on an essentially hierarchical society. Moreover every inhabitant 
whether peasant or chief waxed bitter at the brutal manner in which 
Carbillet and his collaborators carried out their duties with 
imprisonments, beatings, and gratuitous insults. Perhaps, as he said, 
he `loved' the Druze, but if so, he certainly expressed it in a peculiar 
way. 
As a man of the Left, faithful to the principles embodied in the 
French Revolution, Carbillet saw the re-shaping of Druze society as a 
duty with himself as tutor. It was his duty to give to his tutees those 
physical conveniences and cultural advantages which France was 
in a 
unique position to provide. This obligation included 
the moulding of 
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Druze social organisation into some sort of republican ideal in which 
the cultivator was freed from the shackles of landlordism, and the 
gentry were cut down to size. Carbillet was not content to follow those 
indirect methods espoused by Achard since `spoliation' was exactly 
what he was trying to achieve. He acted as though his charges were 
children, filled with uncurbed passions and lacking any sense of 
direction: Only the strong hand of Authority could bring them out of 
darkness into light. Carbillet reaped the whirlwind because he founded 
his programme on principles of `absolute value' by imposing an ideal 
and `pre-established order' rather than seeking to rely on a 
`spontaneous organisation' flowing up from below. 93 
Although Achard made no reference to the policies followed in 
the Jabal Druz in either of his two reports on the agrarian question in 
Syria, 94 one wonders if he had them in mind when he warned that the 
brutal destruction of a landlord-dominated tenure system would `throw 
defiance into the class of the great proprietors' and `provoke on their 
part an opposition which, given the influence which they exercise on 
the mass of the population might have regrettable political 
repercussions. ' For that was precisely the result. 
The land reform which Carbillet imposed on the Jabal Druz was 
the only such attempt to change the structure of agrarian relations in 
Syria during the Mandate period. A Marxist logic would dictate that the 
93 For Carbillet and his reforms, see 1>Lenka Bokova, La Confrontation 
franco-syrienne ä l'epoque du Mandat, 1925-27 (Paris: Editions I'Harmattan, 
1990), 120-28; 2>MacCallum, 110-14; Khoury, Syria ..., 155-58. 
94 `Propriete rurale ... ,' and `Les 
Problemes ... le probleme agraire. ' 
189 
cultivators, oppressed by their `feudal' lords, would unite in support of 
those who struck a blow for their freedom. Instead, this reform led 
directly to the Great Revolt of 1925-27 which was the most serious 
uprising against the French Mandate. 95 
The reason for this outcome was that the land reform and other 
programmes of modernisation were imposed by an alien authority who 
deliberately sought to denigrate and destroy traditional customs and 
values. The Druze, both peasants and lords. viewed these efforts as 
attempts to destroy the integrity of their community. The fact that the 
Ottomans, another outside power, had also sought to destroy this 
integrity, albeit in a cruder way, made a negative reaction to any similar 
attempt even more certain. 
Hama and central Syria. If such strong communal ties 
fanned the flames of revolt in the Jabal Druz, their very absence 
ensured that any rebellion would fizzle in central Syria. For example, 
the Great Revolt failed to implant itself in the districts of Homs and 
Hama. This was due in part to the nature of the terrain, flat and open, 
ideal for military operations, where aerial surveillance and 
95 For the revolt of 1925-27, see 1 >Bokova which is the most recent study 
using Arabic and French sources as well as interviews with Druze fighters or 
their descendants; 2>MacCallum, passim; 3>Khoury, Syria ..., 151-204; 
4>Edmond Rabbath, `L'Insurrection syrienne de 1925-27, ' Revue Historique, 
CCLXVII, Jan. -Mar., 1982,405-47; 5>Saifuddin Joarder, `The 
Syrian 
nationalist uprising (1925-27) and Henri de Jouvenel, ' The Muslim World, 
LXVII, 3, July, 1977,185-204.; 6>Joyce Laverty Miller, `The Syrian revolt of 
1925, ' /MES, VIII, 4, October, 1977,545-63; 7>Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria 
and Lebanon under French Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 
1958), 148-76. 
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bombardment proved most effective. 96 It was due also to the diffuse 
nature of the insurgency, with no central military command and no 
mass party to root it among the villages. Outside the Jabal Druz and 
neighbouring districts, any armed action was by nature sporadic, 
imposed from outside by small mobile bands which were not really 
rooted in the countryside and which could eventually be harassed into 
disintegration. Any local uprising tended to take the form of short 
bursts of destruction and pillage rather than that of a spontaneous and 
massive rebellion. 97 Although many of the great proprietors supported 
the rebellion, many others were neutral or inclined towards the regime 
in place as being better able to protect their property and commercial 
interests. As the pendulum slowly swung towards the Mandatory 
power, this attitude became much more in evidence. 98 
The Great Revolt failed in central Syria because there was little 
community of interest between peasants and landlords except one 
founded on oppression. Although there was social discord between 
them, the peasants, in thrall to their seigneurs, could express their 
frustrations only through violent jacqueries because they were denied 
any of the more civilised forms of protest. There were outbreaks of 
disorder during the first ten years of the Mandate, but it was only in the 
nineteen thirties when peasants driven desperate by poverty faced 
96 Rabbath, 437 reminds us of this elementary point. 
97 Bokova, 236-37 makes these points very well. 
98 For the attitude of landlords and their manipulation by the French, see 
Khoury, Syria..., 192-93. 
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landlords driven desperate by debt that the edifice of obligation 
cracked, and hopelessness bred anger and violence. 
In normal times, the landlords were able to maintain a balance 
between their appetite for an extravagant style of life, and the income 
they were able to wring from their estates. To assuage this greed, the 
tenant-cultivator was pushed towards the margin of existence and the 
landlord continued to use his social authority and access to resources 
to ever expand his domains. 
Nevertheless this equilibrium between the extravagance of the 
landlord and his income was always a precarious one because the 
former ever increased whilst the latter tended to fluctuate with the 
agricultural market. In times of depression, when agricultural prices 
plunged, the proprietor often found himself in dire straits. 
Nevertheless, unwilling or unable to curb his excesses, he first reduced 
the amount necessary to finance cultivation which led to a reduction of 
the area under crops.. This produced less income, and the notable 
then turned to the banks for loans using his properties as collateral. 
The notable, well aware that agriculture in Syria was inherently 
unstable, always believed that good times would bail him out as they 
always had in the past. Nevertheless the crisis of the nineteen thirties 
proved so long and so deep that the proprietor found himself facing 
real impoverishment. 
Examples of this process were rife in central Syria during the 
1930's. Thus in Hama, in 1932, a member of the rich Kilani family 
reduced the hectarage under cultivation by more than one-fifth. At the 
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same time, the number of villages held by banks continued to increase: 
In Hama, ten were mortgaged in their entirety as early as 1930, and 
others partially. By 1933, this picture had darkened considerably as 
the number in this condition had tripled. 99 
Although the proprietor now found himself in a vastly weakened 
economic position, he continued to make his accustomed claims on the 
livelihood of his tenants. Nevertheless his own impoverishment 
reduced the hold he had over his cultivators. They in turn, seeing their 
lord in such straits, and being themselves at wits end, had nothing to 
lose by defiance. 
Even now there was no organised revolt, for the peasants, 
deprived and leaderless, were hardly in a position to bring about 
sweeping changes to the social order. At times, particular incidents of 
brutality produced an enraged response on the part of those attacked, 
but these spontaneous eruptions did not expand into a general 
outbreak of violence. 
For example, on 7 July 1930, one of the Barazis was attacked in 
his own house by the peasants of Tilif who demanded complete 
ownership of the lands they cultivated. 100 The peasants of a village 
belonging to the well-known Hama notable family of Tayfur followed 
them in revolt when this family seized their land, and did not cease 
their agitation until they were granted papers of tapu, giving them 
99 Anon. [Gaulmier], 136-37. 
100 Loc. cit. Probably the same incident is reported by Hanna, 382. Here the 
notable is speciified as `Abdo Agha al-Barazi. 
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ownership. Such discontent was so generalised that on 16 August 
1930, the correspondent of the Damascene newspaper a/-Sha b 
reported that 
"A day does not pass that we do not hear that the peasants 
of such and such a village called for insurrection against its 
owners, refusing to surrender their part of the harvest, and 
demanding property with a permanent deed. ... "lol 
Nevertheless even when the peasants were given title to 
property, they were unable to exploit their new holdings properly 
because they lacked tools and seed which the landlord often supplied 
under the old system. Moreover they had to pay the former owners the 
price of the land, which though small, was quite beyond them, 
particularly in these years of deep economic crisis. There were two 
alternatives: either to mortgage their holdings to banks, often foreign-- 
the principal one being the Credit foncier d'Algerie et de Tunisie102 --or 
to borrow once again from the proprietors at an even greater rate of 
interest. In either case, there was a vicious circle, and the peasants 
soon lost their lands once again to the notables. 
An example of this occurred in the gada' of Masyaf where the 
peasants were largely Alawi, the poorest of the poor. In 1929, in an 
attempt to put an end to unrest which had led to violence, pillage, and 
theft, the government of the Alaouite State purchased six villages 
belonging to proprietors from the city of Hama, and their land was 
101 Hanna, 382. 
102 Andre Latron was one of this bank's principal officials in Beirut, and his 
investigation of rural life in the Mandated territories was done in connexion 
with his official duties. See his comment in `En Syrie ..., ' 225. 
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distributed to the peasant cultivators against payment of an annual 
sum over a period of ten years to the State Agricultural Bank. A similar 
move was made with regard to certain villages in the Ghab belonging to 
the State Domain. Yet these attempts proved vain in face of the much 
older traditions of usury and clientelism, and after a short interlude, the 
proprietors were once again in the saddle. As one of the authors 
describing this venture ruefully remarked: `In order to change such a 
state, it would be necessary to resolve it by a veritable social 
revolution. '103 Which is exactly what occurred some thirty years later. 
When faced with such insurmountable obstacles, it is little 
wonder that peasants vented their frustration in violent attacks on their 
landlords. One of the most notable incidents of this kind took place in 
the village of Barin which was also located in Masyaf qada' This 
village, a large agglomeration of seven hundred inhabitants, was 
constructed on top of the ruins of the crusader castle of Montferrand on 
the peak of a volcano which dominated the plain at the foot of the north 
face of the Jabal Hilu. In the nineteenth century, this village had 
become by force the property of the Kilanis, and in October, 1935, it 
sought to recover its liberty. First its inhabitants turned to law, but the 
Kilanis possessed their titles legally. So then they turned to direct 
action. First they chased off the stewards of the Kilanis, and when they 
attempted to return in force they were thoroughly stoned and one of the 
Kilanis saved himself only by virtue of the swiftness of his horse. Then 
103 Latron, La Vie ..., 208; 
Weulersse, Le Pays ..., 366 whence comes the 
quotation. 
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the peasants divided the harvest, taking only the ears of wheat and 
leaving the straw on the threshing floors. When the agents of the fisc 
came in order to make the annual tax estimate, the cultivators told them 
that they owed nothing because "this year the wheat grew without 
ears. " 
The result was the occupation of the village by the gendarmerie. 
Nevertheless unrest continued and only ceased when the village was 
threatened with military intervention. 
104 
Hanna himself sought to understand the nature of this rebellion. 
According to him, the 'feudal ist-bourgeois' Damascene newspaper a/- 
Qabas105 portrayed this uprising as a "revolt" and the insurrectionaries 
as "rebels". Hanna pointed out that the way in which one assessed an 
event of this sort depended very much upon one's own point of view. 
What the feudalists and their allies consdered sedition, the peasants 
saw as a popular uprising to recover their dispossessed rights. '06 
Nevertheless despite the desires and intentions of the 
cultivators, successful social revolution required more than just the 
unchannelled anger of status groups held in thrall by those with greater 
access to resources such as money, prestige, and authority. What was 
104 Weulersse, Le Pays ..., fn 2 on 364,366, ; 
Hanna, 386. 
105 Founded after 1912, it had `reflected a more radical and uncompromising 
interpretation of Arabism, including greater political autonomy for the 
Arabic-speaking provinces'. By the nineteen thirties, it was one of the two 
newspapers in Damascus which were owned and/or financed by the 
Nationalist Bloc. It thus mirrored the attitude of Syrian nationalist/notables: 
opposition to foreign domination, but at the same time, fear of social 
revolution. Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The 
Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 60-61; /dem, Syria ..., 268. 
106 Hanna, 386. 
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needed was the organisation of these discrete and intermittent 
explosions into a movement of mass protest, controlled and directed 
from above. 
In central Syria during the nineteen thirties, this protest was still 
amorphous. Moreover the French, following the Achardian precepts of 
indirect means, were unwilling to tinker with, far less to overturn the 
established order, even when it was obvious that discontent was rife 
among the mass of the agricultural population. 
One finds an example of this policy in the `Akkar plain. 107 This 
was a region dominated by notable proprietors, the `beys', mostly 
coming from among the various branches of the Mir'abi clan who had 
established their lordship at the end of the eighteenth century. Here 
the tenants commonly received some 60% of the harvest, but bore all 
expenses and were heavily in debt to their lords. On the other hand, 
they might be mere murabi` saddled with the most disadvantageous 
form of production contract. 108 The beys were absolute masters, even, 
it was said, to the right of the ius primae noctis. 
The `Akkar was a region which was somewhat isolated from the 
main currents of agriculture and commerce: It was neither an 
important wheat-growing area due to the nature of its soils nor did it 
107 For the `Akkar, see, 1>Edouard-C. Achard, `Etudes economiques sur la 
Syrie centrale--la plaine d'Akkar, ' AF, XXIII, 200, March, 1923,63-69.; 2>CoI. 
Paul Jacquot, `L'Akkar, ' 23 July 1927. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 877; 
3>Latron, La vie..., 212,214; 4>Paul Sanlaville, `Les Regions agricoles du 
Liban, ' RGL, XXXVIII, 1963,55-57; 5>Gilsenan, `A modern.. ., '449-63 passim; 
6> /dem, Lords ..., passim. 
108 Gilsenan, Lords ..., 92. 
For the muraba `contract, see Table 11.1 supra. 
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participate in the silk industry which burgeoned in neighbouring Jabal 
Lubnan. Therefore under the Mandate, the French relied on the beys 
and their agents, the aghas, to keep order, supplying them with arms 
and support. As a result, these lords reinforced their domination of the 
cultivators, with the connivance of authorities too busy to keep the 
peace themselves. 
Colonel Jacquot, commander of the Northern Sector, in a report 
written in 1927, clearly saw the dangers of this policy. He believed that 
the role of France was to be `pitiless, just, and impartial', and that to 
rely on the beys as individuals or as a group was to 
augment his privileges, favour his ambitions and his 
appetites, arouse the jealousies of other chiefs or 
notabilities. . ., it is to diminish our prestige, distort the 
character of impartiality of our mission, alienate little by 
little the sympathy or the confidence of the inhabitants 
who hold us responsible for their disappointments or their 
sufferings. '09 
Nevertheless, although he pointed out the dangers of a policy of 
favouritism, he did not adumbrate an alternative. Perhaps he shied 
away from what might be the logical conclusion to his argument: the 
creation of an alternative and francophile power base in the 
countryside through active support of the peasants against their 
oppressors. 
In any case, an intelligence officer, more attuned to the realities 
of power, minuted caustically after reading his report: `This is a 
masterpiece of stupidity. . of an unsavoury idealism which 
has. .. a 
109 Jacquot, 7. 
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pretence of understanding'. ' 10 Yet French reliance on the beys only 
produced the result which one might expect. 
In December, 1931, the Tripoli correspondent of the Damascene 
newspaper A/if Ba wrote that the peasants, hired workers, and 
metayers had risen up to demand from the beys ownership of a portion 
of the land. The French sent an official, a certain Doucet, to investigate 
this matter, and it soon became clear that the Mandatory authorities 
were afraid of the `regrettable political repercussions' which might 
result if this movement were allowed to develop in a more 'profound' 
direction. Therefore Doucet's `investigation' amounted to a brief to 
preserve the established order, intimidate the peasants, and repress 
their movement before it got out of hand, 
111 
11.7>The dilemma of agrarian relations 
This vignette captures the dilemma posed by agrarian relations 
during the Mandate. The indirect methods proposed to solve the 
agrarian problem such as the cadastral survey; the creation of 
agricultural banks; the giving of title deeds to peasants which they 
could use to obtain loans to set themselves up as independent 
smallholders--all were inadequate in face of entrenched notable 
domination of the countryside. 
These procedures were not found wanting merely because of 
inadequate resources. Even if the cadastral survey had been 
110 Ibid., 8 
111 Hanna, 384. 
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completed and every peasant had received title to the land he worked; 
even if the banks had proved to be veritable cornucopiae providing a 
never-ending stream of loans for peasants to establish their 
independence, there still would have been no agrarian revolution 
during the Mandate period--for several reasons. 
The first was that Achard and his colleagues refused to admit 
that they could only create a secure class of peasant smallholders after 
they had thoroughly despoiled the notables who dominated the 
countryside by dispossessing them of their properties. 
The second was a necessary corollary of the first. The French 
could not dispossess the great notables because France came to Syria 
as a tutor, not to remake the social landscape, but merely to guide its 
tutees towards an independent destiny. As a tutor, accountable to the 
international community represented by the League of Nations and the 
Permanent Mandates Commission, she could not take drastic measures 
to remake Syrian society. Moreover, she had no wish to do so, but 
merely to carry out her appointed task as expeditiously as possible. 
Finally, compared to her strong and longstanding position in the 
Maghrib, France did not have that much invested in Syria, whether in 
financial investments, strategic interests, or emotional bonds, and so 
was less willing to drain her energy in seeking solutions to apparently 
insoluble problems. 
The third reason for the absence of agrarian revolution during 
the Mandate was that the period between the two world wars was one 
of transition. In economic and social policy, laissez-faire still remained 
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the order of the day. Private enterprise, not public corporations, still 
took the lead in economic development whilst on the social side, 
inequities were usually left to stand no matter how unpalatable they 
might be. 
Such attitudes towards official intervention were reinforced by 
the repugnance felt by officials of aristocratic or bourgeois origin for 
methods which smacked of Bolshevism. Nevertheless even the French 
Left had aims other than social revolution in the lands under the sway of 
France. 
The non-communist Left sought withdrawal from what they saw 
as expensive and exotic ventures which brought little remuneration in 
the form of raw materials to supply French industry, and increased the 
burden of the French taxpayer. The assets wasted in far-flung colonies 
could be far better spent at home. Rather than curing the sick, 
irrigating the farmlands, or building the roads in places which were not 
only alien, but whose people were unappreciative of even the most well- 
meaning efforts, such programmes should be carried out first in the 
metropole. If the Left regarded Syria as `a bottomless pit'112 which 
devoured men and money, they regarded it equally as an illegal 
enterprise, foisted upon a people who legitimately sought their 
112 The title of an article critical of the Syrian venture by the Socialist deputy 
Sixte-Quentin. Sixte-Quentin, `Le Gouffre Syrien, ' La Populaire, 15 March 
1931. 
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independence, and who consistently had rejected the tutelage of 
France. '13 
Nevertheless whilst the non-communist left focused on the needs 
of France at home, and merely called for withdrawal from Syria, it was 
the communists who pointed out the inequities existing in Syria despite 
the claims of high French officials that Syria was "calm and 
prosperous". In 1934, the authorities made numerous attempts to 
extract taxes from cultivators who were living on the edge of 
subsistence. In Damascus, two Syrian deputies protested at the 
seizure of the harvest of the Hawran in order to pay off debts owed the 
State Agricultural Bank. In Zahle, most of the inhabitants protested at 
their tax burden and refused to hand over their due. In Aleppo, a 
municipal counsellor wrangled bitterly with those who wished to seize 
the goods of his father for non-payment of taxes. As the commentator 
put it: 
113 In France, the Left was not necessarily communist or even socialist, but 
included freethinkers and anti-clericals--in short all those opposed to Roman 
Catholicism and monarchism. Examples of their attitudes towards French 
involvement in the Levant are to be found in 1>the debate on credits for the 
Syrian enterprise held in the Senate on 28 July 1920, in particular the 
speeches of the senators, D'Estournelles de Constant and Victor Berard, 
reported in extenso in `Les Affaires du Levant au Senat, ' AF, XX, 184, July- 
August, 1920,268-87; 2>a further debate on the demand for more credits in 
the Senate session of 30 December 1920, in particular the speech of Victor 
Berard. For a good example of views at the opposite pole, see the remarks 
of Dominique Delhaye in the same debate. `La Syrie au Senat et 
la discussion 
des douziemes provisoires, ' AF, XXI, 188, January, 1921,30-36. 
For the attitude of the socialist left towards colonial questions in 
general, see Raoul Girardet, L'/dee co%onia/e en France de 1871 ä 1962 
(Paris: Le Table Ronde, 1972), Chap. VI, 434-35, fn 12. With regard to their 
protests against the Mandate in particular, see 1>'Le Mandat ä la Chambre 
des Deputies, ' AF, XXXI, March, 1931,98-99; 2>Sixte-Quentin, `Le Gouffre... 
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If deputies and counsellors, privileged by imperialism, 
protest, one imagines easily the distress of the poor 
peasantry, one understands then how they battle daily 
against the seizures, the gendarmes, and the taxmen. 114 
Nevertheless if the wind of revolution was still a mere wisp of a 
breeze, it was nonetheless beginning to waft over the landscape. The 
crisis of the nineteen thirties shook the foundations upon which was 
based the domination of the city over the countryside. If the notables 
were that much weaker, the peasants became emboldened by 
desperation to revolt against particularly harsh injustices. This 
occurred in areas where the link between proprietor and peasant was 
weakest. In central Syria, domination was based on usury and often 
imposed by force. Therefore in this region, desperate cultivators had 
no compunction in rising up against their lords, distant masters of great 
latifundia, who ruled through their stewards, men whose status was 
only slightly above that of the peasants they directed. These overseers 
could speak the language of the cultivator, but were eager to 
differentiate themselves from someone whom they despised. Therefore 
they had no scruples in administering rough `justice' to carry out the 
will of the master. 
II. s>From revolt to revolution 
During the period of the Mandate, both the great revolt against 
the alien oppressor and the smaller insurrections against the 
114 `Syrie: La Syrie et la Conference coloniale, ' Cahier du Bo/chevisme, 15 
November 1934,188. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 716. 
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indigenous one proved to be utter failures. In each case, this was 
because of the lack of a co-ordinating organisation capable of 
manipulating events in an ordered fashion. When this organisation was 
formed with an ideology, and a means to precipitate action, intermittent 
revolt was transformed into social revolution. 
Moreover there was another element which was at least as 
important for such a social revolution to occur. It was that any 
transformation had to be rooted within Syria itself, and could not be 
imposed from outside. This could only develop out of other processes 
of change within Syria--ones which altered the way in which Syrian 
society saw itself: the achievement of independence; the debacle of 
1948 which began to undermine the notables; the international climate 
which saw state intervention and social revolution become not only 
acceptable, but ä /a mode; the example presented by Egypt and its 
revolution; the formation of the United Arab Republic. These and more 
prepared the climate for the agrarian revolution which eventually came. 
Perhaps the most important part was that Syrians confiscated 
from Syrians. Although the process was painful for those 
dispossessed, perhaps they found it more acceptable because it came 
as the culmination of an internal evolution rather than being the 
imposition of an external idea which had no indigenous roots. 
Thus it was not for another twenty years, with the arrival of 
Akram Hawrani and his Arab Socialist Party, that mobilisation would 
begin in the countryside. And it was thirty years before the Ba'th would 
institute a far-reaching land reform, and once and for all destroy the 
204 
tyranny of the notables, replacing it by a different sort of tyranny, that 
of a cumbrous state machine. Nevertheless in the end, the revolution 
did finally come. 
II. 9>Community, , notable, and state under the Mandate 
Finally one must come full circle and return to the question of the 
peasant community, the building block of the countryside. Andre 
Latron115 emphasised that the equality created by collective disciplines 
and the physical layout of village fields maintained the primitive 
structure of the community and provided a powerful physical base for 
rural society, especially in the plains of inner Syria. This method of 
organisation was musha`cultivation. 
He also pointed out that the tendency in what he calls the more 
`evolved' areas was towards individuation of properties. This process 
in essence meant the end of the rural community because each 
individual sought to care for his own land, and rejected the collective 
disciplines which had served that community so well in the past. Latron 
believed that this process of individuation was favoured by the planting 
of market crops instead of cereals; by the `decadence' of the notables; 
by the increased sophistication of the peasant; and by the physical 
division of the land into individual bounded plots. 
116 
115 Latron, La Vie rurale..., 238-40. 
116 One must note in this regard that C. Duraffourd, the chief of the Cadastral 
Survey, did not completely share the aversion of Achard for musha'tenure. 
Although he supported the idea of regrouping the scattered parcels into 
more manageable lots, he believed that by basing the new lots on family 
groups, one would reinforce then, and make of them the core of the new 
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Whilst acknowledging the evolution of this process towards `a 
complete individualisation of things and men' Latron felt that the 
process should not be hastened because the peasant functioned better 
in a communal situation. Therefore he suggested that the 
disappearance of the community both physically and socially should be 
supplemented by certain organisations, limited to the village group and 
using what remained of the collective spirit. He believed that the 
peasant, even if entirely independent, would be driven by economic 
necessity and a natural tendency to seek a renewal of those links which 
his own evolution had caused him to lose. 
This official of the Credit foncier d'Algerie et de Tunisie was 
hardly a socialist. Nonetheless he understood the value of the village 
community as the base of both the rural economy and rural society, and 
believed that it was in the interests of the Mandatory administration to 
bolster it as it grew weaker. 
He was also aware of the power of the notables whose 
domination over the countryside was being reinforced by his 
compatriots in order to maintain control over an alien land. It was 
precisely because of this need that the French encouraged the 
expansion of latifundia at the expense of the village community. 
Moreover the ideology dominant among French administrators-- 
organisation which would replace the community built around the rights of 
the collectivity. To his mind, the family group was the `social cell' which 
would serve as the building block of rural society. Duraffourd, 5-6. 
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glorification of the individual smallholder--precluded support for such 
collectivities. 
Indeed in the last report on the Homs irrigation scheme made by 
those who directed the peacetime Mandate, the writer called for the 
dissolution of musha' lands because, among other things, they 
`constitute an impediment to the free exercise of possession and the 
repercussions which result are most harmful from a social and 
economic point of view .. . 
'117 Those who held such an attitude 
towards the village community were hardly likely to share the vision of 
Andre Latron. Such blindness could only impede a thorough 
regeneration of agriculture in Syria during the Mandate. 
II. lo>ßemeinscbaft and Cese//scban in the countryside 
Ferdinand Tönnies would consider those village communities 
which practised musha` tenure as an `outstanding example' of 
Gemeinschafflike social formations because they were bound together 
by kinship, either real or fictitious; neighbourhood--the fact of living 
together; common agricultural disciplines; the holding of common 
property; willing obedience to the decisions of a common leader--all 
permeated by the two principles of fellowship and authority. 
118 Tönnies 
would also assert that the processes of stabilisation and individuation 
117 `Irrigation dans la region de Homs, ' 19 April, 1939. This report was 
transmitted along with others to the French Foreign Ministry at Vichy on 14 
December 1940 as the last act of HC Gabriel Puaux before he left Syria for 
good. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 370. 
118 Tönnies, `Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, ' Part Five of Tönnies, 
Community and Society, Loomis, ed., 257-58 and introduction, supra. 
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which occurred among the musha` villages of the Syrian countryside 
starting in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were moves 
towards Gese//schafflike social formations inspired by the lure of the 
cash nexus. This happened because the relationships among the 
peasant producers, members of the community, slowly grew more 
impersonal as these producers became animated by a rational and 
external purpose which was to acquire profit for themselves. 
Nonetheless Tönnies would also point out that these changes 
were not aberrant, but rather a natural process as Syria evolved 
towards modern life. Moreover he would emphasise that movement 
towards Gesellschafflike structures did not necessarily entail the 
complete disappearance of Gemeinschaft. Among the musha'villages 
of Syria, the shift towards a rational pursuit of gain, whilst attenuating 
the links forged by a common life and common burdens did not obviate 
them. For the bonds of community, nurtured by the common 
agricultural disciplines of musha` cultivation, were quite tensile, and 
could not split just because capitalism began to appear in the 
countryside. 
*** 
If the French, for reasons of ideology and sociology, were unable 
to alter the relationships between landlord and cultivator in the 
countryside, they had somewhat better success with the two other 
prongs of Achard's programme, the improvement of production and the 
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development of a programme of irrigation. 
served as their true legacy to Syria. 
These measures, then, 
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CHAPTER III 
The Mandate--I11: 
Crop Diversity and Production 
III. 1>Introduction--ideas of Achard 
Destroying the power of the large landowners and populating the 
countryside with independent peasant smallholders was only one 
important aspect of the agricultural improvement programme Achard 
set forth for his political masters. He realised that any change in the 
structure of agrarian relations in the countryside would necessarily be 
a long process due to the fact that France could only employ indirect 
methods to achieve this end.. 
Therefore he placed equal emphasis on a programme of physical 
modernisation which he hoped would be of more immediate benefit. ' 
Achard believed this to be all the more urgent because he saw Syria to 
be an essentially agricultural country whose crops provided both the 
main source of sustenance for her inhabitants, and a means with which 
they paid for foreign imports. Such dependence was rendered 
particularly delicate due to the peculiar meteorological conditions 
which affected agricultural production in Syria. To begin with, here 
was a country where there were only two seasons, wet and dry, sharply 
divided one from the other. Moreover rainfall often failed, even during 
the so-called 'rainy' season. Such factors meant that peasants placed 
strong emphasis on such winter cereals as wheat and barley because 
I Edouard-C. Achard, `Actualitds ..., ' 200-06. 
the varieties grown in Syria were able to make good use of the limited 
amounts of water they did receive. In contrast, summer crops such as 
maize, vegetables, sesame, and cotton were confined to those regions 
of western Syria where they could be sustained by impermeable soils 
and water from rivers and springs or draw sustenance from systems of 
riverine irrigation. 2 
Achard argued that when Syria had formed an integral part of the 
Ottoman Empire, this reliance on agriculture was mitigated by the 
prominent role domestic and international trade played in her economy. 
Nonetheless, variations in rural production certainly had an effect both 
on the commercial transactions of which they formed a major part and 
on a budget which sustained itself on the tax revenues they produced. 
According to him, the period 1911-13 exemplified this relationship 
because agricultural deficits had led to the slackening of commercial 
activity, and a reduction in the tax revenues normally produced by crop 
production. 3 
After the First World War, Syria was no longer part of such a 
large economic entity, and was now hemmed in by frontiers and tariffs 
2 In another paper, Achard estimated that in the early 1920's the cultivated 
land in Syria was given over to 80% cereals/20% summer crops. See /dem, 
`Les Problemes .. . I'exploitation ..., ' Bull. EHC, 102; Nantes, FB, Carton 1571,2. 
3 Cause and effect in this relationship is not as clear as Achard would have it. 
Other commentators had different ideas: For example, Huvelin believed that 
the decrease in exports from Beirut, Syria's most modern port, during the 
years 1911 and 1912 was due to two events: The reduction in 1911 resulted 
from the opening of the railway line between Tripoli and Homs (meaning more 
traffic for Tripoli and less for Beirut) whilst that for 1912 was a consequence 
of the war between Italy and the Ottoman Empire over Cyrenaica and 
Tripolitania which disrupted commercial trafic in the eastern Mediterranean 
as well. See Huvelin, 45. 
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which restricted the scope of her commercial activity. Therefore she 
was forced to rely as never before on agriculture for prosperity, 
agriculture which unfortunately was constrained by immutable climatic 
limitations, 
Another way of posing this problem is to look at Syrian 
agriculture in terms of deficiencies in the three factors of production, 
viz Land, Labour, and Capital. 
LAND>Potentially, Syria did have plenty of suitable cropland. 
Yet much of this land could not be used in its present state either 
because it was covered by marshes or because it was undeveloped due 
to its aridity. Moreover traditional irrigation systems had been allowed 
to deterioriate over the centuries. 
LABOUR>To French observers, rural Syria appeared to be 
underpopulated. One of the reasons for this was the maldistribution of 
cultivators which led to a need for seasonal migrations to help bring in 
the harvest and perform other labour intensive tasks. 
CAPITAL>Syrian agriculture was undercapitalised because 
of the refusal of holders of large estates to invest money in order to 
improve the output of their holdings. The peasants, whether owners or 
sharecroppers, had no capital to invest since they were in a perpetual 
state of indebtedness. Therefore it might prove extremely difficult to 
finance the necessary improvements in that infrastructure which 
supported agriculture. 
In his various proposals to regenerate Syrian agriculture, Achard 
dealt with the lacunae present in the factors of production: The 
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principal problem he faced was the revitalisation of the land. First he 
sought to bring some regularity into agricultural production. He 
believed that this would generate an economic climate favourable for 
vital commercial transactions whilst providing the revenue to ensure 
necessary budgetary stability. Coupled to this was a second 
programme to expand and improve this production. Third he 
emphasised the importance of increasing rural population in a country 
where for many years to come men would continue to do the work of 
machines. 
How did Achard propose to implement such far-ranging and 
complex recommendations? Although he believed that agrarian reform 
and improvements in methods of cultivation were absolutely necessary 
in order to regularise and increase output, he readily admitted that any 
progress on these fronts would only occur over time. He was well 
aware that there was little that could be done in the immediate future to 
augment the harvest of winter cereals except to extend the area under 
cultivation. Therefore he focused his attention on crops grown during 
the dry summer season whose yield might be improved by better 
techniques. Of these, the most important was cotton. 
France had sought to retain Cilicia after the First World War 
precisely because of its potential for cotton-growing. Since she had 
lost Cilicia to the resurgent Turkish nationalist forces of Mustafa Kemal, 
she turned her attentions to the cotton producing potential of Syria. 
4 
4 For an appraisal of cotton and its possibilities in Cilicia and Syria, see 
Achard, 'Etudes. . ., '19-62. 
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Achard held that irrigation was the only method which when properly 
employed would realise the potential for cotton and other summer 
crops. This was a technique that neither affected established social 
structure nor forced a rapid change in custom. Moreover it harnessed 
available natural resources which had been wasted heretofore. Finally, 
the inhabitants of the Levant showed long familiarity with this approach 
to the problems of cultivation. Indeed they extolled its utility whilst 
calling for its extension. 
Thus Achard placed great emphasis on the use of irrigation as a 
means to strengthen the agricultural potential of Syria and to expand 
cultivation into areas untouched by the plough for centuries. Such 
approaches would improve the lot of the peasant whilst supplying 
France with certain raw materials she urgently required. 
Nevertheless he was of the opinion that to somehow improve the 
methods of irrigation already in use was an approach which would only 
show results over a long period. Such a scheme demanded a 
knowledge of the physical characteristics of soils and plants which 
were lacking, and entailed attempts to change procedures sanctioned 
by custom and enshrined in law which undoubtedly would rouse 
opposition and delay. 
Therefore expansion onto virgin lands through exploitation of 
water resources still unused was the only answer. As might be 
expected, Achard emphasised the possibilities to be found in western 
Syria, the area with the most agriculture, the most peasants, and where 
the Mandate could exercise the most control. He did advocate the 
214 
repair of the extensive system of foggaras or qanats, ancient 
underground canal systems which existed on the eastern edge of the 
cultivated zone as one means of restoring the ancient patterns of 
irrigation. Nevertheless he cast his eyes on much bigger and 
potentially more useful projects, projects in which his compatriots 
could display all the panoply of modern engineering skills to revive 
agriculture which would bolster the prestige of their homeland in the 
eyes of its wards. 
He discoursed favourably on the potential for irrigation inherent 
in the `Akkar northeast of Tripoli and the plain of the `Amk ('Amuq) in 
the sanjaq of Alexandretta. He extolled the enormous possibilities for 
irrigated agriculture presented by the Euphrates and its affluents, the 
Khabur in particular. Nevertheless, ever the realist, he focused most of 
his attention on the waters of the Orontes. Here was a river with 
underutilised water resources running through a region of good soils 
well suited to the growing of cotton, maize, rice, and other high-yielding 
food and industrial crops. He felt that the area of the middle Orontes 
showed particular promise for extension of irrigation. The valley called 
the Ghab5 between Qala't Shayzar and Jisr al-Shugur was a swampy 
morass which after drainage seemed eminently suitable for raising 
cotton and other valuable summer crops. It was set amidst districts 
which possessed a large population of peasants, and was linked by a 
5 Or by some, incorrectly, the `Gharb'. This appellation is a mute comment 
on the previous experience of many who worked in Syria since it was 
employed here by analogy with the rich agricultural district of that same 
name to be found in Morocco. 
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good network of communications to the world outside. Indeed he 
believed it possible to irrigate a minimum of 44,500 hectares which he 
estimated to be a bit more than half of all currently irrigated land in 
Syria. Again, what is significant here is not the figures which are 
somewhat dubious, but the way in which they illustrate the important 
place development of the Orontes, and particularly the Ghab held in the 
eyes of French experts and administrators. 
The fact that one attraction of the Ghab was its location 
bordering heavily populated rural localities focuses attention on 
Achard's proposals to remedy the deficiencies in Labour, the second 
factor of production. He realised that agricultural expansion in the 
absence of machines was a labour intensive process, and he had 
observed that there was apparently a dearth of cultivators in the 
countryside. Therefore for agricultural regeneration to succeed, rural 
areas must necessarily be repopulated .6 
Achard pointed out that under Syrian conditions, it was 
economically impossible for a landowner to operate his farming 
enterprise directly or by means of rent-paying tenants. In a country 
where one year out of three might bring a good cereal harvest, the 
owner could never cover his costs, much less make a profit or build up 
his equity. Such a situation was hardly conducive to economies of 
scale involving the cultivation of vast surfaces with the most modern 
agricultural equipment money could buy. Such methods of cultivation 
6 For Achard's views on this important question, see `Les Problemes .. 
. I'exploitation ... ,' passim. 
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required enormous capital reserves to service them, reserves which 
were not available to the Syrian landowner. Even if he had such monies 
in hand, this scenario assumed that the magnate, who was more than 
likely a notable of the old school, would wish to invest funds in 
combines and harvesters when there were apparently myriads of 
peasants able to do the job so much more cheaply. Moreover this 
notable was far more interested in dominating men than he was in 
controlling land, for his authority was bolstered by the number of his 
clients. Thus for the landowner, the system of metayage, forms of 
share cropping where the costs were divided between owner and 
cultivator, proved a much more advantageous solution to the labour 
problem. It was far more economical and enabled the seigneurs to 
ensnare a clientele through the mechanism of debt bondage. If this 
process left the sharecropper, `poor devil', crushed by poverty and 
hounded by debt, so what! 
Whatever the evils of metayage, it was indeed a labour intensive 
system of cultivation. Achard certainly could not find `myriads' of 
peasants to make this system work efficiently on the lands currently 
cultivated or to open up those new territories which the implementation 
of irrigation would make available. Using what were undoubtedly faulty 
population figures, and making certain theoretical assumptions based 
upon them, he stated that the agricultural population would have to 
double for the proper exploitation of `those vast stretches of fertile, and 
in very large part, irrigable land which spreads out in the plains of the 
Ghab and the Amk [sic=`Amuq], in the valley of the Euphrates, in the 
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upper Jazira, along the right of way of the Baghdad Railway'. 7 What is 
important here is not the figures, but the sheer magnitude of the 
requirements which he derived from them. 
Confronted by this plague of underpopulation which he perceived 
to be an enormous impediment in the path of the agricultural 
resuscitation of Syria, Achard proposed several solutions: 
1>The creation of smallholdings in order to 
A>reduce or stop large-scale emigration either to 
cities within Syria or abroad. 
B>successfully settle those agricultural populations 
which had emigrated recently from Anatolia to Syria 
or might do so in future. 
C>provide a more prosperous and secure life for the 
Syrian peasant family in order to `sustain and 
develop its prolific tendencies'. 
2>The development of a rural health programme in order 
to reduce the rate of infant mortality. 
These proposals were part and parcel of efforts to solve the 
agrarian question, and were also programmes whose effect would only 
become apparent over many years. That is another reason why he 
placed so much emphasis on the harnessing of water resources that 
bordered districts in which large numbers of cultivators were 
concentrated. 
In all his papers, Achard dealt only indirectly with the problems 
revolving around Capital, the third factor of production. The ultimate 
idea behind the creation of smallholdings to which the peasant 
proprietor held clear title was to break that cycle of indebtedness 
endemic to the countryside, and give the cultivator a means of 
Ibid., Bull. EHC, 104; Nantes, FB, Carton 1571,5. 
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establishing recognised credit through which he could improve his 
patrimony. 
Nevertheless this too was a long term process, and Achard was 
well aware that the large drainage and irrigation projects so dear to his 
heart could only be created by means of the infusion of considerable 
foreign monies. These large capital requirements were implicit in his 
proposals, but he left it to others to clarify them. 
In his expositions on the problems of Syrian agriculture, Achard 
highlighted certain areas in which he felt that intervention by the 
Mandatory Power could have a positive effect on the physical 
resuscitation of the land within a relatively short period of time. His 
concerns both mirrored and influenced the preocupations of those who 
shaped the policies designed to promote this regeneration. 
The Mandatory authorities saw their task as fourfold: First, to 
create a basic infrastructure which had not existed heretofore, and 
upon which they could build. Second, to increase the agricultural 
options available to the cultivator whilst supplying vital raw materials 
for French industry by the introduction of new, remunerative crops. 
Third, to expand the cultivated area through the extensive use of 
irrigation which it was hoped would make of Syria once more "le pays 
du vin et du levain, le grenier de L'Empire Romain". Fourth, to augment 
the rural labour force, certainly through natural propagation, but also 
by immigration and internal migration. 
These strategies were interdependent with each contributing its 
part. Nonetheless as they worked themselves out during the course of 
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the twenty year Mandate, some came to be realised much more fully 
than others. Of these, the most intractable problem proved to be the 
augmentation of the agricultural labour force. 
III. 2>increasing the rural population 
How were the Mandatory authorities to augment the number of 
hands available for the task of rural reconstruction? Natural increase 
was important, but since Syria during the Mandate was not a `brave 
new world', the control of this process was well beyond the ken of even 
the most bureaucratically-minded French official. With Achard, they 
could only hope that the general improvement of the countryside and 
the life of the cultivator would induce him to become more prolific. 
Since the authorities were well aware that this process could only work 
itself out over time, they were forced to turn to internal migration and 
immigration of foreign populations to fill the gap. 
The movement of seasonal workers to help in the harvest was not 
new to Syria. Whilst peasants in the vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus 
tended to move about only locally in order to bring in the winter cereals, 
those living in the Alaouite region were accustomed to travel more 
frequently and for far greater distances to seek agricultural work. They 
moved to the plains for the cereal harvest between the months of May 
and August, and once again to the qada's of Idlib and Ma'arat al 
Nu'man for olive picking in November. This temporary migration from 
the Jabal Ansayria to seek work was related to the fact that in general, 
these mountains were the most over-populated part of Syria. The 
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existence of this spare labour force in the surrounding regions was an 
important factor in determining the development of the Orontes valley 
for cotton cultivation. 8 
Although internal migration was an important means of supplying 
agricultural workers where needed, immigration of foreign populations 
had been a well-tried solution followed by the French in their other 
overseas territories, particularly in North Africa. There colonisation by 
Europeans had gone on apace, and opinion held that they had infused 
an element of modernity and stability into rural areas. During the era of 
the Mandate, Morocco was the most salient example of such a policy. 9 
On the face of it, Syria would appear to be an even more 
favourable candidate for European colonists than were the lands of the 
Maghrib. It was Muslim, but there was a prominent Christian element 
which had long enjoyed close ties with France. Agriculture was in a 
state of degeneration and more than ever needed the transfusion of 
capital and expertise which such immigration would bring. 
Nevertheless from the very beginning, the French were keenly aware 
that Syria could never be a co%onie de peup/ement. 
For Syria was a mandate, not a colony or even a protectorate: 
The international community represented in the League of Nations had 
commissioned France at her own request to guide this proto-nation to 
maturity after which she would depart. No time limit was set for the 
8 For a discussion of the currents of internal migration and its importance for 
the development of cotton, see Achard, 'Culture. . ., ' 73-81. 
9 For the impact of European colonisation in Morocco, see Will D. 
Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages-, passim. 
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achievement of this process, but it was assumed to be short; certainly 
not more than one generation. Moreover there were powerful landed 
elements upon whom the French depended for support who were 
hardly likely to welcome European competition for possession of their 
patrimony. Partnership with such elements was one thing; their 
displacement was quite another. 
Nevertheless, foreign organisations and groups, not 
understanding or caring to understand this difference between 
mandate and colony would propose colonisation schemes to the High 
Commission from time to time. Most of these did not get beyond initial 
enquires. For example, in June, 1937, the Ataman of the Algerian 
Cossack Organisation (Association algerienne des Cosaques), formed 
of Cossacks who fled Russia after the Revolution, wrote the High 
Commissioner (whom he styled `Resident General') to propose the 
establishment of Cossack agricultural co-operatives in the Alaouites 
and along the Euphrates. The High Commission summarily rejected 
this demarche because the `present evolution' of the Mandated 
territories (i. e., the signing of the Franco-Syrian Treaty in 1936) did not 
lend itself to the creation of such European colonies. 10 
A much more serious proposal came from the pen of Leo Winz, a 
German Jewish philanthropist from Berlin, editor and publisher of the 
newspaper, Gemeinedeblatt der Jüdischen Gemeinde zu Berlin, the 
official organ of the Jewish community executive. In 1933, he 
10 For this episode, see the exchange of letters between the Ataman of the 
Algerian Cossacks and the High Commission, 17 June-2 July 1937. MAE-- 
Nantes, FB, Carton 567. 
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approached Haqqi Bey al-'Azm, the President of the Council of 
Ministers of the State of Syria, with a scheme for the settlement of a 
large Jewish agricultural colony in Syria. Winz made his request 
directly to the Syrian leader rather than through the High Commission 
in order to demonstrate to the Syrians, nationalists and others, that his 
proposals were not a product of French imperialist machinations. 
Haqqi Bey was not averse to dealing, but suggested that Winz develop 
his plans discreetly. 
After a study tour in the fall of 1933, Winz set forth his ideas in a 
letter to the Syrian leader: He proposed to settle his co-religionists in 
the Jazira which the State of Syria would proclaim a separate vilayet. 
Jews would have the right of unfettered immigration into Syria and the 
agricultural colonies which they established would enjoy complete 
administrative autonomy. Whilst the Syrian government and the 
Mandatory Power would give every guarantee for the protection of the 
immigrants and their property, the colonists themselves would have the 
right to bear arms for self-defence. Winz believed such rights and 
guarantees of autonomy to be all the more necessary as the Jewish 
colonists were possessed `of their own peculiar characteristics and 
civilisation'. Nonetheless any who might wish to become Syrian 
citizens would be allowed to do so. 
The Syrian government would give the association which 
represented the colonists the sole right to exploit all state lands, 
watercourses, and mineral deposits in the region. All those to whom 
the state had previously granted lands along the course of the rivers 
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Khabur and Jagh-Jagh would have their properties exchanged for 
others. In return for the right to live under these conditions, the 
colonists promised to use their capital to develop the economy of the 
Jazira. Winz assured his interlocutor that he had the support of 
important Jewish financial circles in Europe, and that any collaboration 
between the Syrian state and his proposed settlement would prove 
fruitful for all parties concerned. " 
These `conditions minima' were to serve as the basis for further 
negotiations, and the turn of events appeared sufficiently propitious for 
Winz to feel at liberty to inform the High Commission of his plans. 
Nevertheless, in the climate of the middle nineteen thirties, such a 
demand for a foreign concession, for concession it was, even if not 
specifically so called, had no chance of success. In his reply to Winz, 
the High Commissioner pointed out that the establishment of a capital- 
rich colony in the Jazira held obvious economic advantages in addition 
to its humanitarian aspect in this time of persecution. Unfortunately 
neither the Syrian government nor the Mandatory Power could 
guarantee the security of a foreign concession in the face of a rising 
tide of Muslim [and nationalist] opinion against the alienation of their 
patrimony to outsiders, especially those who smacked of Zionism. 12 
Thus the character of the Mandate reinforced by local 
sensitivities precluded European immigration either from the metropole 
11 See letter from Leo Winz to Haqqi Bey al-'Azm, 23 January 1934. MAE-- 
Nantes, FB, Carton 616. 
12 Letter from HC de Martel to Leo Winz, 16 December 1934. MAE--Nantes, 
FB, Carton 616. 
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or from other countries outside the Levant. At the beginning of the 
Mandate at least, it was another matter entirely with regard to 
populations seeking to enter Syria from other countries of the Middle 
East--particularly if they happened to be Christian refugees fleeing from 
persecution. Ever since the Revolution, France had seen herself as a 
refuge for those seeking a haven from oppression. In the Levant, she 
had long posed as the champion of Christians caught under the 
Ottoman yoke. Therefore it was natural that she should welcome 
Christian communities fleeing hostility. This was even more the case 
because she felt that such groups would be beholden to her politically 
in her struggle with nationalist elements, and might contribute 
economically as well. The French always considered Christians of 
whatever stripe to be more civilised and more reliable than their Muslim 
neighbours; employed them almost exclusively as intermediaries; and 
thus tended to see non-Christians through what was indeed a distorting 
lens. Such attitudes generated a predilection for Christians, 
particularly if they were emerging from the horrors of massacre and 
destruction. 
Unfortunately the settlement of many of these groups did not 
serve to swell the agricultural labour force. Thus the French gave a 
ready welcome to the numerous Armenian refugees who fled the 
Republic of Turkey after the First World War. but their aptitudes and 
preferences tended to revolve around the shop rather than the farm. 
13 
13 For comments on the aptitudes of Armenians for agriculture, see Georges 
Carle, `Les Armeniens immigres dans les Etats sous mandat frangais: leur 
valeur economique et sociale, ' Bull, UES, V, 3,30 September, 1926,195-201. 
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Moreover as the Mandate moved into the nineteen thirties, and 
the balance began to swing ever so slowly against the French in Syria. 
Muslims and nationalists decried the immigration of potential 
agricultural populations, even if they possessed impeccable Middle 
Eastern roots. The perfect example of this is the way in which the 
vagaries of internal Syrian politics sabotaged a plan to develop the 
Ghab with the aid of a community of Christian refugees. 
III. 3>The Assyrians and the Ghab 
When the League of Nations sought a home for Assyrian refugees 
fleeing from persecution in Iraq, a proposal to place them in the heart of 
western Syria was greeted by howls of protest. In its search for an area 
in which to settle this group, the League appealed to twenty-two 
countries in October, 1933 and again in June, 1934 to find out if any of 
them might have a spot in either their home territories or their 
colonies. 14 Faced with either a complete rejection of its request or the 
fact that the territories offered proved unsuitable, the League cast its 
eye once again on the Levant states which already held some 8,800 
Assyrians in a temporary settlement on the Khabur. On 14 April 1935, 
France offered the the Ghab Valley, provided that it would in no way be 
responsible for financing any settlement there. 
As a result of this offer, a proposal was drawn up to place a 
colony of some 15,000 Assyrians in the Ghab Valley. Its elements would 
14 For a list of these countries and their responses, see Societe des Nations, 
`Etablissement des Assyriens de I'Irak, ' Document C. /Min. Ass. /226, Geneva, 
7 October 1936. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 581. 
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comprise a nucleus from the Assyrian colony on the Khabur which 
would then be closed and a further lot of immigrants, some 5-6,000, 
currently living in the region of Mosul. 
The French authorities had long wished to develop the region of 
the Ghab, but for various reasons had thus far been unable to do so. At 
the behest of the High Commission, the Regie des Etudes Hydrauliques 
(REH) had recently presented a plan for the complete development of 
the Orontes which included the drainage and irrigation of the Ghab. 
This fortuitous combination of a sound irrigation project and sufficient 
manpower to exploit it gave the French hopes that it might be possible 
to make an area, which up until that time had remained virgin territory, 
agriculturally productive. 
In this case the project would be expedited because finance 
seemed readily available. Its total cost was estimated at 82,500,000 F, 
of which 62,000,000 were for the works of drainage and irrigation and 
20,500,000 for the settlement of the refugees. The High Commission 
was willing to make a contribution of 22,000,000 F towards the cost of 
creating the physical infrastructure if the League and its member states 
found the funds to complete the budget. This in itself seemed a difficult 
task. The United Kingdom and Iraq were each willing to make a larger 
pledge, but there was a real question of how the rest of the funds could 
be raised. Given the economic circumstances of the time, it was 
difficult to persuade other members of the League to part with cash to 
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support a foreign people no matter how deserving, and an appeal to 
private charities might not be sufficient to supply the balance. 15 
If the finance was problematic, opposition within Syria proved a 
much more serious obstacle. As one might imagine, a project to place a 
large alien Christian population in the heart of western Syria 
engendered violent protests on the part of Muslim and nationalist 
opinion. For example, important members of the community of Homs 
led by their chief, Hashim al-Atasi, Deputy and President of the National 
Bloc, wrote a letter to the High Commissioner in April, 1935 expressing 
strong objections to the immigration of people who, if they had proved 
troublesome in Iraq, would certainly be so in Syria, a country that was 
similar to Iraq in race, language, and religion. In the eyes of Atasi and 
his friends, the French government which had taken upon itself to 
protect the economic, administrative, and social interests of Syria by 
accepting a mandate should not prejudice these interests by 
introducing any discordant elements into Syrian territory. 16 
These sentiments were reiterated in meetings and newspapers 
throughout Syria, but particularly in Hama and Horns, the regions which 
would be most affected by the Assyrian settlement. In the spring of 
1936, the controversy became even more acute because of 
developments in Franco-Syrian political relations. In January, the 
15 For the problems, financial and otherwise surrounding the launch of this 
scheme for Assyrian settlement, see Societe des Nations, `Etablissement des 
Assyriens de ('Irak: Rapport du Comite du Conseil sur I'etablissement des 
Assyriens de ('Irak dans la region du Ghab (Territoires du Levant sous 
mandat fran(; ais). ' Document C. 352. M. 179.1935. VIl, Geneva, 12 September 
1935. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 582. 
16 Letter from Hashim al-Atasi et al. to HC de Martel, 27 April 1935. MAE-- 
Nantes, FB, Carton 584. 
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French brutally suppressed demonstrations occasioned by the closure 
of the Damascus office of the National Bloc, and the arrest of several of 
its leaders. The protest rapidly escalated into a forty-three day general 
strike which effectively shut down the entire country. This culminated 
in an accord on 2 March between the National Bloc and the High 
Commission which, among other things, provided that the Bloc would 
send a delegation to Paris to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty. As 
everybody knew, this act signalled the eventual termination of the 
Mandate, and the achievement of full independence. Long and difficult 
pourpar/ers were pursued in Paris, and it was not until the middle of 
September that the delegation of the National Bloc could return to 
Damascus with a draft treaty in hand. 17 
This sudden change in the course of Syrian history had a decisive 
effect on the plan to settle the Assyrians. From the very beginning of 
this episode, the French themselves had not been insensitive to the 
problems such a colony might cause and were conscious of both Syrian 
reactions and their obligations as the Mandatory Power. 18 Their 
concerns became magnified by the new turn of events, and they felt 
compelled in light of the rapid unfolding of the situation to point out to 
the League that the insertion of a new and unwanted Christian minority 
17 For this episode see, Khoury, Syria ..., 457-67. 
18 See the letter from French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval accepting the 
charge to settle the Assyrians., `Proces-Verbal de la Quatre-Vingt-Cingieme 
Session (Extraordinaire) du Conseil, Tenu ä Geneve du lundi 15 au mercredi 
17 avril 1935, ' Annexe 1538: `Etablissement des Assyriens de l'Irak-- 
2>Lettre, en date du 14 Avril 1935, du Gouvernement francais au President 
du Comite pour I'etablissement des Assyriens de ('Irak'. Document 
C. 165. M. 91.1935. Vll, Societe des Nations, JournalOfciel, XVI, 5, May, 1935, 
579-81. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 581. 
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in a region immediately adjacent to one of the centrepoints of Muslim 
resistance (i. e. Hama) would prove extremely unwise. As a result, of 
this warning which tended to corroborate its own observations, the 
Committee which had been charged by the Council of the League with 
the resolution of the Assyrian question reluctantly proposed to their 
colleagues that the Ghab scheme for Assyrian settlement be terminated 
forthwith. On 4 July 1936, the League Council decided to follow this 
recommendation. 19 
A fortuitous concatenation of circumstances had led to the 
formulation of a project designed to kill two birds with one stone: to 
turn what had always been a vexatious Christian minority into a 
community of peaceful and productive cultivators, and in so doing, 
make the Ghab an important part of the Syrian agricultural economy. 
The outcome of the Assyrian settlement plan only served to underline 
the fact that it was well-nigh impossible to use foreign immigrants to 
swell the rural labour force in the face of virulent local opposition, even 
if these immigrants had the full backing of the international community. 
Writing at the beginning of 1940 on the 'Economic Future of 
Syria', Jean de Hautecloque, the Delegate at Damascus, came to the 
19 For the denouement of the Ghab settlement scheme, see 1>Societe des 
Nations, `Etablissement des Assyriens de I'lrak: Rapport du Comite du 
Conseil sur I'etablissement des Assyriens de I'lrak, and Annexes lVa and b, 
Geneva, 2 July 1936. Document C. 282. M171.1936. Vll. MAE--Nantes, FB, 
Carton 581; 2>Assyrian Settlement National Appeal, `Organising Secretary's 
report on his visit to Geneva, June 21st-July 5th, 1936, ' 14 July 1936, MAE-- 
Nantes, FB, Carton 583; 3>Letter from J. P. Walters, Sous-Secretaire General, 
Directeur de la section politique to Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres de la Republique Frangaise a. b. s. de Monsieur le Sous Directeur 
de la Societe des Nations, 4 July 1936. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 444-- 
Services Techniques. 
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conclusion that there could only be two solutions to the labour problem: 
In areas such as the Jazira, machines must replace men; in regions 
such as those of western Syria and the Hawran where the soils were 
too thin for the successful use of machinery, a reservoir of manpower 
would have to be sought, as it was in the past, from regions of surplus 
population. Although districts such as those in the Alaouites had long 
been accustomed to send their sons to work in fields far from home, de 
Hautecloque proposed their `stabilisation' on surplus state lands in 
important agricultural areas. Like Achard so many years before, he 
pointed out that the best way to attract cultivators was to provide them 
with work that was both secure and profitable. Nevertheless he too felt 
that there was no urgency in seeking an answer to this problem, and 
that eventually other solutions as yet unknown might be found. 20 
For de Hautecloque as for Achard before him, there were other 
questions more amenable to administrative action. Among these, was 
the creation of the physical requisites for agricultural productivity. 
III. 4>Creation of an agricultural infrastructure 
Building a firm foundation was a primary responsibility for those 
delegated to deal with agriculture. This revolved around important, but 
mundane chores: the digging of new wells and the restoration and 
cleaning of qanat systems; the creation of experimental farms and the 
re-establishment of the state agriculture school located at Salamiya; 
20 Jean de Hautecloque, `L'Avenir economique de la Syrie, ' 15-20; Achard, 
`Les problemes... ('exploitation..., ' passim. 
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the encouragement of the use of fertilisers both natural and chemical; 
the construction of stations where motoculture was practised; the 
organisation of the fight against locust depredations in co-ordination 
with their colleagues from other mandated territories. In short, the goal 
was to promote all efforts to expose cultivators to the methods and 
mechanisms of modern husbandry. 
This was a continuing process, unheralded, and with mixed 
success. Certainly many qanat systems were cleared and wells dug. 
Certainly there was a more organised fight against the locust, although 
the results were disappointing. Nevertheless much that was 
accomplished was too little, given insufficient financial resources and 
inadequate supervision. 
One finds an illuminating example of good intentions which came 
to nought in the saga of the Agriculture School at Salamiya. This was a 
school established around 1910 by the mutasarrif of Hama using 
sequestered funds, which were originally destined as an offering (the 
khums) from the Ismaili inhabitants of Salamiya to their spiritual leader 
in India, the Aga Khan. Its buildings were largely destroyed by fire 
during the Ottoman retreat in 1918--a fire which the Sunni inhabitants of 
Hama accused the Isma`ilis of setting themselves in order to obliterate 
the bad memories roused by the school. 
It was re-established in 1920 in a spirit of Franco-Ismaili co- 
operation in order to teach modern methods of cultivation in one of the 
most important agricultural areas of Syria. The inhabitants of Salamiya 
contributed land for its experimental farm. Nevertheless it was never 
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very successful as an educational institution because 'it sought to 
create agricultural engineers in lieu of educating cultivators'. Thus 
whilst hired labour worked its land, the school gave theoretical courses 
rather than the practical instruction which was so badly needed. 
Politics reared its head when the Syrian nationalist government 
closed the school in 1937 because they saw it as the fruit of an entente 
between the hated Mandatory Power and the Isma`ilis, a group little 
disposed to support the nationalist cause. Moreover the land belonging 
to the school, which had been originally received as a gift from its 
Isma'ili owners, was well-watered and fertile. It aroused the cupidity of 
some leading Hamiote nationalists who were apparently assured that 
they would easily be able to rent the cropland and the tree nursery at a 
good price. In doing so, they would profit both financially and politically 
by snatching the rights to this most desirable of properties from under 
the noses of their Isma'ili opponents. That this act roused bitterness in 
the local inhabitants goes without saying. 21 
The unhappy history of the Agriculture School at Salamiya 
illustrates the kind of problems faced by the Mandatory authorities in 
accomplishing some of the more mundane tasks for the betterment of 
agriculture in Syria. Lack of even the most basic information about 
21 For the history of the Salamiya Agricultural School, see 1>Dick Douwes 
and Norman N. Lewis, `The trials of Isma`ilis in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, ' /MES, XXI, 1989,228-29; 2>'Ecole d'Agriculture de 
Salamieh', n. d. (Nov. 1925? ), MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 861; 3>P. Berthelot 
(Delegue Adjoint--Homs-Hama), `Information a/s: Ecole d'Agriculture de 
Selimieh, ' Homs, 18 November 1937, MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 864. See also 
Berthelot's bitter critique of the actions of the Syrian government with 
regard to this school in 4> `Notes sur la mise en valeur de la region de "Gaza" 
de Homs, Memoire de Stage (No. 249), February, 1938, Centre des Hautes 
Etudes sur I'Afrique et I'Asie Modernes [C. H. E. A. M. ], 34. 
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crop requirements; a heavy reliance on theory to the exclusion of 
practical knowledge; the intrusion of political and comunal rivalries in 
what would appear to be the most non-controversial matters often 
tended to stymie their various projects. Nevertheless, considering that 
there was so little modern agriculture in Syria to begin with, and that 
she had suffered the devastation of three years of war and famine, the 
French accomplished a good deal in reconstructing and building upon 
basic structures. 
III. 5>Crop diversification--cereals 
One of the most important strategies followed by the Mandatory 
authorities in their efforts to place Syrian agriculture on a sounder 
footing than hitherto was to encourage Syrian landlords and peasants 
to move from their heavy dependence on the cultivation of cereals used 
largely for local consumption towards experimentation with other 
potentially more remunerative crops. In pursuing this idea, French 
functionaries were aided and abetted by French capitalists who hoped 
to make profits whilst providing important raw materials for their home 
market. 
Nevertheless one must begin any examination of this means of 
strengthening rural resources by looking at winter cereals. Wheat and 
barley were the most important food crops in Syria, yet during the 
period of the Mandate they appeared to suffer from a certain `benign 
neglect'. There was no grand strategy to increase cereal output; no 
massive infusion of French capital; no effort to introduce new varieties 
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or increase the yield of old ones by the introduction of modern 
techniques. 
At first glance, this seems strange for reasons related both to 
historical image and historical reality. From the beginning to the end of 
their Mandate, many French officials and publicists held tenaciously to 
a particular historical vision of what Syria once had been; what she had 
become; and what she would become with their help. In their eyes, 
Syria had been a fertile grain producing land when under the sway of 
those various ancient dynasties which once held her in thrall-- 
Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Seleukids. She reached her apogee 
during the centuries of the Roman Empire when she was truly the 
granary of Rome. Such prosperity persisted through the Classical age 
only to fall into a slow decline under Muslim domination. This 
desuetude reached its nadir during the four centuries of Ottoman rule, 
and France as the heritor of Rome had the appointed role of restoring 
Syria to the agricultural pre-eminence she had held during Roman 
times. 22 
Yet this image of Syria as Demeter bearing sheaves of wheat was 
contradicted by recent experience which demonstrated just how far 
she had fallen from that ideal. During the years which immediately 
preceeded the debut of French administration, the spectre of famine 
had emerged as the central fact of life in Syria. Indeed when the French 
and their allies first came to the Levant in 1918, they were faced with 
22 For an elaboration of this idea, see Huvelin, 4-5. 
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the task of repairing the enormous damage caused by hunger, disease, 
and other ravages of war. 
Yet he who peruses the reports of Achard and Huvelin written 
after their study mission of 1919 learns nothing of these calamities 
because there is nary a mention of them. It is not that the authors were 
ignorant of the famine or unaware of its consequences. It is simply that 
they felt that one should not dwell upon calamities which directly 
stemmed from the War because `however profound and cruel one 
observes them to be,. . . they will pass with the crisis which brought 
them'. Far better to focus on those endemic causes of agricultural 
stagnation which had bedevilled Syria for generations before 1914.23 
Strangely, this contrast between historical vision and recent 
experience in no way incited the French authorities to promote and 
improve cereal cultivation. In focusing on the agricultural situation of 
postwar Syria, they considered their vision of Syria as the granary of 
Rome to be far more a metaphor for a reputed prosperity which might 
be restored than a basis for sound policy. Despite the enthusiastic 
prognosis of such influential figures as General Gouraud who spoke of 
the possibility of producing eight million tonnes of cereals, much of 
which could be exported, 24 no one seriously proposed that Syria would 
or should become a major supplier of wheat--even after the Jazira 
became available. Achard, his colleagues, and his successors were 
23 Ibid., 15. 
24 Figure whose stated origin was `specialist reports' which he gave to the 
French Premier and the Finance Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, 13 
and 20 November, 1920. `Memorandum de 1'expose verbal .. . ': II-- 
'Possibilites Economiques, ' 2; and `Note sur les questions posees..., ' 2. 
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well aware of Syria's capacities for grain production, and saw no 
immediate means of preventing cereal deficits given prevailing weather 
conditions, except through expansion onto new lands. 25 This attitude is 
exemplified by Achard's caustic comment about the granary metaphor, 
that seeing as how Rome found it necessary to have granaries 
scattered throughout her possessions, did it not then follow from this 
that each was of limited capacity? 26 To him it made far more sense to 
focus on crops such as cotton which might prove truly profitable. 
Nevertheless if there existed no concerted strategy to augment 
the output of grain, the Mandatory authorities did institute a number of 
tactical measures in order to shape the pattern of exports and imports 
of this commodity. These acts were designed to remedy short term 
imbalances caused by fluctuations in local production and the impact of 
the world market. 27 
The most salient fact about Syrian grain production was that it 
was usually insufficient to meet Syrian needs. Indeed of the eighteen 
years between 1924 and 1941, only five saw more exports than imports 
25 cf. the opinion of Huvelin that any improvement in yields would be 
`problematic (and in any case too slow and too irregular)' to be of much use. 
Huvelin, 9. 
26 Achard, `Notes sur la Syrie, ' 98. 
27 For information on policy towards the grain trade during the early and 
middle Mandate, see 1 >Norman Burns, The Tariff of Syria, 1919-1932 
(Beirut: 
American Press, 1933 [Reprint: New York: AMS Press, 1973]), especially 
Chap. X, 143-74; 2>L., `Le Commerce du ble au Liban et en Syrie, ' AF, XXXIII, 
312, July-August, 1933,227-33; 3>/dem, `L'Orge au Liban et en Syrie, 'AF, 
XXXIII, 313, September-October 1933,267-68; 4>Reclus (Conseiller du Haut 
Commissariat aux Affaires Economiques), `Situation economique et politique 
douaniere, ' April. 1933, MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 697. Unfortunately, there is 
little information for the period from 1933-40. 
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of wheat and its products (flour, semolina, and groats). 28 The frenetic 
speculation of the immediate postwar years combined with the scanty 
output of grain led to the prohibition of grain exports outside the 
Mandated territories, a ban which was maintained until 1930 with one 
short exception. Exports were then permitted throughout the 1930's 
with the exception of 1937 and 1938 when low stocks accompanied by 
speculation brought another prohibition. 
The approach to grain exports during the `normal' economy of 
the 1920's was complemented by a tariff policy so formulated as to 
balance the needs of both consumers and producers. Since the Syrian 
diet consisted largely of wheat products, those who ate them had to be 
protected from bread shortages and price surges. Yet many 
consumers were also producers, and their prosperity determined their 
purchasing power which in turn affected those other parts of the 
economy which supplied their needs. Therefore the goal was to use the 
tariff to keep the price of bread low whilst assuring a sufficient profit to 
the cultivator. 
Thus the tariff evolved from the standard Ottoman rate of 11 % on 
all goods which provided a limited form of protection for both consumer 
and peasant to a more differentiated and flexible one: In 1925-26, when 
the Druze rebellion combined with a poor harvest to reduce drastically 
28 For this information, see Table: `Balance des importations et exportations 
de bles, farines semoules et gruaux de ble ä 1924 de 1941 [sic], Leon 
Mourad, `Les Conditions economiques de ('agriculture: organisation-- 
transformation--debouches, ' Annexe No. 6, in Fouad Saade et al., 
L'Agriculture: richesse nationale (Troisieme semaine sociale de Beyrouth, 
19-26 avril 1942) (Beirut: Editions les lettres orientales, 1942). One can also 
find this table along with an interesting commentary upon it in an extract from 
Leon Mourad, Notre economie, MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 809. 
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the stocks of grain and drive prices up, the tariff on imported grain was 
lowered to 5.5%. A similar tactic was followed during the bsd harvest 
year of 1928-29. 
With the coming of the world crisis, a tariff wall was gradually 
erected around Syrian wheat. A plunge in the prices of agricultural 
commodities was accompanied locally by bountiful harvests. For the 
peasant, the costs of production were higher than the value of the grain 
produced. To remedy this, a strong protective tariff policy was 
introduced which raised duties through a series of stages to 80% by the 
end of 1932. A poor grain harvest in 1932-33, brought a recoil to 40%. 
This general policy of protection was continued throughout the 1930's. 
By the end of the peacetime Mandate, wheat and barley were walled in 
by a tariff of 120%, semolina by one of 180%, and flour by one of 220%! 
This last was applied in order to stop the inundation of French flour with 
which the exporters of Marseille were flooding the Syrian market. 29 
The question then, is whether tariff policy was successful in 
regulating the excesses of the free market by bringing the grain supply 
more into equilibriuim with the needs of the Mandated territories. To 
contemporary observers, its application seemed to lack a certain 
synchronism. 
For example, the tariff was certainly lowered after poor cereal 
harvests---but not until the price of bread had soared into the 
stratosphere leading to undue suffering on the part of the consumer. 
By contrast, when grain was abundant, the authorities were not slow to 
29 Mourad, `Les Conditions economiques ..., ' 128. 
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raise the tariff--but always it seemed after the poor peasant had sold his 
crop to his own disadvantage. Therefore the ones to reap the benefit 
were the fat middlemen who needed it least. 30 
In these situations, the peasant seemed always to be the loser. 
Because he had no capital reserves, he could not hold back his harvest 
to await a more advantageous situation. By contrast, the large 
proprietor or wealthy merchant who were often one and the same could 
afford to indulge in a bit of grain speculation at the expense of the 
cultivator. 
Speculation was helped by the fact that the price of grain was not 
uniform throughout the Levant. Physical insecurity, the state of the 
roads, and slow means of transportation--in some areas, still by 
camelback--meant that grain continued to be marketed in local centres- 
-the `agro-cities'. Whereas the peasant remained at the mercy of the 
rich proprietor or merchant to whom he was, like as not, bound by the 
iron fetters of fiscal obligation, the latter had many more options for 
marketing the grain he thus obtained. 
The result was a frenetic round of movement as the middlemen 
rushed to take advantage of one market as against another. This led to 
enormous changes in price as one market might be flooded with 
product following the whispered rumour of an elevated price. The first- 
comers were well-served by their information; those slower afoot 
suffered for their delay, any one centre being capable of absorbing only 
so much. And so the race would begin again. 
30 Burns, 154. 
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Thus in 1931, speculators from Horns and Aleppo sent wheat 
collected from their regions to Palestine which had experienced a bad 
wheat harvest instead of to their neighbours in the Jabal Ansayria who 
suffered equally, but were unable to pay the original price demanded. 
The inhabitants of this region were so desperate for bread that finally 
they themselves were forced to go to Palestine to make their 
purchases. In the end, the total price they finally paid was certainly no 
better than that which they had originally refused--and probably a lot 
worse! 31 
Fiddling with the tariff could only alleviate temporary shortages 
or surpluses within Syria. Protection as practiced in the 1930's was no 
long-term solution because whilst the exclusion of foreign grain gave 
more scope for the Syrian producer, it also often drove prices higher 
for the Syrian consumer. Moreover protection had no effect on the 
problem of self-sufficiency in grain which was due to much deeper 
structural causes. At the time, knowledgeable commentators linked 
this question to the Increase of cereal production. Such an increase, 
they felt, was directly related both to improvements in technique and to 
expansion of the cultivated area into new lands, especially those in the 
Jaiira. 32 
One of the authors cited above, writing in 1933, stated that 
The return of security allows lands abandoned for 
several years to be put once more into cultivation, but 
no real extension of the cultivated area is clearly 
apparent compared with the period before 1914. On 
the other hand, up to the present, one does not notice 
31 L., `Le Commerce du ble ..., ' 230. 
32 Ibid., 231; Burns, 154. 
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any improvement in yields for crops taken together: 
certain quite worthy improvements in detail are without influence on the total of the harvest. 33 
If this were true in 1933, a glance at the changes in wheat 
production patterns in the great grain-growing districts of inner Syria 
during the succeeding five years amply demonstrate why such an 
assertion could not be made at the end of the Mandate, viz 
TABLE 111.1 
WHEAT: 
CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF PRODUCTION, 1934-38 
('000 hectares; '000 tonnes) 
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Area Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod. 
N. Syria 100 90 110 150 100 100 113 62 110 150 
S. Syria 216 133 145 187 150 93 142 147 145 151 
Deir ez - 
Zor/Jazira 62 107 71 102 84 149 111 157 115 229 
TOTALS: 378 330 326 439 334 342 366 366 370 530 
....................................................................................................... 
. 
Nota: Figures taken from the Bulletin de la Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban [title 
varies slightly], 1936,8; 1937,10; 1938,9; 1939,12. Unfortunately figures for 
previous years are not broken down by region. 
As the table clearly shows, it was the opening of the Jazira which 
had the greatest impact on cereal production. Between 1934 and 1938, 
the areas in that region devoted to wheat nearly doubled whilst 
production more than doubled. This increase was constant except for a 
slight lag in production in 1935. More important, average yields were 
reported to be approximately double those of any other wheat-growing 
area in Syria. 34 
33 L., `Le commerce du ble ..., ' 230-31 
34 Regie des travaux du cadastre ..., `Rapport general de reconnaissance 
fonciere ..., 16. 
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It is interesting to note that the rise of the Jazira to prominence 
was paralleled by the shrinking importance of the traditional wheat- 
growing regions of Syria. Northern Syria, the old vi/ayetof Aleppo, saw 
its wheat area hold steady whilst its production fluctuated sharply. In 
southern Syria, once the dominant grain-growing region, there was a 
reduction of wheat area accompanied by a stagnation of production. 
Thus by 1938, there was an opening of new lands on the 
northeastern frontier, pre-eminently suited to wheat cultivation. The 
increase in area and production of this basic foodstuff pointed the way 
to what appeared to be a secure future. 
Whilst self-sufficiency in grain was never attained during the 
Mandate, matters were alleviated considerably by the opening of the 
Jazira. The only other way to increase grain output would have been to 
grow more of it under irrigation. Nevertheless French planners refused 
to consider this, believing that irrigation should be reserved for finer 
things. In the words of the writer of one of the reports written in 1940 
which summarised French achievements during the Mandate, `These 
crops [winter cereals--wheat and barley] were able to help the country 
live; they couldn't enrich it'. 35 
The products of the soil which would `enrich' Syria were certain 
summer crops destined to feed the ravenous maw of French industry. 
It is these which received most attention during the Mandate, two in 
particular, silk and cotton. 
35 4L'Oeuvre du Mandat dans le domaine agricole, ' 2. 
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The period of the Mandate saw the decline of an old crop-silk- 
and the introduction of a new one-cotton. The dislocations of the Great 
War--in particular, the destruction of thousands of mulberry trees-dealt 
a body blow to the Lebanese silk industry. It could never be revived, 
despite strenuous efforts of the authorities who were seconded by 
interested industrial circles in the metropole. Silk from the Mandated 
territories continued to face stiff competition from that produced in the 
Far East (chiefly Japan). Its fate was finally sealed by two unrelated 
occurrences: the Great Depression and the invention of rayon. The 
economic crisis of the 1930's brought with it a sharp drop in the prices 
of silk and other raw materials whilst destroying those Lyonnais firms 
which had financed the revival in the Levant. When silk production 
recovered somewhat in the later 1930's, it was with the aid of local 
capital. Nevertheless even the best financed industry could not swim 
against the tide of fashion. The invention of rayon--the so-called 
`artificial silk'--led to a change in style which inexorably drove silk from 
centre stage. 
The demise of the silk industry was counterbalanced by the 
increase in cotton-growing. Cotton was the major crop fostered during 
the Mandate period. A local variety of cotton had of course long been 
produced with more or less success, but the initial hopes held out for it 
soon ran afoul of problems revolving around the quality and 
consistency of the fibre produced. Here again, French industry took a 
hand, supplying seed, machinery, advice, and a ready market for the 
product. The Great Crisis had an effect on cotton similar to that on silk, 
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bringing a price collapse and the failure of those French firms which 
had promoted cotton in Syria. Nevertheless the ultimate outcome was 
different--and happier. Local entrepreneurs took up the slack, and by 
the end of the Mandate, cotton-growing in Syria was well established. 
Here there was no rival fibre to take its place: it was merely a matter of 
growing a product of consistently high quality--and this was something 
which could only develop over time. 
Thus there were striking similarities in the sagas of silk and 
cotton, but also striking differences. The contrast between them is 
quite instructive. 
III. 6>Silk, its rise and fall 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, sericulture had 
developed into one of the premier industries of the Levant. 36 Its main 
centre of concentration was the Christian enclave of Jabal Lubnan 
whence it spread to the neighbouring gada's belonging to the vilayets 
of Damascus and Beirut. 37 The dominance of Mount Lebanon was 
P. 
36 For various aspects of the Levantine silk industry before the Great War, 
see 1>Owen, 154-60,249-53; 2>Marcel Emerit, 'La Crise syrienne et 
('expansion economique francaise, ' Revue Historique, CCVII, April-June, 
1952,211-232; 3>Dominique Chevallier, `Lyon et la Syrie en 1919: les bases 
d'une intervention, ' Revue Historique, CCXIV, 1960,275-320; 4>Boutros 
Labaki, 'La Soie dans I'economie du Mont Liban (1840-1914), ' Peoples 
Mediterraneans/Mediterranean Peoples, VII, April-June, 1979,125-39; 
5>/dem, `La Filature de la soie dans le sandjak du Mont Liban, ' Arabica: 
Revue d'Etudes Arabes, XXIX, 1982,80-90; 6>Kais Firro, `Silk and agrarian 
change in Lebanon, 1800-1914, ' /JMES, XXII, 1990,151-69; 7>Maurice Fevret, 
`La Sericiculture au Liban. Premiere partie: sa fortune passee, ' RGL, XXIV, 
1949,247-60. 
37 Estimates at the beginning of the 20th century apportion the mulberry 
trees as follows: Mount Lebanon--------28,000,000 'pieds ------ 69% 
Vi/ayet Beirut------------------- 9,170,000----------------22% 
of which Tripoli District-----------6,800,000 
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confirmed by the fact that it was under a special regime free from 
Ottoman interference and Ottoman taxes such as the tithe. It was thus 
a region where European economic influence could firmly entrench 
itself. In the case of silk production, it was the entrepreneurs of Lyon 
who were the moving force behind its efflorescence. Certain firms 
(originally chiefly from Lyon and Marseille, that other great centre for 
relations with the Levant) themselves set up modern factories to 
produce the raw product under the best conditions. Another favoured 
approach was for Lyonnais silk merchants to finance small-scale 
production by local entrepreneurs imitating European methods, but 
using more primitive techniques. This was done either by loaning 
capital directly to local entrepreneurs or more safely by passing it 
through banks in Beirut who in turn financed the reeling establishments 
in the Mountain. These used agents who obtained the cocoons from the 
peasants who actually raised the silkworms. With so many middlemen 
involved, those at the end of the chain received very little for their 
pains. 
38 
Another tie binding the Levantine silk industry to its suppliers 
was its increasing dependence upon France for the silkworm eggs 
necessary for production. Between 1853 and 1872, epidemics of 
Vi/ayet Syria ----------3,595,000-------------------9% 
of which Biqa` Valley--------------3,115,000 
TOTAL-------------------------40,765,000 -------------- 100% 
The total covered some 14,000 hectares. Figures are from Chevallier, 297 
and 298. In fn 1 on 298, he gives another hectarage estimate of 22,000 ha. 
Firro (Table 1,152) gives a breakdown of figures for area district by district. 
From his figures, one obtains 20,260 hectares as the total area of trees. 
38 For a clear discussion of the credit system which financed silk production, 
see Chevallier, 291-97. 
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muscardine and pebrine ravaged indigenous silkworms, necessitating 
importation of uncontaminated eggs from France. Because these 
produced the quality of silk demanded by the world market, French 
eggs fed the local hatcheries almost exclusively until the coming of the 
First World War cut off the source of supply. 39 
As a result of these different links, the merchants of Lyon 
achieved complete control of a market which could supply them with 
product of a high standard at an attractive price. Certainly, they 
imported far more silk from the Far East, 40 but there they were in 
competition with other large consumers of silk such as the United 
States. In contrast, over 90% of the raw silk spun in the Levant came to 
Lyon by the time of the First World War. 41 
This dependence meant that the silk industry in Syria was subject 
to the vagaries of the world market. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the vast increase in the production and export of Chinese and 
Japanese silk led to less demand and a lower price for silk from the 
Levant. Moreover the cost price of spinning raw silk in these countries 
was greater because of backwardness in technique. Nevertheless 
local entrepreneurs were unwilling to make the large investments 
necessary to modernise their spinning processes so long as the quality 
of their product faced a serious challenge from the Far East, and the 
39 Ibid., 287-89; Firro, 154-55. 
40 For example, in 1914 the Condition des Soies, the organisation which 
accounted for all silk arriving at Lyon, recorded that two thirds of its imports 
came from the Far East as against only five percent from Syria. Michel 
Seurat, `Le Role.. ., ' 131, 
fn 1. 
41 Chevallier, 286. 
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quantity shipped would not make up for the losses caused by the fall in 
prices. As a result, many silk producing establishments closed. 42 
The effects of the fall in price also affected the planting of 
mulberry trees. Because they needed so much care when young and 
took so long to mature (some four or five years) before returning the 
investment made in them, these trees were not ripped out during a 
short dip in the market or because of a bad yield. Therefore the fact 
that after 1903, peasants in the areas around Beirut began to replace 
them with fruit and market garden crops which found a ready outlet In 
the growing urban agglomeration, shows how much they were touched 
by the fall in the market. This was followed by the planting of orange 
trees along the coasts, of tobacco higher up the mountain, and even of 
wheat in the Biqa` from around 1909.43 
Moreover in the years before the First World War, there was a 
large current of emigration from Mount Lebanon to North and South 
America where the villager could have a life better than cultivating 
mulberry trees or, in the case of women, working in silk factories for a 
pittance. Thus the home industry was drained of many of its most 
skilled workers, but the region as a whole did not lose their income 
because they kept up the ties with their native land and faithfully sent 
remittances home. 44 
42 For the negative forces striking the silk industry before the First World 
War, see particularly, Ibid., 301-02; Owen, 250-53. 
43 For these changes in the crop pattern, see Chevallier, 301-02; Firro, 155- 
56. 
44 For emigration from the Lebanon and its effects, see 1>Chevallier, 302; 
2>Labaki, `Filature ..., ' 
87-88; 3>/dem, `La soie ..., ' 126; 4>Richard 
Thoumin, Geographie humaine de la Syrie centrale (Paris: Librairie Ernest 
Leroux, 1936), Pt 5, Ch. 9,331-342. 
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These indications were but straws in the wind, noticeable only to 
a close observer of the situation. 45 Cocoon and raw silk production, 
the most obvious indicator of the health of the industry suffered no 
letdown before the Great War. Indeed the five years 1910-1914 saw an 
all-time record set of some six million kilogrammes of cocoons 
produced per annum. 46 
The coming of the First World War undoubtedly struck a heavy 
blow at the silk industry in the Levant. Nevertheless, it would have 
gone into decline because of the factors enumerated above even if war 
had not intervened. 
The War merely accelerated the process. 47 Suddenly, the 
growers had to make do with inferior silkworm eggs from within the 
Ottoman Empire because their source of supply in France was cut off. 
Furthermore, during the famine years, peasants were all too willing to 
rip out the mulberry trees in order to plant their lands with food crops 
for their own sustenance. This was quite apart from the wanton (but 
perhaps apocryphal) destruction of trees in the Biqa' valley by the 
Ottomans who needed fuel for their wood-burning locomotives. 
Another blow to the industry was a continued reduction of the 
labour force. The death by starvation of thousands of people removed 
45 Note Ducousso's comments given in Owen, 251. 
46 For production figures for cocoons from 1880-1934, see A. Latron, `La 
Production et le commerce de la soie au Levant, ' AF, XXXV, 328, March, 1935, 
79. Firro gives figures from 1861-1910, Table 3,156. Where the two tables 
overlap, the figures are similar. From 1,000-1,200 kgs of `fresh' cocoons, 
one gets in the end an average of 100 kgs of raw silk. 
47 For the war and its effects, see Maurice Fevret, `La Sericiculture au Liban. 
Deuxieme partie: son declin actuel, ' RGL, XXIV, 1949,348-349; Thoumin, 
167. 
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as surely as did emigration those skilled workers so necessary to rear 
silkworms and reel their cocoons. 
The first year of peace saw the reduction of cocoon production 
by more than 90% to some 500,000 kgs. There was an immediate call to 
revive an industry which was considered to be the most important in 
Lebanon. Therefore during the first decade of the Mandate a vast 
programme was set on foot with the co-operation of silk interests in 
Lyon and other French centres. Its goals were to plant mulberry trees; 
provide properly disinfected silkworm eggs; build modern rearing 
houses (magnaneries); erect experimental stations and model 
nurseries; bring experts to advise on the most efficacious techniques; 
provide education and translate the latest manuals into Arabic; give tax 
relief--in short do everything to restore this industry to what was seen 
as its pre-war grandeur. 48 
The instigators of this programme were aided in their task by a 
rise in price which reached a peak in 1923 and again in 1926. 
Furthermore the complicated system of credit which had existed in the 
period before the War linking peasants, agents, local entrepreneurs in 
reeling, Beirut bankers, and ultimately French capital was once more 
set in place to nourish growth of the industry. 49 
Nevertheless all was to no avail in the face of market forces 
which buffeted the slowly recovering silk industry. In its report to the 
48 See the French government reports to the League of Nations for various 
expositions of this programme, e. g. Rapport ... Juillet 1922-Juillet 1923,28; 
Rapport... 1923-1924,37-38; Rapport... 1924,55-56, etc. 
49 For the credit system during the Mandate, see Latron, `La Production ..., ' 
81. 
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League of Nations for 1926, the French government could boast that 
`the situation of silk production has been in essence restored to its pre- 
war state'. Three years later it admitted that `the decrease in the price 
of silk has led to the reduction in the number of mulberry trees which 
are at 100,000 in 1929 as opposed to 200,000 four years ago' . 
50 By 
1934, the price of silk was lower than it had been in 1914.51 
This fall was due first to the continued flooding of the markets 
with high quality silk, principally from Japan, and secondly to the world 
economic crisis which brought with it the collapse of prices for all raw 
materials, silk included. Nevertheless silk was faced with a special 
problem of its own because the increased production of rayon, soon to 
be followed by the invention and dissemination of other artificial fibres 
created a competitor on its own ground which was too strong to resist. 
For the silk industry in Lebanon, the foundering of prices followed 
by the world crisis led to the unravelling of those complex strands of 
credit which had bound together its various elements. The French 
firms who were the originators of this system found they could no 
longer support it when times were bad, and repayment of debt was put 
off from year to year until finally deemed irrecoverable. They withdrew 
their interests from the Levant. By 1933 there were no more Lyonnais 
firms involved in Syria, either because they had passed into other 
50 Rapport ... 
1926,133; Rapport ... 1929,96. 
Latron says that between 
1928 and 1932, the destruction of mulberry trees was compensated by the 
creation of new plantations. It was only in 1933 and 1934 that most fertile 
zones were definitely turned over to citrus, particularly banana trees and 
market garden crops. Loc. cit. 
51 For a chart of silk prices between 1908 and 1934, see Latron, `La 
Production. . ., '80. 
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hands or had gone into bankruptcy. As the President of the Silk 
Commission of the Chamber of Commerce reported, `Lyonnais interests 
in the Levant are today practically nil'. 52 
As for those at the local end of this credit system, they were also 
felled by the cessation of credit and by their own penchant for 
speculation. With fewer resources, they took greater risks. Thus there 
were many failures, but so had it always been. 
Eventually, there was some recovery towards the end of the 
Mandate, financed entirely from local funds. Nevertheless the demise 
of the French connexion which had ensured a ready market for 
Levantine silk, along with the vastly weakened position of silk itself as 
an important fibre ensured that the industry which produced it could 
never return to the palmy days before the Great War. 
The silk industry in Lebanon was successful because the happy 
combination of foreign capital and local expertise created a system of 
production sufficiently resilient to sustain itself over a long period 
through good times and bad. Because investments on the part of 
capitalists, reelers, and silk producers took so long to bear fruit, they 
were compelled to weather economic downturns in the sure 
expectation of a recovery of their fortunes based on the value of their 
product and the guarantee of a market. 
52 See, `Sericiculture en Syrie et au Liban, ' 5 April 1934; Commission de la 
Soie, reunion du 10 Avril 1934 in CCIL, Fonds Condition de Soies M 1* 6, 
Carton 6, Dossier: La Sericiculture en Syrie et au Liban, 1928-1934. 
Quotation on 2. 
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During the Mandate, the recovery after the dislocations of the 
Great War was only relative. Thus the highest cocoon production of 
this period (3,550 tonnes in 1930) was less than 60% of the production 
of 1914. The average for the ten year period 1921-1930 (2,747 tonnes) 
was slightly more than half that of the years 1901-1910 (5,340 tonnes) 
and lay midway between the averages for 1871-1880 (1,990 tonnes) and 
1881-1890 (3,410 tonnes). 53 Based on average production, one could 
say then that the silk industry had regressed to the 1870's and 1880's. 
Moreover, by the 1930's, the position of the silk industry had 
changed profoundly, as Andre Latron makes clear. 54 It was not that 
there had never been failures of local entrepreneurs, undercapitalised 
and over speculative. It was not that there had never been a turn away 
from mulberry trees to fruit trees. It was not that there had never been 
competition from masses of cheap silk from the Far East. It was simply 
that in the nineteen thirties, the depreciation of the product in terms of 
prices and demand when combined with the closure of the golden tap 
which for much more than half a century had continually irrigated the 
local industry with funds, rendered it moribund with little hope for 
recovery. To put it bluntly, silk was on the way out. 
Moreover there was a certain irony in that throughout this period 
and beyond, a certain sector of the silk industry continued to flourish. 
For raw silk was not only produced in the Lebanon, but also in the 
Alaouites, principally in the southern part of the state, in the gada's of 
53 Figures based on Latron, `La Production ..., ' Table on 79; Firro, 
Table 3, 
156. 
54 Latron, `La Production ., '81-82. 
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Safita and Tal Kalakh. This was a cottage industry, hand-wound and 
spun in the villages, and the inferior silk produced--aghabi--was 
exported via Horns for use in the Arab-owned mills to be found in the 
great cities of the Levant. It was used in making aghabani, muslin 
decorated with silk used in feminine apparel. European firms of course 
took no interest in this product which never became subject to the 
caprice of Western fashion or the uncertainities of the world market. 
As a result this modest industry continued to produce a steady average 
output of some 425 tonnes of fresh cocoons between 1930 and 1950. 
Maurice Fevret makes the comment that at the time of his writing 
(1949), the Alaouites produced almost as much as Lebanon--formerly 
the great centre of silk production in the Levant. 55 
If the Levant during the Mandate period saw the demise of its 
most important industry, it was compensated by the rise of a new one. 
Each was based on a fibre, silk for the old; cotton for the new. In 
certain ways, the early history of cotton developments during the 
Mandate showed a similarity to that of its `rival'. Nevertheless the 
results were in the end quite different. 
III. 7>A cotton famine 
The story of cotton during the Mandate begins with fear of a 
famine--a fibre famine. 
55 For silk in the Alaouites, see 1>Latron, `La Production ..., ' 80; 
2>Fevret, 
`La Sericiculture au Liban. Deuxieme partie..., ' 349. 
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In 1914, the world cotton crop reached the highest production in 
history at 29,805,000 bales. Then for the next ten years (until 1924-25), 
it stabilised at an average of 23,336,000 bales. 56 Meanwhile world 
cotton consumption between 1914 and 1925 tended to balance 
production with a seven year average of 21,074,000 bales. 57 
The United States as the largest producer--slightly more than 
50% of the crop during this period--determined the size of world output. 
A graph of production during the years 1910-1930 shows how closely 
world output mirrored U. S. output. 58 
Nevertheless U. S. production, whilst stable, was subject to 
certain inhibiting factors. One was the problem of gradual soil 
degradation in the old cotton lands of the southeast which was 
compensated somewhat by the cultivating of districts further west in 
Texas and Oklahoma. Another was the outbreak of the boll weevil pest 
which entered the United States from Mexico around 1892, and by 1922 
had spread throughout the cotton-growing areas. A third was that 
<----Fig. 11. Graph showing world cotton production and production of the 
United States, 1910-33. Source: Emil Schreyger, L'Office du Niger au Mali: 
/a prob/ematique d'une Brande entreprise agricole daps /a zone du Sahel 
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1984), Graph on 15. 
56 These figures are taken directly or derived from tables in Baron Edmond 
de Moreau d'Andoy, `The depression in the cotton trade, ' in `Official Report 
of the XV International Cotton Congress held in Paris, ' International Cotton 
Bulletin, No. 36, IX, 4 August, 1931, Appendix, Table 1--The Cotton Crop of 
the World, 542. Here the `bale' is the `running bale' of approximately 490 lbs. 
which is taken as equal to 225 kg. These figures are taken from the Annual 
Handbook of the `Comtelburo', London and are generally the most accurate. 
They tend to differ considerably from figures found in French sources. 
57 Ibid., Table II--The Consumption of Cotton in the World., 543. Note that this 
is a seven year average because consumption figures for the war years 
1915-1918 are not given. I have included the year 1914. 
58 Ibid., Graph I, 523. Also see graph in Schreyger, 15. 
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during the 1920's, the black cotton workers, attracted by the chance of 
a better life, began to migrate in large numbers to certain northern 
cities. A fourth was a certain shift away from cotton to more 
remunerative crops such as sugar cane and tobacco. 
The other aspect of the cotton problem was the increase in 
cotton consumption which tended to keep pace with production. 
Moreover the United States began to make increased use of its own 
production. For example in 1914, the United States consumed 40% of 
the home output. By 1924, this had zoomed to 60%. 59 This trend was 
due to the fact that the textile industry in the United States itself was 
moving south to be in closer proximity to the centres of production 
where workers and transport were cheap, and where the lack of unions 
and labour legislation meant that more goods could be produced at 
lower cost. 
All of these factors produced increased anxiety among many 
European millowners who were dependent on raw cotton produced in 
the United States. A bad crop and increased use by U. S. mills of their 
home production could send the European textile industry into a 
tailspin. Such a state of affairs in 1903 led to reduction of output in the 
English mills which brought unemployment and misery to Lancashire. 
In 1907, the same again. In 1921, there was a bad crop everywhere 
except in Brazil, and world production tumbled by two million bales. 
59 Figures extrapolated from de Moreau d'Andoy, Tables I and II, 542-43. 
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This time accumulated stocks helped to absorb the shock. 
Nevertheless, the menace was still there . 
60 
France was particularly affected by this threat. Because she was 
not herself a producer of raw cotton, she had to import that which she 
spun on her spindles. Her principal source of cotton was the United 
States (75-80%) with Egypt and India running a distant second. 
Moreover her import bill for this cotton was enormous. Between 1914 
and 1918, the price of 50 kg. of `cotton middling' leaped from 78.50 F in 
July, 1914 to 408 F in August, 1918, a bill which had to be met by a 
vastly depreciated currency. 61 
Albert Sarraut and like-minded patriots cast around for a solution 
to this problem of dependence for one of the most important of French 
industries, one that had suddenly expanded by 30% with the return of 
Alsace to the mother country. Their answer was to seek an increase in 
cotton production within the colonial empire hitherto barely exploited, 
but which had proven its worth during the crisis of the Great War. 
At this time, French cotton imports from her colonies were 
miniscule, 764 tonnes in 1913 out of a total of 328,861, and 2,716 tonnes 
in 1920 out of a total of 232,214.62 This was in large part due to 
underdevelopment in cotton cultivation, but also to the fact that such 
60 Discussion of these problems can be found in 1>Schreyger, 13-18; 
2>Albert Sarraut, La raise en valeur des colonies fiangaises (Paris: Payot, 
1923), 163-167; 3>Achard, `Etudes ... ,' 
20-25; 4>X, `Notre 
approvisionnement en coton, ' Bull. UES., II, 4,31 December 1923,245-46. 
61 Schreyger, 19 and Table. 
62 Sarraut, Table on 163. 
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`large' producers as Indochina sent most of their crop to established 
markets outside the metropole. 
Therefore, during the next ten years, there began a concerted 
programme to develop the cotton resources of the colonies. North 
Africa, Madagascar, Cambodia, and especially the valley of the Niger in 
the French Sudan, were all foci of this campaign. As part of this 
strategy, planners turned their attention to the undoubted possibilities 
exhibited by that part of the Levant placed under French tutelage. 
III. 8>Cotton in the Levant 
Not the least of the reasons put forth for France to establish 
herself in the Levant was in order to cultivate for her own benefit the 
apparently large resources in cotton to be found there. To this end, the 
acquisition of Cilicia was seen as particularly desirable. Its reputation 
for cotton was such that the Germans had made efforts to develop it in 
conjunction with the Baghdadbahn during the decade and a half before 
the war. Between 1908 and 1914, the Deutsch-Levantinische 
Baumwollgesellschaft (DLBG) which operated under the auspices of the 
Deutsche Bank, had increased the percentage of Cilician cotton 
exported to Germany from 20% to 50-75%. 63 
Syria was seen as much less important in this regard. In his 
report on cotton production in Cilicia and Syria, Achard devoted thirty 
pages to extoling the possibilities of the former, and just five pages to a 
cursory survey of the latter. 
63 For the DLBG, see also Chapter I supra and references there, fn 23. 
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Despite her hopes, France lost Cilicia, stymied by the valour of 
the Turkish nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal, a check which was 
confirmed by the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October, 1921. To 
writers like Albert Sarraut, the loss of Cililcia meant the loss of the 
greatest part of the lands suitable for cotton. Whatever could be 
produced from the regions in Syria where cotton was cultivated--Idlib, 
the Orontes and Tripoli--would be so meagre that it could have `no 
serious relationship to the order of grandeur of our needs'. 64 
This was the opinion of Sarraut. Other, more experienced 
observers had different ideas. One of these was Georges Carle. A 
specialist in rural engineering, he had formerly held the post of Director 
of Agriculture in Madagascar, and afterwards had spent some time in 
Brazil where he had been engaged in the development of cotton 
growing. He was of sufficient reputation for General Gouraud to 
summon him to Syria in the spring of 1922. Carle was charged with the 
mission of investigating opportunities for irrigation and agriculture. 
Whilst in Syria, he also turned his attention to the prospects for cotton 
cultivation and was of the opinion that this fibre could be profitably 
grown in Syria. 65 
Nevertheless, he indicated certain problems which would attend 
cotton cultivation in this country. He pointed out that for this plant to be 
successfully grown, it must be of a variety perfectly suited to the 
climatic and agricultural conditions peculiar to Syria. After several 
64 Sarraut, 168. 
65 Georges Carle, `La question du coton en Syrie, ' Revue Po/itique et 
Par/ementaire, CXX, 31 July, 1924,416-24. 
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years, imported varieties would become indistinguishable from those 
grown locally through a process of cross-fertilisation to which cotton is 
most prone, and would soon lose their superior characteristics. It 
would take some years for agronomists to create a superior strain that 
was fully acclimatised. 
He also pointed out that in a country characterised by dry 
weather conditions, irrigated cotton would inevitably give higher yields 
than that which was unirrigated. He called for the creation of cotton 
growing enterprises financed by European capital in idle state domain 
lands in such regions as the Ghab, the `Amuq, the area around Lake 
Horns, but also in the plains of Jabla and the Nahr al-Sinn in the Alaouite 
State. 
He also called for a programme to make the cotton that was 
produced more saleable by the establishment of ginning stations which 
would buy raw cotton from the producers and resell it after treatment. 
To these centres might be attached research stations, which would 
produce new varieties of seed whilst experimenting with the production 
of long-fibred cotton. If such organisations had sufficient capital, they 
could make advances to the producers to facilitate their harvest, either 
in cash, in seeds or machinery, or even in labour, e. g. the loan of a 
tractor to till the soil more easily. Perhaps they might even vend such 
machines. 
Finally, these stations would be in the best possible position to 
themselves create great domains of cotton production. These would be 
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worked either by machines or (more likely) through a system of 
metayage. 
Carle pointed out that such a programme was hardly new. The 
most recent example was the pre-war German project in Cilicia. If such 
a programme could be formulated and carried out under the antiquated 
Ottoman regime, how much easier would it be for French enterprises to 
do something similar under a French Mandate. How much indeed! 
The ideas put forth by Carle were an accurate reflection of some 
of the proposals which made the rounds of French investment circles 
during the early years of the Mandate. These revolved around several 
recurring questions: What kind of cotton should be grown in Syria and 
what methods should be used to propagate it? 
III. 9>Cotton--local vs. imported 
The cotton native to the Levant was of the species Gossypium 
herbaceum or Asiatic cotton. 66 It was known in Turkey and Syria as 
yer/i or ba/adi, meaning `local'. This was a plant which produced short, 
coarse, and brittle fibres of 12-25 mm in length, yielding 20-25% fibre 
after ginning. Its advantage was that it was perfectly acclimatised, did 
not hybridise itself when grown in conjunction with foreign strains, and 
was immune to disease. 
66 For discussions of this type of cotton, its advantages and disadvantages, 
see, for example 1>Carle, 419-20; 2>Achard, `Etudes ..., 
' 34-47 and Annexe 
I, 60-61; 3>Pavie, Le coton ..., 
8. Particularly interesting in this regard is 
Annexe I to Achard's study which is the French translation of a British report: 
Professor Wyndham Dunstan, Director of the Imperial Institute, `Caracteres 
des cotons d'Asie Mineure et de Syrie, ' part of a Rapport sur 
/'agriculture en 
Asie Mineure, May, 1908. 
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Nevertheless this fibre was of small commercial value because it 
was difficult to select for consistent quality, and could not be spun 
properly. Even such advocates as Achard and Carle admitted that 
ba/adi could only be a cotton of transition on the way to something 
better. 
The `something better' came in two varieties: Egyptian cotton 
and American Upland cotton. The first, Gossypium barbadense of the 
type Sakellerides or `Sakel', produced fibres of 35-42 mm which were 
white, creamy, supple, silky, and robust, yielding 30-35% fibre after 
ginning. Unfortunately, the plant itself was very delicate, susceptible to 
diseases, and grew best under irrigation in lands where the weather 
was consistent. In a country like Syria, possessed of a variety of 
climatic zones, where conditions were more difficult, and where there 
was little irrigation, Sakel just did not do very well. 67 Moreover 
although most desirable, this type of cotton was not much used in the 
French textile industry. 
Therefore it was American Upland, Gossypium hirsutum, upon 
which those eager to regenerate cotton cultivation focused their 
efforts. This plant produced white, creamy fibres of medium length, 28- 
32 mm, which were also supple, silky, and robust, and yielded 30-35% 
fibre after ginning. Despite these similarities, American Upland was a 
much hardier plant than Sakel. Whilst it did best under irrigation, it 
could also be grown under a system of dry farming. Nevertheless it 
was susceptible to disease, and the plants grown from imported seed 
67 Pavie, Le coton..., 9; Achard, `Etudes ..., ' Annexe L. 
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tended to degenerate by the third year after this was introduced 
through a process of hybridisation with local varieties. Growers could 
combat this tendency by continuous imports of new seed, but this was 
an interim solution, if only because of the expense. The correct solution 
lay in the `creation' of a cotton plant which was perfectly suited to local 
conditons. This could take years. Indeed in Syria, it was not until the 
middle nineteen fifties that this goal was achieved successfully. 68 
The second problem facing those who wished to propagate and 
benefit from cotton culltivation was the choice of means. The 
introduction of a new crop would require capital to finance it. Since 
Syria was under French Mandate and since the results of this 
agricultural experiment were ultimately to bring benefits to France, it 
was French investors who sought to promote and control the process. 
III. lo>French capital for Syrian cotton 
In the pursuit of this goal, the French followed two different 
strategies: In the first, impetus for the projects came from the 
capitalists. In these affairs, the High Commission merely played the 
role of broker by placing French investors in touch with local 
landowners and entrepreneurs; acting as intermediary with local 
governments; and using its departments and personnel scattered 
68 Pavie, Le coton ..., 
9-10; Achard, `Etudes ..., ' Annexe 
I. For the problem 
of degeneration of cotton plants and the methods of combating this, see, for 
example, 1>Pavie, Le coton ..., 
23; 2>Carle, 420-21; 3>Jean Lecreux 
(Director of the Association en participation pour les essais de Culture de 
Coton en Syrie [ACCS]), `Resume de ('action poursuite en Syrie par le 
groupement des filateurs d'Alsace pour assurer le developpement de 
la 
culture du coton, ' June, 1927,6. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1571. 
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throughout the countryside as so many points d'appui to help facilitate 
the operations. 
In the second, the authorities themselves took the initiative. 
These were much larger and more complicated undertakings whose 
implementation would affect the very fabric of the countryside: 
irrigation schemes requiring massive public works, physical alteration 
of the land, and a change in the lives of the local inhabitants. 
Nevertheless those who designed these projects made them attractive 
to private capital, holding out hopes for lucrative concessions and 
eventual profits. Such reliance on the funds of investors, proved a 
weakness, for if they pulled out, all plans had to be terminated. 
Nonetheless in this early period, no other alternative means of 
finance was even considered. Both the French government at home 
and its representatives in Syria were strapped for cash. Members of 
the French parliament were already howling about the wasteful 
expenses of the Syrian enterprise. 69 The High Commission in Beirut, 
faced with the heavy expenses of occupation and the setting up of a 
new administration could not find spare funds for development 
projects, no matter how worthy. Therefore they had to turn to the 
private sector, a necessity which was reinforced by tradition. This was 
largely due to the pattern of investment which had inscribed itself in 
Syria under the Ottoman Empire. Foreign capital embodied in 
69 See for example, speeches by various French senators, in particular 
Senator Celestin Charles Jonnart, a former Governor-General of Algeria, in 
the session held 3 April 1921 and reported in `Le Senat et les affaires du 
Levant, ' AF, XXI, 192, May 1921,193-206. 
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concessions had produced every single public work of any 
consequence in Syria--the port of Beirut, the DHP, trams and electricity 
in Beirut and Damascus--with the exception of the Hijaz Railway. 
For French capitalists, then, concessions were the name of the 
game. Yet they were wary, and rightfully so. The concessionnaires of 
the Ottoman period had suffered much during the War, and had 
received no indemnity for the damage inflicted. Moreover, although the 
ties which linked France and her capitalists to Syria were of long 
standing and had stood the test of time, the postwar period was a new 
and uncertain era. True, there was a French Mandate in Syria. 
Nevertheless no one was quite sure what such a mandate entailed. 
Capitalists were particularly worried over the interpretation of Article 
11 of the Mandate Charter laid down by the League of Nations70 
because it provided for an Open Door policy under which all members 
of the League and the United States were placed on a footing of 
absolute economic equality. If enforced to the letter, this barred 
preferential treatment for French firms. Moreover any mandate was 
inherently a temporary arrangement. Would guarantees given by a 
French administration have any value after independence? French 
investors had well-founded doubts on this point. 71 
70 `The Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, ' 24 July 1922 in League of 
Nations Official Journal, 8, Part 2, August, 1922,1013-17. For the text of this 
charter, see Longrigg, 376-80. 
71 On the problems which the policy of the Open Door caused French 
capitalists and their fears for the future, see 1> Letter: `Le President de 
L'Association des commercants et industriels francais du Levant ä Monsieur 
le Haut-Commissaire de la Republique Francaise, ' 28 March 1927, with 2>a 
cover letter from the H. C. to the MAE commenting on this complaint and 
reporting a conversation held with the president concerning it, `Le Ministre 
Plenipotentiaire Haut-Commissaire p. i de la Republique Francaise A Son 
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In order to facilitate their economic penetration of Syria, those 
industrial and financial groups interested in the Levant had grouped 
themselves at the behest of HC Gouraud in an organisation called the 
Union Economique de Syrie (UES). 72 It was headed by Andre Lebon, a 
former Minister of the Colonies during the 1890's and chairman of the 
powerful colonial bank, Credit foncier d'Algerie et Tunisie. In that 
capacity he had been closely involved in the manoeuvres by French 
financial groups to obtain concessions in Anatolia and the Levant for 
large agricultural projects in the years just prior to the War. 73 
The first efforts at cotton development were small projects, 
financed by industrialists who moved within the orbit of the UES. From 
the inception of their group, its members viewed the development of 
cotton schemes in Syria as a lucrative enterprise of national 
importance. 74 The method followed in implementing these affairs, as in 
so many such ventures during the Mandate, was for investors to expose 
themselves to as little risk as possible by first creating a `research 
company' (societe d'etudes). They also sought local associates, and 
only put up more capital when the enterprise proved sound. 
Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres--Afrique Levant,, ' 3 May 1927, 
MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1573; 3>Letter: `L'Union Economique de Syrie A M. Le 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, ' 9 June 1927, MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 
1573. 
72 For the Union Economique de Syrie and its aims, see `Note pour Monsieur 
le General Weygand ä propos de ('Union Economique de Syrie, ' Paris, 28 
April 1923 and attached letter to him from this organisation inviting him to a 
reception in his honour. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 876. 
73 For these, see Chapter I supra, and Thobie, /nterets .... 423-26. 
74 See for example, the letter from Andre Lebon to the Minister of Commerce 
on the subject of the cotton exploitation in Syria with a supporting letter of 
H. C. Gouraud, Bull. UES, I, 1, December, 1922,21-22 and 25-26. 
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To begin with, a number of stillborn agricultural schemes were 
bruited. The first positive action to be taken by French capitalists in the 
field of cotton development came as the result of an economic study 
mission which HC Gouraud invited to visit the Levant between 13 
September and 19 October 1922 in order to ascertain directly 
possibilities for agriculture, industry, and commerce in the Mandated 
territories. The delegation was composed of certain parliamentarians, 
journalists, delegates from important chambers of commerce, and 
certain large enterprises, and it goes without saying, a representative 
of the UES. 75 
111.11 >Cotton in Syria--the Alsace connexion 
Among the men who made this voyage was one Max Dollfus 
representing the Chamber of Commerce of Mulhouse and the Syndicat 
industriel alsacien, the professional association of regional industry. 76 
Just as Lyon was the great centre of silk manufacture, so Mulhouse was 
renowned for cotton manufacturing and was the hub of this activity in 
Alsace. Max Dollfus was a scion of one of the powerful Alsatian textile 
75 For this mission, see 1>'Une mission d'etudes economiques en Syrie, ' AF, 
XXII, 206, November, 1922,423-24; 2>'La mission economique francaise en 
Syrie et au Liban, ' and `Compte-rendu de M. R. Fournier, Representant de 
I'U. E. S. ' Bull. UES, II, 1,31 March 1923,26-30 and 31-46. 
76 For the saga of the Alsatian fostering of Syrian cotton-growing during the 
1920's, see 1>Pavie, Le coton ..., 17-21 and 
30-36; 2>Jean Lecreux, 
`L'Industrie alsacienne et le coton en Syrie, ' Association Cotonniere 
Coloniale, Bulletin trimestrielle [ACC Bull. ], XXV, 77, January, 1927,8-12; 
3>Georges Masquelier, `Le probleme de coton et nos colonies, ' Bulletin de 
l'Agence Generale des Colonies, XXIV, 273, December, 1931,1657-58. 
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dynasties, and was naturally interested in discovering new zones of 
cotton production. 77 
During his sojourn in Syria, he came to the Alaouite State, to the 
plain of Jabla where under the impulsion of General Billotte, at that time 
Delegate of the High Commissioner for the Northern Region (the former 
vilayetof Aleppo), experiments were being made in the improvement of 
certain varieties of baladi cotton. Dollfus was quite impressed by the 
results, and decided to take samples back to Mulhouse in order to see if 
they would prove any use for the Alsatian textile industry. He agreed on 
behalf of the Syndicat industriel alsacien to send some good seed of 
that American Upland cotton whose fibres were most prized by the 
Alsatian mills in time for the 1923 planting season. 
For various reasons, it was not until 1924 that the seed which 
Dollfus had sent in 1923 came to be planted on the Jabla plain. The 
precise name of this seed could not be determined, but since it was 
known that it had originated in the state of Texas, it was called `Texas' 
and later more precisely `Texas Lone Star'. The history of cotton under 
the Mandate is the history of the increasing dominance of this strain as 
it slowly drove Egyptian and ba/adi varieties to the wall. 
In 1924 and 1925, the trials of this particular variety continued at 
the agricultural station at Buka in the Tartus region and at a newly 
organised station at Sukas in the heart of the Jabla plain. Also in 1925, 
77 For the growth of the Alsatian textile industry since the eighteenth century 
and the roles played by its great dynasties of entrepreneurs, see Michel Hau, 
L'/ndustria/isation de /'Alsace, 1803-1939 (Strasbourg: Association des 
Publications pros les Universites de Strasbourg, 1987), passim. 
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the government of the Alaouite State set up a ginning station at Jabla 
with the help of the Agricultural Bank. 
The Syndicat industriel alsacien purchased the crop grown from 
the seed it provided and the crop of Egyptian as well: three hundred 
tonnes of American cotton and one thousand of Egyptian. Unfortunately 
the product was disappointing. The ginning station, located in small 
temporary quarters was unable to classify the cotton properly, no 
guidelines having been laid down by the prospective purchasers. 
Therefore there was much heterogeneity with irregular fibres of mixed 
quality. Nevertheles the American cotton was considerably better than 
its Egyptian counterpart, more homogeneous and of a more regular 
texture. 
The situation was such that the Alsatian industrialists decided to 
focus on the production of American cotton, tougher and with less 
tendency to hybridise than the Egyptian. The aim was to achieve 
homogeneity by a rigorous classification because only cotton which 
was up to world standard would prove useful to them. 
Therefore they decided to create a societe d'etudes, the 
Association en participation pour les essais de culture de coton en 
Syrie (ACCS) headquartered at Jabla, whose members comprised 
some well-known textile firms of Alsace: les Etablisssements 
Schlumberger Fils et Cie., Charles Mieg et Cie, la Societe Anonyme 
d'Industrie Cotonniere (SAIC), les Etablissements Dreyfus Lantz et Cie, 
la Filature de Guebwiller, MM Frey et Cie, ('Union Textile, les 
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Etablissements Boutry-Droulers,, Hartmann et Fils, Herzog et Cie. 78 
The canny Alsatian investors capitalised this partnership to the tune of 
a mere 220,000 F. 79 Nevertheless anyone who knew their reputation 
were well aware that should the enterprise succeed, they could support 
it with unlimited resources of money and technical expertise. 
The programme set forth for the partnership was, first and 
foremost, the establishment of a ginning station at Jabla which would 
set classification standards to which cotton grown in Syria would 
adhere. In addition, it was to organise the purchase of the crop from 
the planters for the account of those who owned the ginning station. 
To these ends, 500 hectares were sown with Texas seed 
provided by the partnership who directly controlled the cultivation of 
the crop. They made contracts with local proprietors by which the 
spinners provided them with specially selected seed as well as 
technical advice. They advanced the necessary funds to the growers 
using the Agricultural Bank as a conduit, and agreed to buy the entire 
crop at a price equivalent to that of the corresponding American type, 
taking into account expenses and other factors affecting the cost price, 
c. i. f. Marseille. 
The investors hoped that this experiment, so carefully prepared, 
would not only produce marketable cotton, free from parasites and 
78 It is interesting to note that three of the establishments in this partnership: 
Charles Mieg et Cie, Hartmann et Fils, and Herzog et Cie possessed capital 
belonging to Emile Dollfus, the brother of Max, and one of the leaders of the 
industrial elite of Alsace in the interwar period. See Ibid., Table 57, `La 
circulation des capitaux dans le milieu industriel alsacien entre 
les deux 
guerres, ' 358. 
79 By comparison the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, for example, 
possessed a capital of 25,500,000 francs. 
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disease, but that the system of financial and technical aid to the client- 
proprietors would eventually lead to the creation of a Credit foncier, a 
cotton credit bank. Thus was cotton production launched on a sound 
commercial basis for the first time in Syria. 
In his article discussing some of the first small steps taken by 
Alsacian industrialists towards involvement in Syrian cotton cultivation, 
Jean Lecreux set forth certain criteria necessary for the profitable 
investment of French capital in the Levant. In his opinion, the first 
hurdle was to persuade his compatriots that it was well worth their 
while to place their money in a region under a temporary mandate given 
the fact that the colonies were constantly seeking the aid of 
metropolitan investors. 
Nonetheless Lecreux believed investments in Syria to be vitally 
important because he felt that the stability of the Mandate was directly 
related to the economic influence which such interests would give 
French nationals. Moreover since this `mission' given to France by the 
League of Nations was limited both in duration and in function, it was 
even more necessary for capitalists to grasp whatever advantages 
might be obtained by her presence. 
In carrying out this charge, the role of the High Commissioner 
was all important, for it was he who had the task of ultimate control and 
direction. Therefore Lecreux believed that French capitalists should 
ensure that the right man was given the job, one who 
displayed the 
proper qualities of authority, energy, and foresight. 
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A firm hand on the tiller would enable these entrepreneurs to 
exploit the various interesting and remunerative possibilities which 
Syria offered those who wished to invest in her: fertile and unexploited 
lands; a relatively numerous workforce; a good climate with a rainfall 
regime far superior to that in French North Africa; abundant 
groundwater and surface water sources. Nevertheless, Lecreux 
believed that the opportunities which sprang out of these natural 
advantages could only be harvested by foreign capital. For the Syrians 
themselves were not capable of forming the great financial combines 
which controlled the resources so essential to a fruitful outcome. 
Moreover they lacked the sense of foresight and the spirit of 
organisation requisite for the successful management of such 
enterprises. 
Despite his harsh estimation of the qualities of possible Syrian 
associates, Lecreux felt it wise for French investors to team up with 
local partners in any venture, provided that the European element 
always maintained the upper hand. Native participants would not only 
facilitate operations but, more important, would ensure that these 
projects continue to flourish in the era of independence to come. 80 
Thus Lecreux linked the fostering and maintenance of French 
influence in the Levant directly to the seeding of French capital there. 
In presenting to his readers the strategies necessary to achieve this 
aim, he emphasised two things: the key position held by the High 
Commissioner in supporting and strengthening the interests of his 
80 Lecreux, `L'Industrie..., 8-10. 
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compatriots, and the necessity of finding local partners to protect and 
facilitate the activities of foreign entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, the 
course of this first phase of cotton development during which any 
advances made were largely (perhaps one might dare to say 
exclusively) underwritten by foreign capital revealed a gulf between 
these prescriptions and Syrian realities. 
III. 12>The rise of cotton ... 
In many respects, the Alaouite State was chosen as the locus of 
this cotton experiment because it represented the beau ideal. For one 
thing, the quality of the land and the ease of transport and 
communication made this region the perfect place in which to carry out 
the trials. Even more important for those seeking to make their 
fortunes in Syria during the middle twenties was the fact that this part 
of the Mandated territories was politically stable. The firm control 
exercised by French bureaucrats and experts provided a favourable 
milieu within which French enterprises could operate efficiently and 
securely. 81 
In this region then, cotton cultivation made rapid progess as the 
total area planted with cotton leaped from 450 hectares to more than 
10,000 between 1924 and 1930. What is more important is that 
hectares sown in baladi averaged around 150 (except for 1928 when 
they reached 500) whilst those sown with the new American seed 
soared from 200 hectares in 1924 to 8000 six years later. Land sown 
81 Ibid., 6. 
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with Egyptian made a smaller increase going 100 to 2000 hectares 
between 1924 and 1930. The fact that American cotton hectarage was 
only 45% of the total in 1924, but had attained 80% of the total by 1930 
demonstrated the success of the crusade in favour of this particular 
variety. American came to dominate again in terms of export 
production: By 1930, of the 961 tonnes of cotton exported, 800 were of 
the Texas Lone Star variety. 82 
Similar progress was made in the State of Syria83 although the 
road here was more difficult and it took longer to implant American 
cotton. In 1924, there was a large area under cotton, some 23,000 
hectares which was almost entirely composed of plants of the ba/adi 
type. 84 It was not until the planting season of 1927 that American seed 
was introduced to growers in the cotton areas of northern Syria. This 
was done on the initiative of the ACCS and its agent Jean Lecreux, but 
they had a good deal of difficulty in training the local cultivators in the 
procedures necessary to nurture this much more delicate plant. In a 
report on these trials written in October, 1927, Jean Lecreux 
complained bitterly about the failure of the local representatives of the 
82 For these figures, see Pavie, Le coton..., Tables: `Emblavures annuelles 
de coton dans le Gouvernement de Lattaquie' and `Exportation annuelle du 
coton en balles de 100 Kgs. fibre dans le Gouvernement de Lattaquie' to be 
found between pages 26 and 27. 
83 Note that the so-called `State of Syria', originally created by the French in 
January, 1925 included all of modern Syria except for the Jabal Druz and the 
Jabal Ansayria and its coast. Cotton cultivation was practised almost 
exclusively in the northern part of Syria in the area of the former Ottoman 
vilayet of Aleppo. For the administrative divisions of Syria during the 
Mandate, see Hourani, Syria.. ., 172-73. 
84 The figures for 1924 are derived from those given in Edouard-C Achard, 
`La Culture de coton en Syrie: rapport sur les resultats de la Campagne 
1924, ' 17 January 1925. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 866,1. 
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French administration 85 to give his efforts the vigorous support 
promised by their superiors which in many cases had led to lamentable 
results. Nevertheless he was sanguine about the future because local 
cultivators showed a great interest in the possibilities inherent in the 
American seed. 86 
By 1929, American cotton had begun to make good headway in 
the State of Syria. By 1935, this variety was clearly dominant in the 
cotton growing regions of the vilayetof Aleppo which in itself contained 
the most important cotton producing districts of the Mandated 
territories. 87 
Of even greater importance than the introduction of a cotton 
whose fibres were sought by European mills was the development of a 
support structure to ensure that those bales shipped abroad 
conformed to certain internationally recognised standards of quality. 
Writing in August, 1926, Lecreux called for the creation of an 
independent and central organisation to control research into the 
various problems associated with cotton growing. He also sought a 
series of legal decrees which would control the various aspects of 
85 In rural areas this was usually an officer of the Service des 
Renseignements (in 1930, reorganised into the Services Speciaux), the 
military intelligence service whose task was to keep its finger on the pulse of 
the countryside. For a discussion of these two departments, their 
attributions and functions, see X, `La Reorganisation du Service des 
Renseignements du Levant, ' Correspondance d'Orient (Paris), XXI I I, 401, 
May, 1931,204-06. 
86 Jean Lecreux, `Rapport sur les essais de culture du Texas faits en 1927 
dans ('Etat de Syrie, ' October, 1927. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1571, passim. 
87 For the continuing success of the American variety, see 1 >Bulletin de la 
Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban [Bull. BSL], 1930,14 and 1936,10-11; 
2>MAE, Rapport i la Societe des Nations ... 1929,69; and 3>Rapport ... 
1935,17. 
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production and ensure that these were strictly enforced. 88 By June, 
1927, his ideas had expanded to include a call for the creation of a 
Cotton Office, independent and with its own budget which was to be 
furnished in part by those groups with a direct interest in Syrian cotton: 
the High Commission, the different Syrian states, the French cotton 
spinners and merchants who would use the product. He called for it to 
be created under the aegis and the complete control of the High 
Commissioner `with absolute authority in all matters which directly 
concerned the Syrian cotton question'. He felt it particularly important 
that this office have complete autonomy, not only to protect it from the 
vagaries of administrative changes, but also to guard against the 
`possible ill will' of the various Syrian states should they take umbrage 
at measures designed for general welfare. Finally and most important, 
this organ was to be charged with ensuring that the cotton which was 
exported from Syria was of homogeneous quality and classified into 
standard types internationally recognised by the world market. By thus 
so doing it would ensure that Syrian cotton maintained a good 
reputation, and through its relations with the users of the product this 
Cotton Office would see to it that a niche was secured for what was 
potentially Syria's most valuable agricultural resource. 89 
Lecreux felt that the establishment of a Cotton Office should take 
place as soon as possible because without such regulation, the 
planters would tend to make use of inferior seed which would produce 
88 Lecreux, `L'Industrie ..., ' 11. 89 /dem, `Resume de I'action poursuivie 
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an inferior product. In turn, this would be unaccceptable to the world 
market which would not only discourage the growers, but more 
significantly, cause the Alsatian industrialists upon whom so much 
depended to lose interest in such a refractory source. The withdrawal 
of French interest would leave the market open to foreigners who would 
seize it with alacrity. He pointed out that recently a powerful Italian 
cotton firm had established itself at Aleppo, and claimed that its 
activities had led to the closure of the French ginning station at Idlib 
which had been established by the Banque de Syrie et Grand Liban 
[BSL] at the behest of HC Weygand. 90 
In creating the support structure for cotton production, the lead 
came once more from activities in the Alaouite State. In 1924, the first 
modest ginning station had been built at Jabla at the behest of the 
government, but through the intermediary of the State Agricultural 
Bank. In 1926, this station was supplanted by a larger one which was 
financed and directed by the ACCS with government agreement. This 
acted as a centre of the activities of the ACCS who made contracts with 
the cultivators, supplying seed and finance in return for the right to 
treat and buy the cotton produced. Initially, the finance was supplied in 
conjunction with the Agricultural Bank, the contracts serving as 
guarantee. By 1928, the ACCS was doing its own financing, and in 1929 
transformed itself into a limited company, the Societe Anonyme 
Cotonniere de Syrie [SACS] with a capitalisation of two million francs. 
90 Ibid., 12. 
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In the meantime, as cotton growing proved more prosperous, 
other firms entered the lists. Imitating the ACCS, a local firm, G. Saade 
& Fils, opened a ginning station which was attached to its modern olive 
oil mill at Latakia, and began to import seed, contract with cultivators, 
and make advances on the crop in return for the product. Over the next 
several years it deepened its involvement in the cotton industry. 
The next entry was the well-known Lyonnais silk firm La Maison 
Veuve Guerin which began an active programme of cotton purchases. 
Moreover the Agricultural Bank began to import more seed and make 
ever greater loans whilst the government encouraged cotton growing 
by the offer of monetary premiums to encourage production. 
Governmental activity was capped by the promulgation of a series of 
decrees regulating all aspects of cotton production from planting to 
sale. 91 
Nevertheless despite the sense of urgency represented by the 
various communications of Jean Lecreux, a sense which was felt 
throughout the circles of French cotton entrepreneurs, the problem of 
the Cotton Office continued to gestate with no appreciable result. 
Matters finally came to a head with the entrance onto the scene of the 
powerful French cotton lobby embodied in the Association Cotonniere 
Coloniale (ACC) Always keen to stimulate cotton production in the 
French colonies and other lands under French influence, it was so 
encouraged by reports of progress in the Syrian sector that it sent its 
91 For the development of cotton in the Alaouites during this period, see 
Pavie, Le coton..., 30-32. He gives the principal legal texts on 37-61. 
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president M. Waddington to the Levant in May, 1928 to determine what 
aid might be given. Waddington decided that the ACC should 
concentrate its efforts in the Alaouite State where cotton production 
was most highly developed. The Association arranged in agreement 
with the High Commission that rather than create a Cotton Office 
immediately, it would send an expert to be based in the Alaouite State 
who would serve as advisor on various aspects of cotton production. 
By July, 1929, the success of this expert led to the passing of 
three conventions valid for ten years between the ACC and the 
government of the Alaouites authorising the installation and defining 
the remit of the long desired Cotton Office and its associated ginning 
station. The former was to be a supervisory organ independent of local 
political control, directed and funded by the ACC, but receiving a 
government subvention. Its role was to ensure that Syrian cotton was 
acceptable to the world market. The latter provided the means which 
facilitated the classification and treatment of cotton. It was established 
at Hamidiya, in that part of the `Akkar belonging to the Alaouite State 
which showed a large potential for cotton. Because of various 
difficulties, this station did not finally open until October, 1930.92 
92 For the activities of the ACC in general and its initial forays into the 
Mandated territories, see 1 >lbid., 32,35; 2>'Voyage en Syrie de M. Derulle, 
ingenieur de L'Association Cotonniere Coloniale--Les projets de I'A. C. C. 
dans les Etats du Levant, ' ACC Bull. XXVI,, 88, October, 1929,401-07; 
3>Conference des Delegues: a>Services Economiques et Agricoles, `Note 
sur le Coton, ' 1 March 1929; b>PrOCCS-Verbal, 2 March 1929: I--`Coton'; 
4>Conference des Delegues, 1 May 1929: `Coton, ' passim. MAE--Nantes, FB, 
Carton 1574. 
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The success was such that in December 1929, similar 
conventions were drawn up between the ACC and the State of Syria 
creating a Cotton Office and permitting the ACC to set up two ginning 
stations at Horns and Hama. These opened in the autumn of 1930, in 
time to process and classify the increasingly important production of 
the vilayetof Aleppo. 93 
Thus it appeared that by the end of 1930, cotton was ready to 
develop into the major Syrian export crop. Production of the desirable 
American type was increasing, and a strong support structure had 
been laid down which would guide it straight towards the French 
market. Yet this promise was blighted in what seems the blink of an 
eye. For by the end of 1931, cotton production and those who profited 
from it were in deep trouble. 
III. 13>... And its fall 
As with silk, the problem had its origin in the world economic 
crisis which reduced demand for Syrian cotton. From a record high of 
2,212 tonnes in 1930, exports fell to only 633 tonnes in 1931, even 
though the harvest due to weather conditions favouring cotton set 
another record of some 4,100 tonnes. 94 Moreover companies such as 
the SACS and Veuve Guerin which were backed by French parent 
93 For the activities of the ACC in the State of Syria, see 1>'La Culture de 
coton dans ('Etat de Syrie, ' ACC Bull., XXVIII, 90, April, 1930,97-99; 
2>'Remarques sur la culture syrienne de 1929, ' Ibid., 106-07; 3>'Rapport 
presente au nom du Comite de Direction par M. Hesling, Directeur, ä 
I'Assemblee generale de ('Association Cotonniere Coloniale du 17 Juin 1930, 
ACC Bull., XXVIII, 91, July, 1930,165-67. 
94 For these figures, see Bull. BSL, 1932,12; Burns, 159, fn 1. 
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companies had over-extended themselves in giving loans to cultivators 
on the strength of the continuing progress in cotton production. The 
producers could not pay back their loans because of the export crisis 
which meant that the cotton enterprises in their turn could not pay back 
the money they had borrowed from banks. Lending institutions such as 
the BSL and the Banco di Roma in their turn were demanding 
immediate payment because of their own obligations. Due to the 
impact of the economic crisis in France, the parent organisations were 
unable to bail out their affiliated companies in Syria. 
The result of this unfortunate combination of events was the 
collapse of those French enterprises which had underwritten cotton 
production in Syria. The consequences fell heavily on the Alaouite 
State which had been the earliest and chief beneficiary of their 
Iargesse. 95 
One can draw an analogy with Jabal Lubnan and the fate of its 
silk industry in the early nineteen thirties. Both cases involved a small 
region dependent on a single export-oriented industry controlled in 
large part by foreign entrepreneurs. Both industries were sustained by 
95 For a succinct account of the methods of financing cotton production in 
the Alaouites, see MAE, Rapport i la Societe des Nations ... 1930,125. For 
the cotton crisis in the Alaouites and measures taken to combat it, see 
1>Telegrams: a>Nos. 155-157--Diplomatie, Paris A Haut Commissaire, 
Beyrouth, 14 February 1931; b>Nos. 12-14--Haut Commissaire, Beyrouth A 
Gouverneur, Lattaquie, 16 February 1931; c>No. 210--Haut Commissaire, 
Beyrouth A Diplomatie, Paris, 25 February, 1931; d>No. 214--Diplomatie, 
Paris A Haut Commissaire, Beyrouth, 4 March 1931. MAE--Nantes, Carton 
FB, 1573; 2>'Note sur la situation de la culture du coton dans le 
Gouvernement de Lattaquie & sur les mesures ä envisager pour attenuer & 
resoudre la crise, ' 23 November 1931. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1573; 
3>'Affaire du coton--Lattaquie, ' 20 December 1931; 4>'Note au sujet des 
affaires cotonnieres ä Lattaquie, ' 31 December 1931, both in MAE--Nantes, 
FB, Carton 306--Conseiller Financier. 
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an intricate system involving companies, banks, and local 
intermediaries. 96 The disintegration of the system and its components 
in a period of economic crisis was caused by a severe and sudden 
credit squeeze coupled with a collapse in foreign demand for its 
principal product: in Lebanon, silk; in the Alaouites, cotton. 
In looking at the interplay between silk and cotton, between 
Lebanon and the Alaouites, one curious and somewehat ironic fact 
emerges. Remember, that it was in the Alaouites, in the qada's of Safita 
and Tal Kalakh where a cottage industry was centred, one which spun a 
mediocre silk for the Arab-owned mills of the interior. Because this 
production was neither controlled nor financed by Europeans, it 
weathered the storm of the economic crisis, maintaining a steady 
average output through it and beyond. In contrast, cotton which was 
touted by French publicists and investors as the great hope of the 
Alaouites--indeed of all Syria--and which received an enormous 
investment in effort and finance, foundered when its foreign supporters 
did so. 
Cotton production in the Alaouites never really recovered to the 
level it had attained before the coming of the crisis. In 1932, the bottom 
of the depression, planters in the Alaouites sowed 2,600 hectares and 
reaped 150 tonnes of cotton versus 6,000 hectares and 1,500 tonnes 
the year before. Nevertheless even after cotton recovered in the late 
1930's, this region did not share in the boom: In 1936, the maximum 
96 Although to be more exact, it must be noted that the system of silk credits 
in the Lebanon had been formed over a much longer period and was 
consequently more intricate. Nonetheless the analogy remains valid. 
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production year for the Alaouites, only 800 tonnes were harvested from 
3,500 hectares whilst the vilayet of Aleppo grew seven times that 
amount on ten times the area. Furthermore this small output was only 
of local significance, most of it being used to supply raw fibre for the 
textile firm of Arida Freres which had been established in Tripoli since 
1930.97 
III. 14>Cotton, its resilience and recovery 
Despite the setbacks in the Alaouites, cotton, unlike silk, had the 
capacity within itself to make a strong recovery. Silk was a textile in 
decline due to changing fashion and the invention of so-called `artificial 
silk'--rayon and its successors. Cotton, on the other hand was a fibre 
on the rise with vast potential for the future, despite the temporary 
inconveniences of the present. Therefore, placed in a more propitious 
situation, cotton production could only progress. 
Such conditions existed potentially in the State of Syria, 
particularly in the area of the former vilayetof Aleppo. This was a much 
larger region where more land was under cotton and more was 
produced than in the Alaouites. Moreover the cotton-growing industry 
suffered less from the effects of the crisis because in the early 1930's, 
97 For the figures for 1931, see Bull. BSL, 1932,12; for those for 1932, see 
MAE, Rapport J la Societe des Nations ... 1932,24; 
for those for 1936, see 
Bull. BSL, 1938,12. A discussion of the role played by Arida Freres is in 1 >A. 
Schuler, `La Culture du coton dans les Etats du Levant sous Mandat 
Frangais: role et activite de ('association cotonniere coloniale, ' in Bull. EHC, 
3,1935,293; 2>/dem, `Campagne cotonniere en Syrie en 1936-37, ' Bull. EHC, 
1,1937,64; 3>/dem, `La Campagne cotonniere en Syrie en 1938, ' Bull. EHC, 
3,1938,168. 
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production and its support structure was not as advanced: The French 
companies had only just begun to extend their operations to the State of 
Syria, and did not have as much capital invested as in their 
headquarters in the Alaouites. There were also other prominent 
players: the Italians, but more particularly, local firms, notables and 
capitalists. Therefore since the French firms were not as dominant, 
their collapse had less effect. 
Cotton production in the State of Syria was able to weather the 
crisis of the early Thirties and emerge stronger than before. One good 
sign was that even when cotton area and production were at their 
lowest during 1932, the reduction was much greater in ba/adi cotton 
than in the more commercially viable American variety. 98 Another was 
that when expansion took place, it did so first in the traditional cotton- 
growing areas between Homs and Aleppo, especially around Idlib 
where planters never lost their enthusiasm for cotton nor their 
expertise in growing it. It would appear that during the Mandate, the 
major regions for cotton growing continued to lie in these traditional 
districts west of Aleppo. As regards those to the east, cotton if grown 
at all, was planted in a small way only starting in 1936. In writing of the 
qada' of Jarablus during September, 1936, M. Pignarre who was 
Agricultural Advisor to the State of Syria described it as a poor and 
neglected region whose chief crop was wheat. In the muhafaza of 
Euphrates (comprising from north to south the qada's of Raqqa, Dayr 
al-Zur, Mayadin, and Abu Kamal) cotton had once been grown in the 
98 MAE, Rapport J la Societe des Nations... 1932,26. 
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valley of that great river. When it was taken up again, hectarage went 
from some 400 of irrigated cotton in 1936 to 520 in 1938 and production 
from 600 to 1,300 tonnes of raw fibre. 99 
A similar picture appears for the Jazira. Here cotton was once 
grown in the valley of the Khabur. In 1936, Pignarre in his report 
praised the agricultural potential of the Jazira and marvelled at the 
vigour shown by the cotton grown both there and in the valley of the 
Euphrates. He opined that the well-watered region of the High Jazira 
was destined to play a regulating role in Syrian agriculture due to its 
rainfall pattern, its terrain and its facilities for irrigation. He felt that in 
deficit years when other less well-endowed parts of the country were 
suffering, the Jazira would be able to fill the gap. If the promise of this 
region proved true for wheat during the Mandate, cotton was just 
starting its course. In 1936, there were a mere 79 hectares of irrigated 
cotton, producing some 40 tonnes of unginned fibre. Nevertheless it 
was sown throughout the muhafaza, along the Tigris, the Jagh-Jagh, 
and the Khabur. By 1940, only some twenty tonnes were produced and 
in the cadastral report presented in that year there was the comment 
that `Cotton is little cultivated'. 100 
99 On the gada' of Jarablus and the muhafaza of Euphrates, see Pignarre, 
untitled report on `Situation generale de ('agriculture en Syrie, ' September 
1936,17-19. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 864. For the figures and commentary 
on the Euphrates region, see also Schuler, `Campagne ... 1936-37, ' 62 and 
Table on 65 (figures for 1936); /dem, La Campagne ... 1938,167. 
100 For the Jazira, see comments in Pignarre, 19. For figures and 
commentary, see Schuler, `Campagne .. . 1936-37, ' 62-63. For 
figure for 
1940 and comment regarding cotton possibilities here, see Regie des travaux 
du cadastre ..., `Rapport general 
de reconnaissance fonciere ... ', 17 and 
Table on 21. 
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This expansion in cotton growing in the State of Syria was helped 
by the creation of local mills. The cotton supplied to such firms as Arida 
Freres in Tripoli and from 1936, the Societe syrienne de filature et de 
tissage in Aleppo compensated somewhat for variations in foreign 
demand caused by the vagaries of the international market. 101 From 
1934 when exports began to pick up again, foreigners tended to take 
slightly more than half Syrian production, the rest going to local mills. 
In 1938, the last full year of the peacetime Mandate, Syrian buyers 
purchased nearly three quarters of their home production. 102 
III. 15>French cotton strategy--a failure 
When one looks at the pattern of foreign demand for Syrian 
cotton, an interesting fact emerges. This is that France, despite all her 
efforts at investment, failed to achieve any sort of dominance over the 
export market. From 1924 until 1930, France slowly built up her share 
of this market from some 10% in 1924 to 43.5% in 1930. These were the 
101 For expansion in the Idlib region, see Bulletin BSL, 1932,11; MAE, 
Rapport ä /a Societe des Nations ... 1934,23. For the Societe syrienne de filature et de tissage, see Bull. BSL, 1936,18; 1937,22; 1938,21; 1939,25. 
102 For the figures, see the Bull. BSL and the Rapport ä la Societe des 
Nations. Production--1934-36: Bull. BSL, 1937,12-13; -1931-38: Bull. BSL, 1939, 
15; --1934-35: MAE, Rapport... 1935,17; -1936-31: MAE, Rapport... 1937,15; - 
1938: MAE, Rapport ... 1938,20. Note that the only major discrepancy between the figures given in the two sources are the ones given for 1934 
where the Bull. BSL. gives a production of 3,580 tonnes whilst the Rapport 
gives 2,200 tonnes. This seems to be due to the fact that for 1934, the Bull. 
BSL gives total production of ginned and unginned cotton whilst the Rapport 
gives a figure which includes only ginned fibre. In all succeeding years, the 
totals match and are for ginned cotton. The Rapportalso gives another much 
larger figure for unginned cotton. Since only ginned cotton was used at 
home and abroad, apparently it alone was counted for the figures. ExPorts- 
1934-35: Bull. BSL, 1936,11; -1936-31: Bull. BSL, 1938,12 and Table on 36; - 
1938: Bull. BSL, 1939,15 and Table on 41. 
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years when her capitalist entrepreneurs were the most active in 
supporting cotton production in Syria. 
The years of crisis dealt a heavy blow to this promising position. 
By 1934, her imports of Syrian cotton had sunk to a measly 4% of Syrian 
cotton exports, and in rank had sunk to fifth behind Italy, Great Britain, 
Palestine, and Germany. This position continued to deterioriate until, 
by the last two years of the Mandate, the BSL in its annual report, no 
longer listed her among the `principal' importers of Syrian cotton. 103 
It is somewhat ironic that in a report dated February, 1939, the 
Syndicat industriel alsacien indicated that one of the desiderata of the 
French cotton industry with regard to the Syrian market was to obtain 
for itself a share in the export of yarn and cloth to a market which 
hitherto had been dominated by imports of yarn from Britain and India 
and imports of cloth from Britain and Japan. The authors were 
particularly excited about a plan to be worked out with the co-operation 
of the High Commission in Beirut for a quota system which would give 
the French mills a considerably larger share. All of this from an 
103 For figures on the French share in Syrian cotton exports, see 1 >Schuler, 
`La culture du coton ..., ' 294; 2>`Coton, ' May-June, 
1934. This is one of a 
series of monographs on various products produced in Syria in response to 
a questionnaire sent out by the committee preparing documentation for the 
Conference Economique de /a France Metropo/itaine et d'Outre-Mer which 
was held in December, 1934. This was a conference whose aim was to 
improve trade and other economic links between France and her overseas 
territories. For two different perspectives on this conference and Syria's 
role in it, see 1>'La Syrie et le Liban A la Conference Economique de la 
France Metropolitaine et d'Outremer, ' Le Commerce du Levant, 1 December 
1934 and 2>'La Syrie et la Conference coloniale, ' Cahiers du Bolchevisme, 15 
November 1934,188-93. The documents relating to this conference are to be 
found in MAE--Nantes, 1713, Carton 716. 
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organisation which had once had a major part in developing Syrian raw 
cotton production for its own mills. How times had changed!! 104 
Thus a cotton policy which had been pursued on and off for 
twenty years, in the end had failed to provide France with raw fibre for 
her mills with the ultimate goal of giving her autarky in event of war. 
What were the reasons for this? 
One of the major problems was simply that of timing. The support 
structure of Cotton Office and ginning stations and the means to 
finance them were not in place until 1929-1930. No sooner had they 
started to function when the effects of the great economic crisis began 
to bite deep, and these underpinnings collapsed along with the demand 
for the products they sustained. 
For example, the ginning stations in the Alaouites closed with the 
collapse of cotton production in that region. By the end of 1931, the 
station belonging to the ACC at Hamidiya which had just opened the 
previous fall was closed temporarily whilst the one at Jabla operated by 
the SACS was only running a fortnight per month. By 1935, the field 
was left to the locally owned station of G. Saade et Fils at Latakia which 
operated only for a short period during the season . 
105 
The story was similar with the stations sponsored by the ACC at 
Horns and Hama which had also opened in the fall of 1930. By 1933, the 
station at Hama had closed whilst the one at Homs was treating mostly 
104 Syndicat industriel alsacien, Mulhouse, Bulletin Mensuel, 2, February, 
1939,6. 
105 Etats du Levant sous Mandat Francais, Gouvernement de Lattaquie, 
Services Agricole & Economique, Bulletin Annuel, 1931,97; 1935,89; 
Schuler, `La culture du coton ..., ' 293. 
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the locally grown Egyptian varieties. Most of the other cotton grown 
was ginned in one of two ways: if ba/adi, in small stations powered by 
the norias situated on the Orontes in the region of Homs and Hama; if 
American, sold to merchants in Aleppo who treated it there. 106 
Another obstacle to achieving French dominance, was that every 
effort made to improve Syrian cotton could not ensure an output as 
homogeneous nor a quality as consistent as that of fibre grown in other 
areas of the world where cotton had long been established. Therefore 
French mills tended to buy their cotton elsewhere. 
Moreover the collapse of the price of American cotton provided 
less incentive for its improvement in lands such as Syria where it had 
been recently introduced. Nevertheless if France refused to buy Syrian 
cotton due to quality problems, other countries--Palestine, Italy, 
Germany, even the Soviet Union--were not so picky. The three 
European dictatorships had all begun programmes of forced-draft 
industrialisation and had great need of huge quantities of raw materials 
to feed their factories. Syrian cotton, not the best, but cheap, and from 
a region close enough to ensure reduced freight charges, fitted the 
bil1.107 
Finally there was the fact of what one might call the 
`indigenisation' of the Syrian cotton industry. This had happened in the 
case of silk when economic depression had brought the withdrawal of 
European firms from the Lebanon only to be replaced by local capital 
106 Schuler, `La culture du coton ..., ' 293.; 
Bull. BSL, 1935,19. 
107 Schuler, `La culture du coton ..., ' 294-95. 
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when times improved. Yet silk was a dying industry and no amount of 
funds from whatever source could revive it. On the contrary, cotton was 
a rising one. Local interest and local capital carried it through the dark 
days, ensuring its survival and its revival under national direction whilst 
preparing it for the bright future which was to come. Thus when cotton 
production did blossom during the nineteen fifties, its profits flowed 
back into national coffers rather than to those of foreign entrepreneurs. 
Understandably then, Syrian capitalists and the Syrian 
government rejected a French hegemony which for all its loudly- 
proclaimed intentions had failed to set up a support structure to launch 
Syrian cotton onto the world market. One can discern this bitterness in 
their attitude towards the projects of the ACC. 
Those agreements which had been signed with such fanfare in 
1929 between the ACC and the various Syrian states to establish a 
Cotton Office in order to ensure quality control and improvement, 
proved practically a dead letter from the very outset. In 1939, when it 
came time to renew the contract which had been signed ten years 
before, the Syrian government complained vigorously to the High 
Commission over its terms. The Syrians pointed out that although they 
had faithfully paid over an annual sum of 50,000 francs to the ACC as 
agreed, fibre classification by that organisation had occurred only once 
in ten years. Moreover the rules for classification set up by the ACC 
had proved defective whilst its ginning stations had closed their doors 
long ago. The Syrian government itself and local entrepreneurs had 
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long filled the gap left by the dereliction of the ACC, and all resented the 
tutelage of an organisation which had failed them so utterly. 108 
If French cotton policy during the Mandate failed to achieve its 
stated objectives through the use of private entrepreneurs and private 
capital, could it have done any better had government-in this case the 
High Commission--played a more vigorous role? In this regard, one 
should recall that in 1926, Jean Lecreux believed that perhaps the most 
important requirement for a successful cotton policy was the presence 
of a High Commissioner who would bring to his post `the authority, 
energy, and perception desired'. 109 
III. 16>The shackles of indecision 
Unfortunately, the High Commissioner and his official 
collaborators seemed unwilling to assume such qualities--at least in 
economic matters. In reading the reports and the minutes of the 
conferences held between the High Commissioner and his principal 
advisors in the spring of 1929, one gets a brief glimpse into official 
attitudes, and senses a real hesitancy to intervene decisively. 
They appear to be saying; 
`Yes, French cotton policy has failed completely, 
for ten years of efforts have little to show for them. 
Nonetheless we cannot intervene decisively to change 
this because we are handicapped by the limits of our 
brief. 
`Syria is a mandate, directed in the final 
analysis by the League of Nations and the conditions 
108 Note from L. M. Demorgny (Affaires Economiques), 15 January 1940. 
MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 866. 
109 Lecreux, `L'Industrie alsacienne ..., ' 9. 
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under which we have accepted our tutelage commit us to a policy of the Open Door. Therefore we cannot push French interests too blatantly. 
`Moreover while the State of the Alaouites has 
proved both docile and efficient, we must show 
solicitude for the feelings and attitudes of the State of Syria which is more than likely to reject any attempt 
at the imposition of "draconian" legislation which 
might infringe on its sovereignty. 
`Therefore, taking all these matters into 
consideration, we must proceed discreetly and 
quietly, nudging rather than ordering. ' l0 
In certain respects, such attitudes developed from the original 
decision to carve the Mandated territories into statelets, whilst 
providing each of them with `national' attributes, complete with 
ministers, departments--and even flag. That each of these states was 
not really master in its own house; that each minister, each department, 
had a shadow in the form of a French `counsellor'; that in the 
countryside, ultimate power lay with the regional bosses, the French 
Delegates backed by the officers of the Service des 
Renseignements/Services Speciaux, all these were undeniable facts. 
Nevertheless because they had created this system of `indirect rule', 
the French felt compelled to nourish this fiction whenever possible by 
giving exaggerated deference to the sensibilities of their creations in 
fields which were outside what might be considered the clearly political 
arena. For the French, it was particularly important to bolster the 
110 For these attitudes, see 1 >Conference des Delegues: a>Services 
economiques et agricoles, `Note sur le coton, ' 1 March 1929; b>PrOCeS Verbal, 
2 March 1929: I--`Coton'; 3>Conference des Delegues, 1 May 1929: `Coton, ' 
passim. MAE--Nantes, FB. Carton 1574. 
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legitimacy of their proteges because this was challenged by Syrian 
nationalists who saw them as mere puppets of imperialism. 
Yet these monkeys did not always jump to the tune played by 
their masters. Those notables who collaborated with the French, just 
as they and their fathers had worked with the Ottomans, did so in the 
hopes that as intermediaries they would be able to maintain their local 
networks of authority. Moreover this traditional pattern of manoeuvre 
was the only one they knew to use when faced with foreign domination. 
Nevertheless the French were not the Ottomans. Alien in religion and 
culture, they had seized Syria by force after the summary dissolution of 
Faysal's Arab kingdom. As a result of this humiliation, those who co- 
operated with the invader were burdened with a certain shame for 
doing so, especially when faced with the intransigence of their 
nationalist compeers. Therefore they resisted when they could, not 
actively, but by insisting upon those limited prerogatives which the 
occupiers had granted them and by a passive refusal to carry out 
reforms proposed by their advisors--and gaolers. Indeed the more 
these counsellors pressed economic reforms upon them, the more the 
Syrians resisted their implementation. As one astute observer pointed 
out, the fact that the High Commissioner, stymied by lack of agreement 
on the political front, sought to focus his energies on the economic front 
was enough to make any reforms in this area suspect in Syrian eyes. It 
was as if the French sought to lull the Syrians with economic gains in 
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order to make them forget their desire for liberty. Which was indeed 
the case. 
111 
Thus a certain delicacy of manoeuvre on the part of the High 
Commission was complemented by obstruction on the part of those 
whom they chose to do their bidding. In economic policy, the result 
tended towards paralysis even when events such as the economic 
crisis of the thirties warranted a vigorous response. 
This failure to articulate and implement a coherent cotton policy 
was equally a function of a certain bureaucratic malaise. To put it 
bluntly, the High Commission could not make up its mind what it wanted 
to do even when in areas such as cotton policy, positive decisions could 
only be of benefit to French interests. Such an attitude seems all the 
more inexplicable because if given a green light, these interests were 
willing not only to do the work, but also to put up most of the funds. 
Another explanation for this immobilism presented at the time 
was that the existence of so many statelets acted as a strong 
impediment to co-ordinated action both to the detriment of cotton 
policy and economic policy in general. 
'12 This observation came as the 
result of hard experience, but unknowingly reflected a sentiment 
expressed at the very beginning of the Mandate. In 1920, a high official 
of the Ministry of Finance pointed out to a colleague in the Quai d'Orsay 
that this division of the Mandate into numerous small states was unwise 
"I See the observations by William Martin , `L'Equipement 
economique de la 
Syrie, ' Journal de Geneve, 5 December 1929 in Bull. UES, VIII, 8 (New 
Series), 31 December 1929,297. 
112 For this viewpoint, see Pavie, Le coton..., 17. 
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on financial grounds, would stymie the development of their resources, 
and most important from his point of view, might result in a heavy 
burden on the French taxpayer who would be required to make up the 
difference. The response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that 
whilst this division was necessary for political purposes, particularly 
with regard to the Lebanon, nonetheless it did not necessarily mean 
that for the other states legal partition necessarily implied a complete 
administrative or financial separation. 
'13 Unfortunately, despite this 
caveat and the existence of such shared organisms as the Common 
Interests (Interets Communs) and the Customs Service (Service des 
Douanes), co-operation between the different states in economic 
matters tended to reflect the realities strongly criticised by Charles 
Pavie rather than the pious hopes voiced by bureaucrats sitting far 
away in Paris. 
*** 
Nevertheless in examining the evolution of agriculture during the 
Mandate, there was one field in which it would appear that the High 
Commission would be forced to assume the leading role. This domain 
encompassed both modifications in the land and lives of the people who 
worked it as well as large and complex engineering works, all watered 
113 Draft letter: Direction du Mouvement general des Fonds A M. le President du 
Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, `Organisation Administrative de la 
Syrie, ' Paris, 2 October 1920 and Response: Le President du Conseil, Ministre 
des Affaires Etrangeres ä M. le Ministre des Finances, `Organisation du 
Mandat en Syrie, ' Paris, 6 October 1920 in MF, Carton 632.936, F30 
2043 
(1919-32). 
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by a copious dose of finance. This important aspect of agricultural 
development was of course, irrigation. An examination of French 
moves within this sphere reveals much about the strengths and 
weaknesses of agricultural policy during the Mandate. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Mandate--IV: 
Irrigation and Production 
Perhaps the most important legacy which the French left to Syria 
was the creation of the first modern irrigation systems to be installed in 
that country. To achieve success, such projects required firm 
direction, sophisticated engineering, and large amounts of capital--all 
of which the High Commission in Beirut was in a position to obtain. 
Moreover these irrigation schemes brought a profound 
transformation to the village communities in the regions where they 
came to be established. The French administrators and engineers who 
designed and constructed the great irrigation projects, modern 
temples to revivify an ancient land, were convinced that the success of 
these schemes depended upon the destruction of the traditional 
agricultural community. They asserted that such commynities, built 
around the collective agricultural disciplines and territorial 
organisation characteristic of musha` cultivation, prevented the free 
exercise of the right of ownership and the maximisation of production. 
In their opinion, only a class of peasant capitalist smallholders could 
achieve these goals. The peasants, for their part, often resisted what 
they rightly perceived as deliberate strategies to undermine communal 
routines which they themselves did not perceive as having the `most 
pernicious repercussions from a social and economic point of view'. ' 
Yet the French bureaucrats, eager as they were to construct 
efficient and rational structures to regenerate the countryside, refused 
to recognise the contradiction between their ideological predilections 
and the requirements which flowed out of their own actions. This 
contradiction was that the installation of systems designed to make use 
of water in a planned and centrally controlled manner could not operate 
by means of the decisions of individual smallholders, but rather through 
the central directing authority which had built the physical structures; 
was responsible for their efficient operation; and controlled the 
allocation of water, the most important element for successful 
cultivation. 
*** 
Iv. l>Irrigation --a panacea for production 
When all was said and done, the key to efficient agricultural 
production in Syria was a plentiful and uninterrupted supply of water. 
Since rainfall was erratic to say the least, other sources of the precious 
liquid had perforce to be exploited. Wells, norias and other sorts of 
lifting devices, foggaras/ganats, primitive dams--all served to utilise 
groundwater and water from rivers and streams. The most impressive 
traditional irrigation system in Syria was the Ghuta surrounding 
' `Irrigation dans la region de Homs, ' 19 April, 1939,2-3. MAE--Nantes, FB, 
Carton 370,7. 
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Damascus which in this naturally dessicated land resembled a Paradise 
on Earth. 2 In 1926, Achard had the Agriculture Service of the State of 
Syria do a survey of surfaces watered by traditional means and gave an 
estimate of the area as some 130,000 hectares out of a total cultivated 
area of some 1,200,000, i. e. slightly more than ten percent. He further 
estimated that the total irrigable surface was some 385,000 hectares. 3 
Despite lauding the achievements of the past, and taking 
measures to put back in order some of the works (such as foggara 
systems) which had fallen into disuse, Achard and his colleagues 
believed that large scale modern agriculture required waterworks 
commensurate with it. In their eyes such products of modern 
engineering skill were bound to be more efficient than the antiquated 
methods of the past. 
Nevertheless to build such structures required bureaucratic co- 
ordination and decisive action in order to launch them, finance them, 
and see them through to the end. In Syria, during the Mandate years 
such a combination tended to be in short supply. In order to 
2 For the Ghuta, see the extensive discussion in 1>Thoumin, Chapter III, 60- 
75; 120-25; 228-32. Also 2>/dem, `Notes sur I'amenagement et la distribution 
des eaux ä Damas et dans sa Ghouta, B. E. O., IV, 1934,1-26; 3>Rene Tresse, 
`L'Irrigation dans la Ghouta de Damas, ' Revue des Etudes Islamiques, 1929, 
Part 4,461-574; 4>J. Allen Tower, The Oasis of Damascus (Beirut: 
Publications of the American University of Beirut, 1935); 5>Anne Marie 
Bianquis, `Le Probleme de I'eau A Damas et dans sa Ghouta, ' RGL, LI I, 1, 
1977,35-53. 
3 For his report on traditional methods of irrigation which discussed the 
methods in use region by region, see Achard, `Les irrigations ..., ' passim. 
Since these figures resulted from an investigation to determine specifically 
the extent of irrigated areas in the State of Syria, they were perhaps more 
reliable than those Achard gave in his report written two years previously 
where he estimated the area irrigated in all the Mandated territories as 
86,500 ha. (58,500 for the State of Syria) out of a total irrigable surface of 
450,000!! See /dem, `Actualites syriennes ..., ' 205. 
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understand the course followed by irrigation policy, one can do no 
better than to look at a number of cases where these qualities were 
present in differing degrees. 
iv. 2>Irrigation for cotton--the Ghab 
One of the reasons for the poor quality of Syrian cotton was that it 
was largely grown under a system of dry farming. Both Egyptian cotton 
and its American cousin flourished under irrigation. If necessary, the 
latter could also be dry-farmed, although this might lead to lower 
production. Writing in 1935, Schuler stated that, in his opinion, the 
failure of Syrian cotton to maintain commercially desirable consistency 
and homogeneity was due to dry farming under the unfavourable 
climatic conditions of the two previous years. In giving his own 
analysis, Schuler cited a statement of Achard, one which he had voiced 
three years previously, but which Schuler himself believed was `still the 
most burning question of the hour: "In Syria, the fundamental problem 
to resolve... is that of irrigation... "'4 
Nonetheless, writing two years later about the cotton harvest of 
1936, which had the greatest extension of any during the Mandate, 
Schuler sadly admitted that the vi/ayet of Aleppo, with the largest area 
under cotton, grew 80% without irrigation (25,600 hectares out of 
33,300). As one proceeded south through the muhafazas of Hama and 
Horns and east towards the Euphrates, this proportion was reversed 
4 Schuler, `La Culture de coton ..., ' 294. 
He cites a report of Achard 
`Rapport sur ('evolution de la culture du coton au Levant, ' 1931. 
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and increased to 94% due to the use of riverine irrigation, necessary 
because of the excessive aridity. Nonetheless the area under cotton 
here was miniscule compared to that of the vilayet of Aleppo: a total of 
only 1,447 hectares of which 83 were not-irrigated. 5 
Thus those persons most concerned with cotton cultivation 
called for irrigation whilst admitting that the amount of land so watered 
was derisory. That this should be so at the end of the Mandate after 
nearly twenty years of agitation is cause for question. It is particularly 
ironic that towards the close of his Syrian career (he retired sometime 
in 1933-34), Achard should still describe irrigation as `the fundamental 
problem to resolve', given his call for such a policy ever since his 
arrival in Syria in 1919. Writing in 1924, he was much more sanguine, 
particularly as concerned the irrigation of the valley of the Ghab in the 
middle section of the Orontes River, a project which at that time 
seemed to be on the point of realisation. 
One attraction of the Orontes was its location in fertile western 
Syria close to three major cities--Horns, Hama, and Aleppo-and the 
roads and railways linking them to the rest of Syria and to the world 
outside. Another was the fact that its most undeveloped parts--the 
Ghab valley and the `Amuq plain--bordered the Jabal Ansayria with a 
large and underutilised peasant population. Yet even beyond this was 
the undeniable fact that French agronomists and engineers saw this 
river as a showcase where their modern technical skills would enable 
them to emulate the still visible work of the Ancients and go well beyond 
5 Schuler, `Campagne cotonniere ... 
1936-37, ' 60-62,65; Bull, BSL, 1938,12. 
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them. Moreover during the Mandate, this was the only river in Syria to 
provide sufficient scope for large projects, the Euphrates still being in a 
region of unsettled nomadism. 6 In order to understand more clearly 
the fascination exercised by this particular waterway, one must 
examine closely its physical structure and the engineering 
achievements of the past. 7 
The Orontes, that most Syrian of rivers, has left an indelible mark 
on the landscape about it. It flows for nearly six hundred kilometres 
(600 kms) to the Mediterranean through the northern part of that great 
trench which is the continuation of the the Great Rift of East Africa. As 
a river, it possesses two peculiarities: 
The first peculiarity is the fact that it is a perennial stream flowing 
through a somewhat dry area (average rainfall of 400 mm) behind the 
well-watered coastal region. Its affluents are a series of `wadis' which 
pour torrents of water into it during the rainy season, but usually remain 
dry during the rest of the year. Therefore the only way this river can 
flow during the dry period is because underground sources which 
spring from its bed or in close proximity to its course continually feed 
<----Fig. 12. The bed and the valley of the river Orontes. Stippled areas 
indicate marshy lowland valleys; slanted lines represent the bordering hills. 
Source: Jacques Weulersse, L'Oronte. etude de f/euve (Tours: Arrault et C'e, 
Maitres Imprimeurs, 1940), Fig. 5,16. 
6 For expert opinion on the present unsuitability and future prospects of the 
Euphrates, see the `Note confidentielle sur les irrigations de I'Euphrate, ' 1 
February 1928 written by M. Garbe who was Conseiller pour les Travaux 
Publics fora brief period in 1927-28. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1367. 
7 For the Orontes, see 1>Moussly, Le Probleme ..., 65-69; 2. 'Weulersse, 
L'Oronte ..., passim; 
3>Naval Intelligence Division, Syria, B. R. 513 
(restricted), Geographical Handbook Series, 1944), 45-49. 
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its waters. In the words of Jacques Weulersse, the Orontes is `a river 
which, so to speak, is born of itself'. $ 
The second is that the bed of the Orontes forms a series of 
`steps', each step being defined by a sill of hard rock which changes 
the nature and sometimes the course of its stream. Within these steps, 
the river passes alternately through gorges and arid plains on its way to 
the sea. 
These sills divide the Orontes into five slices: a torrent of the 
Lebanese mountains above the Lake of Horns; a river of the Syrian 
plateau in the plains surrounding Homs and Hama; a sort of `drainage 
canal' for underground sources in the Ghab and again in the `Amuq 
plain; and finally a Mediterranean coastal stream below Antioch. 9 In 
giving the river its peculiar structure, they also split it up into sections, 
each in itself manageable for irrigation. Moreover because each of its 
segments is fed by its own springs and/or affluents as well as by a 
certain volume of water coming from upstream, any modification for 
agriculture has little effect on similar projects downstream. 
Therefore the Orontes throughout history has provided a 
challenge and an opportunity for engineers to exercise their skills. The 
most famous result of their efforts in ancient times was the Horns Dam 
which was built upon the basalt flows which form the first sill, creating 
the artificial reservoir of Lake Homs/Qattina. 
8 Weulersse, L'Oronte..., 21. 
9 Ibid., 19. 
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Nevertheless, it was the Ghab rather than the region watered by 
the Horns Dam which saw the first major irrigation project proposed 
during the Mandate-10 This section of the Orontes lies between the sills 
at Latamna and Qarqur. Here the river first passes through a gorge 
between the sill of Latamna and Qal'at Shayzar; then it flows west 
through a plain before turning north into the Ghab proper at the spur of 
Asharna (Asharina), the last outcrop of the Jabal Zawiya. In the 
flatlands between Qal'at Shayzar and Qarqur its slope practically 
disappears as it runs level with the land on either side. In addition, it 
receives an enormous input of water from more than fifty sources lying 
along its course and springing out of the surrounding hills. One result 
is that the channel of the river loses itself in meanders as it wends its 
way northward towards the sill at Qarqur. Another is that much of the 
valley never dries out: It remains a noisome swamp where malaria is 
endemic, and where the temperature during the year varies between 
17° C during the winter and 40° C during the summer, always 
accompanied by stifling humidity. 
<----Fig. 13. Topography of the Ghab. Source. Jacques Weulersse, L'Oronte: 
etude de f/euve (Tours: Arrault et Ce, Maitres Imprimeurs, 1940), Fig. 32, 
69. 
10 For a physical description of the Ghab and the problems posed by it, see 
1>Richard Thoumin, `Le Ghab, ' Revue de Geographie Alpine, XXIV, 1936, 
Fasc. III, 467-538; 2>Weulersse, L'Oronte..., 17-18; 3>Francoise and Jean 
Metral, `Irrigations sur I'Oronte ä la veille de la motorisation, ' in Techniques 
et pratiques hydro-agr-ico/es en domaine irrigue: approche pluridiscip/inaire 
des modes de culture avant la motorisation en Syrie (Actes du Colloque de 
Damas, 27 June-1 July 1987 (Paris: Geuthner, 1990), 407-08; 4>A. -M. 
Goichon, `L'Amenagement de la vallee syrienne de l'Oronte, ' Orient (Paris), 
X, 37,1966,150-56. 
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The Ghab-Asharna region comprises an immense domain. The 
Asharna plain which acts as doorstep to the Ghab proper is a sort of 
vague triangle 15 kilometres on a side whose points lie at Qal'at 
Shayzar, Asharna, and south towards Aqrayba. The Ghab itself is 55 
kms. long by an average of 11 kms. wide. " In 1923, the author of the 
first drainage proposal estimated that the utilisable part covered an 
area of some 60,000 hectares, of which some 32,000 was permanent 
swamp; 8,000 inundated during the wet season and cultivated during 
the dry season; and 20,000 cultivable or cultivated. 12 
Although the Ghab was a swamp and had obviously been so for a 
very long time, to those who sought to promote an agricultural 
renaissance, it appeared to have possibilities which modern 
engineering techniques could bring to fruition. When General Gouraud 
was High Commissioner, he had Georges Carle investigate the 
potential for agriculture and irrigation in the Mandated Territories with 
a focus on industrial crops, cotton in particular. Although Carle was on 
mission in Syria from 1 May until 15 September, 1922, his stay was so 
brief that he was unable to do more than make a cursory examination of 
most of the regions which might favour irrigation. Nevertheless he 
11 Thoumin, `Le Ghab, ' 471. 
12 Ivan Wilhelm, La Culture du coton en Syrie: projet d'organisation sur une 
grande eche/% (Grenoble: Imprimerie Allier Pere et Fils, 1923), 23. These 
figures tally more or less with estimates made later, e. g. 1>Total area: 
56,000 ha. (Asharna plain 9,000; Ghab, 47,000) of which 34,000 were 
swampy (3,000, for the Asharna and 31,000 for the Ghab). See, Sir Alexander 
Gibb & Partners [Gibb], Report: `Republic of Syria: The Economic 
Development of Syria, ' (London, 1947), 61; 2>Total irrigable area: 70,000 ha. 
of which an average of 38,000 were inundated (Asharna, 8,000 of which 
1,400 were perennial; Ghab, 30,000 of which 26,000 were perennial). 
Frangoise and Jean Metral, `Maitrise de I'eau et societe dans la plaine du 
Ghab, ' RGL, LIV, 3,1979,308, fn 7 and 309. 
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described the Ghab as that part of the Orontes which he found to be the 
`most interesting' for purposes of irrigation, and called for a more 
thorough study to be made in conjunction with a cadastral survey to 
determine who owned what. 13 
Achard himself examined the problem of the Ghab in the summer 
of 1922, and sketched out two solutions in his usual succinct fashion, 
viz 
A>Build a dam at Qal'at Shayzar high enough to raise the 
Orontes which would be then be channeled through the 
valley by two canals lying one on either side of the 
riverbed. These canals would be large enough to hold both 
the river at flood and the water coming from numerous 
springs. The canals would empty into the river below the 
sill at Qarqur. They would serve in turn as canals of 
drainage and of irrigation. 
B>Straighten and widen the channel of the Orontes in the 
Ghab above Qarqur whilst widening and deepening it 
below the sill. Channel the streams flowing from the 
sources at the base of the mountains on either side of the 
depression, and build an irrigation canal on each side of 
the plain to water the newly drained lands. 
In his opinion, the execution of either of these projects depended 
on various considerations, chief among them being 
1>Technical difficulty. 
2>Cost price of the works. 
3>lrrigable area which was dependent upon the volume of 
water available. 14 
The programme which Carle had merely sketched out and to 
which Achard had provided more detail was adopted with a vengeance 
13 For the report of Georges Carle, see his `L'Hydraulique ..., ' 564-602. The 
discussion of the Ghab is on 595-97 with map of the `Gharb' [sic] on 599. 
14 Edouard-C. Achard, `Note sur le dessechement des terrains marecageux 
du "Gharb, "' Beirut, 28 July 1922 in Pavie (ed. ), Etat d'Alep..., 52,53. Also 
in Bull. UES, II, 3,30 September 1923,160-63 under a slightly different title. 
306 
by the man who succeeded Gouraud as High Commissioner in 1923, 
General Maxime Weygand. Weygand was a superb administrator who 
had been Chief of Staff and alter ego of Marshal Foch during the Great 
War. Unlike his predecessor, he had never served in the colonies, and 
had not shown any particular interest in colonial questions. 
Nonetheless he immediately grasped the potentials inherent in the 
Ghab as a means of implementing concrete plans to make agricultural 
prosperity through cotton cultivation a reality. Achard lauded him as 
the prime mover behind the scheme which next took shape. 
Nevertheless if he was indeed the prime mover, the real architect 
and driving force behind plans to develop the Ghab was one Ivan 
Wilhelm. Wilhelm was a senior civil engineer of many years experience. 
He was also a man of vigorous personality: hard driving, energetic, 
opinionated, and rather undiplomatic. In May, 1923, he accepted a 
contract to come to Syria as Counsellor for Public Works (Conseiller 
pour les Travaux Publics) to the High Commissioner. Soon after his 
arrival he began to occupy himself with the problem of the Ghab in 
consultation with Achard who had already made a preliminary study the 
year before. In September-October, the units of the Cadastral Survey 
made their first foray into this region in order to draw up a preliminary 
assessement of its size; the amount of swamp and cultivable land; the 
number of villages; and the flow of the river. Upon receiving these 
statistics, Wilhelm drafted a project of improvements to be made; 
arranged for his draft to be printed into a little booklet; and proposed 
that he return to France for several months in order to sell his ideas to 
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industrialists who might have an interest in financing their 
implementation. 
In his pamphlet, Wilhelm emphasised that the Ghab would be 
ideal for cotton cultivation after it had been drained and irrigated. To 
achieve this end he proposed a solution which in his view would prove 
the cheapest and the most expedient. He rejected the idea of 
straightening and deepening the bed of the Orontes whilst lowering the 
sill at Qarqur (in essence Achard's Plan B) as being technically 
possible, but too difficult and too costly. Instead, he called for the 
implementation of the `classic solution' for such situations (a 
modification and simplification of Achard's Plan A), that which had been 
used for example in flood control of the Po in Lombardy. His idea was 
to construct earth dikes along the course of the river on either side, set 
back so that they would not be undermined by the current and could 
avoid some of the meanders of the channel. Behind and parallel to 
each of these would run drainage canals which would channel the 
runoff from the springs. The excess would be diverted into the river at 
certain convenient points. The drainage of the plain would be 
completed by a system of secondary canals. 
The second phase of his plan was the irrigation of the plain. He 
proposed to build a low dam with sluice gates on the Orontes below 
Qal'at Shayzar which would supply the water to two irrigation canals 
approximately 75 kilometres long, one on each side of the plain at the 
foot of the mountains. These would be situated well behind the 
drainage canals, so as to embrace the largest possible area, and would 
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capture the waters of those springs to be found along the base of the 
uplands. Connected to these two principal canals would be a network 
of secondary canals tied in with a system of irrigation channels for 
distribution of water to the fields. 15 
Officials of the High Commission counselled him to seek finance 
from the French textile industry to underwrite this project. In order to 
persuade hard-headed businessmen to put their funds into what they 
might consider to be a risky and expensive scheme, the idea put 
forward was for the scheme to proceed by stages. As in the cotton 
projects formed later in the Alaouites, first would be formed a societe 
d'etudes which would be capitalised sufficiently, but not enormously. 
This company would be charged with gathering technical information 
and performing the myriad preliminary tasks necessary for the success 
of such a weighty enterprise. When the time was ripe, it would 
transform itself into the enterprise which would actually carry out and 
operate the project. The scheme itself would unfold over a period of 
ten or twenty years, and would advance in tranches with the success of 
one leading to the implementation of the next. 
Unlike the cotton projects which would be developed in the 
Alaouites, the French Mandatory administration was to be intimately 
involved in supporting this scheme. A senior official suggested to 
Wilhelm that he ask French cotton industrialists from the three principal 
textile regions to capitalise the proposed organisation to a tune of 
1,000,000 francs to which the Syrian state governments would add a 
15 Wilhelm, 19-21; 23-34. 
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subvention of 500,000 francs. In addition, another 250,000 francs 
would be obtained from the Comite de Liquidation du Consortium 
Cotonnier. 16 This total of 1,750,000 francs was a considerable sum for 
a mere societe d'etudes--the ACCS was only capitalised at 220,000- 
and indicated the importance and 
envisaged. 
In return for underwriting this 
complexity of the enquiries 
preliminary programme the 
Mandatory administration promised to ensure that the investors 
received the option to exploit the lands for which they had drawn up the 
draft projects. The authorities assured them that they would be able to 
enjoy the concession of land as freehold since the Cadastral Survey 
had determined that the swampy land was State Domain. There would 
be no problem allocating parcels once the improvements were 
completed, and the concessionnaires would from then on enjoy a 
secure and valuable source of fibre. As for the land currently 
cultivated, the proprietors could be legally compelled to pay some of 
the cost of its enhancement whilst the companies holding the 
16 The Consortium Cotonnier was an organisation formed under state control 
during the Great War in order to centralise the requirements of the textile 
industry in machinery and raw materials; make purchases abroad; and 
redistribute them equably throughout the textile industry. When this 
consortium was liquidated, the funds released were to be used to underwrite 
existing enterprises or as matching funds to help start new ones. For this, 
see Letter No. 7: `Lettre par laquelle M. le Ministre du Commerce et de 
('Industrie repond ä celle du President de I'UES relativement ä un projet 
tendant ä developper la production cotonniere dans les pays places sous le 
Mandat frangais dans le Levant' (No. `405, ' 23 June 1923), 22 November 
1923, Bull. UES, III, 1,31 March 1924,8. 
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concession would enjoy the right to tax those who profited from the 
improvements. 17 
Wilhelm returned to France in December, 1923 in order to make 
personal contact with the magnates and Chambers of Commerce in the 
three principal textile centres of Mulhouse, Lille, and Rouen. His hopes 
were that they could be persuaded to band together to form a powerful 
enterprise to carry out the tasks envisaged. He was particularly eager 
to help in the formation of such a combination because he was worried 
that a foreign company, probably English or Italian, would demand the 
right to exploit this opportunity before his compatriots could get onto 
the ground. Moreover because of the principle of the Open Door which 
had been written into the Mandate Charter (the famous Article 11), this 
could hardly be refused them. And given their desperate need for 
cotton, European textile producers would be fools should they fail to 
take up this challenge. 18 
Upon his arrival in France, Wilhelm gave what was described as a 
`magisterial' presentation of his case before a meeting of the UES on 
Saturday, 19 January 1924. He pointed out that the large outlay of 
funds required to make his vision become a reality were certainly 
commensurate with the results to be achieved. In order to keep the 
17 Wilhelm, 30-32; 39-40. Also `Note pour aider ä la constitution d'un 
groupement qui proposerait sous I'egide du Haut-Commissariat de France en 
Syrie le drainage, ('irrigation et la mise en valeur de la plaine de Gharb, ' n. d. 
[October-November, 1923]. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 477--Services 
Techniques. 
18 For these arguments, see Letter: L'ingenieur en Chef des Ponts et 
Chaussees, Conseiller technique du Haut Commissariat ä Monsieur le 
General Weygand, Haut-Commissaire de la Republique, ' 10 November 1923. 
MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 477--Services Techniques. 
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expense down and to find the necessary work force more easily, he 
indicated that in this first stage only 6,000 hectares would be 
developed. He emphasised that the societe d'etudes to be created 
could `count on the full moral and financial support of the High 
Commission' which would allocate subventions for the studies to be 
made. 19 
Nevertheless despite these high hopes and a positive reception 
of his proposals, Wilhelm returned empty-handed. As he ruefully 
admitted a year later, the group of investors headed by the Credit 
foncier d'Algerie et Tunisie with whom he had negotiated regarding this 
affair, had finally presented him with a counterproposal whose 
stipulations he found unacceptable. In effect, the financiers promised 
their support on `condition that they would incur no loss whatsoever, 
neither in capital nor even in interest. When all was said and done, they 
did not wish to be exposed to any risk'. 
Given this attitude, the High Commission decided to continue the 
preliminary work which was being carried out by the agents of the 
Cadastral Survey. Once the cadastration had been completed and the 
maps prepared, the draft project regarding the 6,000 hectares of the 
Asharna plain would be examined by the Public Works Department of 
the State of Syria, and the area of State Domain delimited. With this out 
of the way, Wilhelm felt that he could return to the pourparlers with the 
19 `Projet d'Organisation sur une grande echelle de la culture de coton en 
Syrie'. Causerie de M. ('Ingenieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussees Ivan 
Wilhelm, Conseiller Technique du Gouvernement Federal Syrien et du Haut- 
Commissariat, 19 January 1924, Bull. UES, III, 1,31 March 1924,15-18. 
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industrialists and financiers armed with even more precise information 
as to the cost and the extent of the irrigation canals whilst giving them a 
more sure appraisal of the extent and nature of those State Domain 
lands which they were to be given in concession. 20 
Nevertheless these hopes too were dashed, and writing one and 
a half years later to HC Ponsot, Wilhelm stated baldly that the only way 
irrigation works could be constructed in Syria was as a public work, 
one which would be controlled and directed by the State. 21 The fact 
that his opinions in this matter should shift 180° after three years of 
hard experience says much about the issues raised by irrigation 
proposals during the Mandate. 
IV. 3>The 1923 Ghab project--a balance sheet 
An assessment of the 1923 Ghab project, the first important 
irrigation scheme to be conceived in Syria in modern times, reveals 
certain strengths and weaknesses which were to affect the 
implementation of French development plans throughout the Mandate 
period. On the positive side was the fact that a single well-thought out 
proposal was drafted; a strategy for investment was decided upon; a 
booklet was printed up complete with map; and its author and his 
superiors had sufficient confidence in this project to present it to astute 
20 Letter: `Le Conseiller pour les Travaux Publics A Monsieur le Ministre 
Plenipotentiaire, Secretaire General du Haut Commissariat, ' 5 February 
1925. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 477--Services Techniques. 
21 Letter: `Monsieur Henri Ponsot, Haut Commissaire de la Republique 
Francaise des Etats de Syrie, du Grand Liban, des Alaouites et du Djebel 
Druie, ' 1 September 1926. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1570. 
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metropolitan industrialists and financiers. That this occurred at all was 
due to the presence in Syria at that time of a High Commissioner who 
knew exactly what he wanted and who gave his complete confidence to 
an able subordinate obstinate enough to push it through. Because he 
had the support of his chief, Wilhelm was able to fight off rivals who 
sought to intrude upon what he considered his territory with rival plans 
of their own. 
For example, C. Duraffourd, who was at the beginning of his 
career as the Regisseur des travaux du cadastre (the chief of the 
Cadastral Survey), sought to by-pass Wilhelm and present his own plan 
directly to the High Commissioner. For this he was gently rebuked by 
the Chief of Staff (Secretaire General) as having exceeded his brief 
whilst Wilhelm himself sharply rejected his encroachment and heaped 
scorn upon his arguments. 22 
Nevertheless this stubbornness which enabled Wilhelm to fight 
off rivals and ram through his own project also made him many 
enemies. He was sufficiently undiplomatic to openly display a 
condescending attitude towards Syrians, whether they were 
subordinates or his political superiors within the State of Syria. This 
scorn was heartily returned, and despite his undoubted abilities, he 
22 Letter I: `Monsieur C. Duraffourd, Charge de ('execution des Travaux du 
Cadastre et d'Amelioration Agricole des Etats de Syrie A Monsieur le General 
Weygand, Haut-Commissaire de la Republique Francaise en Syrie et au 
Liban, ' 28 March 1924; Letter II: `L'ingenieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussees, 
Inspecteur des Travaux Publics de la Federation A Monsieur le Haut 
Commissaire de la Republique Francaise, ' 23 April 1924.; Letter III: `Le 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire, Haut-Commisaire p. i. de la Republique Francaise 
en Syrie et au Liban A Monsieur Duraffourd, charge de ('execution des 
Travaux du Cadastre et d'amelioration agricole des Etats de Syrie, ' 11 May 
1924. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 477--Services Techniques. 
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was shunted aside in favour of lesser men when a new High 
Commissioner chose to support his Syrian associates rather than his 
own compatriot. As a result, the Ghab project languished, returning 
once more to the limbo of indecision. 23 
The outcome of Wilhelm's Syrian career serves to introduce 
some of the negative issues surrounding this first Ghab project. The 
first is that this particular period in the life of the Mandate was witness 
to administrative flux as three High Commissioners passed through in 
four years. This meant that there was no continuity of direction at the 
top, something which was vitally necessary for the success of the 
Mandate and any projects associated with it as observers like Jean 
Lecreux were well aware. 24 
Yet at a deeper level than that of one or two personalities no 
matter how able, the failure to implement the drainage and irrigation of 
even the smallest part of the Ghab hinged upon the temporary nature of 
a `mandate' and its impact upon the execution of any major capital- 
intensive scheme. Writing in 1926 about his experiences with the Ghab 
plan, Wilhelm conceded that during the autumn of 1923, he and his 
colleagues still held `tremendous illusions' about the possibilities of 
finding concessionnaires to carry out operations of this type. 25 In the 
final analysis, potential investors were unwilling to put their money into 
a concession which might in the end cause them to lose their shirts. 
23 For this, see `Monsieur Henri Ponsot ..., ' passim. This letter is one long 
plaint about the problems Wilhelm faced during his three years in Syria and a 
plea for vindication. 
24 See supra. Chapter III. 
25 `Monsieur Henri Ponsot.... ' 
315 
Twenty years or even half that amount was a long time in a temporary 
political construct, and metropolitan capitalists were not keen to rely on 
the guarantees of an administration which was likely to be long gone 
when their investment was finally realised. Even the suggestion that 
the project proceed in tranches, with the success of one leading 
directly into implementation of the next, did little to allay their fears. As 
Wilhelm pointed out, they wanted no risk at all! 
One must admit that after all the talk of concessions, this sudden 
attack of financial conservatism on the part of potential investors 
seemed all the more incongruous. Nevertheless it was forged in the 
heat of uncertainty as to the future in both the metropole and its newly 
won mandate. 26 
On the home front, the early nineteen twenties were a period 
when all the fruits of the recent victory seemed to have turned sour. 
The titanic struggle of the Great War had left France burdened with 
debt in addition to the costs of reconstruction. Unfortunately, financial 
policy during these years refused to grapple with these dilemmas. One 
result was speculation on the franc which led to a rapid deterioration in 
its value between October, 1923 and March, 1924. The fall of the franc 
and the deeper malaise which this symbolised was hardly encouraging 
26 For a summary of these doubts as seen by an astute observer, see P. 
Gentizon, `Sur le Statut definitif de la Syrie et du Grand Liban' (extract from 
article `Le Probleme Syrien, ' Le Temps, 28 July 1925), Bull. UES, IV, 4,31 
December 1925,287-290. 
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to those French capitalists who were asked to sink their money in what 
was in itself a highly risky foreign venture. 27 
For investors, another source of uncertainty revolved around 
French ambivalence regarding her Syrian venture, and many 
questioned the extent of her commitment. The doubts as to the wisdom 
of her taking on this onerous and expensive charge which had 
manifested themselves at the time of the ousting of the Faysalian 
regime persisted as the debts and responsibilities of the metropolitan 
government became ever more weighty. 28 As General Weygand 
pointed out whilst meeting with the UES in March, 1924, the arguments 
of such Cassandras hardly encouraged French capitalists to put their 
money in the Levant. He strongly urged the members of the UES to use 
their influence to counter them. 29 
A third source of scepticism was tied to the evolution of the 
political situation within Syria during the first years of French rule 
there. When they observed the rocky course followed by the Mandate 
during its first three years, potential investors came to the conclusion 
that Syria was inherently unstable. Moreover they considered many 
potential Syrian partners to be extremely unreliable and even resentful 
of the hold foreign capital had over their country, although it was 
27 For the French financial crises of the early nineteen twenties, see Jean- 
Jacques Becker and Serge Berstein, Victoire et frustrations, 1914-1929 
(Nouvelle histoire de la France contemporaine, 12) (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1990), 223-30; 264-77. 
28 For these doubts, see Chaps. II and III supra. 
29 For Gen. Weygand's thoughts on the role to be played by the UES in 
support of the Mandate, see `Reception de M. le General Weygand, Haut- 
Commissaire de la Republique en Syrie et au Liban, par les membres de 
I'U. E. S., ' Bull. UES, III, 2,30 June 1924,90. 
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obvious to French eyes that economic improvements could not be made 
without it. As one observer succinctly put it: `Capital puts up its guard 
as soon as passions appear,. 30 
It is interesting to note that such questions about the safety of 
any foreign investment in the Levant manifested themselves even 
before the outbreak of the Druze rebellion. 31 This political cyclone only 
served to confirm French investors in their fears. 
Impediments such as these had put paid to any attempt to 
undertake the major development of the Ghab for cotton production, 
using French capital as the lever with which to launch this project. One 
observer felt that the only way to dissolve such obstructions was 
through the smack of firm government which would suppress 
dissidence whilst at the same time delivering the benefits of material 
progress: `By instinct, France lies behind each act of order and 
authority directed at achieving practical results and great prosperity. 
Act, govern, achieve in the practical realm; at present, this is the 
essence of the Syrian question'. 32 Unfortunately, in the domain of large 
irrigation projects, converse principles seemed to animate French 
policies. 
30 Gentizon, 288. 
31 Note the date of Gentzion's prescient article which almost coincided with 
the outbreak of this revolt. 
32 /bid., 290. 
318 
IV. 4>A time for sowing--the Regie des Etudes Hydrauliques 
The period between 1925 and 1934 seemed to be one where the 
animators of irrigation policy within the Mandatory administration 
merely marked time. In the second half of the nineteen twenties, there 
was great activity by private firms in the development of cotton 
cultivation, but no initiatives were launched in the field of irrigation. 
This seems particularly surprising because of the rising crescendo of 
voices calling for such steps to be taken, in the belief that irrigation 
would launch a renaissance in Syrian agriculture. In this regard, one 
can cite the opinion of C. Duraffourd who in the course of his cogent 
analysis of the benefits of irrigation stated that in countries like Syria `, 
.. a careful and rational policy must be carried out in order to solve the 
water problem to which are linked agricultural development and the 
very existence of their inhabitants'. '[italics his]33 
Those who examined closely the reasons for the failure of 
irrigation to be firmly launched in the first years of the Mandate came to 
the conclusion that one of the major reasons for this lack of success 
was due to the fact that in reality there was little hard data on the 
hydrological and agricultural capacities of Syrian rivers. Indeed, in 
1929, the only study of this nature which had any pretense of covering 
Syria in toto was the summary analysis done by Georges Carle in 1922! 
33 C. Duraffourd, `Notice sur I'orogenese des pays syriens et le probleme de 
I'eau en Syrie' (extrait du rapport de Monsieur C. Duraffourd sur la Plaine de 
I'Amouk), September, 1928,11. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 880 and Carton 
1574. Parts of this most interesting study were extracted in Bull. UES, VIII, 7 
(N. S. ), 30 Sept. 1929,190-202 and in L'Orient(Beirut), 16 November 1929. 
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The lack of reliable data was complemented by a dearth of 
carefully conceived plans to develop Syrian waterways as efficiently as 
possible. Such schemes were particularly necessary with regard to the 
great rivers, the Euphrates, the Yarmuk, and particularly the Orontes. 
Each of these could be fruitfully exploited in different sectors of their 
course and effective co-ordination was needed in order to gain 
maximum utility. 
34 
As with the propagation of cotton cultivation, the problem was 
how to achieve this co-ordination in the face of a multiplicity of states, 
each jealous of its prerogatives and concerned to assert its rights vis-ä- 
vis its neighbours. The High Commissioner in consultation with his 
most senior advisors decided to divide potential irrigation projects 
within the Mandated territories into two sections. Smaller projects 
such as the development of the river of Damascus, the Barada, and the 
river of Aleppo, the Quwayk, were left to the technical services of the 
state concerned. For those rivers which passed through more than one 
state or which flowed beyond the confines of the Mandate, the High 
Commission decided to turn to a private company who would have the 
task of gathering hydrological and geographical data and outlining 
preliminary proposals. Administrators felt that the information needed 
could be obtained more efficiently, more quickly, and at less cost by 
turning to an organisation which stood outside the bureaucratic 
34 The first discussion of a general irrigation programme for the Mandated 
territories was contained in two notes written by Paul Vasselet, the 
Conseiller pour les Travaux Publics du Haut Comissariat, `Note pour 
Monsieur le Secretaire General, ' 1>19 December 1928 and 2>8 February 
1929. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1570. 
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machine, but nonetheless was subject to its guidance. Therefore they 
confided this task to a societe d'etudes, the Regie des Etudes 
Hydrauliques (REH). 35 Just as the ACCS had been formed by a 
consortium of Alsatian textile mills to exploit cotton in the Alaouites, so 
was the REH created by a partnership of several French banks involved 
in the Levant along with two other interested parties in order to gather 
irrigation data for the Orontes, the Euphrates, the Khabur and the 
Yarmuk. The partners ensured that the REH. would have proper 
direction by hiring as its `representative' and director of operations, an 
experienced and senior engineer. 36 
After somewhat difficult negotiations, a contract was drawn up 
between the REH and the different states which made up the Mandated 
territories, and signed on 25 July 1929. The REH worked for the 
account of these states rather than directly for the High Commission, 
and was paid pro rata from their proper funds according to the services 
35 In France and in countries under French influence, a regie is a mode of 
managing certain state enterprises of general utility (such as public works, 
manufacture of war materiel, e. g. gunpowder, etc. ) which because of 
excessive risk or urgency would be difficult, inconvenient, or improper to 
operate under market conditions. Such an organism was run for expenses 
only with sometimes a slight return above expenses allowed as 
compensation for the efforts taken. For the REH this amounted to ten 
percent. 
36 The partners were the BSL, the Banque Ottomane, the Credit foncier 
d'Algerie et de Tunisie, the Regie generale des chemins de fer et travaux 
publics (a regie concerned with similar tasks within the metropo%), and the 
Societe des tramways et eclairage de Beyrouth. Like the ACCS, this 
company was capitalised at only 250,000 Frs., but should the the partners so 
decide it could be transformed into a societe anonyme. This was duly carried 
out in the spring of 1931. See `Statuts de la Regie des Etudes Hydrauliques 
dans les Pays du Levant sous Mandat Francais, ' 4 April 1929. For its 
transformation into a societe anonyme, see the letter from Desire Bourgeois, 
the official representative of the REH in Beirut to `Monsieur le Conseiller pour 
les Travaux Publics du Haut Commissariat, ' 7 May 1931. Both in MAE-- 
Nantes, FB, Carton 373--Services Techniques. 
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performed. Originally the contract between them was to run for a 
period of thirty months. In June, 1932, this agreement was extended for 
a second period of thirty-three months, and the contract was 
terminated by mutual agreement among the parties concerned in June, 
1934, primarily for budgetary reasons. 37 
The creation of the REH was part of the preparations made for 
the launching of a General Economic Programme (Programme general 
economique) which was proposed during the course of the year 1929.38 
As conceived, this was to be the master plan for the development of the 
Levant states with provisions for the expansion of the port of Beirut and 
other ports; the construction and modernisation of railroads; the 
building of airports; improvement of the telephone system; and of urban 
amenities--all in addition to irrigation. It was felt that investment in such 
a programme could only bring economic benefit to the Mandated 
territories. One could also say, although the view was not usually 
expressed officially, that such schemes were a means of compensating 
for the failure to make satisfactory progress on the political front. 
37 For a full discussion of the negotiations, the contract, its provisions and 
problems, see the letter, `Le Haut Commisaire P. I. de la Republique 
Francaise A Son Excellence, Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres-- 
Afrique--Levant, ' Objet Regie des Etudes Hydrauliques, 13 August 1929. 
MAE. --Nantes, FB, Carton 1574. For its extension and a 
list of work to be 
undertaken, see the letter from Secretary-General Tetreau to Desire 
Bourgeois, the Representative of the REH, 29 June, 1932. Attached to this 
letter is a copy of the original contract: `Etats de Syrie, du Liban & des 
Alaouites: Convention'. All in MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 365/2--Services 
Techniques. For its termination see the note from Paul Vasselet, `Note pour 
Monsieur le Secretaire General, ' 29 June 1934. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 
373--Services Techniques. 
38 For two versions, see 1>`Programme Economique: Rapport Vasselet (form 
primitive)'. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1575, n. d. (probably summer, 1929); 
2>'Etats du Levant sous Mandat Francais, ' 10 September 1929 in MAE-- 
Nantes, FB, Carton 697. 
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The cost of the programme was originally estimated at 
924,000,000 F. The financial health of the Levant states was quite 
sound, but it was out of the question for them to provide for these vast 
improvements out of their own budgets. Nor was it seen desirable that 
the present generation pay for the future through means of a vast tax 
increase, particularly when the amount gained would be hardly 
sufficient for the task. 
As the High Commissioner explained in a letter to his superiors at 
the Quai d'Orsay, 39 there was no fund available within the Mandated 
territories to finance such a programme of capital improvements. In 
1924, the four per cent increase in the tariff from 11% to 15% had been 
used to establish such a fund, but with the outbreak of the Druze Revolt 
in 1925, this money was used to pay the expenses of suppression in 
order to relieve the French Treasury of this burden. The tariff had again 
been increased in 1926 from 15% to 25% to fund the vast increase in 
military expenditure occasioned by the rebellion. 40 Therefore since 
39 `Monsieur Henri Ponsot, Haut Commissaire de la Republique Frangaise ä 
Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres: Projet 
d'emprunt pour la mise en valeur des Etats sous Mandat Frangais, ' 18 
February 1930. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 364--Services Techniques. 
40 This extraordinary contribution was some 72 million F in 1925-26. With the 
suppression of the revolt, this sum, rather than being reduced, continued to 
be allocated annually to the military budget. 
In addition to this amount, the territories under Mandate made an 
annual contribution to the maintenance of French forces in the Levant drawn 
from their ordinary budgets. This sum had risen from 3,000,000 F In 1924 to 
7,000,000 in 1925 and was finally stabilised at 94,000,000 in 1927. 
At the time of the negotiations for a Franco-Syrian Treaty in 1936, 
officials of the Ministry of Finance estimated the total military expenditure 
between 1920 and 1936 to be `in the order of' 2 milliard F. For this figure, see 
Prods-verbal: `Reunion aux Affaires Etrangeres au sujet de la creance de la 
France sur la Syrie, ' 7 May 1936. MF. Dossier: Syrie: Finances des Etats-- 
Creance de la France sur les Etats sous Mandat francais (1926-36), Carton B 
32.937--F302044. 
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there was no money available within the Levant for a huge economic 
programme, the High Commissioner and his advisors decided to turn to 
the expedient usually employed by French colonies in similar situations: 
a loan guaranteed by the French state. 
In the meantime, the cost of the programme had risen from 
924,000,000 F to 1,185,000,000 of which irrigation comprised 
250,000,000. Nevertheless HC Ponsot admitted that the detail of many 
of these programmes (irrigation, for example) was not yet in place, and 
called for a first tranche of 510,000,000 to improve communications 
and trade. Funds were to be spent on the Port of Beirut, the telephone 
system, the railroads, and a seaplane harbour. 
Nevertheless this tentative proposal to obtain funds was largely 
rejected in a quite peremptory manner by M. Decron, the high official of 
the Ministry of Finance sent out to assess the projects in the spring of 
1930. When he came to examine the irrigation programme, he admitted 
that agricultural improvements utilising the water resources of the 
country should be placed in the first rank of projects to be realised. 
Nonetheless he asserted that, `it was utterly premature to mobilise 
capital whilst the corresponding projects had been neither drawn up, 
examined nor adopted', 
41 
The onset of the economic crisis of the 1930's made the Ministry 
of Finance think hard before supporting a request which had to be 
41 Untitled `confidential' report, dated 4 June 1930, of conversations held 
with M. Decron, Inspecteur General des Finances who was `en mission' in 
Beirut during the months of April and May, 1930. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 
364--Services Techniques. 
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approved by the French Parliament, and which was more than likely to 
be rejected out of hand, given the world crisis and the parlous state of 
public finance both in Syria and in France itself. Moreover the revenues 
of the Mandated territories had to go towards palliating the effects of 
the crisis, and could not be used to service an enormous loan. Finally, 
as Decron had pointed out, any money given for irrigation would have 
been premature in 1930 since the REH was still in the course of making 
its studies. One might even say that his strictures were quite unfair 
since the High Commissioner had not requested that money for 
irrigation be placed in the first tranche. 
Therefore for both financial and technical reasons, the General 
Economic Programme was placed in hibernation to await the advent of 
a more propitious season. Although such a season seemed far away, 
like spring as seen from amidst the depths of winter; like spring, it too 
finally arrived. 
IV. 5>A time for harvest: irrigation triumphant 
Three years later, matters had changed--technically, politically, 
and financially with regard to the prospects for irrigation. In June, 
1934, the contract between the REH and the states of the Mandated 
territories was annulled due to reasons of finance. Nonetheless the 
REH had done good work in gathering hydrological and agricultural 
data about areas to be irrigated and the rivers to be employed in doing 
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this. Moreover it had drawn up a report elaborating on the projects to 
be undertaken. 42 
Complementing this increased technical knowledge was a 
concatenation of political circumstances which ensured that such 
knowledge would be put to good use. First was the fact that in the 
autumn of 1933, High Commissioner Henri Ponsot was replaced by 
Comte Damien de Martel who had spent much of his career in the Far 
East, serving as Minister to China and in his last post, as Ambassador to 
Japan. This new proconsul had the reputation of a man of action, quick 
and decisive. And so it turned out to be . 
43 
Second was the fact that in the autumn of 1932, after years of 
vacillation, the French had presented the Syrian Parliament with a draft 
Franco-Syrian treaty whose object was to `terminate' the Mandate and 
place the two parties on a more `equal' footing. Although the French 
were inspired to act by the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 
which gave to that country formal independence and a seat in the 
League of Nations whilst preserving British influence, the document 
which they presented for negotiation proved to be quite unacceptable 
to their tutee. The principal objection held by all shades 
<----Fig. 14. General plan for the development of the Orontes. Probably 
based on the report of the Regie des Etudes Hydrauliques. Source: Jacques 
Weulersse, I'Oronte: etude de fleuve (Tours: Arrault et C'`, Maitres 
Imprimeurs, 1940), Fig. 30,63. 
42 `Rapport general sur I'amenagemant hydraulique de I'Oronte et de 
I'Euphrate. ' 159 pages + Annexes. This report in its entirety is not available 
for examination. 
43 For an assessment of the personality of de Martel, see Dr. George-Samne, 
`Le Voyage de M. de Martel en France, ' Correspondance d'Orient (Paris), 
XXVI, 435, March, 1934,97-101. 
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of Syrian opinion was that the treaty maintained the division of the 
country into separate zones with the Druze and Alaouite states 
retaining their autonomy under French control. Syrians were also not 
happy at the extent of French domination in the supposedly 
`independent' region because the Mandatory Power had retained the 
right to intervene with armed force anywhere and at any time. 
Moreover the French had ensured that they themselves retained 
management of the Common Interests which gave them control over 
the Customs revenues, the most important source of income for the 
Mandated territories. All these factors led the Syrian Chamber to reject 
the treaty so unequivocally that on 24 November, 1933, the new High 
Commissioner suspended its sessions sine die, and two days later 
withdrew the treaty from consideration . 
44 
Thus after these unpleasant and frustrating episodes in Franco- 
Syrian relations there was every reason for HC de Martel to adumbrate 
a programme of large scale development projects in order to turn the 
minds of Syrians towards matters other than politics. As he himself put 
it, relying on his `personal experience', "The population interests itself 
far more in the development of the natural resources of commerce and 
transit than in the sterile speculations of politics[!! ]"45 
44 For the episode of the Franco-Syrian treaty and its rejection, see 
1>Hourani, 194-96; 2> Longrigg, 189-99; 3>Khoury, 382-94. For the text of 
the treaty, see Oriente Moderno, XIII, 12, December, 1933,607-12. 
45 Quoted in `Le Haut Commissaire et I'essor economique, ' AF, XXXIV, 318, 
March 1934,96; also found in `Une politique economique: les declarations de 
M. de Martel, ' Correspondance d'Orient (Paris), XXVI, 434, February, 1934, 
78. 
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It was also a hard truth that despite their vaunted expertise, the 
French had been able to do little to mitigate the effects of the world 
economic crisis. As a man of action, the High Commissioner sought to 
launch a programme which would go far to ensure that the future of the 
country would be more prosperous than the present. In some measure 
this would justify the French presence which was otherwise so widely 
resented. Fortunately, circumstances combined to give him the money 
with which to carry out his plans. 
The year 1933 saw the final extinction of the Ottoman Public 
Debt. 46 This had not disappeared with the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire, but had been divided among the Republic of Turkey and the 
other sucessor states in proportion to the territories and resources of 
that defunct entity which each had acquired. Of this debt, Turkey held 
the lion's share, some two thirds. After complicated and lengthy 
negotiations about the terms of repayment, agreement between the 
European bondholders and the Turks was ratified by the Grand 
National Assembly in Ankara and took effect on 1 December 1928. 
Following upon this, a contract and an accord annexed to it was 
signed on 19 January 1929 between the bondholders and the 
representatives of the Levant states. It was agreed that the percentage 
of the Debt due from Syria and the Lebanon would be 8.41% of the total, 
46 For the background to the Ottoman Public Debt and its relation to the 
Levant states, see 1>Raymond O'Zoux, Les Etats du Levant sous Mandat 
Francais (Paris: Larose, 1931), 157-60; 2>Ch. De Sailly, `Le Reglement de la 
Dette publique ottomane, 'AF, XXVIII, 264, November, 1928,369-74 and AF, 
XXVIII, 265, December, 1928,414-17; 3>'Le Reglement definitif de la Dette 
publique ottomane, ' AF, XXIX, 269, April, 1929,137. 
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and that the annuities to be paid would be done so on an ever- 
diminishing scale until the year 2015. To ensure payment, the Debt 
would have first call on the total net revenue of the Customs. For the 
first seven years, starting on 1 June 1929, the amount to be handed 
over was 244,000 Turkish gold pounds equal to some 27,000,000 
French francs. 47 
For the Levant states, the coming of the economic crisis of the 
1930's proved to be a godsend. Starting in 1930, Turkey began to fall 
behind in her payments which led to a fall in the market value of the 
securities in which this Debt was held. As a result of this reduction, the 
Levant states were able to buy back those parts of the debt which could 
be amortised in this fashion at an extremely favourable rate. This 
meant that the burden held by the Mandated Territories was 
progressively lightened (by two-thirds in four years), so much so that 
the High Commission decided to repurchase the remainder of the 
capital of their debt. Therefore representatives of the Levant States 
under the aegis of the High Commission entered into negotiations with 
the Council of the Ottoman Debt, its governing body. These were 
facilitated by the fact that three fourths of the bondholders were 
French, and pressure could be brought to bear to ensure a favourable 
outcome. 
The long term debt could be bought up, and the negotiators 
agreed that this transaction would be handled with a single payment. 
47 Under terms of this agreement, 1 Turkish gold pound=112.217 French 
paper francs. For this agreement, see 1>'Le Reglement definitif .. . '; 
2>`Reglement de la Dette ottomane, ' AF, XXXIV, 319, April, 1934,122-23. 
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As for those other loans which formed part of the Debt, but which were 
not susceptible to retirement in this fashion (arrears bonds, the Turkish 
lotteries, irrigation of the plain of Konya), It was further agreed that the 
Levant states would make an advance payment equal to all the 
remaining annuities less a discount of 7.5%. 
As a result, by a single payment of 32,850,555 F, Syria and 
Lebanon freed themselves from a debt which otherwise would have 
burdened them, in theory, until well into the first quarter of the twenty- 
first century. More immediately, they found themselves without public 
debt at a time when the world economy was collapsing about them. 
Indeed, they now had surplus funds which could be used for far more 
productive purposes than to service obligations which most Syrians 
and Lebanese felt were not theirs. Finally one might well say that of all 
the services performed by France for the Levant States, the extinction 
of the Ottoman Debt was perhaps the greatest since it ensured that 
when independence finally came, Syria and Lebanon were not 
burdened with the results of the financial miscalculations made by their 
Ottoman predecessors. 48 
This conjunction of events impelled the new High Commissioner 
to resurrect the General Economic Programme in a form so modified 
48 For the crisis and resolution of the Ottoman Debt, see 1 >`La crise de la 
Dette Ottomane, ' Correspondance d'Orient (Paris), XXIII, 402, June, 1931, 
263-65; 2>'La Dette publique ottomane et les pays sous mandat, ' AF, XXXIII, 
310, May, 1933,175; 3>'Dette Ottomane: le rachat de la part des Etats du 
Levant, ' Correspondance d'Orient (Paris), XXV, 429, September, 1933,130- 
31; 4>'Le Reglement definitif ... .' Note that this article contains the 
complete text of the communique issued after the signing of the agreement 
on 29 July 1929 following negotiations between the Levant states and the 
bondholders held under the auspices of the High Commission. 
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that the revenues freed by the extirpation of the Ottoman Public Debt 
would suffice to pay for it. Since 1930, this programme of grands 
travaux had been progressively reduced in scope and in cost as 
financial realities set in. As conceived by the High Comissioner and his 
advisors, the programme finally laid down was to cost a total of 
179,000,000 F and was to be spread over a period of six years, ending 
in 1939. The works to be carried out were to be covered almost entirely 
by those funds normally alloted from the Common Interests for the 
service of the Ottoman Debt, some 27-30,000,000 per annum. By using 
this money the Mandated territories would not need to have recourse to 
a guaranteed loan which everyone knew the French Parliament would 
still never approve. A further precaution was taken in that the 
programme of works was not mandated ne varietur. The details of each 
annual tranche were finalised only when the money was in hand, and it 
was certain that the works proposed for that year would be completed 
within the time set for them. 
Such fiscal conservatism paid off. Although there were certain 
major changes to the original programme as a result of the negotiations 
for the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 (notably the addition of important 
road improvement projects), nonetheless the three most important 
works--the enlargement of the Port of Beirut; the extension of the 
former Baghdadbahn from just beyond Nusaybin to the Iraqi frontier; 
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and the raising of the Horns Dam and the expansion of irrigation beyond 
Horns--were completed on time and practically within cost! 49 
Of these projects, the most important from the agricultural point 
of view was of course the raising of the Horns Dam and the extension of 
irrigation in the Homs region. At least as far back as December, 1928, 
Paul Vasselet had enunciated what might seem to be a simple and 
logical proposition, but one which had not been adumbrated 
heretofore: to wit, that the Orontes could only be rationally exploited by 
moving from its source to its mouth since upstream alterations to its 
course would inevitably affect those below. Therefore drainage of the 
Ghab and the `Amuq should not be done before the development of the 
upper reaches of the river. In a later note in the same series in which 
he elaborated his ideas for an organised plan of water exploitation via 
irrigation, he mentioned first of all, the `raising of the dam at Lake 
Horns, development for irrigation, and possibly for the production of 
electric energy '. 50 
49 For the adumbration of this programme, see 1>`Conference economique 
tenu au Grand Serail, le 23 octobre 1933, ' 17-21,25. MAE--Nantes, FB, 
Carton 697; 2>`Conference tenue le 22 decembre ä la Residence des Pins 
pour ('etude d'un programme de grands travaux, ' passim. MAE--Nantes, FB, 
Carton 365--Services Techniques; 3>Letter: `L'Ambassadeur de France, 
Haut-Commissaire de la Republique en Syrie et au Liban A Son Excellence 
Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres (Levant) a/s Programme 
economique' and attached `Note, ' 26 January 1934. MAE--Nantes, FB, 
Carton 697. For the expenses as they were originally set out and as they in 
fact turned out, see `Note pour Monsieur I'Ambassadeur. Objet: Programme 
des grands travaux, ' 26 June 1939. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 364--Services 
Techniques. 
50 Paul Vasselet, `Note pour Monsieur le Secretaire General, ' 19 December 
1928; and `Note pour Monsieur le Secretaire General, ' 8 February 1929. 
MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 1570. 
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Vasselet's opinion carried weight: He had been one of Wilhelm's 
ablest assistants and several years later took over his post as 
Counsellor for Public Works in the High Commission. It was he more 
than any other person who was responsible for conceiving and 
administering the great public works projects undertaken during the 
later years of the Mandate. In the words of one of his younger admirers, 
writing in 1944: `a great creator; a man of competence; one who forges 
ahead, and who draws requests for consultation'. 51 
Therefore in 1933, when the new High Commissioner asked him 
to produce plans for the programme of public works which were to be 
inaugurated, Vasselet placed the raising of the Homs Dam near the top 
of his list. He pointed out that the raising of the dam could be met at 
relatively little cost, and would produce excellent results unlike the 
drainage of the Ghab or the `Amuq which would require an enormous 
amount of money because of the engineering problems involved. 
Moreover detailed plans for a barrage and a network of canals lay right 
at hand as a result of the labours of the REH, and once the 
administration gave its assent, work could begin immediately. 
iv. 6>The Noms-Hama project: an oasis in the steppe 
On the face of it, the qada' of Homs52 appeared to be a most 
promising area for the implementation of a large-scale irrigation 
51 Capt. G. M. Louyot, `Rapport confidentiel sur le Congres Agricole du 
Moyen-Orient tenu au Caire du 7 au 11 Fevrier 1944, ' 17 February 1944,8. 
MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 764. 
52 Note that the gada'of Homs was one of two (the other being the qada'of 
Qaryatayn) which comprised the liwa or muhafaza (after 1936) of Homs. 
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project. This region embodied a mixed agricultural economy. On the 
one hand, it was a better watered area than that of Hama to the north, 
and was quite capable of supporting the cultivation of unirrigated 
53 cereals. Yet on the other, Its inhabitants were not unfamiliar with the 
problems and potentials of irrigation. 
The area upstream from Lake Homs had long been intensively 
irrigated. Some of the systems were derived from the numerous 
springs which dotted the region whilst still others had their source in 
the river itself, making use of three ancient barrages which though in a 
state of disrepair, still functioned to supply the canals derived from 
them. The entire system resembled the Ghuta of Damascus and was 
similar in extent, some 6,000-8,000 hectares. 54 
As for the old Homs Dam itself, it was one of the most visible 
works of the art of ancient engineering to be seen in Syria. Of great 
antiquity, built perhaps by the Romans, perhaps centuries earlier, it 
served as a testament to efforts made to give a steppe-like area 
sufficient fertility to support a major regional centre. Weulersse 
described this system as `irrigations which until the Mandate 
constituted the most important overall effort for a rational 
development'. 55 
53 The average amount of rainfall in the Homs region was 592 mm for the 
thirteen years between 1932 and 1945 with a low of 409 in 1932-33 and a high 
of 806 in 1937-38. The comparable figures for the Hama region were 379 mm 
for the average with 216 mm for the low in 1932-33 and 492 mm for the year 
1940-41. Data extrapolated from Gibb, Table No. 7: `Rainfall in Millimetres, ' 
10-11. 
54 For the irrigations above Lake Homs, see 1 >Weulersse, L 'Oronte ..., 51-54 
and map on 53; 2>Moussly, 238-39. 
55 Weulersse, L'Oronte ..., 54. 
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The dam itself was a remarkable basalt construction 850 m. long 
and 5 m. in height which was built upon the natural sill) blocking the 
northern outlet of Lake Homs. The lake was 12 km. long by 3 wide and 
covered an area of 4,300 hectares. It held some 90 million m3 and was 
at 497 m. above sea level. 
Although the dam appeared superficially intact, the action of the 
water had caused it to disintegrate below, making numerous breaches 
through which streams of water rushed. Three canals branched from 
it, two of only local importance whilst the third was the main channel for 
the irrigation of the gardens of Homs. After passing through a desert- 
like landscape for ten kilometres, it came to this oasis where it watered 
some 1,000--1,300 hectares by means of derivation and gravitation. 56 
Downstream, in the river valley between Homs and Qal'at 
Shayzar, another 6000 hectares were irrigated, a large proportion by 
means of norias which observers considered a sort of symbol for the 
area of the middle Orontes. Finally, still more irrigation was practised 
in the districts (nahiyas) on the plateau--Qusayr to the south west of the 
city, Hassiya to the south and Ain Zath to the northeast. Here use was 
made of canal systems--some very old--derived from the river or from 
local springs. 57 
56 For this dam, its origins, and the functioning of the system derived from it, 
see 1>Rene Dussaud, Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et 
medievale (Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1927), 112-14; 
2>Weulersse, L 'Oronte ..., 54-55 and 
65 and map on 53; 3>Leonce Brosse, 
`La digue du Lac de Homs, ' Syria, 1923,234-40; 4> `Irrigation dans la region 
de Homs, ' 2-3; 5>Moussly, 239-40. 
57 For the irrigations downstream and on the plateau, see 1>Weulersse, 
`L'Oronte ..., ' 
55-59; 2>Moussly, 240-41; 3>Berthelot, 'Notes. . ., 3-5. 
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In its original plan, the REH proposed to utilise existing 
constructions as a base whilst enlarging and extending them in order to 
irrigate a total of 60,000 hectares, a nearly fivefold increase. 58 On the 
upper Orontes south of Lake Homs, at the spot where the river 
emerged from the gorges of Hermel (altitude, 558.5 m. ), two canals 
denominated A and B were to utilise existing channels. The former with 
a flow of 7.4 m3 per second for the irrigation of a total of 32,000 
hectares was projected to run for 77 km. from the right bank of the 
river, ending at the village of Mishirfa. The latter with a flow of only 1.7 
m3 per second for the watering of 7,800 hectares was to run for 20 
kms. from the barrage to the lake. For whatever reason, these were 
never built, and the development of this part of the river was left to 
private initiative. 59 
Downstream, the plan called for the construction of a much 
larger version of the Homs Dam immediately behind the old one which 
was used to support it. When finally completed, it was 1,500 m. long by 
7 m. high; raised the level of the lake from 497 m. to 500 m.; and 
<----Fig. 15. The planned irrigation projects on the upper Orontes. Note that 
Canals A and B were never constructed. Source. Jacques Weulersse, 
L'Oronte. etude de f/euve (Tours: Arrault et C`e, Ma? tres Imprimeurs, 1940), 
Fig. 31,67. 
58 For a summary of the irrigations which the REH projected for the Mandated 
territories, see 1>'Note sur les irrigations possibles dans les Etats sous 
Mandat, ' 22 December 1933. MAE--Nantes, FB, Carton 373--Services 
Techniques; 2>Weulersse, L'Oronte..., 65-66 and map on 63. 
59 For the projected canals upstream of Lake Homs, see 1> Weulersse, 
L'Oronte ..., ' 65 and map on 67; 2>Moussly, 234-36; 3>Berthelot, `Notes .. 
., '75-76. Berthelot himself could not understand the reason for this, and 
gives as his view (76) that their `completion seems to be rather easy and of 
relatively little cost'. For a brief discussion of the private initiatives which 
have developed this region since the Mandate, see Metral and Metral, 
`Irrigations..., ' 402. 
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increased the amount of water impounded from 90 million m3 to 200 
million m3 with a utilisable volume of 150 million m3. On the right side, 
there was an outlet which wes employed simultaneously to release 
water for use downstream and to supply the principal canal (canal C). 
This cement canal first followed the course of the ancient canal to the 
gardens of Horns crossing them via a siphon 830 m. long. Its maximum 
flow was 6.4 m3 per second60 and at the end of the first stage of 
construction in 1939, it had attained a length of 31 kms. From it were 
derived a network of 56 kms. of secondary canals and 250 kms. of 
tertiary canals which enabled a total of approximately 14,000 hectares 
to be irrigated between the city of Horns and the village of Rastan. Of 
these, 12,000 formed newly irrigated land whilst the remainder 
comprised the land of ancient watering, now much improved. 61 
In the second stage, starting in 1940 and extending to 1950, the 
principal canal was extended for a total length of 71 kms. It crossed the 
river by a siphon 3 kms. in length to proceed along its left bank to 
Hama. In the Hama region, another 6,000 hectares was made irrigable 
for a total of 20,000.62 
60 This gave an irrigation module of 0 litres 20 per second per irrigated hectare with 
each hectare having the right to one hour of irrigation per week. In giving these 
figures, Gibert considered them to be `modest' for the type of agriculture envisaged. 
Gibert, 154. 
61 For the technical details of the Homs-Hama project, see 1>Weulersse, 
L'Oronte..., 65-68; 2>`Irrigation dans la region de Homs, ' 3-6. ; 3> Berthelot, 
'Notes. . ., 
'74-76; 4> Gibert, 153-54; 5>Moussly, 236-38. 
62 For the second stage of the project in particular, see in addition to the 
sources cited in previous footnote, 1>'Note au sujet de ('irrigation de la 
region Homs-Hama, ' 13 June 1939; 2>'Etats de Syrie et du Liban, `Grands 
Travaux Hydrauliques, ' February, 1944 and attached maps. Both in MAE-- 
Nantes, FB, Carton 444--Services Techniques. 
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Although one might think that previous exposure of the local 
population to irrigation of one sort or another would predispose them to 
accept government-sponsored waterworks, a close analysis of the 
progress made by the Homs-Hama scheme during its first ten years 
reveals a slow rhythm of exploitation for this newly irrigable land. The 
reasons for this stemmed from the failure of the architects of this 
scheme to fully understand the relationship between communalism and 
individualism in the Horns plain and by extension in the Syrian 
countryside as a whole. 63 
iv. 7>Communalism and individualism on the Homs plain 
Both communalism and individualism informed agricultural life in 
the gada' of Horns. Here agrarian relations were more equable than in 
the Hama region to the north where only six out of 114 villages had 
totally or partially escaped the clutches of local notables. 64 There the 
notability formed a caste of territorial magnates who derived both their 
income and their influence directly from possession of their latifundia. 
Horns, in contrast, was dominated on the whole by a commercial 
bourgeoisie with the exception of one or two families. They did own 
some agricultural land, especially in the areas of old irrigation in the 
valley of the Orontes, but derived most of their wealth and influence 
from trade. A large proportion of the cultivated area was divided into 
small and medium peasant holdings worked under the system of 
63 Fora discussion of the structure of agrarian relations, see Chapter II 
supra. 
64Anon. [Gaulmier], Map III, 132. 
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musha'tenure. Moreover much of this land was sufficiently fertile to 
support a peasant family even if its plot was quite small, and cultivators 
were better able to resist the encroachment of great notables. 65 
In the Horns region, certain of these villages possessed a tiny 
portion of irrigated land. This was particularly true of those located in 
the centre of the qada' in the district (nahiya) of Horns City. On these 
well-watered parcels the villagers raised fruit trees and garden 
vegetables--broad beans, onions, garlic and the like. This irrigated 
land was the first to become fixed and delimited for all time because of 
what Latron calls a `bouleversement of agricultural technique' which 
came with the rejection of cereals and the traditional agricultural 
disciplines associated with them in favour of more remunerative crops. 
Anwar Naaman underlines this change by asserting that it was `well 
understood that no discipline of this type [i. e. musha'tenure] has been 
observed on irrigated lands'. 66 
65 Gibert brings out this this point. Gibert, 152. Figures for large, medium, 
and small properties of privately held land (i. e. not in State Domain) in the two 
regions give some support to those who noted that in Homs the small and 
medium cultivator was preponderant. According to Gibb, working in 1946, 
approximately 52% of these tracts in the Homs muhafaza were divided into 
small (< 10 ha. ) or medium (10-100 ha. )-sized parcels whilst 48% were divided 
into large (>100 ha. ) ones. The fact that 12% of the holdings were small and 
40% medium shows the more equable nature of the distribution here. 
The figures for Hama muhafaza were 44% and 56% respectively. Of 
the 44%, only 2% (8,000 ha out of 348,000! ) were small plots and 42% 
medium. Data extrapolated from Gibb, Table No. 10: `Land Tenure, ' 20. 
Note that this table is the ultimate source for nearly all the figures given for 
land tenure by Syrian and foreign authors in the next fifteen years. 
66 For irrigation in Homs qada' and the crops grown there, see Berthelot, 
`Notes 
..., ' 
3-5. For the relationship between irrigation and stabilisation in 
this region, see Naaman, 54-55. Quotation on 55. Andre Latron points to 
certain factors which tended to disrupt communal agricultural disciplines in 
favour of individualisation, see Latron, La vie ..., 195-96. Of course, it might 
be that Naaman misunderstood the situation, and that these irrigated 
gardens had been mu/k all along. Latron supports this idea by commenting 
(143 and fn. 3) that in Homs and other places, agricultural irrigation was 
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Even though these irrigated portions were but a minute 
proportion of the total land farmed by the village community, the fixing 
of their boundaries and their ownership highlighted the possibilities of 
individuation, and so began to tip the balance against those communal 
principles upon which musha'tenure was based. For as Latron points 
out, the peasant was not adverse to the undermining of the community 
if it was to his advantage to do so--and if he could get away with it. 
These villages whose irrigated lands had become fixed and 
delimited were the first to apply this principle to that portion of their 
patrimony which was dry-farmed, and this tendency became ever more 
pronounced during the creation of the Homs irrigation project. The 
Cadastral Survey made a special effort to divide and register 
properties within the purview of the new scheme: Of the 67 villages so 
treated in Syria up to 1945,33 were within the muhafaza of Homs, 
covering a total of 75,325 hectares which was slightly more than half of 
all the village lands cadastred within Syria. In contrast, only four were 
delimited within the region of Hama-Salamiya for a total of 13,450 
hectares. 67 
That the French authorities encouraged individualism to the 
detriment of communalism in the Homs region was quite in keeping with 
received wisdom. From the very beginning of the Mandate, French 
always a concession of the city, chief water user and `mistress of the 
[water]works'. City gardens were always mu/k, and perhaps this principle 
was extended to the `suburbs'. 
67 For a discussion of the land tenure system and agrarian relations in the 
districts of Horns and Hama with figures, see Naaman, 53-59; also Gibert, 
152-53. 
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officials concerned with the problems of restoring Syrian agriculture 
saw musha` tenure as a form of unmitigated evil. Achard writing in 
1925 condemned the principle of what he called `collective' ownership 
and frequent repartitioning. He felt that such a system hardly 
encouraged the peasant to improve his methods of cultivation, an 
improvement which he believed necessary to intensify agricultural 
production and reduce its costs. Duraffourd concurred and also 
pointed out that fragmentation of the land lowered its value both 
because it was hard to work properly and because it was practically 
impossible to sell the segments piecemeal. 68 
If the ideal of the individual smallholder could not always be 
achieved given the structure of landholding with its bias towards 
communalism, at least the operations of the Cadastral Survey could 
`safeguard the social cell which makes societies strong' by 
encouraging and facilitating the stabilisation and concentration of 
parcels in the hands of family units. 69 Nonetheless even this reform 
tended to undermine the community because families with consolidated 
parcels were no longer forced to follow the common agricultural 
disciplines laid down by their fellows. 
It was in this spirit that those who sponsored the irrigation 
scheme in the Horns region sought to break up the system of musha' 
tenure prevalent there because they felt that it would hamper the 
68 For such ideas, see 1>Achard, `Propriete rurale ..., ' 13; 2>Duraffourd, 4-5; 
3>the comments of M. Gennardi who was in charge of the waqf and land 
departments (Wakfs et Services Fonciers) at the `Conference economique 
tenu au Grand Serail, le 23 octobre 1933, ' 22-24. 
69 Duraffourd, 5-6. 
341 
development of the new regime to be put in place. Such wholesale 
transformations resulted in a certain amount of obstruction on the part 
of those who were supposed to benefit the most from them. 
Emboldened by the fact that they had successfully resisted the 
encroachment of city notables upon their holdings, they did not hesitate 
to baulk at changes which appeared to bring no immediate gain, 
particularly since these were imposed by foreign masters whose time 
of dominance was rapidly drawing to a close. Thus the delicate 
political situation which existed during the last years of the Mandate 
compelled the French to proceed cautiously with their plans for 
wholesale transformation. 
For example, in June, 1938, the gardens of Homs were deprived 
of water for two or three days at the time of changeover from the 
ancient system to the newly built Canal C. This produced howls of 
outrage from gardeners and property owners. More seriously, the 
village of Tal Bissa, whose lands were to be watered by the new 
scheme, absolutely refused to let their vineyards be cadastred, and the 
authorities were forced to give way. Nonetheless the irrigation network 
was traced out, in anticipation of a more propitious moment for 
action. 70 
Of a piece with this more overt resistance was the fact that the 
cultivators were slow to take advantage of the opportunities for 
70 For French moves to dissolve musha' tenure in the area of the Homs 
irrigation scheme, see 1>`Irrigation dans la region de Homs, ' 6-7; 
2>Weulersse, L'Oronte ..., 
68,70-71. For the political situation and local 
resistance, see Weulersse, L'Oronte..., 68 and fn 2; 70, fn 1. /dem, Paysans 
..., 206. 
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irrigation. In 1940, only 472 hectares out of a possible 2,460 hectares 
of irrigable land was actually under irrigation, some 19%. In the years 
1942-45, the amount had increased to an average of 30.5%, and in the 
latter year, the percent of irrigable land actually watered was almost 
equal to this average--2,456 hectares out of 8,050.71 There were two 
reasons behind this hesitancy. On the one hand, those who farmed the 
irrigable land did not all demand that their own plots be watered, whilst 
the water which they did request was hardly sufficient to supply all the 
potentially irrigable surface . 
One can see from these various forms of defiance that the 
peasants were not happy with the accelerated dissolution of a familiar 
and customary system of managing their land. Moreover they were not 
easily persuaded that it was in their interest to adapt themselves to the 
different disciplines of what was to them a complex and novel way of 
managing irrigation. The novelty lay in the sheer scale of the system 
envisaged, not merely the lands of one or two villages, but 15-20,000 
hectares. If the peasants were capable of organising irrigation over a 
small area from a spring or a stream, they had had no experience in 
managing and co-ordinating a network as large as the Homs scheme. 
Even such marvels of ingenuity as the watering of the lands 
surrounding the upper Orontes, the gardens of Horns, or the Ghuta of 
71 Percentages derived from figures in Gibert, 156. He gives no figures for 
1941. 
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Damascus were essentially a series of small irrigations linked together, 
subtle and flexible, but requiring talents of a different order. 72 
To order and elucidate the complexities of the new system, the 
state perforce had to fill the gap, but the problem lay in the fact that the 
state and its minions were not fully prepared to do so. As the 
documents attest, Vasselet and his colleagues had set in place a 
formidable physical network: a dam, a primary canal (Canal C), 
secondary and tertiary canals, canals to drain the excess water, 
siphons, bridges, sluice gates, canal regulators--all to be managed by 
the Irrigation Department which had been built up under their 
guidance. Nevertheless it soon became obvious that mere technical 
organisation was insufficient. Gibert pointed out that in this first 
irrigation project in the Levant with a genuinely `collective character', 
the technical organism needed an economic organism to complete it. 73 
As a result of this lacuna, the peasants were slow to learn of the 
different possibilities inherent in the new system.. 
For example, it was quite feasible to grow four crops a year, with 
unirrigated winter cereals to be followed by crops on a threefold 
division of the land during the irrigation season. By dividing the amount 
of water to which they had a right, the peasant could grow a spring 
crop (onions and beetroot) on one third; a summer one (cotton, maize, 
sesame, beans) on the second third; and an autumn one (maize, kidney 
beans) on the last third before sowing again for cereals. 
72 For irrigation and the peasant mentality, see 1 >Latron, La vie ..., 141-181; 
2>Thoumin, Geographie ..., 
' 108-111; 3>Weulersse, Paysans..., 34-43. 
73 Gibert, 156. 
344 
Whether out of obstinacy or ignorance, the peasants tended to 
use their entire allotment on a third of their lands during the summer. 
Perhaps they wished only to have a lush crop on a smaller portion, 
giving them more income for considerably less work. Yet there was still 
a lack of knowledge of the aptitudes of different types of terrain for 
different crops under irrigated conditions, and so it was difficult to find 
the proper harmonies. Here is where education was needed. 
Another example lay in peasant ignorance of the relationship 
between price and demand which was revealed by his sudden 
exposure to market forces. Between 1940 and 1942, there was a large 
demand for onions to feed the soldiers then in Syria. As a result the 
area devoted to this crop went from 118 hectares in 1940 to 510 in 1943 
whilst the price which was 60 Syrian piastres (40 francs) per kilo in 
1940 plummeted, reaching 3 piastres (0 F 60) in 1945. Here again, the 
cultivator needed instruction. 
As might be expected, the cultivators found it difficult to grow 
crops under an agricultural regime which was entirely new to them. 
Moreover they lacked fertiliser, and the extra hands to carry out the 
many more tasks necessary to raise irrigated crops successfully. 
Finally, the beneficiaries themselves were required to make certain 
financial outlays for capital investments and water usage fees. First, 
the authorities expected them to complete the system with their own 
funds, building the various ditches and drains necessary to bring and 
remove the water from their fields. This proved difficult because they 
had little money, and could not easily obtain it. Second, water was 
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supplied freely only until 1947. After that date, its users had to pay a 
tax, proportional to the irrigated surface which they cultivated, in order 
to cover the maintenance expenses and recoup the cost of the project. 
As might be imagined, the peasants were not happy about this. 74 
Of course one can attribute many of these deficiencies to 
problems of start-up, complicated by the exigencies of the war years. 
Indeed Moussly, writing in 1951, noted that the irrigation project was in 
the throes of transforming the landscape of the Homs-Hama plateau. 
The canal system had led to the construction of a parallel network of 
paths and roads. Trees had been planted as windbreaks, which 
facilitated the spread of orchards. Inauguration of intensive irrigated 
cultivation had already attracted a labour force from the Jabal Ansayria 
and the surrounding steppe, and new villages were springing up 
throughout the region. Moreover for the first time, the landscape was 
becoming dotted with isolated farmsteads sited along the roads and 
canals as the importance of the village community for agriculture 
became ever less. Change was certainly coming to the countryside, 
and would continue to do so, but slowly. 75 
Yet if one examines more deeply the problems attending the 
exploitation of the Homs-Hama scheme, one always returns to the 
contradiction between the ideological bias of those who proposed and 
put it in place and the methods needed to make it function properly. 
For a society of individual peasant smallholders, each acting in his own 
74 Ibid., 155-57. 
75 Moussly, 242-44 and map on 243. 
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interest was hardly capable of managing an irrigation scheme 
distinguished by its `collective character'. Even if the authorities had 
chosen to bolster that communal tenure so typical of the Homs plateau, 
this form of association could not direct an organism of which it was not 
the progenitor. The project was proposed and created by bureaucrats 
at the centre and perforce had to be administered by them. Yet those 
who were so eager to impose a complicated engineering network on a 
virgin landscape shied away from considering the implications of this 
act: that a complex physical system of barrage and canals could only 
function properly when complemented and supported by a social and 
economic administration which would reveal to the 
beneficiaries possibilities which were outside their 
experience. 
iv. 8>The Horns project and the Ghab project of 1923--a comparison 
peasant 
common 
In assessing the Horns irrigation project, one should not allow 
such shortcomings to mask the successes of this large and complex 
undertaking. In comparison with Wilhelm's scheme to drain and 
prepare the Ghab, the irrigation of the Horns plain proved politically 
opportune; technically feasible; and financially viable. 
The initiation of each project was due to the political support of 
the High Commissioner of the day, and to the tenacity and commitment 
of the subordinate charged with implementing it. That the Ghab project 
proved stillborn whilst the Homs scheme was carried through to 
completion, on time and under cost, was due not only to political will 
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and efficient administration, but to a favourable conjuncture of 
technique and finance. 
The fact that it took nearly fifty years to drain and utilise the Ghab 
is mute testimony to the complexity of this task. In his enthusiasm, 
Wilhelm underestimated this, and put forth ideas based on insufficient 
data. Whilst the REH made no explicit critique of his solution to the 
drainage problem, the fact that it did not use it as a base from which to 
elaborate its own proposals is criticism enough. 
Whatever the merits or demerits of Wilhelm's ideas in 
themselves, those who held the responsibility for the development of 
the Orontes basin believed that the most logical plan was to move from 
upstream to downstream rather than starting in the middle of its 
course. In designing the changes to be made to the upper and middle 
Orontes, the REH based its new constructions upon those already in 
place, of ancient provenance admittedly, but soundly conceived and 
built. These only had to be extended and improved. 
The third and perhaps most important contrast between the two 
schemes lay in the realm of finance. The failure of the first Ghab project 
to become operational demonstrated conclusively to those responsible 
for the regeneration of the Mandated states that they could no longer 
rely on private capital to finance projects for public benefit, despite a 
long tradition of doing so. For such large sums could only come from 
abroad, and foreign investors offered their funds, more in the hope of 
accruing profit for themselves than with the intention of resuscitating 
the economy of a alien land through the activities which they 
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underwrote. Naturally, such men did not care to risk their money on 
propositions plagued with uncertainty, even though these proposals 
might eventually prove to be of genuine utility. It was this sort of 
reasoning which led to the rejection of the Ghab plan proposed by Ivan 
Wilhelm. 
With the elimination of private capital as a source of funds for 
complex and expensive projects, some other method of finance had to 
be found. The individual states could manage and pay for small 
schemes within their own boundaries, but large ones whose 
elaboration affected the Mandated territories as a whole, necessarily 
fell within the province of the High Commission. For only the High 
Commission, working in conjunction with its superiors in Paris, could 
find a solution to this problem of finance. 
Such involvement became imperative with the collapse of the 
capital markets during the economic crisis of the nineteen thirties. 
Although the intervention of the Quai d'Orsay was insufficient to secure 
the support of the French parliament for a large loan to develop the 
Levant states, the fortuitous extinction of the Ottoman Debt released 
money which could be put to more constructive purposes. This sudden 
infusion of funds allowed the High Commission to launch a long- 
prepared programme of capital intensive projects of which the Homs 
irrigation scheme was only one. 
These sums were public monies which had been set aside to 
service a public debt owed by the states themselves as heirs to the 
Ottoman Empire. That the High Commissioner should use them to fund 
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a `public good' seems natural given their provenance and the parlous 
finances of the Mandated territories. Nonetheless by doing so he set a 
precedent, asserting that Government was willing without demur to 
promote and fund works of public utility. 76 Admittedly two of the 
projects supported, the expansion of the port of Beirut and the 
extension of the railroad from Nusaybin to the Iraqi frontier, were 
enhancements of French concessions. Nonetheless this does not 
detract from the fact that the action of the French High Commissioner, 
in opting for the auto-generated finance of public works, inaugurated a 
trend which would eventually result in the economic independence of 
Syria, and the termination of the influence of his own country in the 
affairs of the Levant. 
iv. 9>The transitional nature of the Noms scheme 
The Homs-Hama irrigation scheme was the centrepiece of 
French efforts to regenerate Syrian agriculture. The problems 
attendant upon its inception reflected the fact that it was conceived and 
built during a period of transition. 
To begin with, at the political level there was the move from 
mandate to independence, from foreign tutelage to the emancipation of 
the tutee. This meant a gradual loosening of the tutor's hold over the 
wheels of government which was accompanied by a loss of influence 
76 The funding of the Hijaz Railway by the Ottoman government and pious 
Muslims everywhere was in fact the first public work financed in this way. 
There is no evidence that French officials during the 
Mandate used this 
enterprise as a precedent for their own actions. 
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and a waning of prestige. As a result, this `lame duck' administration 
had to move carefully in establishing a project which demanded of its 
beneficiaries disciplines quite different from those to which they had 
hitherto been accustomed. 
Next, at the economic level, there was the passage from an era of 
expansion by means of private capital towards one in which the state 
was forced to take the lead. During the former, private entrepreneurs, 
as were their wont, sought to exploit economic opportunities offered by 
the newly mandated territories. Even if French financiers moved 
cautiously into the arena because they hesitated to risk their money in a 
land under temporary tutelage which could never be their own private 
preserve, few among the closely intertwined political and industrial 
elites questioned the principle of development/exploitation through 
private investment. 
Nonetheless the onset of the world economic crisis, 
demonstrated conclusively that such private capital, itself beset by 
failure and retrenchment, was unequal to this task. Therefore the 
metropole through its representatives in Damascus was forced to play 
the leading part in orchestrating those various elements necessary for 
the successful completion of vital capital-intensive projects such as the 
irrigation of the Homs-Hama plateau. Creation of a scheme of this 
complexity was an untried procedure, and it is small wonder that there 
were problems and deficiencies in execution. The fact that an 
economic support organisation was slow in arriving on the Homs plain 
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was perhaps due as much to administrative failure as it was to wartime 
exigencies. 
Finally, at the social level, the Mandate era saw a re-orientation of 
the relationship between the individual and the community of which he 
was a part. The economic crisis of the nineteen thirties brought with it 
a gradual awareness that the interests of the wider society should at 
times override those of its constituent elements. When such interests 
were in play, it was for the state to hold the ring in their favour because 
it alone could understand the needs of society as a whole and act to 
fulfil them. 
In the final analysis, it was the failure (or refusal) of French 
administrators to grasp this last point fully which encumbered the 
development of their finest creation. After all, in 1939, five years after 
its inauguration, they still proclaimed to the world (or at least to their 
superiors in Paris) that the destruction of musha'tenure would create a 
class of peasant smallholders fully capable of improving their lands and 
planting them with those export crops within which lay the future 
prosperity of Syrian agriculture. " Such attitudes blinded those who 
held them to a reality which was much more complex. It was not until 
this point of view had evolved into one which allowed that the state 
might have a positive role to play in the ordering of society that the 
irrigation of the Horns plain could achieve its full potential. 
77 `Irrigation dans la region de Homs, ' 7. 
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iv. lo>Gemeinscbat and Gesellschaft in the Homs plain 
The installation of the irrigation project on the Homs plain 
undermined the Gemeinschafflike structure of the musha`communities 
which flourished there. Certainly control of water allocation by 
technicians whose first loyalties were to efficient and rational 
agricultural production rather than to the needs of the village 
communities in their charge, moved a long way towards the 
Gesellschaft spirit. Now external purpose, market-oriented and 
impersonal, directed the strategies of cultivation, and sought to 
undermine communal disciplines because they were considered no 
longer germane. 
Yet, the resistance of the villagers of Tal Bissa to the cadastration 
of their vineyards--the first step towards the rationalisation of 
production--demonstrated that they were unwilling to accept meekly 
the destruction of the Gemeinschafflike structure of their community 
and its mode of cultivation in order to further the economic relationship. 
Their actions recall those of the Hawrani peasants who revolted in the 
1890's; those of the Druze who revolted in 1925; and those of the 
various village protests which took place during the nineteen thirties. 
For each of these sought to preserve their communities-- 
Gemeinschafflike structures all--in the face of attacks by forces which 
represented, in one way or another, external purpose. These forces 
sought to impose `a pre-established order' which was ultimately 
founded on bureaucratic norms and the cash nexus, and which struck 
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at the very foundations of those village communities whose routines 
and disciplines had served their members so well over time. 
*** 
A fortunate combination of politics, technique, and finance 
ensured that the irrigation of the Homs plain was the first project of its 
kind successfully inaugurated in Syria. Moreover this was a Syrian 
project, which if directed by the French, was financed by Syrian funds, 
and built by Syrian contractors. In this respect, it epitomised those 
solid economic accomplishents which the French themselves believed 
were the most durable legacy of their twenty years of stewardship. 
They admitted that their achievements were certainly less spectacular 
than the transformation of Turkey and Palestine under the impetus of 
Kemalist revolution and Zionist colonisation respectively, but still 
profound and durable. Moreover, unlike the attainments of their 
neighbours, those in the Levant had been implemented with a minimum 
of disturbance--without war, revolution, or dictatorship. 78 
If this assessment was unabashedly self-promoting, it 
nonetheless contained within it a hard core of truth. Much was 
accomplished during the Mandate in the way of solid economic 
development. One must remember that when the French arrived, 
whatever had been realised under Ottoman suzerainty had been largely 
negated by four years of ruinous war. Therefore they had to start from 
scratch in their work of regeneration. 
78 `Realisations frangaises au Levant, ' n. d. (c. spring, 1940). 
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Agriculture was the basis of the Syrian economy, and the work of 
improving it and expanding its capacity to enrich the country was a vital 
task. Writing some thirty years later, Syrian Ba'thist revolutionaries 
pointed with some bitterness to what they saw as the deficiencies of 
this oeuvre. In essence, their criticisms focused on the favouritism 
which the French showed to the rich `feudalists' at the expense of the 
humble cultivator; their failure to develop a rational programme to 
expand and improve agricultural production; and their inability to 
promote Syrian agricultural exports, particularly during the crisis years 
of the nineteen thirties. 79 
The deficiencies cited were quite similar to those which Achard 
said must be addressed for Syrian agriculture to prosper. If indeed the 
Syrian nationalists were correct in their assessment, then one can 
judge French agricultural policy a failure. 
Certainly in terms of the physical resuscitation of cultivation, this 
assessment seems overly harsh. The various initiatives undertaken 
during the Mandate--well-digging, foggara-clearing, and locust control; 
development of cotton production; expansion of irrigation; the opening 
of the Jazira--all gave agriculture a solid base from which to move 
forward. The rapid expansion during the years of the Second World 
War, 8° when necessity forced Syria to become self-sufficient in food, 
79 Office Arabe de Presse et de Documentation, Etude speciale sur 
/'agriculture syrienne, 1 st ed. (Damascus, 1964), A92-95. 
80 Cultivated area in 1939: 1,904,079 ha.; 1946: 2,290,000 ha. Ibid., A95. 
This estimate seems a bit too large. Other sources give the total cultivated 
area of 1939 as 1,047,609 hectares and that of 1946 as 1,710,500 which 
appear more reasonable. Figures for 1939: Saleh Essaleh, L'Etat actuel de 
/'Economie syrienne: Agriculture, Industrie, Commerce en comparison avec 
/es pays /imitrophes (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1944), tables on 47-49. 
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would not have been possible had Syrian agriculture remained in the 
state in which the French found it in 1919. 
Moreover, if the tutor largely failed in his efforts to defend the 
tutee against the ravages of the Great Depression, it was because the 
tutor himself became only gradually aware that ordinary measures 
would not suffice to meet an extraordinary crisis. Nevertheless this 
crisis concentrated his mind and led to the initiation of important 
development projects of which the Homs irrigation scheme was the 
most significant for agriculture. 
Nevertheless the Ba'thists made one valid criticism, and it was 
perhaps the most telling of all: The French failed utterly to force 
change in agrarian relations, and to free the peasant from the 
oppressive ties which bound him to the great landlords. Edouard 
Achard, one of their most astute experts, had stated at the very 
beginning of their tenure that the liberation of the cultivator was the 
sine qua non for the reconstruction of agriculture. The fact that one of 
his intellectual heirs, Jacques Weulersse, writing at the very end of the 
Mandate, stated that to break the hold of the latifundia would require a 
`veritable social revolution' underlines just how much this policy had 
failed. 81 
Although Achard saw clearly the need for some sort of social 
revolution, he was unable to accept it ideologically, and quailed before 
Figures for 1946: Marion Clawson. Hans H. Landsberg, Lyle T. Alexander, 
The Agricultural Potential of the Middle East (New York: American Elsevier 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), Appendix Table C8-35,260. 
81 Achard, `Notes ..., ` 100-102; 
Weulersse, Le Pays ..., 366. 
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its consequences. His beliefs were formed around those good 
bourgeois virtues of capitalism and individualism, and his horror of 
revolution was undoubtedly reinforced by the all too recent convulsions 
which had shattered the regime of France's Russian ally and had cost 
French bondholders a fortune. Moreover as a practical matter, he 
feared that the `spoliation' of the great landed magnates would serve 
no purpose because it was only through their mediation that the new 
and alien masters could reach the mass of the peasantry. He feared 
that to alienate the notables would only lead them to rouse the 
cultivators, still bound to them by ties of obligation, against the foreign 
intruder. 
The alternative to confiscation was purchase. Unfortunately, 
purchase on a scale to destroy the latifundia; put the newly released 
lands in the hands of their cultivators; and finance these cultivators 
until they could stand on their own two feet required sums which were 
not available. Thus practical necessity chimed with ideological 
conviction to forestall any forceful intervention by the Mandatory Power 
in the land question, a question whose resolution was at the root of 
agricultural revival in Syria. As a result, the individual did triumph in 
the countryside, but it was the wrong individual, the notable rather than 
the cultivator who consolidated his position. 
It was the persistence of this inclination for capitalism and 
individualism coupled with an aversion to state intervention which 
hampered much of the work of rural regeneration during the Mandate. 
Moreover the very idea of `regeneration' did in itself tend to impose a 
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linear view which saw movement from one physical reality to another 
and `better' one paralleled by a movement from one social reality to 
another and `better' one. Although the process was inevitably slow, 
those who held this view envisaged a transformation into a new form of 
rural society which had sloughed off the vestiges of its predecessor as 
did a python its old skin. 
It is here where one might say that in the issues it addressed, the 
Homs-Hama irrigation project embodied in microcosm the Mandate as 
a whole, and beyond the Mandate the course of agriculture in modern 
Syria. For within itself, this irrigation scheme linked the individual 
peasant, his village community, and the wider society within which they 
functioned in a relationship new to agrarian relations in that country. 
It is here too, where one sees the bond between the French 
Mandatary and the Ba'thist revolutionary. For each held history to be 
linear: Each was certain that the creation of his particular ideal--for the 
one, the individual capitalist smallholder; for the other, the cog in the 
machine of state socialism--would at one fell swoop solve the problem 
of the peasant and with it the problem of agriculture in Syria. 
In their eagerness to impose their vision, both ignored the reality 
that was rural life, a life where there was a harmony between the 
individual cultivator and the community to which he belonged, where 
elements of individualism and communalism were inextricably 
intertwined. 
Moreover this rural world of individuals and their communities 
was set within a wider society, one whose ordinary intrusions were 
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those of landlords and tax collectors (often one and the same) who held 
the threads of patronage which tied the peasant however tenuously to 
the larger world outside. At times this society played a more intrusive 
role when necessity or policy decreed that agriculture should be 
organised on a larger and more complex scale. In Syria, perhaps the 
only time this higher order was achieved before the era of the Mandate 
was during the period which saw the construction of the old Homs Dam 
and its associated waterworks. 
This relationship between the three elements of individual, 
community, and society was not linear with one proceeding to the 
other, the whole process being surrounded by an aura of `progress' or 
`decay'. Nor, taking the longer view, could one say that the relationship 
formed a cyclical pattern with the elements continuously replacing one 
another over the centuries. 
Rather each of them formed part of a social reality, and each was 
necessary for the existence of the others. At times, one element might 
have a certain preponderance. Nevertheless should it become too 
weighty, the balance would shift in favour of its fellows. 
In Syria, the Mandate period was one of transition. In the 
countryside, the pre-eminence of the communal element gradually gave 
way to individualism. It was due partially to natural changes--the 
growing of export crops such as cotton and fruit; a shift to irrigation-- 
and partially to the pressure of an outside element--the French 
authorities--who saw the drive towards the creation of individual 
smallholders as a form of `progress'. 
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The intervention of the Great Depression and the creation of a 
large and complex irrigation scheme as a result of it, put a check to this 
element, and began to accentuate the interests of society as a whole. 
In a way, the state, in the person of the Mandatary, represented these 
interests and held the balance between individuals--peasants and 
notables--and the different communities to which they belonged. 
Nevertheless because the Mandatary was an alien power, it was 
unable to fully represent Syrian society vis-ä-vis its constituent 
elements, and therefore was limited in the areas of its intervention. If 
France could promote public works projects at little harm to itself and 
to the benefit of her tutees, she could hardly promote agrarian reform. 
For to do so would go against her own interests and alienate that social 
group which helped her control the countryside. If in the process, the 
peasants, `poor devils', were left in misery, so be it! 
This pattern of limited state intervention persisted during the first 
fifteen years of independence as the notable/nationalists succeeded 
the French at the helm of the ship of state. This period saw the 
extension and completion of the Homs project, and the initiation of 
other large scale irrigation schemes such as the long-sought drainage 
and development of the Ghab. Nonetheless the Syrian political elite 
rejected any proposals for even a modest land reform because such 
schemes would result inevitably in the undermining of its power over 
the inhabitants of the countryside. 
If the influence of the state expanded during the years following 
independence in 1943, so did that of the individual entrepreneur. For it 
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was he who introduced cotton cultivation into the Jazira. In these vast 
underpopulated lands, production was necessarily capital intensive 
rather than labour intensive, and agriculture was transformed into 
agribusiness. Nonetheless in Syria as a whole, there was an increasing 
bias in favour of state intervention.. As a result, this blaze of capitalism 
flashed like a comet across the sky with no sequel. This trend 
culminated in he union with Egypt in 1958 and more particularly, the 
Bath Revolution of 1963. 
To revolutionaries, it appeared that the state control now 
triumphant in Syria was truly the wave of the future. Society was firmly 
in the saddle, representing peasants against landlords and capitalists 
whilst solidifying its position. It accomplished this by instituting a land 
reform; completing the Ghab scheme; and implementing the harnessing 
of the Euphrates for agriculture. Nonetheless the revolutionaries 
deluded themselves if in their hubris they, like the French before them, 
thought that they could overturn the ageold pattern of relations 
between the individual, his community, and society at large to the 
permanent advantage of one of them. 82 
82 For insights into the changing pattern of cultivation over a long period, see 
Robert McC. Adams, `Historic patterns of Mesopotamian irrigated 
agriculture, ' in Theodore E. Downing and McGuire Gibson (eds. ), Irrigation's 
Impact on Society, Anthropological Papers of the University of Arizona, No. 
25 (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 1-6. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conclus. 1>Indiuidual, community, and society in Syria 
During the period of the French Mandate and the eras which 
followed it, the process of agricultural development in Syria has 
displayed both continuities and changes. The most important pattern, 
the one which formed the foundation for these continuities and changes 
was the eternal, but ever-changing relationship of individual, 
community, and society. 
Whereas the continuities and changes which one can see 
occurring as one sweeps through the different periods of modern 
Syrian history--Ottoman, Faysalian, Mandatory, Independent, and 
Revolutionary--are linear in the sense that each flows out of its 
predecessors, they are founded on the relationship between the 
individual, his community, and the society to which both belong. 
Each element plays its own part, although at times one might be 
more dominant than the others. Since a social organism is not a 
machine, but a human formation, its components have a tendency to 
impose an ordering principle upon the pattern of its elements. They do 
this in order to understand it, and to guide it towards a preferred 
destiny. Yet the act of imposing such an ordering principle upon 
elements which are in equilibrium, causes the others to react against it, 
and in the end the human directors of that social organism are forced to 
acknowledge the validity of each element within it. 
The changes and continuities which took place in the relationship 
between Syrian agriculture, society, and polity in the years since the 
coming of France to the Levant at the end of the Great War reflected the 
evolution of this relationship between individual, community, and 
society in certain ways. The late Ottoman period saw the beginning of 
the slow dissolution of communal structures in the countryside, with 
moves towards stabilisation and individuation. Moreover the insertion 
of Syria into the world economy in the eighteen sixties exposed her 
population to the impersonality of the cash nexus whilst subjecting it to 
the fluctuation of market forces. The frontier zone of the Hawran and 
Jabal Druz was a region where the communal structures of musha' 
tenure were particularly strong, and during the economic crisis of the 
eighteen eighties, the Hawrani peasants put up a vigorous resistance to 
attempts by the Ottoman government and urban entrepreneurs to 
beggar them and replace relations of patronage with ones of direct 
exploitation. 
The trend towards stabilisation and individuation of properties in 
the countryside accelerated under the Mandate. This was expedited by 
the work of the Cadastral Survey which sought to promote the family 
cultivating unit as a replacement for the communal unit in the 
countryside through delineation and consolidation of properties. 
This 
emphasis stemmed from the ideological predilection of 
French 
agronomists for a commonwealth of independent self-capitalised 
smallholders. 
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Nevertheless the French were unwilling to attack the great 
notables who dominated the countryside and whose presence there 
ensured that this commonwealth could never be created. The failure of 
an alien power and temporary mandatary to institute an agrarian 
reform which would dissolve the great latifundia and rock the 
countryside to its foundations was quite understandable. Yet this 
omission meant that during the Mandate, individuation remained an 
ideal rather than becoming a reality. 
The Great Depression began to bring another element to the fore 
as it became clear that society represented by the state could alone 
bring to fruition large capital-intensive agricultural projects. The state 
was forced to intervene because French capital refused to sink funds 
into projects which carried much risk with hope of little reward. 
Moreover the individual peasant and his community had neither the 
experience nor the funds to construct and to manage such complex 
schemes. Although the Mandatory authorities built the physical 
structure of the Horns irrigation scheme, their ideological predilections 
made them slow to create an economic structure to complement the 
physical one. 
The Mandate era was one of transition. During its course, it 
became evident that the agricultural regeneration of Syria could only 
be achieved by the direct intervention of the state. Nevertheless under 
the Mandate, and during the period of independence which succeeded 
it, the dominance of the state over agricultural processes was still 
incomplete because those who held power refused to see that the 
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creation of physical structures to reorder the countryside required 
social structures to complement and complete them. Such a vision was 
not realised until the coming of the Bath `revolution' of 1963 when 
society and its pilot, the state achieved what was apparently secure 
mastery over the processes of rural change. 
*** 
Conclus. 2 >Agriculture and Politics in Syria under the French Mandate--a balance 
sheet 
In concluding this study of the relationship between agriculture 
and politics in Syria under the French Mandate, it might be useful to 
tabulate the most salient features of French attitudes towards the 
agricultural regeneration of Syria; the policies they propounded to 
achieve this goal; and the problems which limited their achievement. 
A>The French authorities had no great incentive to make 
improvements in a land over which they would hold sway 
for but a limited time. Nonetheless they felt that their duty 
as mandatary required them to make an effort to leave 
Syria more prosperous than it was at their arrival. 
B>Due to the fact that these foreign officials were unable to 
communicate with the rural inhabitants, people whose 
language and customs they found utterly alien, they were 
compelled to rely upon the local elite of landowner- 
notables to act as intermediaries. Because of this 
dependence, the French were afraid to upset the 
established social order in the countryside even though 
they were well aware that any successful regeneration of 
agriculture owed as much to the improvement of the status 
of the peasant as it did to the construction of public works. 
C>The French saw economic development as a form of 
substitution for political development rather than as 
another facet of it. They believed that the physical 
improvement of the land and livelihood of the inhabitants of 
Syria was the best means of diverting the minds of the 
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political class from the struggle to throw off the cords with 
which the mandatary bound their country. Such visible 
constructions as dams, roads, and wells were also a way 
for the French to justify their rule in the face of obdurate 
opposition. It was this insistence on separating economics 
from politics which made the undoubted economic 
successes of the French in Syria less than they might have 
been otherwise. Nevertheless it was perhaps inevitable 
that this should be so: France was a tutor for Syria, not a 
father, and had neither the will nor the authority to make a 
revolution in a foreign land. 
D>ln order to make such physical improvements to the 
agricultural infrastructure, substantial financial resources 
were required. Before the era of `foreign aid', these could 
only come from private capital; from foreign loans; or from 
the internal revenues of the mandated states. 
Unfortunately, capitalists were loath to invest where there 
could be no guarantee of profit, and domestic revenues 
derived from tariffs and the like were too small to fund 
large capital projects. Thus less spectacular 
improvements were made than was the case in Kemalist 
Turkey or Zionist-dominated Palestine. It was only 
because the settlement of the Ottoman Debt released 
certain funds held in reserve that it became possible to 
implement such large projects as the irrigation of the land 
around Lake Homs and the extension of the port of Beirut 
during the last five years of the peacetime Mandate. 
Moreover, by extinguishing this charge upon the revenues 
of the mandated territories, France ensured that they 
would start their independent existence without being 
burdened with an obligation which most of their citizens 
felt was not theirs to bear and which had the potential to 
mortgage their future prosperity. 
E>An overriding problem, one which tended to ensnare 
any plans for agricultural improvements, revolved around 
the organisational deficiencies of the French 
administration. France brought to Syria her bureaucratic 
traditions: a proliferation of departments ensconced in a 
multilayered administrative structure. Each Service was 
eager to carve an arena of action for itself, one which it 
jealously guarded against the encroachments of its rivals. 
Infighting ensued, as each department sought to push its 
own ideas and gain the ear of the High Commissioner. 
These bureaucratic clashes were compounded by a lack of 
decisive direction from the top because the chief French 
representative tended to be more preoccupied with 
managing the immediate and future concerns of politics 
per se than with selecting and promoting 
the various 
366 
economic projects proposed by his subordinates. The 
result was a certain malaise as over the years schemes 
were initiated, studied, reformulated, and revived over and over again. 
F>Given these various handicaps and the fact that Syria 
had been so unevenly developed before the Mandate, the 
progress made during the twenty years of French 
administration was not negligible. A start was made in the 
expansion of agriculture onto virgin lands; new crops were introduced and irrigation works were begun. All these 
served as a springboard for further improvements after independence. Unfortunately, the fact that the French 
were unable to master the agrarian question set a limit to 
any change in the countryside. 
G>As a matter of course, Syrian nationalists complained of 
what little benefits their country had derived from this 
tutelage. Yet one must ask whether any foreign tutor 
would have expended capital with such little hope of 
return. Clearly the answer is no. Even if France had sunk a 
fortune in the amelioration of Syrian life, no amount of 
money could render acceptable an administration which, 
for many Syrians, was illegitimate in and of itself. Moreover 
it is too much to expect an alien power consciously to 
destroy an agrarian structure which served as an 
important prop for its own rule. Such a radical 
refashioning of the countryside could only be carried out 
by a national government, but one which itself was 
committed to change. 
In examining the French oeuvre, three aspects appear 
particularly significant. The first is the mixed and quite interesting 
impact of European capitalism on Syria during the Mandate and the way 
in which it facilitated the emergence of a vigorous local capitalism. The 
second is the problem of the relation between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft, between the organic community in the countryside and 
the administratively created one. The third is the intertwining of 
systems of knowledge, systems of power, and webs of expectation: For 
the manner in which the French apprehended Syria affected the way in 
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which they conducted their administration whilst the manner in which 
Syrians apprehended France affected the way in which they reacted to 
this tutelage. 
Conclus. 3>French capitalism, local capitalism, and the development of Syrian 
agriculture 
The most interesting aspect of the impact of French capitalism on 
Syria during the Mandate is that it turned out, paradoxically, to be so 
minimal. Under the Ottoman Empire, French capitalists held a powerful 
position in Syria because the Ottoman authorities had granted them the 
right to create certain services which the government had neither the 
means nor the expertise to develop for itself. These so-called 
`concessions' to construct and operate public utilities and 
communications, particularly railways, usually brought a certain 
amount of profit to their investors. By their very nature, concessions 
were relatively risk-free because they were involved in sectors which 
were isolated from the daily concerns of the majority of the local 
population. Such isolation meant that the concessions were less 
exploitative than they would have been were they enterprises which 
controlled vital sectors of the economy, but it also meant that the 
French capitalists gained little insight into the real problems of the 
Syrian economy and Syrian society. These problems revolved around 
agriculture, but the foreign concessionnaires generally found such 
investments too risky because profits could neither be immediate nor 
guaranteed. 
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The coming of the Mandate apparently saw France master of 
Syria. At the same time, the events of the Great War had compelled her 
to seek autarky in those primary products best-suited to feed her home 
industries. These two factors in combination drove French 
entrepreneurs to the Levant in order to supply the mere patrie with the 
raw materials these factories required whilst making a tidy profit for 
themselves. 
Nevertheless French capital was cautious. To hardened 
imperialists, the new and untried system of `mandate' with its 
international supervision and principle of the Open Door seemed hardly 
to guarantee a chasse gardee. Moreover the temporary nature of 
French tutelage gave little assurance that investments by her nationals 
would remain secure once independence was attained--a conviction 
which the political instability of the early Mandate years tended to 
confirm. Finally, the lack of a coherent policy towards economic 
development on the part of the Mandatory authorities themselves 
tended to stymie the initiatives of their compatriots. 
Despite such constraints, it appeared that by 1929, French 
capital was on the verge of achieving results in the one area in which it 
had focused its energies, namely the production of American cotton in 
the Alaouite State. Unfortunately the onset of the great Depression in 
the early nineteen thirties put paid to French economic ambitions in the 
Levant, for in anticipation of coming profits, French entrepreneurs had 
over extended themselves, and were unable to meet their obligations to 
the banks which had financed them. The fact that French capital had 
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just begun to root itself in the Syrian economy ensured that it would be 
easily be swept away by the first tempest to strike it. 
If the world economic crisis destroyed French enterprises, local 
ones proved to be a hardier breed. Heretofore, local capital had not 
much interested itself in agricultural investment, with the exception of 
silk, much preferring the more familiar path of trade. The success of 
French capital in promoting the production of marketable cotton 
whetted the appetites of local entrepreneurs, and its failure 
emboldened them to enter the lists. Therefore when the crisis lifted, 
Syrian and Lebanese capitalists were quick to fill the gap left by the 
demise by their foreign competitors, building on the foundations which 
they had laid down whilst avoiding their costly mistakes. It was these 
men who produced and benefited from the cotton boom of the nineteen 
fifties, a boom which derived ultimately from the activities of those 
French entrepreneurs who had pioneered the cotton projects in the 
Alaouites some thirty years before. 
In sum, it was the Mandate system and the peculiar economic 
climate of the interwar period which prevented Syria from being turned 
into a French economic satellite. When independence came, French 
capital had no stronger position in Syria than the capital of any other 
country. Moreover if French capitalists did not themselves reap 
rewards in the sectors where they had blazed the path, the fact that 
they had done so enabled local entrepreneurs to follow in their 
footsteps. This ensured that the capital expended strengthened Syria 
rather than merely supplying profits to foreigners. 
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Conclus. 4>8emeinschaft and Cese//scnaltas models for social change during 
the French Mandate 
This work has demonstrated that in Syria during the Mandate the 
Gemeinschafflike structure of the village community founded on musha' 
tenure still dominated much of the countryside. Nevertheless, starting 
in the late Ottoman period, elements of Gesellschaft began to intrude. 
A spirit of individualism which was propelled by the attraction of profit 
from the sale of such commercial crops as fruit, nuts, and olives, slowly 
undermined the structure of the community. 
The officials of the Mandatary promoted adherence to 
Gesellschaft norms. They sought to improve production by creating 
individual smallholdings owned by peasants who would treat their land 
as mere capital to be exploited rationally for profit rather than as part 
of the patrimony of their own community. 
Between pages 371 and 372. Figs. 16 and 17. Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft on the Syrian plain. Fig. 16 (left) shows the village of Bar Ilyas 
(Biqa') before the individuation of properties when the organisation of 
musha' cultivation embodied the spirit of Gemeinschaft held by the village 
community. Fig. 17 (right) shows the same village after the individuation 
promoted by the Regie de Cadastre reduced the number of parcels from 
32,643 to 950. Individual exploitation `ä /a moderne was now possible, for 
the Gesellschaft spirit had triumphed over that of Gemeinschaft. Nevertheless 
in some places (the upper right quadrant, for example), the map shows 
remnants of the parallel strips so characteristic of musha` cultivation. 
Perhaps this is an example of Tönnies' belief that even in the midst of the 
evolution towards Gesellschaft, there are those who wish to maintain a 
communal spirit, and do so by retaining Gemeinschafdike structures. 
Source: Jacques Weulersse, Paysans de Syrie et du Proche Orient (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1946), Figs. 37 and 38,192,193. 
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Another aspect of the reliance of the Mandatary on the principles 
of Gesellschaft lay in the firmly held belief that the road to agricultural 
regeneration passed through the fields of capitalism, whether the agent 
be the peasant on his private holding or the French financier placing 
large sums into modern irrigation works. 
Nevertheless during the Mandate period, the peasant capitalist 
remained largely an ideal rather than a reality. The collapse of the 
international market during the economic crisis of the nineteen thirties 
effectively stifled any idea of creating peasant smallholders. Moreover 
it showed the weakness of capital worldwide and the error of the 
Mandate administration in relying on investments by interested 
entrepreneurs to develop certain aspects of Syrian agriculture. 
The failure of private capital meant that it fell to the state in the 
person of the High Commissioner to take the lead in formulating and 
executing large agricultural improvement projects. Thus when the 
principles of Gesellschaft failed, the state found it necessary to 
intervene. Although officials of the Mandate authorised, designed, and 
created the physical structures of such schemes, schemes which in 
their very nature exemplified the principles of Gemeinschaft, these men 
could not see the implications of their acts. They shied from installing 
economic and social structures which would complement and complete 
the physical ones and create a Gemeinschafflike organisation in the 
countryside. Indeed, so blind were they, and so wedded to the 
principles of Gesellschaft, that in the final report on the 
accomplishments and goals of the greatest of their irrigation projects, 
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the writers still spoke of their intention to destroy communal structures, 
and replace them with individual smallholdings owned by peasant 
capitalists. 
Such policies and attitudes illustrate the transitional nature of the 
Mandate period, one in which elements of Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft were inextricably mixed. It was an era in which the 
organic community still retained its vitality despite all attempts to 
eradicate it, but one also in which the potential of the administratively 
created community first became apparent. Such a community could 
come into its own only under a system in which `external purpose', i. e. 
the ideological conceptions and policies of central planners in 
Damascus, became more important than satisfaction of the genuine 
needs of communities in the countryside. 
Conclus. 5>Systems of knowledge and systems of power: France and Syria 
When France agreed to accept the Mandate for Syria, she did so 
with a certain image of Syria firmly fixed in her mind's eye, an image 
which affected her plans to regenerate and modernise that country. 
She saw Syria as a land once so fecund, `le pays du vin et du levain, le 
grenier de 1'Empire Romain', which under Muslim and particularly 
Ottoman rule had sunk into a long decline. As tutor, her appointed task 
was to regenerate this land and make it once more a cornucopia, one 
whose products would enrich Syria, and France as well. 
In seeking to regenerate Syria, French administrators and 
experts came with particular ideological biases fixed firmly in their 
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minds. Good bourgeois, transfixed by the horrors of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, they believed that rural Syria could only modernise through 
the imposition of the structures and processes of capitalism. By 
tenaciously pursuing this idea, even when they found it to be less than 
suited to Syrian conditions, they embodied those critiques which 
Georges Hardy believed limited the achievements of his compatriots: 
Legislation in the abstract. 
Collection of facts within systems of expectation. 
Conception of a pre-established order rather than 
reliance on a spontaneous organisation. 
Foundation of colonial law on principles of absolute value. 
Following the logic of these precepts, one could well say that the 
French might have achieved more, had they utilised the communal 
structures in the countryside instead of seeking to dissolve them. Such 
a criticism is too severe. Even had she been so inclined, France could 
not have modernised from below. She was in Syria for a brief period as 
a mere tutor, to guide rather than refashion. She had neither the will 
nor the resources to make a revolution. 
Yet her aptitude at ordering and creating an efficient 
bureaucratic organism from above did bring some weighty 
achievements. This talent shone its brightest in the adumbration and 
establishment of the Horns irrigation scheme. One must not forget that 
this substantial project was constructed within both a specified time 
and an allotted budget. Moreover if conceived by a foreign 
administration, its construction was a truly Syrian enterprise, paid for 
by Syrian funds and built by Syrian contractors. In all its aspects, the 
Horns irrigation scheme served as a model, one which could only have 
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stemmed from the manner in which France conceived and conducted 
her rule. 
Conclus. 6>Systems of knowledge and webs of expectation: Syria and France 
In addressing briefly the system of knowledge and webs of 
expectations through which Syrians apprehended France and her 
Mandate over them, one returns to the queries posed by Albert Hourani 
which inaugurated this work. How did Syrians, inhabitants of a land 
which for centuries had been a crossroads between East and West and 
between Christianity and Islam, react to the first systematic intrusion of 
a European power into their society? 
The coming of France to the Levant only confirmed that this 
region, for good or for ill, was wedded permanently to the world 
economy, a situation which had slowly evolved since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Syrians welcomed this marriage and, with their 
genius for trade, eagerly participated in it. Moreover they accepted the 
necessity for certain policies which French experts introduced in order 
to regenerate agriculture, the engine of their prosperity. Indeed 
Syrians themselves have continued to apply them in one form or 
another. Although those who controlled the land did not actively 
participate in implementing these policies, informed opinion constantly 
complained of what to its eyes was the slow pace and inadequate scope 
of progress. 
These methods were and are what one might call applications of 
technique--irrigation, the expansion of production, and the introduction 
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of new crops. Nevertheless where the French failed, and were seen to 
fail, was in their refusal to overturn the inequitable relations of 
production between notable landowner and humble cultivator. The 
French did so out of self-interest because of those `regrettable political 
repercussions' which such action would entail for their own position. 
Yet by refusing to do so--and the arguments used to justify this refusal 
were very strong--the French ensured that their oeuvre would be 
incomplete. 
Writing in 1946, as the last French troops were finally 
withdrawing from Syria and bringing an end to the Mandate, Albert 
Hourani wondered which path the movement of `Arab nationalism' 
would follow. He felt it might become one of opposition to the West 
using its technical skills to resist the political encroachments and 
spiritual challenges of Europe and America. Yet he also believed that 
this movement might become one which would use the skills acquired 
to reconstruct Arab society through assimilation and adaptation of 
those elements which are best in Western life. ' 
With regard to Syria, her experience of Western tutelage during 
the French Mandate was a mixed one. Whilst she received many 
blessings--roads, irrigation schemes, new and potentially profitable 
crops--she also was subject to prolonged and inept political 
manipulation by administrators who were keener in preserving the 
privileges of their own country than they were in supporting and 
Hourani, 1-2. 
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promoting the political aspirations of their tutees. Nevertheless French 
tutelage, though often frustrating, did turn out to be a short one. A 
concatenation of circumstances revolving around Franco-British rivalry 
during the Second World War ensured that when France departed from 
Syria in 1946, she did so completely, leaving behind no residue of 
interests which might impel her to interfere in the affairs of newly 
independent Syria. 
As a result of this timely departure, Syria was able to take her 
first independent steps, free from foreign tutelage. The mistakes she 
made, and they were many, were her own mistakes. In the final 
analysis, despite an erratic course which brought with it a commitment 
to Ba'thism and an attenuated form of State socialism, Syria was never 
alienated from the West. One can attribute this happy circumstance to 
a short and finite Mandate experience which, seen in the long term, 
proved to have had effects which were far more positive than negative. 
FINIS 
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APPENDIX 
STATISTICS OF PRODUCTION AND AREA OF WHEAT, BARLEY, AND 
COTTON (1325M/1909-10--19921 
ROTA: It is extremely hard to find accurate statistics about the area and 
production of Syrian agriculture, particularly for the Ottoman and 
Mandate periods. All of the figures given below are estimates only. 
Generally speaking, the statistics for the nineteeen thirties are `better' 
than those for the nineteen twenties simply because the Mandatory 
authorities were better organised. The French themselves admitted 
that the figures they issued for area and production were hardly exact, 
even though those presented were carefully scrutinised by the 
Economic Counsellors of the High Commission. They felt that figures 
for those crops which were either subject to `fiscal surveillance' or to 
technical control on the part of the administration (e. g. tobacco and 
cotton) were more exact than those for `ordinary' crops such as cereals 
(Rapport ä /a Societe des Nations ..., 1930,20). Nonetheless the figures can serve as a rough guide to the effect of drought, and when 
broken down by region as they sometimes are, the can indicate 
comparative agricultural development or decline. 
CROP PRODUCTION 
thousand tonnes) 
Wheat Barley Cotton 
1325 M 
(1909/10) 546.7 259.9 4.7 
1920 249.0 162.0 
1921 220.2 134.9 
1922 345.0 182.5 1.2 
1923 364.0 171.0 1.8 
1924 325.8 190.3 3.0 
1925 271.3 186.2 3.1 
1926 375.5 236.2 1.7 
1927 400.0 336.7 1.9 
1928 200.0 298.0 .9 
1929 453.1 530.8 3.1 
1930 527.3 480.5 2.7 
1931 386.8 311.7 4.1 
1932 482.3 205.0 8.8 
1933 326.3 273.1 9.3 
1934 443.0 292.1 5.5 
1935 504.0 347.1 5.5 
1936 427.4 308.1 6.8 
1937 468.8 266.3 5.6 
1938 627.4 382.1 7.6 
Wheat Barley cotton 
1939 685.0 480.0 8.2 
1940 602.0 338.5 7.6 
1941 473.1 274.4 5.4 
1942 507.4 248.9 3.2 
1943 525.6 315.0 8.8 
1944 438.8 250.3 8.7 
1945 415.1 247.6 12.4 
1946 577.9 284.2 14.1 
1947 403.8 168.8 15.5 
1948 656.7 305.1 25.6 
1949 909.3 357.5 38.1 
1950 830.0 322.0 100.3 
1951 509.6 154.7 175.5 
1952 900.0 466.9 176.4 
1953 870.0 472.5 126.0 
1954 965 635 220.8 
1955 438 137 233.3 
1956 1051 462 252.5 
1957 1354 721 291.5 
1958 562 228 249.8 
1959 632 218 265.0 
1960 555 156 278.7 
1961 757 335 324.9 
1962 1374 798 403.9 
1963 1190 784 410.0 
1964 1100 637 470.1 
1965 1044 690 476.3 
1966 559 203 375.3 
1967 1049 590 329.1 
1968 600 512 394.0 
1969 1003 627 382.4 
1970 625 235 382.6 
1971 662 123 407.9 
1972 1808 710 418.9 
1973 593 102 404.3 
1974 1630 656 386.5 
1975 1550 597 414.3 
1976 1790 1059 408.9 
1977 1217 337 394.8 
1978 1651 729 377.2 
1979 1320.0 394.7 343.9 
1980 2225.8 1587.7 325.1 
1981 2087.0 1405.7 355.9 
1982 1556.2 661.0 422.2 
1983 1612.0 1043.3 526.5 
1984 1067.6 303.5 450.6 
1985 1714.0 740.2 486.9 
1986 1969.0 1115.7 418.7 
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Wheat Barley Cotton 
1987 1656.4 576.3 351.0 
1988 2067.1 2835.8 472.5 
1989 1020.2 271.1 430.7 
1990 2069.8 846.2 441.2 
1991 2139.9 917.4 555.1 
1992 3045.6 1091.4 688.6 
CROP AREA 
(thousand hectares) 
Wheat Barley Cotton 
1325M 
(1909/10) 503.3 251.7 13.2 
1922 380.0 
1923 
1924 22.0 
1925 512.7 255.5 39.4 
1926 463.9 252.7 31.9 
1927 495.5 265.2 24.8 
1928 414.4 360.0 16.7 
1929 364.0 313.0 24.0 
1930 520.0 349.0 31.0 
1931 485.4 323.1 30.9 
1932 481.3 321.0 8.1 
1933 478.5 300.0 8.2 
1934 555.2 295.4 13.2 
1935 523.2 289.3 32.8 
1936 532.6 294.3 40.4 
1937 555.8 321.6 34.5 
1938 538.0 337.2 37.3 
1939 545.0 300.0 38.0 
1940 616.4 371.0 38.6 
1941 620.0 361.8 25.2 
1942 648.5 336.4 15.5 
1943 503.6 242.6 15.2 
1944 570.7 272.7 16.7 
1945 751.1 384.1 17.5 
1946 810.5 370.8 19.8 
1947 843.4 365.0 19.3 
1948 788.1 341.6 24.0 
1949 987.9 347.9 25.3 
1950 992.2 416.4 78.0 
1951 1036.7 343.6 217.4 
1952 1167.2 396.7 189.3 
1953 1314.4 428.0 127.6 
1954 1347 543 187.3 
1955 1463 614 248.8 
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Wheat Barley cotton 
1956 1537 636 272.2 
1957 1495 813 258.3 
1958 1461 769 260.8 
1959 1422 727 227.2 
1960 1550 742 212.3 
1961 1315 727 249.1 
1962 1417 723 302.4 
1963 1559 804 291.7 
1964 1476 765 286.5 
1965 1214 683 287.8 
1966 1312 716 255.1 
1967 1201 646 239.4 
1968 934 656 288.4 
1969 1221 626 299.1 
1970 1341 1126 249.3 
1971 1274 435 250.4 
1972 1354 593 238.2 
1973 1476 914 200.4 
1974 1537 697 205.5 
1975 1692 1011 208.1 
1976 1590 1172 181.8 
1977 1528 1021 186.5 
1978 1555 1033 169.1 
1979 1445.1 1102.2 154.8 
1980 1449.1 1210.2 140.9 
1981 1255.0 1347.0 143.4 
1982 1222.3 1588.6 158.8 
1983 1290.4 1520.3 175.7 
1984 1107.0 1289.1 178.5 
1985 1265.0 1385.9 170.2 
1986 1098.3 1548.1 144.3 
1987 1183.0 1569.9 128.7 
1988 1100.8 1844.1 171.0 
1989 1239.9 2891.7 158.1 
1990 1340.6 2729.4 156.4 
1991 1268.6 2233.1 170.4 
1992 1380.8 2266.5 211.8 
SOURCES: Ottoman Period 
1325 M/1909-10 (M=Mali or financial year)--Figures are 
converted from dunums (I dunum=919.302 m2) kiyyes (1 kiyye=1.28 kg 
and ki/es (1 ki/e=36.37 litres): Justin McCarthy, compiler, The Arab 
World, Turkey, and the Balkans (1878-1914): A Handbook of Historical 
Statistics (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1982) Tables XIV. 4; XIV. 6; XIV. 8, on 
266,268,270. Note that `Syria' comprises the vilayets of Aleppo, 
Damascus, and Beirut, and the independent sanjaq of Zor, and thus is 
larger than either mandated or independent Syria because territory is 
381 
included which became part of Turkey, Jordan, and Palestine after the Great War. 
Mandate Period 
1920-1930--Based on Norman Burns, The Tariff of Syria, 1919- 
32 (Beirut: American Press, 1933; New York: AMS Press, 1973), Table 
I, 143 and notes on 288-90. Burns was a careful scholar, and his figures 
are juduciously balanced. Other sources are Republique Frangaise, 
Ministare des Affaires Etrangeres, Rapport ä la Societe des Nations, 
various years; Bull. BSL, various years, and La Syrie et le Liban sous 
/'Occupation et le Mandat Francais, 1919-1927 (Nancy--Paris-- 
Strasbourg: Berg er-LevrauIt, Editeurs, n. d. ), 238. Note that until 1938, 
figures for Lebanon and the sanjaq of Alexandretta are included in all 
totals. 
1931-38--Based on the Rapport ... and the Bull. BSL, various 
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